5.22.'05.

From the Library of
Professor Samuel Miller
in Memory of
Judge Samuel Miller Breckinridge
Presented by
Samuel Miller Breckinridge Long
to the Library of
Princeton Theological Seminary

SCC B2798
#11,567 .W73



IMMANUEL KANT,

The Founder of

The Critical Philosophy

Reg. Prof. of Logic & Metaphysics at Koenigsberg

BORN 22d of April 1724.

ELEMENTS

OF THE

CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY:

CONTAINING

A CONCISE ACCOUNT OF ITS ORIGIN AND TENDENCY;

A VIEW OF ALL THE WORKS PUBLISHED BY ITS FOUNDER,

PROFESSOR IMMANUEL KANT;

AND A GLOSSARY FOR THE EXPLANATION OF TERMS AND PHRASES.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED:

THREE PHILOLOGICAL ESSAYS;

Chiefly tranſlated from the German of

JOHN CHRISTOPHER ADELUNG;

Aulic Counſellor and Firſt Librarian to the Elector of Saxony.

BY

A. F. M. WILLICH, M. D.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR T. N. LONGMAN,
No. 39. PATERNOSTER-ROW.

1798.

Entered in Stationers Hall.

To

The Right Honourable

SIR WILLIAM MILLER of GLENLEE, Bart.

One of the Senators of the

College of Juſtice

in Scotland;

To

To

The REV. JAMES FINLAYSON, F. R. S. E.

Prof. of Logic and Metaphyſics

in the Univerſity of Edinburgh;

And

The REV. JAMES MILNE,

Profeſſor of Moral Philoſophy

in the Univerſity of Glaſgow:

Theſe Elements

are

very reſpectfully inſcribed

by

Their moſt obliged and humble Servant

The AUTHOR and TRANSLATOR.

PREFACE.

THE taſk of writing prefaces is none of the moſt grateful; eſpecially when a variety of circumſtances concur, to impoſe it as a duty upon one, who is in a manner, partly the author, and partly the tranſlator of a new work, on a new ſubject.

It has now become the frequent practice of certain tranſlators, to iſſue their mangled productions into the world as their own manufacture; though, upon compariſon, they do not even deſerve the character of being accurate tranſlations from the German; a language, with which our modern tranſlators, in general, are but very imperfectly acquainted.

To obviate a charge of this nature, and to acknowledge my obligations to thoſe meritorious friends of literature in Germany, from whoſe labours I have derived very conſiderable aſſiſtance in the compoſition of this work, I muſt mention, in the firſt place, the REV. DR. STAEUDLIN, PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY AT GOETTINGEN. His claſſical performance, "*On the Spirit and Hiſtory of Scepticiſm*, in two Volumes, octavo, 1794," has afforded me the materials of the 'HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.'—In reliance upon a character of ſo much worth

worth and eminence, as that of Dr. Staeudlin, I have not hesitated, pp. 23 and 24, to record, with due praise and respect, a work written by Mr. ADAM WEISHAUPT. Without entering upon an inquiry into Mr. Weishaupt's *moral* character, I can safely aver, that his *literary* works have been received, upon the Continent, with almost universal approbation. In this assertion, I am supported by the Conductors of the first German Reviews in general, and particularly by the respectable evidence of Prof. Staeudlin himself, as well as by that of the celebrated PROF. EBERHARD of HALLE, both of whom have ranked Mr. Weishaupt's writings among the first philosophical compositions of Germany. And as he has lately published the third volume of his work "On Truth and Moral Perfection; Regensburg, 1796;" as likewise another work entitled, "On the secret Art of Governing; Frankfort on the Main, 1795;" I must leave Mr Weishaupt to defend his private character in Britain, as well as he has done it to the satisfaction of his learned friends in Germany.

For the conciseness of the 'SYNOPSIS,' which contains the statement and general solution of *Five connected Problems*, I need make no apology; as the terms occurring in this part of the 'ELEMENTS' are, I hope, sufficiently explained in the GLOSSARY. Without this expedient, I might have extended the Synopsis alone to a length, far exceeding the whole of the present work.

In the 'CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS,' perhaps, I have been in some parts too prolix, while others might have been

been enlarged upon with advantage. But it is not an eaſy matter to keep within proper bounds, in the diſcuſſion of abſtract metaphyſical ſubjects. Nor dare I flatter myſelf, that I am ſufficiently acquainted with the idiom of the Engliſh language, to exhibit the moſt abſtruſe inquiries of the human mind, in a luminous point of view. In this reſpect, I can offer no better apology than that given by my great maſter, whoſe own words I have quoted in page 9. of the Introduction.—Although I had the good fortune to attend Prof. Kant's Lectures between the years 1778 and 1781, during my reſidence at the Univerſity of Koenigſberg; and again heard ſeveral of his Lectures in ſummer 1792, when I reviſited my native country; yet I muſt confeſs, that my other profeſſional labours have not permitted me to devote, to the ſtudy of the Critical Syſtem of Philoſophy, that portion of time and cloſe application, which, in more favourable circumſtances, I ſhould have been happy to beſtow upon this important branch of human knowledge.

Relying, however, on the candour and impartiality of the learned in this country, I truſt they will not decide upon a work of ſo comprehenſive a nature as the preſent, from partial views; nor do I entertain the leaſt apprehenſion, that they will be deterred from a *thorough* examination of it, by any *paradoxical* poſitions, or even *apparent* contradictions, that may occur in the *firſt* peruſal.—A nation, which has produced a BACON, a NEWTON, a LOCKE, a HUME, and ſo many other *profound* inquirers, cannot be ſuppoſed to have a taſte merely for the lighter,

(or

(or what are vulgarly called) *popular* purſuits of literature. Valuable and uſeful as theſe are to the community at large, no man of any penetration will deny, that metaphyſical ſpeculations, or inquiries into *firſt truths*, are equally beneficial and honourable; though they muſt ever remain the property of the few, whoſe genius leaves the beaten track, and ſearches for higher principles than ſuch, as are barely deduced from the world of ſenſe, or experience.

To thoſe, therefore, who are both able and diſpoſed to become acquainted with the ſpirit of the Critical Syſtem, I beg leave to addreſs myſelf in the words of the worthy PROFESSOR WILL of ALTDORF, who gives his pupils the following excellent advice:

1. "Not to prejudge and decry the works of KANT, as being too ſubtle and abſtruſe, as being couched in unintelligible terms, as breathing innovation, and productive of confuſion in philoſophy:

2, "Not to complain of the want of that plainneſs, which is neceſſary to render a book palatable to *popular* readers; ſince difficulty of apprehenſion appears to be peculiar to the inquiries, that form the object of the 'CRITIQUE:'

3, "Not to appeal, according to the prevailing faſhion of the age, to the deciſion of the multitude, whenever an abſtract propoſition occurs, which cannot, at firſt view, be clearly underſtood from the ſimple operations of *Common Senſe*;' for Metaphyſics do not acknowledge the *excluſive competency* of this tribunal:

4.

4, To abſtract from all other Metaphyſical Syſtems, in ſtudying the Critical, i. e. not to make any other Syſtem the ſtandard, by which the merits of the preſent are to be tried:

5, To ſtudy *firſt* the general aim of the work, by ſucceſſively examining every ſolution, which the *Critique* of Kant affords in regard to the five principal problems (contained in the 'Synopſis'): and laſtly,

6, As the inquiries forming the object of Kant's Critique are merely of a ſpeculative nature, to proceed likewiſe in the proſecution of them merely upon ſpeculative grounds, and to abſtain carefully from all partial views of any intereſt whatever. For the reſult of ſound ſpeculation can never be prejudicial to the true intereſts of human nature."

With reſpect to the GLOSSARY, I muſt refer the reader to the few obſervations premiſed at the head of it: and if I have not ſucceeded in rendering the ſubject itſelf more intelligible, by the definitions given of thoſe terms, in the uſe of which Kant differs from his cotemporaries, I can only plead the good intention, and the patient induſtry, with which I collected and arranged the materials.

The 'THREE PHILOLOGICAL ESSAYS', have been added to theſe 'ELEMENTS' by way of Appendix; in order to relieve the reader, in ſome degree, from the arduous taſk—and ſuch it undoubtedly is—of reflecting upon ſo great a variety of abſtract ſubjects. And as theſe Eſſays are, in a manner, unconnected with the Philoſophy

of

of Kant, they have been at the ſame time ſeparately printed, in a form ſomewhat different from the preſent; in order to accommodate thoſe, who might wiſh to poſſeſs them as a diſtinct work.

Finally, the ſtyle and compoſition of this work, I am ſenſible, require more than common apology. Unfortunately, however, it is a matter of no ſmall difficulty to make *good* apologies, eſpecially in a foreign language. Whatever the execution may be, for the anxiety of my wiſhes I can confidently appeal to the teſtimony of thoſe literary friends, who have occaſionally lent me their aid in correcting the grammatical part of both the Elements and the Eſſays. They well know my eager and ſincere deſire of improvement in Engliſh compoſition; and if any material errors ſhould occur in the courſe of ſuch a diverſity of ſubjects as the preſent, I beſeech the judicious reader and the candid critic to conſider, that I have ventured into a field of inquiry, of which but a ſmall part has hitherto been explored.

The indulgence, which I claim, will not be withheld by thoſe, who have tried their ſtrength in tranſlating from a foreign into their own language: and I apprehend ſtill leſs ſeverity from the few individuals, who have attempted to write, or to tranſlate into, a foreign language, which they had an opportunity of acquiring, merely by reading and converſation.

NOVEMBER, 1797.

CONTENTS

CONTENTS.

PAGE

Hiſtorical Introduction, containing a ſuccinct account of the origin and tendency of the Critical Philoſophy, 1

ELEMENTARY VIEW OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT:

Preparatory Remarks, - - - 34

I. SYNOPSIS.

A. *Definition and Diviſion of Philoſophy,* - 38

B. *Problems and Solutions:* Exordium, - 42

Problem Firſt, - - - 43

Problem Second, - - - 44

Problem Third, - - - - 45

Problem Fourth, - - - - 49

Problem Fifth, - - - - 51

II. CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS: Exordium, 53

I, Reflections upon the true computation of living powers; 1746, - - - 55

II.—XVI. A Liſt of fifteen different works, which the author has publiſhed between the years 1755 and 1764, - - - 60

XVII. (1) *De Mundi ſenſibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis*; 1770, - - - 62

XVIII. (2) Critique of Pure Reaſon; 1781, - 64

XIX. (3) Introductory obſervations with reſpect to every future Syſtem of Metaphyſics &c. 1784, 80

XX. (4) Reflections upon the foundation of the powers and methods &c. 1784, - 83

XXI. (5) Fundamental Principles of the Metaphyſics of Morals; 1785, - - *ibid.*

XXII. (6) Metaphyſical Principles of Natural Philoſophy; 1786, - - - 93

XXIII.

PAGE

XXIII. (7) Fundamental Principles of the Critique of Taſte; 1787, - - - 99

XXIV. (8) Critique of Practical Reaſon; 1788, *ibid.*

XXV. (9) Critique of the Judging Faculty; 1790, 103

XXVI. On a certain diſcovery, &c. 1790, - 113

XXVII. (10) Religion conſidered within the bounds of mere Reaſon; 1793, - - 114

XXVIII. Project for a Perpetual Peace; 1795, 121

XXIX. (11) Metaphyſical Elements of Juriſprudence; 1797, - - - 127

XXX. (12) Metaphyſical Elements of Ethics; 1797, 134

A Liſt of fourteen Eſſays, on various ſubjects, publiſhed by the author, between the years 1777 and 1794, 136

GLOSSARY: from 139, to 183

Corrigenda.

p. 16, l. 21 *for* directs, *read* deſerts.

p. 19, l. 24, *for* Propedeutic, *read* Propædeutic.

p. 32, l. 23, *for* cloſe, *read* thoſe.

p. 83, l. 25, *for* inherent to, *read* inherent in.

Note: The terms *intuition* and *intuitive* have, by inadvertency, ſometimes been uſed inſtead of the words, *cognition* and *cognitive*, particularly in No. XVIII. (2) of Kant's works, or between pp. 64. and 80.—The reader is therefore requeſted to attend to this circumſtance, eſpecially in places, where the promiſcuous uſe of theſe terms might occaſion ſome ambiguity.

ELEMENTS

OF THE

CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY, &c.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

In Germany, two circumſtances in particular have contributed to bring about a revolution in philoſophy, and to diminiſh the eſtimation in which the *dogmatical ſyſtem* of Wolf was formerly held: the ſtudy of the writings of the later Engliſh and French philoſophers; and the appearance of a philoſophic prince upon the throne of Pruſſia.

The former circumſtance made the German philoſophers acquainted with many objections that had been ſtarted againſt the dogmatical ſyſtem of Metaphyſics, gave riſe to a turn for popularity in philoſophical inquiries, and awakened a ſpirit of emulation among them. Selections were made from various ſyſtems; and the learned, now for the firſt time, began to convey information with elegance and taſte. There aroſe a ſort of *Eclecticiſm*, which diſcouraged party-ſpirit, and recommended philoſophical diſcretion; but which was, at the ſame time, attended with ſome injurious effects; for incoherent ſyſtems were thus formed, inconſiſtent ſyſtems were mingled together, and philoſophy became ſtill more wavering and flimſy, and was ſtill farther removed from the perfection of a ſcience.

The hiſtory of philoſophy was now inveſtigated with greater attention, and more generally ſtudied than it had formerly

been: With many, the ſtudy of philoſophy was converted into that of its hiſtory;—a clear proof, how much the turn for dogmatiſm had declined, and how little hope was entertained of forming a ſyſtem, at once ſtable and ſuited to the ſpirit of the age.

FREDERIC the Great collected a number of foreign philoſophers round him, who, in a great meaſure, merely to pay adulation, and from ſelfiſh views, openly profeſſed, like him, infidelity and ſcepticiſm. This circumſtance, from the novelty of the thing, and from the admiration in which the character of Frederic was held, had an almoſt magical influence on all the opinions of the age. It would, however, be equal to ingratitude towards the manes of this ſurpriſing monarch, to omit mentioning in this place, that the ſyſtem of his own practical philoſophy has been held out, both by divines and laymen, as complete and downright Atheiſm; whereas it is now clear and uniformly admitted by ſound and unprejudiced inquirers, that it amounted to nothing more than ſimple Deiſm.

Among the philoſophers who ſurrounded Frederic, no one declared himſelf ſo expreſsly, and ſo openly, in favour of ſcepticiſm as d'ARGENS, the author of the "Philoſophy of good "ſenſe," which is written in a ſuperficial manner, with a view of gaining popularity, but which is not even calculated for the Fair Sex and Gentlemen of faſhion, for whoſe uſe it was originally deſigned; though it abounds in erudition and abſtract ſpeculation. D'Argens there endeavours to ſhow the uncertainty of Hiſtory, (and this is the beſt part of the work) of Logic, of Phyſics, of Metaphyſics, and of Aſtronomy, without advancing, in oppoſition, any new, or genuine, philoſophical principles. It does him, nevertheleſs, ſome honour that, with regard to the morality of life, he obſerves a reſpectful ſilence. His ſcepticiſm is directed more againſt the uſual pre-

pretenſions of the ſchools, and the learned in particular, than againſt human knowledge in general.

It is more remarkable, though leſs known, that, in the ſame country, a celebrated and profound Divine declared himſelf in favour of an almoſt unlimited *Pyrrhoniſm*.—M.de BEAUSOBRE, in his "Pyrrhoniſme raiſonable," called it rational, becauſe he allowed certain probabilities, both in kind and in degree, and maintained certain firſt principles, which did not admit of doubt. The work is written in a lively ſceptical humour, and affords pleaſure in the peruſal. It contains, indeed, many new and unexpected remarks; for it is an aſſault upon all ſyſtems, eſpecially upon that of Wolf. "ARISTOTLE," the author ſomewhere ſays, "had numerous followers for many centuries. The "time of his fall is now come; and DESCARTES has given him "the laſt blow. The fame of the French philoſopher was of "ſhorter duration, becauſe people now poſſeſſed more un- "derſtanding and leſs pedantry. LEIBNITZ came; Wolf "was his ſucceſſor: At preſent philoſophers are in a ſort of "anarchy; they wait for a man who is bold enough to build "upon the ruins of former Syſtems, new opinions, and conſe- "quently new errors." No where does Beauſobre attack religion and revelation, but rather reſpectfully affirms their certainty. The following paſſage is worthy of attention: "Al- "though it be difficult to prove the exiſtence of GOD by the "light of reaſon, yet even this light is ſufficient to convince "us, that the proof of the contrary is impoſſible. How can "we ſatisfactorily prove the oppoſite, if we have no clear idea "of the ſubject which we wiſh to call in queſtion? Although "I could bear in my mind no ſufficient proof of the exiſtence "of God, yet the advantage which attends the belief of this "truth, the impoſſibility of comprehending the nature of an "infinite Being, and the reflection that this truth is both the "moſt rational and uſeful of all others, would be ſufficient to

" induce any thinking perſon to give his aſſent, nay even to " determine *me*."

But after this we are aſtoniſhed to find him conſidering all morality as uncertain. His chief reaſon is, " that the good- " neſs of actions depends upon their conſequences, which man " cannot foreſee, nor accurately aſcertain." This argument, maturely conſidered, is obviouſly ſhallow, becauſe it proceeds upon falſe ideas of morality: But the following objections are of greater importance: " That we are ſo little acquainted " with the motives from which we act, and in general with " our paſſions, that we know not how far our prejudices, " and our weakneſs, can juſtify our actions; and that the in- " terference and colliſions of our different duties are inexpli- " cable to moſt men, nay ſome of them inexplicable to all." The remark at the end of this work is not leſs ſtriking. " The " uncertainty of our knowledge ſhould not render us diſſatis- " fied; its advantage, or diſadvantage, will not thereby be " much affected. Certainty, with reſpect to us, is not even " the moſt uſeful quality of our knowledge. The difficulty " of acquiring accurate knowledge, is an admonition of nature, " which reminds man of his weakneſs, and of the caution he " ought to obſerve."

The inclination to Scepticiſm ſhowed itſelf alſo in other parts of Germany, in different writings. It appeared manifeſtly, for inſtance, in the " Phyſical Cauſes of Truth," by Lossius, and in the firſt edition of Platner's " Philoſophical " Aphoriſms." In the ſyſtems of Logic and elementary books alſo, much more regard was paid to it than formerly; in proof of which I ſhall only mention the excellent diſcuſſions in " Lambert's Organum," and in the elementary publications of Feder.

But no author had, on the one hand, paid more attention to the objections of the Sceptics, and the diſtinguiſhing character-

iſtic

iſtic of the poſſible ſyſtems; and on the other, inveſtigated more profoundly the faculties of the Human Underſtanding, and, indeed, of the whole Human Conſtitution, than TETENS, in his "Philoſophical Inquiries concerning Human Nature, and the "developement of it," which were publiſhed in two volumes, in the year 1777. It is not our buſineſs here to mark minutely the excellencies or defects of this work; we take notice of it on this account chiefly, becauſe that profound philoſopher was the firſt among the Germans, who examined ſome of the ideas of HUME, with an acuteneſs worthy of ſuch an opponent; and he has inveſtigated the doctrines of *objective* truth, and of the objective exiſtence of things, more deeply and more preciſely than had been done before. Againſt the explanation given by Hume, of the idea of Cauſation, he objected with juſtice, that it did not exhauſt the ſubject; for we underſtand by it not merely a connection, but alſo a dependence of one thing upon another. He remarked that we perceive in ourſelves ideas in a neceſſary ſucceſſion, and that this is properly our notion of a cauſe, or connection: he pointed out inſtances, in which the ſubjective connection of ideas ariſes from a neceſſary operation of the underſtanding, and, actually, has another foundation than the aſſociation of ideas formed by experience;—caſes where we explain a compound effect from compound cauſes; and where the idea of the complex effect has never been before aſſociated with that of the complex cauſe, but where the connection is the work of reflection: in fine, he has pointed out the operations of the mind, by which we deduce one truth from another. He maintained, therefore, that the idea of Cauſation is abſtracted from certain aſſociations of ideas, in which we remark ſomething more than mere ſucceſſion and combination.

Although this explanation is not altogether ſatisfactory, yet it, in a great meaſure, holds good againſt Hume's idea. Tetens admits

admits that ſenſations afford the materials for all ideas; but he contends that *their* form depends upon the mind, or the power of thinking. After having, in a very profound manner, illuſtrated the origin of our knowledge, from the objective exiſtence of things, he next examines the truth of objective knowledge. According to his acceptation of the terms, our knowledge is called objectively true, in ſo far as objects muſt be perceived by every other being, in the ſame manner in which we repreſent them to ourſelves;—a being who has ſuch a mind as we have: and in ſo far as the relations, which we remark in our external perceptions, correſpond with thoſe of every other being, whoſe underſtanding is ſo conſtituted, that it thinks of the objects in queſtion, as we do. The neceſſary rules of thought, according to which the mind proceeds, are, with him, not only *ſubjective* rules of our thinking faculty, but of every reflecting principle; and the general truths of reaſon are not only truths with reſpect to us, but to every reaſoning being. We cannot conceive an underſtanding which is capable of thinking againſt the principle of contradiction, or in other words, of diſputing the admiſſibility of that principle: hence this is juſtly conſidered as an objective principle.

Tetens here contradicts what Loſſius had laid down; and what Deſcartes had indeed, pretty diſtinctly before explained: That truth is only a relation with reſpect to the being who thinks of it, and that the contradiction is incapable of being an object of thought, only with reſpect to our underſtanding. Thus Tetens, with many others, proceeded in reaſoning upon ſubjective neceſſary principles. He appealed to the fact, that when we apply theories to real objects, we always ſuppoſe that the reality is ſo conſtituted, as the general ideas repreſent it. But here, argues he, the mind proceeds according to laws which we muſt conſider as the laws of every reaſoning being;

being;—consequently the truths which are here admitted, or supposed, are objective truths.

With respect to the objects of sense, the knowledge of them, indeed, is often only an objective appearance; but the necessary laws of thought lead to this conclusion, that other thinking beings, in similar circumstances, represent these objects to themselves in a similar manner; that these objects, with certain conformations, exist without us, and that certain properties of the impressions which we experience, are also the properties of the objects themselves.—A Sceptic, however, without going out of his way in quest of far-fetched arguments, might easily find a good deal to object against this deduction.

The work of Tetens had not the effect of promoting a solid philosophic spirit, and of bringing about a salutary revolution in the study of philosophy, which might otherwise have been expected. But this was not merely the consequence of the circumstances of the times;—but also of a style, not so much obscure, as languid, prolix and affected; as well as of a slavish dependence upon the Empiricism of Locke, which is insufficient for the explanation of the most important problems.

What this work did not accomplish, another did.—KANT, who by various compositions upon philosophical subjects, had long ago announced himself as an original genius, and an excellent philosopher, published in the year 1781, the "Critique of Pure Reason," which promised a total and beneficial reform in every philosophical department. For a long time, however, after its publication, it had been unaccountably neglected, or, at least, misunderstood. This was surely not in consequence of the difficulties, with which the study of it, as well as of every metaphysical subject, is necessarily attended; but of a certain indifference to philosophy, and of a rooted taste for shallow and popular discussions, which Kant directly opposed. But as soon as the work was more studied and investi-

gated

gated, and had found ſeveral ſucceſsful Commentators, at once a revolution in philoſophy commenced. It ſoon met with numerous admirers and friends, and even its opponents could not with-hold their admiration from this maſterly production. They ſaw themſelves, every where, driven from their ſtrong holds, and obliged to erect new fortifications for the defence of thoſe philoſophical tenets which they wiſhed to maintain. Nay, many of the enemies of this ſyſtem became its friends; and the invaluable part of it, which treats of morals, met with an almoſt univerſal approbation. All the different branches of Philoſophy were examined with greater ardour, and new ſources of knowledge, which formerly had ſcarcely been conceived, were now expoſed to view. The limits of the ſcience were more accurately defined, and the laudable reſearches after ſtable and ſimple principles, and after a rigid method, gave to philoſophical inquiries a certainty, and an intereſt, which for a long time they had not poſſeſſed. Long before this period doubts had ariſen, in reflecting minds, concerning the ſyſtems of Leibnitz, Wolf and Locke; but theſe had never been unfolded with ſufficient clearneſs, nor a better ſyſtem ſubſtituted in the place of that which was to be relinquiſhed. Here all ſyſtems were examined with critical acumen, and a ſolid foundation was laid for a new one. This New Philoſophy, in a ſhort time, was attended with an almoſt magical influence upon all the Sciences. It found friends and adherents, even among ranks of people who had not devoted themſelves to Science, or leaſt of all, to Metaphyſics. It excited in Germany, a ſound, philoſophic ſpirit of inquiry, of which the preſent age was ſcarcely deemed capable. It contains ſuch an immenſe ſtore of new ideas and views that, hitherto, only a ſmall part of theſe materials can be conſidered as digeſted, and even, in a diſtant age, new branches of knowledge may ſhoot forth from it.

The

The work itſelf is arranged with a ſyſtematic ſpirit, and written with a noble philoſophic impartiality. The ſtyle is ſomewhat obſcure *, the conſtruction and arrangement of the periods, in many places, ungraceful, heavy, and over-loaded; but a reader who has a tolerable underſtanding, and an intereſt for truth, is ſufficiently recompenſed by the originality of thought, and by the new and ſtriking images in which it abounds. The celebrated author diſcovers all the talents requiſite to a reformer of philoſophy, eſpecially in our age:—not merely an admirable acuteneſs, and a rare talent of making *himſelf* the object of *his* reflection, but alſo a knowledge in Mathematics and Natural Philoſophy, of which he had formerly given proofs: a nice ſenſibility of the Beautiful and Sublime; and in general, a cultivated manly taſte, a thorough acquaintance with the different Syſtems of philoſophy that prevailed before his time; and a refinement of feeling, which is truly honourable.

It is not my deſign *here*, to deſcribe minutely the ſyſtem of this philoſopher, which, beſides the work already mentioned, is explained in the "Prolegomena to every future Syſtem of Metaphyſics," publiſhed in 1783; in the "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphyſics (Theory) of Morals," in 1785; in the "Metaphyſical Principles of Natural Philoſophy," in 1786; in the "Critique on Practical Reaſon," in 1788; in the "Critique on Judgment," in 1790; and in the "Religion within the limits of Pure Reaſon," in 1793: And which Syſtem has found in REINHOLD, SCHULZ, SCHMID, and others, friends and commentators,—men who themſelves were quali-

 fied

* "I am not very conſcious," ſays KANT, in his preface to the 2d edition of the *Critique of Pure Reaſon*, p. 43. "that I poſſeſs the talent of exhibiting an abſtract philoſophical ſubject in a luminous point of view: I truſt that the occaſional defect of ſtyle will be further ſupplied by the writings of thoſe deſerving characters who, together with a ſolid judgment, are in the poſſeſſion of that talent. For, this being the caſe, there is no *danger* of being refuted, but rather of being *miſunderſtood*.

fied to advance ſcience. The following abſtract will be ſufficient for our preſent purpoſe.

Kant begins with doubting, whether Metaphyſics, in general, be capable of being ſtudied as a ſcience. He remarked that, hitherto, this branch of knowledge could not lay claim to the appellation of a ſcience; although it was older than all the others, and beſides, by the intereſt it excited, always obtruded itſelf upon our attention. Two circumſtances led him to diſcoveries, which were to bring about a revolution in Metaphyſics, and ſecure to them the rank of a ſcience;—the obſervation, by what means Mathematics and Natural Philoſophy had become ſciences; and Hume's inquiries concerning the idea of cauſation. We begin with the latter, and ſhall make Kant himſelf give the account of it.

"Since the Eſſays of Locke and Leibnitz, or rather ſince "the origin of Metaphyſics, as far as their hiſtory extends, no "circumſtance has occurred, which might have been more "deciſive of the fate of this ſcience, than the attack which "David Hume made upon it. He brought, indeed, no light "into this department of knowledge, but he ſtruck a ſpark "which, if it had fallen among combuſtible materials, and had "been carefully fanned, might have been eaſily kindled in-"to a blaze. Hume proceeded upon a ſingle but important "idea in Metaphyſics, the connection of cauſe and effect, and "the concomitant notions of power and action: he challenged "*reaſon* to anſwer him, what title ſhe had to imagine, that any "thing may be ſo conſtituted as that, if it be given, ſomething "elſe is alſo thereby inferred: for the idea of cauſe denotes "this. He proved beyond contradiction, that it is impoſſible for "reaſon to think of ſuch a connection *a priori*, and out of "its own ideas; for it contains neceſſity; but it is not poſ-"ſible to perceive how, becauſe ſomething is, ſomething elſe "muſt

" muſt alſo neceſſarily be ; nor how the idea of ſuch a con-
" nection can be introduced a priori."—

" Hence he concluded, that reaſon entirely deceives herſelf
" with this idea, and that ſhe erroneouſly conſiders it as her own
" child, when it is only the ſpurious offspring of imagination,
" which imagination, impregnated by experience, has brought
" certain ideas under the law of aſſociation, and ſubſtituted a
" ſubjective neceſſity, thence ariſing, that is habit, for an ob-
" jective one derived from perception. Hence, again, he con-
" cluded that reaſon had no title to think of ſuch connections,
" even in a general manner ; becauſe then all her general ideas
" would be merely fictions, and all her pretended notions,
" ſtamped a priori, would be nothing elſe than counterfeited
" ordinary leſſons of experience : which is juſt ſaying, there is
" no ſcience of Metaphyſics at all, and there can be none."

" However haſty and unwarrantable Hume's concluſion
" might appear, yet it was founded upon inveſtigation, and this
" inveſtigation well deſerved, that ſome of the philoſophers of
" his time ſhould have united to ſolve more happily, if poſ-
" ſible, the problem in the ſenſe in which he delivered it : a
" complete reform of the ſcience might have reſulted from
" this ſolution. But it appears to have been the unavoidable
" deſtiny of Metaphyſics, that *he* ſhould not be underſtood by
" his cotemporaries. For it is a mortifying reflection, that *his*
" opponents, REID, BEATTIE, OSWALD, and laſtly PRIESTLEY
" himſelf, totally miſunderſtood the *tendency* of his problem.
" Always admitting as granted, what he never had called in
" queſtion, they ſo miſunderſtood his aim at improvement, that
" every thing remained in the ſame ſtate, as if nothing had been
" done.—The queſtion was not, whether the idea of cauſe be in
" itſelf proper, and indiſpenſible to the illuſtration of all natural
" knowledge ; for this Hume had never doubted ; but whe-
" ther this idea is an object of thought through reaſoning a

" priori; and whether, in this manner, it poſſeſs internal evi-
" dence, independently of all experience; conſequently, whe-
" ther it be of ſuch extenſive utility, as is not limited to objects
" of ſenſe alone.—It was upon this point Hume expected an
" explanation.

" The opponents of this celebrated man, in order ſatisfac-
" torily to ſolve *his* problem, would have been under the ne-
" ceſſity of penetrating more profoundly into the abſtract na-
" ture of reaſon, in ſo far as it is employed in *pure* thought;
" an inquiry to which *they* were little, if at all, diſpoſed.—
" Hence they contrived a more convenient method of diſplay-
" ing their malignity, without ſubjecting themſelves to the
" trouble of making further reſearches; namely, the appeal
" to the *common ſenſe of mankind*.—It is indeed a great gift of
" Heaven, to poſſeſs a plain and unbiaſſed underſtanding;—
" but we muſt manifeſt it, and eſtabliſh ourſelves in this poſ-
" ſeſſion, by facts, by reflection, and by reaſon, by what we
" do and ſay; not by appealing to it as an oracle, when we
" can produce no rational arguments to juſtify the claim.—
" When obſervation and ſcience are put to the laſt ſhift, then,
" and not ſooner, is it time to appeal to common ſenſe.—
" This is one of the ſubtle contrivances of modern times, by
" which the ſhallow prattler aſſumes a right, boldly to chal-
" lenge a man of profound erudition, and frequently main-
" tains the conteſt. As long, however, as there is any room
" left for diſcovery, we ſhall do well to beware of having re-
" courſe to this laſt expedient. And, in truth, this appeal is
" nothing elſe than a ſubmiſſion to the judgment of the mul-
" titude, a reference at which the Philoſopher bluſhes, but in
" which the ſilly witling triumphs and exults.—I ſhould
" think, too, Hume might have laid claim to a ſound un-
" derſtanding, as well as Beattie; and beſides, to what the
" latter certainly did not poſſeſs, to a critical acquaintance with
" that

" that ſpecies of reaſoning, which keeps common ſenſe within
" due bounds, and prevents it from loſing itſelf in ſpecula-
" tions; or what is more to the preſent purpoſe, which hin-
" ders it from deciding upon any ſubject, becauſe it knows not
" how to juſtify its mode of proceeding upon its own prin-
" ciples; a reſtraint, without which an underſtanding will
" not long remain ſound.—The chiſſel and the mallet may do
" well enough for ſhaping a piece of timber, but the ra-
" dius-needle, a nicer inſtrument, muſt be employed for en-
" graving.—In the ſame manner, a ſound and plain under-
" ſtanding, as well as a ſpeculative one, are each of uſe in
" their turn; the former, when we are converſant about
" judgments that are immediately applicable to experience;
" the latter, when we are about forming general judgments
" from mere abſtract ideas, as in Metaphyſics, where the un-
" derſtanding, termed ſound or plain, but often erroneouſly ſo
" denominated, cannot afford any aſſiſtance.

" I freely own, the ſuggeſtions of David Hume were, what
" firſt, many years ago, rouſed me from my dogmatical ſlum-
" ber, and gave to my inquiries quite a different direction in
" the field of ſpeculative Philoſophy.—I was far from be-
" ing carried away by his concluſions, the fallacy of which
" chiefly aroſe from his not forming to himſelf an idea of the
" *whole of his problem*; but merely inveſtigating a part of it,
" the ſolution of which was impoſſible, without a comprehen-
" ſive view of the whole.—When we proceed upon a well
" founded, though not thoroughly digeſted thought, we may
" expect, by patient and continued reflection, to proſecute it
" farther, than the acute genius had done, to whom we are in-
" debted for the firſt ſpark of this light.—I firſt enquired,
" therefore, whether Hume's objection might not be a general
" one, and ſoon found, that the idea of cauſe and effect is far
" from being the only one, by which the underſtanding a

priori

" priori thinks of the connection of things ; but rather, that " the science of Metaphysics is altogether founded upon these " connections.—I endeavoured to ascertain *their* number, and " as I succeeded in this attempt, upon a *single principle*, I pro- " ceeded to the deduction of those general ideas which, I was " now convinced, are not, as Hume apprehended, derived " from experience, but arise out of the pure understanding. " This deduction, which seemed impossible to my acute pre- " decessor, and which nobody besides him had ever conceived, " although every one makes use of these ideas, without asking " himself, upon what their objective validity is founded ; this " deduction was, I say, the most difficult which could have been " undertaken for the behoof of Metaphysics. And what was " still more embarrassing, Metaphysics could not here offer me " the smallest assistance, because that deduction ought first to " establish the possibility of a system of Metaphysics. As I " had now succeeded in the explanation of Hume's problem, " not merely in a particular instance, but with a view of the " whole power of pure reason, I could advance with sure, " though tedious steps, to determine completely, and upon " general principles, the compass of pure reason, both what " is the sphere of its exertion, and what are its limits : which " was all that was required for erecting a system of Meta- " physics upon a proper and solid foundation."

Kant remarked, that Mathematics and Natural Philosophy had properly become sciences by the discovery, that reason a priori attributed certain principles to objects ; and he inquired, whether we could not also succeed better in Metaphysics by taking it for granted, that objects must be accommodated to the constitution of our mind, than by the common supposition, that all our knowledge must be regulated according to external objects. The following are the elements of his " Critique of pure reason,"—the first of Kant's systematical works,

works, and the moſt remarkable for profound reaſoning, and the ſtriking illuſtrations, with which it throughout abounds.

" We are in poſſeſſion of certain notions a priori, which " are abſolutely independent of all experience, although the " objects of experience correſpond with them ; and which are " diſtinguiſhed by neceſſity and ſtrict univerſality. To theſe " are oppoſed empirical notions, or ſuch as are only poſſible a " poſteriori, that is, through experience. Beſides theſe, we " have certain notions, with which no objects of expe- " rience ever correſpond, which riſe above the world of " ſenſe, and which we conſider as the moſt ſublime, ſuch as " *God*, *Liberty*, *Immortality*.—There are *analytical* and *ſyn-* " *thetical* judgments a priori; the former are merely illuſtra- " tive, and depend upon the principle of contradiction ; the " latter are *amplificatory*, i. e. they enlarge our knowledge, " and are eſtabliſhed upon another (aſſertory) principle. The " laſt are peculiar to the ſcience of Metaphyſics ; although it " alſo contains analytical judgments. Beſides, there are con- " tained in all theoretical ſciences of reaſoning, purely ſyn- " thetical judgments a priori as principles, namely, ſuch as " amplify, or enlarge our knowledge of objects, without im- " mediate perception.—Mathematical judgments are altoge- " ther ſynthetical. The Mathematician may by his poſition " always give ſomething material, or empirical ; but there is " always ſuppoſed in it a pure perception a priori, a form of " the ſenſitive faculty, viz. *Space* and *Time*. This form firſt " renders every actual appearance of objects poſſible. Thus " pure Mathematics are poſſible, and can be reduced to a ſci- " entific form—Natural Philoſophy alſo contains ſynthetical " judgments a priori, as its principles.—By the ſenſitive " faculty we are able to form perceptions : by the under- " ſtanding we form general ideas. By the ſenſitive faculty " we experience impreſſions, and objects are given to us : by the

" the underſtanding we bring repreſentations of theſe objects " before us; we think of them. Perceptions and general " ideas are the elements of all our knowledge. Without the " ſenſitive faculty, no object could be given (propoſed to) " us: without the underſtanding, none could be thought of " by us. Theſe two powers are really diſtinct from one ano- " ther; but neither of the two, without the other, can pro- " duce a *notion*, (*Erkenntniſs*). In order to obtain a diſtinct " notion of any one thing, we muſt preſent to our general ideas, " objects in perception, and reduce our perceptions to, or con- " nect them with, theſe general ideas.—As the ſenſitive fa- " culty has its determined forms; ſo has our underſtanding, " likewiſe, forms a priori. Theſe may be properly termed " *Categories*; they are pure ideas of the underſtanding, which " relate, a priori, to the objects of perception in general. The " objects of experience, therefore, are in no other way poſ- " ſible; they can in no other way be thought of by us; " and their multiplied diverſity can only be reduced to " *one* act of judgment, or to one act of conſciouſneſs, by " means of theſe Categories of ſenſe. Hence, the Catego- " ries have objective reality.—— They are either Catego- " ries of 1. *Quantity*; as unity, number, totality: or 2. of " *Quality*; as reality, negation, limitation: or 3. of *Rela- " tion*, as ſubſtance and accident, cauſe and effect; or the re- " ciprocal operation between agent and ſufferer: or 4. of " *Modality*; as poſſibility and impoſſibility, exiſtence and " non exiſtence, neceſſity and contingency.—The judgment is " the capacity of applying the general ideas of the under- " ſtanding to the information of experience.*) The objects of " experience are regulated according to theſe ideas; not, vice " verſa

* Hence we obſerve in thoſe who are deprived of, or deficient in, this important faculty, that they are unable to determine between good and bad, between danger and ſafety, and ſo forth.

" verſa, our ideas according to the objects. We can attain no " knowledge of an object, as a thing in itſelf, but only ſo far " as it is an object of our ſenſitive perception, or a phenome- " non ; though we muſt be capable of conceiving objects as " ſubſtances, and likewiſe of admitting their reality ; becauſe " our *internal* experience, the conſciouſneſs of our own ex- " iſtence, is only poſſible on the ſuppoſition of *external* expe- " rience, or by the perception of other things without us. " As ſoon as we pretend to conſider the objects of ſenſe, as " things in themſelves, reaſon falls into a contradiction with " itſelf, into oppoſite principles which it cannot unravel, ſo " that as much can be ſaid for one poſition, as for its oppoſite. " Our knowledge, then, is wholly confined to the objects of " experience, without which the pure abſtract ideas of the " underſtanding are of no value, and conſequently they are " no longer of uſe, when we abandon the regions of the *ſenſi-* " *ble* world. Liberty, God, and Immortality are ideas which " are exalted above all ſenſitive faculties ; they are not ob- " jects of ſenſitive knowledge, nor of objective certainty, but " of *neceſſary* thought and belief. *Speculative* reaſon, when it " conſiders any thing, as to what it *is in itſelf*, directs us here, " or leads us into conjecture and contradiction ; but *practical* " reaſon, when it conſiders that which *ſhall be*, by clear ex- " preſſions announces to us truths, than which nothing can " be more important. It declares us, as moral beings, to be " free agents, who are not ſubjected to the mechaniſm of na- " ture : it holds out to us an *ideal*, moral perfection, which " we *ought* to attain, but which we *can* attain only by an " endleſs progreſſion, and therefore enjoins us to cheriſh a be- " lief in immortality. By the idea of a moſt perfect ſtate, it " ſatisfies that inſtinctive deſire of happineſs, which is a con- " ſtituent part of our ſenſitive nature ; and while it holds out " to us the idea of a moſt *perfect harmony*, in which happineſs

" and virtue muſt one day be united; it teaches us to believe " in the exiſtence of that Being, who alone can eſtabliſh this " harmony."

This imperfect account will, at leaſt, ſerve the purpoſe of ſhewing, how this ſyſtem, on the one hand, ſets limits to the *Scepticiſm* of Hume; while it refutes and overturns *Materialiſm*, *Fataliſm*, *Atheiſm*, as well as *Fanaticiſm* and *Infidelity*. —Kant does not attack the dogmatical proceſs of reaſon employed in pure (abſtract) notions, but rather enjoins ſo far a more ſtrict dogmatiſm than formerly prevailed, while he raiſes Metaphyſics to the rank and ſolidity of a ſcience: he combats that arrogant dogmatiſm, which ſets out with its *hypothetical* notions, without previous enquiries, whether, and how far reaſon is intitled, by its peculiar judging powers, either to admit, or to reject, theſe notions. " This critical work of mine," he ſays, " is not written with a view of encouraging prat- " tling ſhallowneſs, under the arrogant name of popularity, " nor for the purpoſe of ſupporting ſcepticiſm which, as well " as the former, is rather an excreſcence, than an ornament of " the ſciences. The *Critique* is the previous preparation for " the advancement of a well-founded ſyſtem of Metaphyſics, " as a ſcience which, neceſſarily dogmatical, and in the ſtrict- " eſt ſenſe ſyſtematic, muſt be formed according to ſcientific " rules, not merely adapted to the vulgar."—Upon Scepticiſm, its value, its limits, its relation to the Critical Philoſophy, Kant, in another part of his inquiry, has made excellent remarks.—JACOB, another German Philoſopher, has ſince, in a more direct and comprehenſive manner than Kant himſelf, employed the Critical Philoſophy for the confutation of Scepticiſm in general, and that of Hume in particular.

Not long after Kant's Critique, there appeared a work, by an ingenious and liberal author, " upon the doctrine of Spinoza, in Letters to Moſes Mendelſſohn, 1785, which accidentally,

ly, in many inſtances, confirmed the doctrines of the Critique. The author defined *belief* to be immediate certainty, which required no ſupport by arguments, ſuperſeded all proofs, as it reſted upon a revelation, and contained the elements of human knowledge; he maintained, that reaſon only leads to doubts and errors in the moſt important objects of thought, that Spinoziſm is ſtill the moſt coherent ſyſtem of reaſoning, but it eſtabliſhes downright atheiſm; and that in general, according to the expreſſion of PASCHAL, "*Reaſon expoſes the Dogmatiſt to ſhame, and nature itſelf refutes the Sceptic.*"—As little however, as his doctrines of belief agree with the principles of Kant, ſo much were his opinions, of Scepticiſm and Spinoziſm, a ſtrong corroboration of Kant's aſſertions; that *ſpeculative* reaſon teaches us *nothing*, with demonſtrative certainty, upon the exiſtence of God, and the objects beyond the world of ſenſe. —Soon after this, in 1787, the worthy ſon of a truly philoſophical father, Joh. Albr. Heinr. REIMARUS of Hamburgh, publiſhed a work "upon the foundation of human knowledge, and natural religion," in which he examines the different doctrines of Jacob and Kant, and which here deſerves honourable mention, as it contains many valuable hints, together with happy illuſtrations of intereſting, though abſtruſe, ſubjects. In the mean time Kant's ſyſtem, or rather his elementary *Propedeutic* for a ſyſtem, acquired ſtill greater reputation, and gained every where friends notwithſtanding ſeveral accidents of ſo ſerious a nature, as to threaten its ſubverſion. The ſyſtem of Locke, that of Leibnitz, a ſpecies of Eclecticiſm, and finally the Philoſophy of Common Senſe, were alternately oppoſed to it. Some imagined they ſaw in it a concealed infidelity; others an over-credulous religious and moral *Myſticiſm*; a third party maintained, that it led to Scepticiſm; and a fourth, that it contained nothing new. All theſe obſtacles could not retard the rapid progreſs it was daily making, almoſt without exception, in the Proteſtant Univerſities of Germany: in ma-

ny of the Catholic Schools, too, it obtained decisive victories over the systems of Aristotle and Descartes.

But however much, from conviction, enlightened minds were inclined to befriend this philosophy, yet with a moderate acquaintance with the history of Ethics, it was easy to foresee, that even Kant's System, notwithstanding all the evidence and strength of its principles, could scarcely withstand the furious attacks of Pyrrhonism, or rather the pyrrhonic art, by which, without discrimination, every thing is called in question; Mathematics and Natural Philosophy itself not excepted. Without doubt, many of the opponents of the New Philosophy, long ago remarked this; but they hesitated to make the pyrrhonic experiment with Kantianism; because every other possible system, that could be substituted in the room of the Critical, might in like manner be rendered wavering and uncertain; and because such a pyrrhonism, in general, either leads to no end at all, or it is attended with consequences detrimental to morality and happiness.—Further, this attack would only have served to place the strength of the system attacked, in a more striking point of view.—But a more moderate scepticism might have been easily and advantageously employed against certain principles of the Critical Philosophy, if its opponents had been aware of denying, or calling in question, some facts of consciousness, to which Kant necessarily appeals. It was not, therefore, a matter of surprise that, after repeated attacks in our times, this species of scepticism also should be employed against the Critical Philosophy.

The author of "Aenesidemus," or, on the foundation of the "Elements of Philosophy, published by Prof. Reinhold, in "Jena; together with a defence of Scepticism, against the "pretensions of the Critical Philosophers, 1792," has endeavoured to prove, that the sceptical doctrines of Hume are

not

not in the leaſt confuted by the Critique of Pure Reaſon. The work, here mentioned, is written with uncommon perſpicuity, acuteneſs, and reſpect towards the Father of the Critical Philoſophy. The anonymous author directs his objections againſt the chief pillars of Kant's Syſtem, the derivation of neceſſary ſynthetical judgments from the mind, and the reference of theſe to the perception of *empirical* objects. He allows, that there are neceſſary ſynthetical judgments in human knowledge, that they form an indiſpenſible part in it, and that the neceſſity which takes place in the connection of the predicate with the ſubject, in theſe judgments, can be derived neither from pre-exiſtence, from frequent repetition, nor from the conformity of a certain number of facts. But he maintains, that, in the "Critique of Pure Reaſon," the mind is held out as the real ground of theſe neceſſary judgments, that from our being able to think only of the power of repreſentation (or conception) as the foundation of neceſſary ſynthetical judgments, a concluſion is drawn, that the mind *muſt actually be* the foundation of theſe. Now, argues he, what Hume called in queſtion, is here plainly taken for granted; namely, 1ſt, that for every thing we perceive, there is objectively pre-exiſting a real ground, and a really diſtinct cauſe of it, ſo that the poſition of the ſufficient ground, in general, depends not only upon the repreſentations and their ſubjective aſſociation, but alſo upon *things in themſelves*, and their objective connection: 2dly, that we are intitled, from the conſtitution of a ſomething in our conception, to form conjectures reſpecting the conſtitution of that ſomething without us.—Kant, continues this Sceptic, has not proved, that our mind alone can be the ground of ſynthetical judgments; for the conſciouſneſs of neceſſity, which accompanies theſe judgments, is not an infallible criterion of their origin a priori, and from the mind.—That we *cannot* now think of, or explain ſomething otherwiſe but in a certain manner;

ner; this circumſtance by no means proves, that we *could not* have thought of it in any other way. Another origin of theſe judgments is conceivable, than from the mind; namely, from the operation of real objects, and their various modes of affecting us. It might, therefore, be eaſily conceived, that repreſentations and general ideas, which exiſt in us a priori, are ſtill in another way referable to real objects, than merely by the circumſtance, that they exhibit to us the conditions and forms of the objects. Theſe repreſentations and ideas a priori, might alſo relate to the objective conſtitution of things without us, by means of a pre-eſtabliſhed harmony between theſe, and the operations of our underſtanding; and agreeably to this harmony, ſomething might be repreſented to the mind by means of perceptions and general ideas a priori, which ſhould not only have objective validity in our underſtanding, but alſo correſpond with the conſtitutions of things in themſelves, and be the means of repreſenting them.—The Critical Philoſophy, he adds, proves the origin of neceſſary ſynthetical judgments from the mind, by making ſuch uſe of the principle of cauſation, as is contrary to its own principles in the application of the Categories; whether we underſtand by mind a *Noumenon*, a thing in itſelf, or a tranſcendental idea.—To theſe doubts, ſeveral of which were formerly propoſed by FLATT and BRASTBERGER, the friends of the Critical Philoſophy have already anſwered. Whether the ſcepticiſm of this author agrees with that of Hume, whether it does not contain in ſome reſpects more, in others leſs than the laſt, I ſhall not venture to determine.

PLATTNER, that excellent *Anthropologiſt*, who, in a rare inſtance, to a profound knowledge of medicine, joins extenſive erudition in philoſophy, and peculiar penetration, and who deſerves to be ranked among the firſt philoſophers of Germany, has employed rational ſcepticiſm againſt the Kantian Syſtem, in

in an elementary treatiſe, deſigned chiefly for academical inſtructions, and has even declared himſelf in favour of this mode of thinking in general, with reſpect to all philoſophical ſubjects. "Would not a well underſtood ſcepticiſm," ſays he among other things, "be the moſt natural way to a-"void all metaphyſical controverſy, and at the ſame time the "moſt rational means for calming all dogmatical and critical "paſſions? What can be our aim under the titles of Logic, "Metaphyſics, Critic of Reaſon; what elſe can be our object "under the general title of Philoſophy than, after admitting "the unqueſtionable reality of our repreſentations, to ſketch "faithfully the hiſtory of them; and *then* to prove what "is true and certain with reſpect to them; and what in the "human mind (whether it be the lower, or more exalted part "of it) carries the conviction of truth and certainty along "with it?"—This philoſopher wiſhes the whole of his work to be conſidered merely as the *ſubjective* conviction of a Sceptic, and deſcribes the ſceptical mode of thinking more accurately than has been done by any of his predeceſſors. In oppoſition to the Critique of Kant, he has ſtarted a number of queſtions, ſome of which are completely in the ſpirit of the old Pyrrhoniſts. —Upon theſe doubtful points, likewiſe, anſwers have already been publiſhed by the friends of the Critical Syſtem. However concluſive ſuch refutations may appear to the party, on whoſe behalf they were attempted, it ſtill remains to be wiſhed, though there is now little hope left for this proſpect, that the aged Father of Rational and Critical Dogmatiſm may deign to defend himſelf againſt the attacks of Plattner, and thoſe of the New Aeneſidemus.

With pleaſure I proceed, by oppoſing to theſe ſceptical writings a work written with noble intentions. Although it deviate in ſome reſpects from the principles of Kant, yet it ſupports, with energy, the truth and certainty of human

knowledge,

knowledge, and at the ſame time places the intereſting nature of theſe queſtions in a clear point of view.—The treatiſe, here alluded to, is " On Truth and moral perfection; by ADAM WEISHAUPT, 1793."

All the writings of Sceptics, it is ſincerely to be hoped, will never totally deprive man of the belief in objective truth; and the Sceptic himſelf will never be capable of abandoning it completely. For it is of the utmoſt importance, that we ſhould admit ſomething objective, for the ſake of morality and religion, both of which muſt loſe their value, and their exiſtence, as ſoon as they are conſidered merely as ſomething ſubjective and relative. Philoſophers ought, therefore, rather to juſtify the belief in objective reality, than repreſent to us, that there is no other but ſubjective conviction, which they hold out as the higheſt ſtep of philoſophical and conſiſtent thought.—We cannot, indeed, proceed beyond the power of comprehenſion, and all conviction merely reſts on our ſtate of mind; but could it be otherwiſe?—It is ſufficient that, in our conſciouſneſs, clear traces are given us of objective truth; that it is in our power to diſtinguiſh objective and ſubjective truth from one another; and that from the whole mode of our thought and action, and from the ideas of duty exalted above all neceſſity, we muſt reaſonably admit *ſomething objectively true.*

Philoſophical Scepticiſm, which is not merely pretended, or affected, and which does not flow from an impure ſource, has as yet found, and ever will find, but a few *genuine* ſupporters: but when it is taught and extolled in writings, and in public places of inſtruction, it may, in a great number of individuals, gradually produce a ſhallow mode of ſceptical reaſoning, deſtroy the ſpirit of inquiry, and ultimately promote immorality. Perhaps, Philoſophy would ſoon fall into diſrepute, and the public ſpirit among mankind, as well as the general utility of the learned, would ſuffer extremely, were our attention confined

fined merely to the deſcription of the phenomena that occur in the mind, and to the limited conſideration of what is ſubjective alone, without placing any value upon what is objective.—It would be raſh and irrational, to obtrude our maxims, opinions, and convictions upon others ; though every one wiſhes to cultivate what *alone* is ſtable in us, our *reaſon* ; and to try by gentle and ſuitable means, to bring to the clear conſciouſneſs and conviction of others, what our fair and candid examination teaches us to be uniformly true and good. We wiſh not, individually, to conſider ourſelves as inſulated creatures that live, each of us, in our own world of ideas ; but to believe, that we all have a claim upon a certain number of truths, and that it depends upon our own exertions, to get poſſeſſion of theſe.

In our times, it might be more dangerous than many imagine, to repreſent the Scepticiſm of Hume as incontrovertible, or incapable of ſolution ; for the greater number of ſuperficial readers might thus be induced to ſurrender their weak minds to the moſt dangerous apathy, to ſhun every mental exertion, to ſearch for no further diſcoveries in the department of philoſophy, and—by gradually returning to the age of barbariſm—to leave every thing in this deplorable ſituation, in which they themſelves ultimately fall victims to infidelity, or fanaticiſm.

There prevails at preſent, in almoſt every civilized country, a very ſhallow and dangerous ſcepticiſm, extending its influence over the moſt important objects. It has aſſumed a ſyſtematic form, to which people readily ſubſcribe ; becauſe it is more diſcreet, and leſs intolerable, than the *profeſſed* mode of thinking, which characterizes almoſt every philoſophic ſect. This ſpecies of ſcepticiſm, in the greater number of individuals, aſſumes the appearance of an indolent and irreſolute diſpoſition of mind ; and in many, that of a wild, fanatical

ſickleneſs; a ſickleneſs, with which one party, by way of retaliation, uſually reproaches the other.

The cauſes of this ſingular propenſity, it is not difficult to trace: an inclination for ſenſual indulgence is every where manifeſt; the intereſt in *pure intellectual truth* is univerſally weakened; the old philoſophical and theological ſyſtems have been ſhaken in their foundations, while the new ones have as yet been able to procure but little public reputation.

Prof. STÆUDLIN diſtinguiſhes with accuracy the different ſpecies of ſcepticiſm, and he endeavours to aſcertain their true origin.—As a ſpecimen of his maſterly method of inquiry, I conclude this *Introduction*, with a faithful extract from his Treatiſe "On the Sources and Origin of Scepticiſm."

"There is," ſays he, "a certain kind of ſcepticiſm which deſerves to be ſtiled the *philoſophical*, and which ariſes nearly in the following manner. Men of vigorous minds, in whom a lively intereſt for every important truth is joined to an uncommon degree of penetration and activity, begin to think, and to inquire for themſelves: ſuch men diveſt themſelves of their juvenile opinions and prejudices, at a much earlier period of life, than others. Their propenſity to peculiar and original ideas exhibits every thing in a ſuſpicious light, which formerly, either from mere cuſtom or authority, had formed a part of their creed. The conſtant deſire of diſcovering truth; the ſtrong conſciouſneſs of their own powers to ſearch for it; the bold proſpect of opening, perhaps, new views in philoſophy, continually induce them to inquire into every ſource, from which truth may be derived:—thus they are impelled by a kind of philoſophic enthuſiaſm."

"That remarkable epoch of human life, in which ſometimes the painter, ſometimes the poet, as if by inſpiration, feels in himſelf the genius of his art; this epocha has been frequently obſerved by men whom nature had deſigned for celebrity.

lebrity. The philoſophic genius, not unfrequently, diſcovers a ſimilar period, in which the views he directs to his intellectual nature, the manner in which he reflects upon the whole created fabric, and the reſearches he makes into the writings of the ancient philoſophers, fill his mind with a pleaſing anxiety, with a lively energy, and lead him to augur his future deſtiny: but this exertion of evolving talents not rarely terminates in ſcepticiſm. His mind treſpaſſes upon regions unknown, and far remote from human conception; he is firſt induced, and that moſt frequently, to ſtart queſtions which, to men, are altogether unanſwerable. Unfortunately, too, he begins with the moſt difficult ſubjects of inquiry; for the more eaſy propoſitions appear to him beneath his dignity. The latter he treats with contempt; and graſping principally at the former, he is continually diſappointed by the tranſient hopes of diſcovering myſteries, which lie concealed behind an impenetrable gloom. The unſucceſsful efforts made upon that which is difficult, ſoon render him ſuſpicious of what is both eaſy, and within his horizon. He wanders from one ſyſtem to another in order to find the philoſopher's ſtone; (or, as it is very forcibly expreſſed in the original) *to ſolve the riddle of the world.* He alternately pays homage to the different ſyſtems, which engage his attention; ſo that at one time the adherents of LOCKE, at another thoſe of LEIBNITZ, at another thoſe of DESCARTES, and at length thoſe of ROUSSEAU are, with him, the repreſentatives of truth. Sometimes, he creates ſyſtems of his own; but they are as quickly deſtroyed, as they were erected."

"He is, finally, led to inveſtigate the foundation of all human knowledge and evidence, as well as to inquire into the poſſibility of an *objective* truth. Here, where he was in ſearch of a certain reſting point, a boiſterous ocean of uncertainties, at once, appears in view. In vain he attempts, af-

ter the moſt accurate ſcrutiny of his intellectual powers, to diſcover the general and neceſſary characters of truth. His ſenſations, every where, appear to inform him of things, not in uniſon with his reaſon; and upon the moſt important concerns, which inſpire his heart with hopes and deſires, his reaſon is ſilent; or it torments him with ſuch doubts and apprehenſions, as are ſufficient to blaſt his moſt ſanguine expectations. In vain he endeavours to reconcile that at leaſt, in which the opinions of all men coincide, with the general characters of truth. With indignation he obſerves the contradictory opinions of the greateſt philoſophers of all ages; with ſurpriſe he ſees, how frequently he had already imagined himſelf in the poſſeſſion of truth; and how frequently he had alſo been obliged to reject it, as illuſory. The moſt oppoſite judgments of men, even in common life; the operation of phyſical cauſes; the influence of the paſſions, of authority, and of the moſt incidental circumſtances, as affecting theſe judgments,—now excite the whole of his attention. The obſervation, that innumerable multitudes had from the beginning of time lived happy, and found the moſt complete conviction in ſpeculative fancies and errors; this obſervation makes him deſpair of diſcovering certainty in any ſubject whatever. With a compaſſionate ſmile he beholds the dogmatiſt, bold and deciſive, proud and ſelf-ſufficient, propoſing his opinions, in which he diſcovers little more, than proofs of ignorance, or of arrogance and diſſimulation. At laſt, he forms the reſolution of renouncing all diſcoveries tending to eſtabliſh abſolute truth; of deducing in every inſtance no other than doubtful reſults; and of obtruding his judgments as little upon any man, as he would be inclined to adopt them from others. But as he feels in himſelf an irreſiſtible propenſity, ſtill to adopt *ſome* things, and to lay down for himſelf ſome rules of conduct, not being able to act altogether without

out *fixed* principles; there is no wonder that he beſtows his approbation upon ſome ſentiments and judgments; yet he does this with the conſtant reſtriction, *that theſe are by no means abſolute, and that they are true only as to himſelf.*"

" The philoſophical ſcepticiſm, the origin and progreſs of which we have here deſcribed, is, however, extremely rare. We meet more frequently, particularly in the preſent age, with other ſpecies of it, which ariſe from very different ſources, and which may with more juſtice be termed *premeditated pyrrhoniſm*, or a decided propenſity of the mind to univerſal doubt."

" Scepticiſm, alſo, frequently derives its origin from indolence and ignorance. Some people acquire a ſuperficial knowledge of the hiſtory of philoſophical opinions; they are perhaps informed, that there has been a ſet of men who doubted every thing; they are fond of claiming the name of philoſophers, who are not blind followers of others, and who riſe above the common ſet of men. Inſtead of inſtituting profound inquiries into the nature of the human faculties for acquiring knowledge; inſtead of calmly and patiently comparing the opinions of philoſophers; they raiſe a hoſt of doubts upon every ſubject, that requires acute reflection: thus they ſtudy the art of contriving endleſs objections."

" It is, indeed, much eaſier and more convenient to frame objections againſt every concluſion, than to draw the reſult from laborious reſearches, and to defend this reſult againſt the objections of others.*—When a ſubject is only in part underſtood, doubts muſt ſpontaneouſly ariſe, which may confound the

* Bayle, in his letter to Minutelli; " *Oeuvres div. IV.* p. 537." very juſtly remarks: " En verité, il ne faut pas trouver etrange, que tant de gens " aient donné dans le Pyrrhoniſme: car c'eſt la choſe du monde la plus commode. " Vous pouvez impunement diſputer contre tous venans, et ſans craindre ces " argumens ad hominem, qui font quelque-fois tant de peine. Vous craignez " point la retorſion; puiſque ne ſoutenant rien vous abandonnez de bon coeur a " tous

the cleareſt propoſition. Among this claſs of ignorant and ſhallow ſceptics, we frequently meet with the ſtrangeſt compounds of ſcepticiſm, credulity and dogmatiſm. They are apt to believe the groſſeſt abſurdities, provided that the objects be very contiguous to their ſight, and require no acute inveſtigation: but they entertain doubts concerning the demonſtrative evidence of mathematics, and the reality of moral law."

"Ambition, a fondneſs for paradoxes and novelty, are, with many, the principal ſprings of ſcepticiſm. It is ſomething ſo very uncommon to doubt every thing; it diſcovers ſo much boldneſs, ſuperiority, acuteneſs and liberality, ſo much art, to combat every opinion that enters into the common creed. On the other hand, it appears ſo very modeſt, when in imitation of SOCRATES—the ſceptical genius pretends to know nothing; nay, he goes even farther, in confeſſing, that he is not quite certain of *this!* Such is his modeſty, produced by a ſtill greater impulſe of ſelf-denial."

> Nil ſciri quiſquis putat, id quoque neſcit
> An ſciri poſſit quo ſe nil ſcire fatetur.
>
> LUCRET. IV. 471.

"It is a peculiar ſatisfaction, to triumph over that pedantic dogmatiſm, which ariſes ſometimes from ignorance, ſometimes from an abundance of *knowing*, but not of *real knowledge*. It is a pleaſing reflection, to behold the ardent conteſt of opinions, and to look on this dangerous and tempeſtuous paſſage upon the ſea of human uncertainties, with a calm, perhaps affected, reſignation."

> Suave mari magno turbantibus æquora ventis
> E terra magnum alterius ſpectare laborem,
> Non quia vexari quemquam, eſt jucunda voluptas,
> Sed quibus ipſe malis careas, quia cernere ſuave eſt.

"We

"tous les ſophiſmes et a tous les raiſonnemens de la terre quelque opinion que ce "ſoit. En un mot vous conteſtez et vous *doubez* ſur toutes choſes tout votre "laoul, ſans craindre de peine du talion."

" We find, in the records of philoſophical hiſtory, many celebrated characters who were profeſſed ſceptics, and who, in that hiſtory ſtill ſhine as luminaries: though, by the moderns, conſigned to obſcurity. Is it not honourable, to rank among men of ſuch celebrity?—This ambitious ſcepticiſm, certainly, ariſes from immoral ſources: it is productive of frequent miſchief, both in the moral character of thoſe who profeſs it, and of thoſe who liſten to this deception. Its progreſs, in the preſent age, is very conſiderable.—As the modern ſyſtem of toleration is frequently the moſt intolerant, this modern ſcepticiſm alſo frequently appears in the higheſt degree fanatical and magiſterial. By means of this deluſive art, men *of a certain deſcription* endeavour to render *every thing* doubtful, which is believed by the generality of mankind; to deſtroy without mercy, all the antiquated forms and ſpecies of belief, and to impoſe upon us the inventions of their own brain, in the moſt inſinuating and deciſive tone. Unhappily, they find eaſy acceſs, through the vices and paſſions of man, ſo that great moral and political revolutions have been frequently produced, in conſequence of metaphyſical ſpeculations which, at firſt, ſeemed to have little, or no influence, upon the practice of life."

" Avoid thoſe—ſays the Vicar of Savoy to the young man, to whom he delivers his confeſſion of faith—" who, under " the pretext of expounding nature, fill the heart of men with " inert doctrines, and whoſe apparent ſcepticiſm is infinitely " more deciſive and dogmatical, than the poſitive tone of their " adverſaries. Under the ambitious pretence, that they alone " are enlightened, veracious and ſincere, they imperiouſly " ſubject us to their deſtructive deciſions, while they affect " to communicate to us the true principles of things, by " means of thoſe unintelligible ſyſtems which are the produc- " tions of their own fancy.' Hence, they ſubvert, deſtroy, and

" trample

" trample under foot, every thing that is venerable to man " in ſociety; they deprive the afflicted of the laſt comfort in " their calamities; the rich and powerful of the only bridle " of their paſſions; they ſnatch the ſtings of conſcience from " the receſſes of the heart; their propitious hopes from the " virtuous; and withal, they ſtill boaſt of having been the " benefactors of the human race. Never, they ſay, is truth " pernicious to man. I believe this, as well as they; but " this very circumſtance is, in my opinion, a ſtrong proof, " that *their* doctrines cannot claim the character of truth."

Luxury and degeneracy of manners are perfectly conſiſtent, as well with each other, as with a partial illumination and improvement of the mind. If we neglect to unfold the mental faculties; if the intereſt which ties us to the intellectual and inviſible (not, viſionary) world gradually vaniſhes; then this immoral and ſhallow ſcepticiſm eaſily ariſes, and infects even numerous claſſes of ſociety. It carries along with it the appearance of cultivation and enlargement of mind; but, at the ſame time, it opens an extenſive field to every ſelfiſh deſire.

Legion is the number of the deluded, who are in ſearch of illumination of mind, chiefly by diſputing and cavilling upon cloſe ſubjects of intellectual inquiry, which were formerly held to be moſt true and worthy of veneration. Thoſe fortunate travellers, whoſe object, in viſiting the reputed Capitals of Europe, was not amuſement alone; they muſt have the cleareſt proofs, how much that flimſy mode of reaſoning now prevails, and how certain it is, that it ariſes from the ſources here mentioned. The authors of the moſt enlightened nations of Europe agree that, many new philoſophical productions, as they are called, are nothing but the offspring of this crude and unphiloſophical ſcepticiſm.*

Many

* Vid. for inſtance "Letters of Literature, by Robert Heron; London, 1785." —a ſtrang medley of undigeſted thoughts.

Many remarkable events of the preſent age may be conſidered as the conſequences of a philoſophy—without having the leaſt claim to that dignified name—which undermines the pillars of every uſeful inſtitution, but rears no fabric; which leaves man in a ſtate of indolence and indifference with reſpect to his moſt important concerns; and which converts him into a ſenſual and ſelfiſh being, that is determined ſolely by time, accident, and circumſtances; and that is toſſed, to and fro, on this ſea of life, without a rudder or compaſs, without a ſure rule for his conduct or belief, without any fixed object, to which his future proſpects and hopes can be rationally directed.

Placed on this iſthmus of a middle ſtate,
A being darkly wiſe and rudely great:
With too much knowledge for the ſceptic ſide,
With too much weakneſs for the Stoics pride,
He hangs between; in doubt to act, or reſt;
In doubt to deem himſelf a God or beaſt;
In doubt, his mind or body to prefer;
Born but to die, and reas'ning but to err;
Alike in ignorance, his reaſon ſuch,
Whether he thinks too little, or too much:
Chaos of thought and paſſion, all confus'd,
Still by himſelf abus'd, or diſabus'd;
Created half to riſe, and half to fall;
Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all;
Sole judge of truth, in endleſs error hurl'd:
The glory, jeſt, and riddle of the world.

POPE.

ELEMENTARY VIEW

OF THE

PHILOSOPHY OF KANT.

Preparatory Remarks.

BEFORE we enter upon this arduous task, it may be of some importance to premise a few necessary observations on the method which has been adopted in the execution of it; and on the various obstacles which the student of every new System, particularly of Ethics, must unavoidably encounter.

It appeared to me, at a very early period of my studies, that the principal dissensions, and subsequent divisions in philosophy, have arisen *chiefly* from the following obvious sources. —Every systematic writer on subjects, which, from their nature, do not admit of demonstrative certainty, nor of any such proofs as are manifest from *objective reality*, is almost involuntarily led to employ new terms and phrases, in order to express the different opinions he broaches among his cotemporaries. It is of little consequence *to him*, whether the ideas, which gave rise to these opinions, be also new. For, though the latter may be already germinating in the seeds sown by his great predecessors, or may only have been differently explained, he is equally certain of finding *some* adherents, who pride themselves upon discovering a new sense, or perhaps a new application of the sense, in which his terms, the definitions of them, or the scientific divisions, are now more clearly, or more obscurely, understood. This has uniformly happened, I could

almost

almoſt ſay, ſince the beginning of philoſophical ſpeculations: hence the abſolute neceſſity of giving, in every inſtance, the cleareſt poſſible definitions of words, muſt be obvious to every novice in philoſophy. But this I conſider as a task, the *ſtrict* performance of which, from the very imperfect ſtate of language, has been (and probably will never ceaſe to be) one of the many *human deſiderata*. Hence, the immortal BACON, when the ſame, or at leaſt a ſimilar idea pervaded his comprehenſive mind, was induced to expreſs himſelf upon this ſubject, in the following excellent words: "*Præterea ut bene ſperent, Inſtaurationem noſtram ut quiddam infinitum et ultra mortale fingant, et animo concipiant; cum revera ſit infiniti erroris finis et terminus legitimus.*"

Were it, however, poſſible to define *all* philoſophical terms with that degree of preciſion which we, ſometimes, obſerve in the works of a BACON, a NEWTON, and a KANT; yet we could alſo ſuggeſt the remark—a remark which is by no means in favour of human perfection—that even theſe illuſtrious characters, in their own elementary works, not rarely deviate from the original, or primary, definitions of terms. Thoſe, who are converſant in ſpeculative inquiries, will readily, and within proper limits, underſtand this aſſertion; and ſuch readers as might extend the meaning of it further than I am inclined to admit, I only remind of the *logical* difficulties attending every long demonſtration. It would, therefore, be raſh in the extreme to charge theſe eminent characters with incongruity of thought, or reaſoning; as the *more minute* deviations, *in terms*, are chiefly owing to the unſettled ſtate of language in general; and as the very term, *perfection*, when ſpeaking of human beings provided with human organs, is only *relative*.

A long and dear-bought experience in teaching has firſt induced me to entertain thoughts upon this important theme,

which may not find many ſupporters. Yet I think myſelf juſtified in aſſerting, that the moſt, if not all, Syſtems of Grammar and Rhetoric, as well as the Dictionaries of languages, are compiled upon mechanical, wavering and untenable principles; * for they are, more or leſs, liable to the following ſerious objections:

1ſt. That the rules contained in Grammars, generally admit of a greater number of *exceptions*, than of *poſitive determinations*.

2d. That the inflections of nouns and verbs are not accommodated to the *etymology* of words, but are chiefly taken from *analogy*;—a circumſtance productive of endleſs miſtakes and confuſion in the grammars of *modern* languages.

3d. That ſo far from improving the phraſes and idioms of languages, grammarians ſeem to labour hard to render them, if poſſible, more perplexed and inconſiſtent; †—by daily adopting new idioms in one language, which are borrowed from another; by uſing words in a figurative ſenſe, which cannot be *thus* employed without impropriety; by transferring words from the *phyſical* to the moral *ſenſe*, and vice verſa, when there is no other neceſſity for this outrage upon *good ſenſe*,

---

* Whether the *Elementary Grammar* of the *German* Language, which I propoſe to publiſh, together with an *Identical Dictionary* of the *German*, *Engliſh*, *French* and *Latin* languages, will be liable to the charges which my predeceſſors have incurred, I am not confident enough to aver. The ſhort ſpecimen given of the latter at the end of this work) which accompanies the *third* "Eſſay, On the merits and demerits of JOHNSON's Engliſh Dictionary, on language in general, &c. by ADELUNG," will ſerve as a tolerable criterion of the execution of the whole.

† If it be objected, that this is no fault of Grammarians, ſince language is formed and modelled by a whole people, I ſhall briefly anſwer; that tradition and cuſtom *alone* do not appear to have any ſuch tendency, as to make a whole nation ſpeak and write jargon, or nonſenſe, for ever; and conſequently, that errors and miſtakes ought not to be perpetuated in *elementary* books of inſtruction.

ſenſe, than the fancy or caprice of the ſpeaker, and ſubſequently, that of the writer *.

4th. That inſtead of giving a ſyntax of ſpeech, or ſentences arranged in the moſt natural order, and ſtill conformable to the premiſes, as well as to the ſubſequent concluſions, they adhere to the oppoſite extreme; by neglecting the *general*, and giving the *ſpecial* conſtruction of the individual parts.—This, indeed, is of itſelf a uſeful piece of labour, if the rules were not too much crowded upon the tyro; but it by no means deſerves the name of a *ſyntax*, for its object is merely the *inflection* of nouns and verbs, as preparatory to a *General Syntax* †.

5th. That no Grammarian, or Lexicographer, excepting perhaps ADELUNG, has accurately and *uniformly* diſtinguiſhed, both the *moral* and *phyſical* ſenſe of words—however eaſy this may appear at firſt ſight—nor the *objective* and *ſubjective* application of terms and phraſes ‡.

As

* This charge cannot, in juſtice, be levelled at the captivating effuſions of Poetry; an art which, from its nature, and the frequent good effects it produces in rouſing, like muſic, the palſied organs of mortals, deſerves more deference, than any of the liberal arts; as it is likewiſe underſtood to poſſeſs a much greater latitude, than all the ſiſter-arts.

† Upon accurate inveſtigation, it muſt ſtrike even the novice in grammar, that there can be *only two parts* in the nature of ſpeech, which being the *regulators* of all the Data involved in the reſt, produce that change of place, or ſituation, which we expreſs by the term *Syntax*: theſe *two* unqueſtionably are the nominative of the *Noun*, with its correſponding *Verb*.—All other parts of ſpeech are, in my opinion, liable to the ſame modifications, or changes, which characterize a numerous progeny, whoſe father and mother alone are ſtable and fixed.

‡ The immortal author of the "Critique of Pure Reaſon" was, among the Germans, without exception the firſt, who perceived the *abſolute* neceſſity of this diſtinction in philoſophical inquiries.—In juſtice to the high rank held by the Engliſh and French philoſophers, however, I muſt frankly own, (what I have, in part, already declared in the Preface) that I have not been ſo happily ſituated as to examine, with critical accuracy, *their* reſpective *nomenclatures*. But if I may

rely

As KANT's *Critique of Pure Reaſon* is the principal elementary work, upon the pillars of which the whole of his Syſtem, together with all the works that illuſtrate it, muſt either ſtand, or fall, we ſhall firſt explain its *aim* and *moral tendency*, by giving KANT's peculiar definition and diviſion of philoſophy, accompanied with *five connected problems;* and in the next place, it will be uſeful to lay down the *particular contents* of *all* his works. The former we ſhall exhibit in the *Synopſis* : * the latter muſt be the feeble effort of a *literal*, not elegant, tranſlation; and we propoſe to compriſe them in the ſubſequent *Chronological Analyſis*.

I. SYNOPSIS.

A. DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY.

Philoſophy is the ſyſtem of all philoſophical, i. e. *diſcurſive* knowledge derived from bare ideas, or notions.—This is the ſcholaſtic definition; but, in a coſmological ſenſe, it is the ſcience concerning the relation of all our knowledge to the eſſential purpoſes of human reaſon, (teleologia rationis humanæ) and the philoſopher is not an architect of reaſon, but the

rely upon the information of that learned and ſagacious pupil, who condeſcended to tranſlate the *Synoptical Problems* here ſtated, with their ſolutions, as a ſpecimen of his progreſs in the German,——Dr REID, of Glaſgow, was the firſt among the Britiſh Philoſophers, who diſtinguiſhed clearly between the *objective* and *ſubjective* uſe of the words, which are employed to expreſs the immediate objects of *ſenſation* and *perception*.

* Originally digeſted by Mr JOHN SCHULZE, an eminent Divine and Court-Chaplain at Koenigſberg; a particular friend of KANT's who, on that occaſion, congratulated him upon having *fully* entered into the ſpirit of the CRITIQUE; and beſtowed upon him every mark of approbation.

the law-giver of it. We cannot, hence, learn philoſophy itſelf; it is philoſophizing which ought to be our ſtudy.

---

1. *Philoſophical Knowledge*
   a.) is *diſcurſive*, as derived from ideas, and oppoſed to mathematical *intuitive* knowledge, derived from the conſtruction of ideas.
   b.) is to be underſtood *objectively*:
      1.—as the prototype for judging upon all the attempts of philoſophizing.
      2.—as a bare idea of a poſſible ſcience, which is no where given *in concreto*: for where is it? who is in the poſſeſſion of it? and by what means may it be diſtinguiſhed from others?
   c.) conſiders particulars only in the general; while mathematical knowledge conſiders general ſubjects in the particular, nay, even in the individual.—Thoſe who pretend, that *quality* is the object of philoſophy, *quantity* the object of mathematics, have erroneouſly adopted the effect, inſtead of the cauſe.
2. The *ſcholaſtic definition of philoſophy* denotes a ſyſtem of knowledge, which we purſue only with a view of reducing it to ſcientific rules, without any other aim, than that of attaining to a logical perfection of knowledge.—Thus philoſophy is merely conſidered as one of thoſe arts, which may be applied to certain arbitrary purpoſes; and in this ſenſe the philoſopher is an architect of reaſon.
3. The *coſmological idea of philoſophy* implies that, which neceſſarily concerns every individual.—In this view the philoſopher is the legiſlator of human reaſon.
4. *Among the eſſential purpoſes of human reaſon*, one is the final

final purpoſe, and this is the *complete* deſtination of man. The philoſophy which has this purpoſe for its object, is called Ethics. Hence the ancients always underſtood by the name philoſopher, at the ſame time, and principally, the Moraliſt, the Stoic, or him who can govern himſelf.

5. To *Philoſophize*, means to exerciſe, by certain plain experiments, the talent which reaſon diſplays in judging conformably to its general principles.—According to Kant's Syſtem, philoſophy is divided into, and conſidered as

1ſt. *formal* (methodical) *philoſophy*, which concerns merely the form of the underſtanding and reaſoning faculties, as well as the general rules of thought, throughout independent of the objects: hence *Logic*, *Canon* for underſtanding and reaſoning.

2d. *material philoſophy*, ſuch as is employed in reflecting upon any one object, and again is

A. the *pure*, or the philoſophy of pure reaſon, which depends upon fundamental principles and notions *a priori*. This is,

a. *Propædeutic*, or *Critique*, which inquires into the faculty of reaſon with reſpect to all its pure knowledge a priori;

b. *Metaphyſics in a more extenſive ſenſe*, the ſyſtem of pure reaſon; or the collective philoſophical knowledge from pure reaſon, in ſyſtematic connection, whether real, or imaginary.—This again comprehends

a.) *Metaphyſics of Nature*; Metaphyſics in a more limited ſenſe, that of the ſpeculative uſe of pure reaſon, which confines its inquiries to what actually is, or exiſts. Its component parts are the following four:

aa. *Ontology*, the ſyſtem of all ideas and principles

ples, which relate to subjects in general, without proposing any objects of perception.

bb. *Rational Physiology*, which investigates nature, i. e. the complexus (compass) of subjects; whether they be exhibited to the senses, or to any other perceptive faculty. It comprepends 1st, *Rational* (not empirical) *Physics*, treating of material objects, and including every thing that may be known by means of the external senses;—2d, *Rational Psychology*, which considers the subject of the internal sense, mind; and, according to its fundamental notions, the reflecting capacity in general.

cc. *Rational Cosmology*, which employs itself with the internal combination of the objects of experience; but which proceeds beyond the possibility of experience; *general knowledge of the world*, by which nature is considered as an absolute Universum.

dd. *Rational Theology*, which investigates the connection subsisting between Nature and a Supreme Being.

b.) *Metaphysics of Morals*, or the practical use of pure reason, which attends to the laws, according to which every thing happens in this, and no other, manner;—*pure morals, Ethics*.

B. The *experimental, practical Philosophy*, which is altogether established upon experience, and again consists of three principal divisions, viz.

1. *Physics*, the experimental doctrine of the material world.

2. *Psychology*, the experimental doctrine of mind.

3. *Anthropology*, the practical doctrine of free-acting man, derived from experience.

Corrolaria.

1. Material Philoſophy is, therefore, divided like Mathematics, into *pure* and *applied* (practical).
2. There are, originally, only *two* principal diviſions of philoſophy, *Logic* and *Metaphyſics*; or, according to the plan of the ancient Greeks, *three*; namely, *Logic*, *Phyſics*, and *Ethics*.

B. Problems and Solutions.

Exordium.

The aim of Kant's *Critique* is no leſs, than to lead Reaſon to the true knowledge of itſelf; to examine the titles, upon which it founds the ſuppoſed poſſeſſion of its metaphyſical knowledge, and by means of this examination to mark the true limits, beyond which it cannot venture to ſpeculate, without wandering into the empty region of pure fancy;—an attempt, the bare idea of which ſufficiently diſcovers the philoſophic ſpirit of its author.

In order to acquire a correct notion of the term *Pure Reaſon*, we muſt conſider it in this point of view.—Every act of judgment, which is not mingled with any *heterogeneous* ingredients, is called *pure*. But particularly every piece of comparative knowledge, which is unmixed with any experience, or ſenſation, and which conſequently is poſſible altogether a priori, deſerves the name of *abſolutely pure*; v. g. *Liberty*, *God*, *Immortality*.—Reaſon, then, is that faculty, which affords to us the principles of comparative knowledge a priori.

Hence

Hence *pure reaſon* contains the principles of judging upon any thing *abſolutely* a priori. The whole compaſs of thoſe principles, conformably to which all pure judgments a priori can be acquired and carried into effect, might be called an *Organon* of pure reaſon.—The whole Critique of pure reaſon, therefore, is eſtabliſhed upon this principle, (not *poſtulate*, nor *petitio principii*, but the reſult of an appeal to *acts of conſcioufneſs*) *that there is a free reaſon independent of all experience and ſenſation* *.

Reaſon, as the organ of mind *in concreto*, muſt be conſidered, both ſubjectively, and objectively. *Subjective* reaſon is capable of perpetual increaſe, by approximation to the *objective* ſtate of it, viz. to the perfect model, (ſtandard).

Problem First.

To determine the nature of the Senſitive Faculty and its diſtinction from Underſtanding.

1. The *Senſitive Faculty* conſiſts in the capacity of our Soul to receive immediate repreſentations of objects, merely from being affected by them in this or that way.

2. The repreſentations, which the Senſitive faculty affords to us, are therefore referred to the object which affects us, i. e. they are *Perceptions*.

* Although M. Selle, one of Kant's opponents, has endeavoured to prove, in an Eſſay publiſhed in the *Berlin Monthly Magazine*, for December 1784, "*that there are no pure ideas of the reaſoning faculty, independent of experience;*" yet I think it neceſſary to remind the reader, that all ſuch *negative proofs*, as ariſe from the *ſubjective* conviction of an individual, ſay as little againſt the validity, or ſtability, of a philoſophical propoſition which altogether depends on the manner of exhibiting it to the mind, as the failure of converting the Turks and Jews to the Chriſtian Religion, can furniſh any argument to the diſadvantage of the latter.

3. All our Perceptions have a twofold form, *Space* and *Time*, as repreſentations which relate to objects, and which are themſelves Perceptions, pure Perceptions that, a priori, previous to all actual ſenſation, are diſcoverable originally in the repreſenting capacity of our Soul, and lie already at the foundation of all our actual ſenſations, as neceſſary conditions of their poſſibility.

4. Hence Space and Time are not ſomething attached to objects themſelves, but mere ſubjective repreſentations *in us*. The Being in Space and Time, conſequently extenſion, impenetrability, ſucceſſion, change, motion, &c. are therefore not qualities which belong to objects *in themſelves*, but repreſentations in our minds, which attach barely to the nature of our Senſitive Faculty. In other words, the motion of matter does not produce repreſentations in us, but is itſelf mere repreſentation.

5. Hence alſo we know things merely as they appear to us; that is, we know only the impreſſions which they make on *our* Senſitive Faculty; but what they may be in themſelves, and for *other* reaſonable Beings, is altogether unknown to us.

Problem Second.

To inveſtigate the whole ſtore of original notions diſcoverable in our Underſtanding, and which lie at the foundation of all our knowledge; and at the ſame time to authenticate their true deſcent, by ſhowing that they are not derived from experience, but are pure productions of the underſtanding.

1. The perceptions of objects contain, indeed, the matter of knowledge, but are in themſelves *blind* and *dead*, and not knowledge: and our ſoul is merely paſſive in regard to them.

2. If theſe perceptions are to furniſh knowledge, the *Underſtanding* muſt think of them, and this is poſſible only through notions (conceptions), which are the peculiar Form of our Under-

Underſtanding, in the ſame manner, as Space and time are the Form of our Senſitive Faculty.

3. Theſe notions are active repreſentations of our underſtanding-faculty; and as they regard *immediately* the perceptions of objects, they refer to the objects themſelves only mediately.

4. They lie in our Underſtanding, as pure notions a priori, at the foundation of all our knowledge: they are neceſſary forms, radical notions, Categories, (Predicaments) of which all our knowledge muſt be compounded: and the Table of them follows.

Quantity: Unity, Plurality, Totality.

Quality: Reality, Negation, Limitation.

Relation: Subſtance, Cauſe, Reciprocation.

Modality: Poſſibility, Exiſtence, Neceſſity.

5. Now to *think* and to *judge* is the ſame thing; conſequently every notion contains a particular form of jndgment concerning objects. There are *four* principal *genera* of *judgments*: they are derived from the above four poſſible functions of the Underſtanding, each of which contains under it *three ſpecies*, namely with reſpect to

Quantity, they are univerſal, particular, ſingular
Quality, ——— affirmative, negative, infinite
Relation, ——— cathegorical, hypothetical, disjunctive
Modality, ——— problematical, aſſertory, apodictical

} Judgments.

6. And thus not only the whole power of our underſtanding is fathomed out of its own nature, and therefore perfectly a priori; but alſo, at the ſame time, the pure deſcent of our notions from the Underſtanding; and their perfect independence on all experience, is proved.

Problem Third.

To ſhew in what manner we are entitled to aſcribe objective reality

reality to thoſe notions, which are merely ſomething ſubjective in us; or in other words, to ſhew how the underſtanding is juſtified in going, as it were, out of itſelf, and in transferring its notions to things which are external to it, that is, to refer them to objects.

1. Space and time are, as pure perceptions a priori, merely *ſubjective*; but as *forms* of our *Senſitive Faculty*, they have a neceſſary relation to objects of ſenſe,—are neceſſary Predicates of whatever can be an object of ſenſation; and therefore the following ſynthetical principles a priori are eſtabliſhed:

a. Every thing that can be an object of our exernal ſenſes, ſo as to be perceived or felt, is in *Space*; and all the predicates of ſpace, extenſion, diviſibility, &c. *neceſſarily* belong to it.

b. Every thing that can be an object of our ſenſes in general, whether external or internal, is in *Time*; and therefore, all the predicates of time, ſimultaneity, ſucceſſion, &c. alſo *of neceſſity* belong to it.

2. In like manner, all pure notions a priori are, indeed, ſomething merely *ſubjective* in our Underſtanding; but as *forms* of our *Thought* (of the Thinking Faculty), they muſt likewiſe relate to all objects of our Senſitive Faculty. Hence the following univerſal ſynthetical maxim, a priori, is eſtabliſhed.

Every thing which can be an object of poſſible experience, muſt not only be in Space and Time; but to it alſo muſt belong *one* of each claſs of the pure notions of the underſtanding.

3. Our notions, therefore, receive relation to objects, or *objective reality*, only through a third mediating repreſentation a priori, which has ſomething in common with the perception, as well as with the notion, and by means of which, therefore, the union of the Notion with the Object becomes poſſible.

poſſible. This, in reality, is *Time*, which KANT calls the Schema of Notions * ; for it has ſomething common with all per-

---

* The *Schemata* are *indetermined ſenſualized repreſentations which the imagination places under pure notions of the Underſtanding* ; and conformably to the Number of the Categories, they may be exhibited in the following Table :

1. QUANTITY, i. e. Series of time.
   Number.
2. QUALITY, i. e. things contained in time.
   Reality, i. e. exiſtence, ſenſation in time, time filled.
   Negation, i. e. non-exiſtence, abſence of feeling, vacuum in time.
   Limitation, i. e. tranſition from feeling through its various degrees, till it has vaniſhed, or vice verſa.
3. RELATION, i. e. arrangement in time, relation of feelings to each other in time.
   Subſtantiality, i. e. the real, in ſo far as it is permanent in, and with, time—the ſubſtratum of all changes : and accidents, i. e. the real in ſo far as it changes.
   Cauſality, i. e. ſucceſſion of different feelings in time, conformably to a rule.
   Community, i. e. ſimultaneity of feeling, according to rule.
4. MODALITY, i. e. the modes, in which an object belongs to time.
   Poſſibility, i. e. the repreſentation of a thing, conformably to the conditions of any one time in general.
   Actuality, i. e. the repreſentation of a thing, in a determinate time.
   Neceſſity, i. e. the repreſentation of a thing at all times.

(FINIS)

perceptions, becauſe it is itſelf a perception a priori, and it has ſomething common with all notions a priori; becauſe it is a Form of all Senſations and Repreſentations a priori. The uniting of a pure Notion with an object is, therefore, poſſible merely through time as its Schema.

4. Through means of this Schema, according to the Table given in the preceeding note, all ſynthetical axioms may now be exactly determined a priori, and they are the following:

Axiom of Quantity, (or of perception). "All phenomena in perception are exhibited under the notion of extenſion."

Axiom of Quality, (or of the anticipation of obſervation). "In all phenomena, ſenſation, and the reality which correſponds to it in the object, have *intenſive quantum*, or a degree; that is, every reality can, through infinite gradations, become leſs and leſs, till it be = o."

Axioms of Relation, (or Analogies of experience).

a. "In all phenomena there is ſomething permanent, i. e. Subſtance; and ſomething ſhifting, or accidents."

b. Every event has a cauſe.

c. All ſubſtances, ſo far as they are co-exiſtent, ſtand in reciprocation with each other.

Axioms of Modality, (or Poſtulates).

a. That which agrees with the form of experience (according to Perception and Notion) is poſſible really, not merely logically.

b. That which is connected with the matter of experience, i. e, with ſenſation, is actual.

c. That which is connected with what is actual, agreeably to the univerſal conditions of experience, is (exiſts) neceſſary.

PROBLEM

Problem Fourth.

To determine by these means the true bounds of human reason, consequently to explain positively, how far our reason can reach through mere speculation, where; on the contrary, our proper knowledge ceases, and nothing but faith and hope remain.

1. All the elementary notions, of which our Understanding is capable, are exactly those which the foregoing Table of them indicates, so that there are neither more nor less of them in number.

2. All these elementary notions are applicable merely to sensible objects, and hence they serve only for determining the necessary predicates of every possible perception. From this the following consequences result.

a. We cannot apply our notions to the most perfect Being; consequently we cannot prove that he has extension, or qualities; that he is a substance, a cause of other things; that he is possible or actual, or necessary.

b. Even as to the objects of our sensitive faculty, all our elementary notions can teach us none of the predicates that belong to them in themselves, that is, to their Essence; but all predicates which, through these notions, can be ascribed to them, concern merely their perception, and the union of the varieties in it, consequently the way merely, in which they *appear* to us. Things in respect of what they are in themselves, are no objects, either of our senses or of our understanding.

c. Hence the three *cosmological* questions are mere chimeras, viz.

Whether the world, in point of space, be finite or infinite?

Whether it has had a beginning, or has existed from eternity?

Whether the number of parts, of which matter conſiſts, be finite or infinite?

d. But as the underſtanding cannot aſſert, or prove, any thing of objects that come not under the cognizance of the ſenſes, as little can it deny, or refute them, by any argument that has even the appearance of validity. And hence ariſes the (ſublime) preſuppoſition and belief of a Supreme Being, and of an immortality of the Soul; becauſe there are certain neceſſary purpoſes of human nature, moral laws, which require this preſuppoſition.

e. Yet though we have ſufficient *ſubjective* grounds for preſuppoſing and determining certain ſuperſenſible objects; we have not, through ſuch grounds, the leaſt knowledge, how theſe objects may be conſtituted in themſelves; but we try to determine them, only by analogy.

3. All the Synthetical Axioms of our Underſtanding, by means of which we are able to judge of objects, are *exactly* thoſe which the foregoing Table of them indicates, and we know, therefore, a priori, the whole foundation of all the knowledge of which our Underſtanding is capable.

4. But all theſe axioms of our Underſtanding have objective validity, only ſo far as the poſſibility of experience depends on them; and they ſerve merely to determine the neceſſary connection of ſenſible things with each other. It may hence be juſtly ſaid, that our Underſtanding, inſtead of firſt learning its axioms from nature, rather through them, a priori, preſcribes laws to nature; and that on this account it is the *true legiſlature of nature*, ſo that, without theſe axioms of our Underſtanding, all regularity and order among the objects of ſenſe, conſequently the poſſibility of experience itſelf, would ceaſe. Hence, too, as ſoon as we wiſh to riſe with the axioms of our Underſtanding to ſuperſenſible objects beyond nature, we always make an unjuſtifiable uſe of them.

§.

5. And as our *Underſtanding* can neither form a notion of ſuperſenſible objects, nor judge of them; as little can our *Reaſon* diſcover by inference any ſuperſenſible object; conſequently, no Syllogiſm can lead us to new objects, which lie without the ſphere of poſſible experience.

6. All notions which our reaſon can form of ſomething, that is abſolutely *unconditionate*, are therefore mere *Ideas*, whoſe objective validity can be proved through no ſpecies of Syllogiſm.

7. Hence the Axiom, "If the conditionate thing be given, the abſolutely unconditionate thing is alſo given," is nothing but a ſubjective logical Maxim of Reaſon, i. e. a Maxim which regulates the train of reaſoning in the Mind itſelf.

8. As now the whole of ſpeculative Coſmology, Pſychology and Theology entirely reſts on this Axiom; theſe three Sciences, as far as concerns their ſpeculative parts, are nothing but Syſtems of fallacies *. Ontology, alſo, completely fails, and muſt be changed into a bare Analyſis of the notions of our Underſtanding.—The whole body of Metaphyſics, then, muſt be confined to the Metaphyſics of Nature.

Problem Fifth.

To ſolve the riddle, why our Reaſon is ſo irreſiſtibly inclined to venture with its ſpeculations beyond the bounds of poſſible

* From what is here ſaid, the reader may be led to ſuppoſe, that Kant altogether denies the poſſibility of proving the exiſtence of a Supreme Being, the immortality of the Soul, &c. This ſuppoſition, however, would be ill founded; for Kant diſtinctly and repeatedly admits the exiſtence of theſe ſuperſenſible objects; but maintains, that we arrive at the knowledge of them through a proceſs of practical, not ſpeculative, Reaſon. This proceſs he endeavours to vindicate and illuſtrate, by the moſt appropriate examples, in his *Critique of Practical Reaſon*, the contents of which the Reader will find in our Chronological Analysis.

knowledge; and hence to detect the fallacy, by which it is in this respect involuntarily deceived.

1. The ground of this irresistible bias lies in the nature of of our Reason itself. Reason cannot be satisfied with the original Notions and Axioms of the Understanding alone; but through categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive conclusions, it attains to the *Idea* of a simple substance, of an absolute Universum, of an absolute existent perfection in the number of real parts of matter, of an absolute perfection in the series of causes, of an absolute necessary Being, and of a Substance that possesses all realities.

2. Consequently the Idea of the absolutely unconditionate thing has indeed perfect *subjective* validity, and is in no manner an arbitrary fiction: Reason forces it on us necessarily. But hence it does not follow, that this Idea has also *objective* validity. Reason commits a very concealed, indeed, but undeniable sophism, when from mere Notions it forms the synthetical Axiom, "that, if the conditionate thing be given, so must be also the absolutely unconditionate."

3. As the Idea of absolutely unconditionate objects is indispensibly required by our Reason, it is very natural, that even the acutest philosopher should not only feel in himself an unavoidable bias to such fallacious conclusions; but also, that it must be very difficult for him to disencumber himself from them completely, though he be fortunate enough to discover the deception.

Scholion.

Thus, through the CRITIQUE of KANT, all these five problems, concerning the possibility and the limits of pure rational discoveries, have been thoroughly solved, but in a way which perhaps no philosopher had supposed. According to the result

of

of this *Critique*, the poſſibility of pure rational knowledge, ſuch as Metaphyſics *can* furniſh, *has been* eſtabliſhed. But that knowledge extends no further, than to the world of ſenſe, conſequently only to the univerſal and neceſſary laws of nature. A demonſtrably certain Syſtem of Metaphyſics is indeed poſſible, but a very different one from what we have had hitherto, which, as its name indicates, ſets out with propoſitions for judging dogmatically upon things diſcoverable beyond the region of Phyſics, i. e. without the limits of Nature.——If the principles above delineated be juſt, the *only poſſible* Metaphyſics, ſo far as we are entitled to proceed dogmatically, are the *Metaphyſics of Nature*.—Conſequently the Critique of Kant conſiders all the Metaphyſical Syſtems, which have been hitherto propoſed, as falſe ware, and maintains that we have as yet no juſt Metaphyſics. His own work is important and profound, and deſerves to be carefully examined by thoſe who are converſant in ſuch ſtudies. Whatever the reſult of this examination may be, philoſophy will undoubtedly gain by it: aud although the Critique of Kant ſhould not ſtand the teſt of future, perhaps more ſucceſsful reſearches, it will nevertheleſs form a remarkable epoch in the hiſtory of Metaphyſical Science.

II. Chronological Analysis.

Exordium.

In venturing upon this eſſential part of the Elements, which are deſigned to afford a conciſe, though comprehenſive view of the diverſified labours of Kant, I deem it a duty incumbent upon me to ſtate that, both his ſyſtematic works *, as well as thoſe

* That theſe may be more eaſily diſtinguiſhed from others, I have arranged them by a ſecond number encloſed in ( ).

thoſe which treat upon general ſubjects of philoſophy, are here *ſucceſſively* ſubmitted to the conſideration of the reader.

I muſt however remark that, conſiſtent with the plan and extent of theſe *Elements*, the review of ſo great a variety of ſubjects cannot abound in Criticiſm; but I hope it will be found the more complete in the *analytical* part of it, comprehending *every* ſubject * treated by the illuſtrious author, during a period now exceeding half a century.

Though my abilities—the limited compaſs of which is beſt known to myſelf—were adequate to do the works of KANT that juſtice in reviewing them critically, to which they are certainly entitled; I would ſtill heſitate to engage upon an undertaking, obviouſly not the moſt grateful, and in my relative ſituation, as a former pupil to the moſt renowned Profeſſor in Europe, perhaps unbecoming. Hence I ſhall content myſelf with the humble province of briefly commenting upon the aim of every individual publication, and then of exhibiting the contents of each through a preciſe tranſlation.

The difficulty of underſtanding the peculiar terms and expreſſions of KANT muſt, I have reaſon to hope, in great meaſure vaniſh; if the reader, in every inſtance, with patient and diligent application, reſorts to the *Gloſſary*.

In order to characterize the early genius of the author, who, in the twenty-ſecond year of his age, publiſhed an Eſſay upon one of the moſt abſtruſe ſubjects of inquiry, I ſhall conclude theſe preliminaries with the ſingular *Motto* prefixed to this juvenile production:

Nihil

---

* Thoſe Eſſays, which have not been ſeparately printed, and the moſt of which were publiſhed in the *Monthly Magazine of Berlin*, I could not procure from Germany; but I have ſtill introduced them in this review, merely for the ſake of completeneſs, upon the authority of *Prof.* WILL of *Altdorf*, and *Prof.* SCHMID of *Jena*.

Nihil magis præſtandum eſt, quam ne pecorum ritu ſequamur antecedentium gregem, pergentes, non *qua* eundum eſt, ſed qua *itur*.

SENECA *de vita beata* ; Cap. I.

I. *Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte.*—Reflections upon the true computation of living (moving) powers. Königſberg, 220 pp. large 8vo. with two plates, 1746.

After having paid handſome and due compliments to his meritorious countrymen LEIBNITZ, WOLF, HERRMANN, BERNOULLI, BULLFINGER, and many other eminent philoſophers, the young author examines the different theories and proofs advanced " on the living (inherent) powers of bodies," and endeavours to ſhew, that *their* notions on this intricate ſubject were far from being correct, and that the diſſentions prevailing among them aroſe chiefly from having, each of them, conſidered the ſubject in a different point of view. Thus their underſtandings were miſled by paying an undue regard, partly to the *obſtacles overcome by weight*; partly to *matter as acted upon, or moved, by weight* ; partly to the *preſſure ſuffered by elaſtic bodies* ; and finally to the *velocities ariſing from compound motion*.—He attacks LEIBNITZ moſt ſeverely, while he enters upon a fundamental inquiry into the origin of his theory concerning the moving powers. It appears obvious to KANT, that LEIBNITZ had been led to this theory, by implicitly proceeding on the known rule from which DESCARTES explains the nature of the lever. Prior to LEIBNITZ, the world had admitted the ſimple propoſition of DESCARTES, " that the mere velocity of bodies, even ſuch as are in actual motion, ſerves as a rule for aſcertaining their power." But LEIBNITZ ſuddenly rouſed the reaſoning powers of man, by propoſing a new law which, ſince that period, has offered rich materials for diſcuſſion to the moſt learned and acute. DESCARTES had computed the powers of bodies in motion by *mere* velocity. But LEIBNITZ adopted the *ſquare of velocities* in this computation.

Whatever

Whatever merit may be due, from this CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS, *to the Recorder of* KANT'S COLLECTIVE WORKS, *and from having engaged in a task—perhaps the most toilsome in life;—I have still to lament the impossibility, or rather the impracticability of giving the respective contents of each work at full length; especially when I consider, both the limited size of these* ELEMENTS, *and the almost boundless region of* KANT'S *speculations.*

Nothing, therefore, but the well-founded hope, that no reasonable man will expect to find in these CONTENTS *more, or less, than I have promised,—can support me in this laborious undertaking.—*

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER FIRST. *Of the power of bodies, in general.* § 1. Every mechanical body possesses an *essential* power. 2. This power of bodies LEIBNITZ expressed by the common name, *effective power*. 3. It ought to be called *vis motrix* (moving power). 4. On the method of explaining motion from the effective powers in general. 5. Of the difficulties arising from the theory of reciprocal operation of body and mind, if we attribute to the former no other power, than the *vis motrix*. 6. Of the obstacles thence arising in the explanation of the manner, in which the mind affects the body; of the method of removing them, if we adopt a common *vis activa*. 7. There may exist things, the presence of which cannot be at all demonstrated. 8. It is not improbable, in a strict metaphysical sense, that there may be more than *one* world. 9. If bodies, or substances, had no power to operate *externally*, there would be neither *extension* nor *space*. 10. The *triple* dimension of space is probably derived from the law, according to which the powers of substances affect each other. 11. Of the condition which renders the existence of a plurality of worlds probable. 12. Some Metaphysicians maintain, that bodies, by means of their (peculiar) powers, incline towards motion in all directions. 13, 14. Two objections against this opinion: a.) That the moving body does not advance in an equal ratio with the body moved; b.) That the effort towards motion, which substances manifest in all directions, must have a certain degree of intensity; for it cannot be infinite, and a finite (limited) exertion, without a certain degree of effort, involves a contradiction. 15. Motion must be considered to be of *two* different kinds. 16. Motion of the *first* kind is analogous to dead (inert) pressure. 17. 18. 19. Motion of the second kind presupposes a power, which corresponds with the square of velocity.

CHAPTER SECOND. *Inquiry into the principles, upon which the adherents of* LEIBNITZ *explain the living powers.* § 20, 21. BUELFINGER'S advice in settling differences between parties. 22. LEIBNITZ'S and DESCARTES'S method of computing powers. 23. *First* error of LEIBNITZ, in asserting "if a body is in actual motion, its

its power is equal to the ſquare of its velocity." 24. Actual motion is that, which is not merely at the point of beginning, but during which a certain time has elapſed. This intermediate time, between the beginning of motion and the moment in which the body moves, properly conſtitutes what is called *actual motion*. 25. *Second* error of Leibnitz, " that the time conſumed during motion is the true and only character of living power, and that from this alone the difference of computing dead and living powers muſt reſult." 26. Further proof againſt Leibnitz, from the law of continuity. 27. The time elapſed during motion, conſequently the reality of motion, is not the true criterion of computing the living power of bodies. 28, 29. Mathematics cannot prove the reality of living powers. 30. Leibnitz was firſt miſled in the computation of living powers, by Deſcartes's explanation of the lever. 31. HERRMANN's aſſertion, that the powers are in proportion to the heights, to which they may riſe. 32. Refutation of this aſſertion. 33. The followers of Deſcartes commit the ſame error. 34, 35. LICHTSCHEID's doubts upon this head removed. 36. 37. 38. An inſtance which proves, that in the computation of power ariſing from weight, time muſt be neceſſarily taken into account. 39. Summary of all the proofs derived from the motion of elaſtic bodies. 40. The Leibnitzians refute their own conjectures, through the Syſtems of Mechanics which they eſtabliſh. 41. Herrmann's ſtatement, reſpecting the repulſion of three elaſtic bodies, examined. 42, 43. The origin of the fallacy in the reaſoning, by which he eſtabliſhed his concluſion. 44. This concluſion was unknown to *Mad. de* CHASTELET. 45, 46, 47. JURIN's objection concerning the reciprocal pulſion of two elaſtic and unequal bodies;—BERNOUILLI's anſwer to this objection, in comparing it with the preſſure ſuffered by elaſtic bodies;—his ideas on the ſubject are refuted by his *own* premiſes, which confirm KANT's opinion. 48. Defence of the living powers, ſupported by the conſtant balance of power in the world. 49, 50. Two different ways of explaining this aſſertion. 51. The ſource of Leibnitz's hypotheſis relative to the preſervation of a uniform power, with propoſals for ſettling this controverſy, and a concluſive anſwer to *his* aſſertion. 52. According to the law eſtabliſhed by LEIBNITZ, the power exerciſed in the touch, between a ſmall and a larger elaſtic body, is the ſame before as after this contact. 53. The fallacy of this obſervation itſelf refutes the theory of the living powers, as maintained by the Leibnitzians. 54. This appears ſtill more obvious, by inverting the caſe; if, namely, a larger elaſtic body is brought into contact with a ſmaller one. 55. Calculation affords proofs of the Carteſian law, that " if a larger body touches a ſmaller one, there remains an equal proportion of power." 56. The power, with which a ſmaller body recoils from a larger one, is called *minus*. 57. Mad. de CHASTELET has very improperly ridiculed this determination, which *M. de* MAIRAN firſt propoſed. 58. The Leibnitzians ſhrink from the inquiry into the living powers, by means of the pulſion obſerved in *unelaſtic* bodies. 59. The latter is more deciſive in determining the living powers, than the reſiſtance of elaſtic bodies. 60, 61. The Leibnitzians give a frivolous anſwer to theſe objections, by ſaying, that " in the repulſion of unelaſtic bodies, one half of the power is conſumed in the impreſſion

made upon the parts of these bodies." 62. Reply *first*: because this is a mechanical, not a mathematical effect of bodies. 63. Reply *second*: because we have right to call a body unelastic, tho' it be perfectly hard. 64. Reply *third*: the impression made upon the parts, offers no argument for asserting, that a part of the power of unelastic bodies is lost by the resistance exerted on their side. 65. Reply *fourth*; the degree of hardness in unelastic bodies, and the degree of power exerted in the contact, must yet be determined by the Leibnitzians. 66. The resistance of unelastic bodies entirely destroys the living powers. 67—70. General proof, that the concussion of elastic bodies must, in every instance, evince the falsity of supposing living powers;—that in the percussion of elastic bodies we ought to consider only the *incipient* velocity of the body *percussed*. 71==77. Examination of the proofs of the living powers derived from compound motion: particularly BUELFINGER's, which is refuted in several ways. 78. The straight power in the diagonal line does not correspond with the amount of power exerted towards the lateral parts. 79. In the computation of power by LEIBNITZ, the amount of it, in an oblique direction, is equal to the diagonal power; but in that by DESCARTES, the former frequently is infinitely greater than the latter. 80==83. A new case towards the refutation of living powers; viz. "that a body moving in a circle produces the same effect, with respect to gravity, as if it reclined upon an oblique surface;—and that a circular moving body, in every finite measure of *time*, produces the effect of a finite *power*, even against the obstacles of *gravity*. 84. DESCARTES removes this difficulty by his method of computing power. 85. Another contradiction in this computation by the square; for every one agrees "that the computed power of velocity resulting from the multiplication with itself, according to the right angle, must have infinitely more force, than that which is simply expressed by the measure of velocity; and that it has the same relation to this, as the surface has to the line." 86. The case stated by BERNOUILLI, concerning the *elastic* power of *four similar* springs, is here refuted. 87==90. MAIRAN's objection against the statement of HERRMANN; the utility of the method adopted by the former; its tendency to prevent certain palpable mistakes, which have long remained concealed. 91. BUELFINGER's distinctions, by which he endeavours to elude the objection of MAIRAN, are settled by this method. 92, 93. A singular compound case by LEIBNITZ, which rests upon fallacious reasoning.

"As BERNOUILLI, HERRMANN and WOLF, the admirers of LEIBNITZ, have "not, in the usual manner, informed us—that *nothing* equals this proof in point of "invention and (apparent) strength—I am inclined to think, 'says Kant,' that "so great a man as LEIBNITZ could not err, without gaining reputation by the "very idea, that misled him into this error." I cannot, upon this occasion, forget "the words of HECTOR in VIRGIL:

—— —— —— Si Pergama dextra
Defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent.
Virg. Aeneid.

94, 95. The power, which the body A has acquired by the arrangement of a machine

machine, is *not* the effect of power produced by the body B. 96. The fame is confirmed from the law of *continuity*. 97. The whole extent of the *fufficient reafon* in the preceding pofition. 98. The only difficulty, that ftill prevails in the Leibnitzian argument, is anfwered. 99. PAPIN's evafive objection is weak and untenable, viz. "*Quomodo autem per tranflationem totius potentiæ corporis A in corpus B, juxta Carteſium, obtineri poſſit motus perpetuus evidentiſſime demonſtrat, atque ita Carteſianos ad abſurdum reductos arbitratur. Ego autem et motum perpetuum abſurdum eſſe fateor, et Cl. Vir. demonſtrationem ex ſuppoſita tranſlatione eſſe legitimam.*" And after having, in this *poſitive* manner, declared himſelf againſt that important poſition of DESCARTES, he ſeeks for ſhelter, in diſputing the premiſes of his adverſary; and in challenging *him*, to ſolve this *Gordian knot*. The following words diſcover his opinion: *Sed Hypotheſis ipſius poſſibilitatem tranſlationis nimirum totius potentiæ ex corpore A in corpus B pernego, etc. (Act. Erudit.* 1691. page 9.)—100=101. LEIBNITZ's reply to PAPIN is equally inconſiſtent, and KANT believes that the former has written theſe words in good earneſt: "*Cum Florentiæ eſſem, dedi amico aliam adhuc demonſtrationem, pro poſſibilitate tranſlationis virium dotalium, &c. corpore majore in minus quieſcens, prorſus affinem iis ipſis, quo Cl. Papinus ingenuoſiſſime pro me juvando excogitavit, pro quibus gratias debeo, imo et ago, ſinceritate ejus dignas.*"—Proof, that a quadruple body may communicate to a ſingle body four degrees of velocity by means of percuſſion upon a lever;—how PAPIN ought to have reaſoned againſt LEIBNITZ; all the arguments for proving the entity of living powers againſt the computation of Deſcartes have failed; no hopes are left to to reconcile them. 102. The principal arguments of the Leibnitzians refuted 103, 104. WOLF's argument, and his principal axiom: "if a body has paſſed through the ſame ſpace, it has alſo produced the ſame *innocuous effect.*" 105. Another axiom of the *Wolfian Schediaſma:* "As ſpaces (objects of ſpace), in the act of uniform motion, bear a compound relation to the velocities and times; ſo the *innocuous effects* correſpond with the maſſes, times, and velocities of bodies." Upon this axiom, WOLF eſtabliſhes the following erroneous theorem: *Actiones quibus idem effectus producitur, ſunt et celeritates.* 106. We are not yet in the poſſeſſion of a *Syſtem of Dynamicks.* 107, 108. The argument of MUSCHENBROEK examined. 109. A new caſe for the confirmation of the Carteſian method of computing powers. 110. The doubts of Leibnitz ſolved by Jurin. 111, 112. Mad. de Chaſtelet's frivolous objection againſt Jurin's argument expoſed. 113. RICHTER's objections ſhare the ſame fate.—The author concludes this Chapter with ſome ſupplementary notes and illuſtrations, in which he unfolds the following particulars: (a) Why the undetermined idea of finite time, alſo includes the portion of time infinitely ſmall? (b) Leibnitz's method of computing powers cannot even be admitted under the condition of finite (limited) velocity. (c) Why time muſt neceſſarily enter into the computation of the obſtacles occaſioned by gravity.

CHAPTER THIRD. *A view of a new method of computing the living powers; being the only true meaſure of natural powers.*—§ 114. That law, which has been found inapplicable in *Mathematics*, may nevertheleſs apply to Natural Philoſophy. 115. Diſtinction between *mathematical* and *natural* bodies, and between the laws relative

to both. 116. Velocity affords no juſt idea of power. 117. There would be no power, if there were no effort to preſerve the *ſtatus in ſe*; illuſtration of the idea of *intenſion*. 118. If intenſion be comparable with a *point*, power reſembles a line, namely that of velocity. 119. If intenſion be finite, i. e. like a line, *power* is comparable with a *ſquare*. 120. A body, that manifeſts an internal effort to preſerve its motion free and conſtant, has a power analagous to the ſquare of velocity. 121. A body cannot acquire its living power from without. 122. There is an infinite number of intermediate degrees between dead and living power;—the latter can ariſe only in a finite time, after the beginning of motion. 123. That ſtate, in which the power of bodies is not yet *living* (evolved), but is in a progreſſive criſis, KANT terms the *vivification*. 124, 125. According to a new eſtimation of powers, a body that preſerves its velocity, in free motion, *in infinitum* undiminiſhed, poſſeſſes living power, i. e. ſuch a power as can be eſtimated by the ſquare of velocity. 126. As there are free motions, there are likewiſe living powers.—Mathematics admit no free motions. 127. An eaſier method of applying theſe reflections to advantage. 128. BERNOUILLI was not unacquainted with theſe ideas, "*Vis viva*," ſays he, "*eſt aliquid reale et ſubſtantiale, quod per ſe ſubſiſtit, et quantum in ſe eſt, non dependit ab alio: ——— Vis mortua non eſt aliquid abſolutum et per ſe durans*, &c. 129. The living powers are of an accidental nature. 130, 131. Experience confirms the ſucceſſive *vivification*. 132, 133. Vivification is not applicable to all velocities in general;—application of this rule to motion, in a reſiſting medium. 134, 135. Whether vivification and free motion, in all the higher degrees of velocity, are poſſible *in infinitum*. 136—138. The living power may in part vaniſh, without having produced any effect. 139, 140. The phenomena of thoſe bodies which overcome gravity, neither manifeſt any living power, nor do they reſiſtate againſt it. 141. Soft bodies do not operate with their collective power. 142, 143. Query: whether the effect of bodies, without diſtinction, is proportional to the maſs of their living power. 144, 145. The maſs, in which a body can produce effects proportional to its living power, muſt be determined; ſmaller maſſes, under a certain ſize, cannot produce that effect. 146, 147. Fluid bodies operate in proportion to the ſquare of velocity. 148—151. The motions of elaſtic bodies are inconſiſtent with the computation of Leibnitz, but they agree with that of Kant. 152, 153. Mechanical proof of the living powers, by MUSCHENBROEK. 154, 155. A ſpring of equal elaſticity communicates a greater degree of power to a larger body than to a ſmaller one. 156—158. Whence the ſquares of velocities of cylinders are in an inverſe ratio to the maſſes. 159—161. In the effect of gravity, time ought to be computed;—ſoft ſubſtances are of a very different nature. 162. The force of reſiſtance of ſoft matter takes place with finite velocity.

II. *Allgemeine Naturgeſchichte, oder Theorie des Himmels, nach Newtoniſchen Grundsätzen.* A general hiſtory of nature, or theory of the heavens, upon Newtonian principles. 8vo. *Koenigſberg.* 1755.

III.

III. *Principiorum metaphyſicorum nova dilucidatio.* 4to. 1755.

IV. *Diſſertatio de principiis primis cognitionis humanæ.* 4to. *Regiomonti* 1755.

V. *Monadologia phyſica.* 4to. 1756.

VI. *Geſchichte der merkwürdigsten Vorfälle des Erdbebens, welches am Ende des* 1755 *sten Jahres einen groſſen Theil der Erde erſchüttert hat.*—Hiſtory of the moſt remarkable events produced by the earthquake, which convulſed a great part of the globe, towards the end of the year 1755. 4to. *Koenigsberg*, 1756.

VII. *Neuer Lehrbegriff der Bewegung und Ruhe, und der damit verknüpften Erfahrungen in der Naturwiſſenſchaft.*—New theory of motion and reſt, together with an account of the experiments relative to them in Natural Philoſophy. 4to. *Koenigsberg.* 1758.

VIII. *Betrachtungen über den Optimiſmus.*—Reflections upon Optimiſm. 4to. 1759.

IX. *Entwurf und Ankündigung eines Collegii der phyſiſchen Geographie, nebſt einer Unterſuchung: ob die Weſtwinde in unſern Gegenden darum feucht ſind, weil ſie über ein groſſes Meer ſtreichen?*—A ſketch and annunciation of a courſe of lectures on phyſical geography; together with an inquiry whether the weſterly winds are for this reaſon moiſt in our climate, becauſe they blow over a great ſea. 4to. *Koenigsberg.* 1759.

X. *Erweis der falſchen Spitzfindigkeit der vier ſyllogiſtiſchen Figuren.*—The falſe ſubtleties of the four ſyllogiſtical figures proved. 8vo. 1762.

XI. *Verſuch, den Begriff der negativen Gröſſen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen.*—An attempt towards introducing the idea of negative magnitudes into philoſophy. 1763.

XII. *Einzig möglicher Beweisgrund zu einer Demonſtration*

des

des Daſeyns Gottes. The only poſſible method of proving the exiſtence of the Deity. 8vo. *Koenigſberg.* 1763.

XIII. *Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen.* Obſervations upon the effect of the Beautiful and Sublime. 8vo. *Koenigsberg.* 1764. 2d Edit. 1770.

XIV. *Träume eines Geiſterſehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphyſik.* Dreams of a Fanatic, illuſtrated by dreams in Metaphyſics. 8vo. 1764.

XV. *Abhandlung über die Evidenz in Metaphyſiſchen Wiſſenſchaften; die bey der Königlichen Akademie der Wiſſenſchaften das Acceſſit erhalten hat, und mit Moſes Mendelſohn's Preiſſchrift zugleich erſchienen iſt.* A Treatiſe on Evidence in Metaphyſical Sciences, &c. 8vo. *Berlin.* 1764.

XVI. *Anmerkungen zur Erläuterung der Theorie der Winde.* Remarks ſerving to illuſtrate the theory of the winds. 4to. 1765.

Of theſe works, the reader will ſcarcely require a detailed account; for the moſt of them, though ſeveral times reprinted, have become very ſcarce. They are indeed, in ſome degree, connected with the following ſyſtematic works of the author; but as Profeſſor Kant has not ſtrictly adopted that method of demonſtration, which he *firſt* propoſed in the publication ſtated under No. XII. viz. "The only poſſible method of proving the exiſtence of the Deity," I conſidered it as an unprofitable taſk to tranſlate the Indexes belonging to theſe reſpective works; though it were in my power to procure them from Germany. For the ſame reaſon, I preſume, Mr. Nitsch has remarked in his late excellent publication, "A general and introductory view of Prof. Kant's principles concerning man, the world, and the Deity;" that the work above alluded to, No. XII, does not conſtitute any part of the Kantean Syſtem, as the firſt edition of it was publiſhed ten years (or from the firſt Edition of it, eighteen years) before that ſyſtem was completed.

XVII. (1) *De Mundi ſenſibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis.* Diſſertatio pro loco profeſſionis Log. et Metaph.

taph. ordinariæ rite ſibi vindicando; quam exigentibus ſtatutis academicis publice tuebitur IMMANUEL KANT.—*Regiomonti*; in auditori maximo, horis matutinis et pomeridianis conſuetis; Die XX. Aug. MDCCLXX.

SECTIO I. *De notione mundi generatim.*—Momenta, in mundi definitione attendenda, hæc ſunt: 1 *Materia* (in ſenſu tranſcendentali) h. e. *partes*, quæ hic ſumuntur eſſe *ſubſtantiæ*. 2. *Forma* quæ conſiſtit in ſubſtantiarum *coordinatione*, non ſubordinatione. 3. *Univerſitas* quæ eſt omnitudo compartium *abſoluta*.

SECTIO II. *De ſenſibilium atque intelligibilium diſcrimine generatim.*—*Senſualitas* eſt *receptivitas* ſubjecti, per quam poſſibile eſt, ut ſtatus ipſius repræſentativus objecti alicujus præſentia certo modo afficiatur. Intelligentia (rationalitas) eſt *facultas* ſubjecti, per quam, quæ in ſenſus ipſius per qualitatem ſuam, incurrere non poſſunt, ſibi repræſentare valet.

SECTIO III. *De principiis formæ Mundi ſenſibilis.*—*De* TEMPORE. 1. *Idea Temporis* non oritur ſed *ſupponitur* a ſenſibus. 2. Idea Temporis eſt *ſingularis*, non generalis: Tempus enim quodlibet non cogitatur, niſi tanquam pars unius ejuſdem temporis immenſi. 3. Idea itaque temporis eſt *intuitus*, et quoniam ante omnem ſenſationem concipitur, tanquam conditio reſpectuum in ſenſibilibus obviorum, eſt *intuitus*, non ſenſualis, ſed *purus*. 4. Tempus eſt *quantum continuum* et legum continui in mutationibus univerſi principium. 5. *Tempus non eſt objectivum aliquid et reale*, nec ſubſtantia, nec accidens, nec relatio, ſed ſubjectiva conditio per naturam mentis humanæ neceſſaria, quælibet ſenſibilia, certa lege ſibi coordinandi, et *intuitus purus*. 6. Tempus eſt conceptus veriſſimus, et, per omnia poſſibilia ſenſuum objecta, in infinitum patens, intuitivæ repræſentationis conditio. 7. Tempus itaque eſt *principium formale Mundi ſenſibilis* abſolute primum.—*De* SPATIO. A. Conceptus ſpatii non abſtrahitur a ſenſationibus externis. B. Conceptus ſpatii eſt ſingularis repreſentatio omnia *in ſe* comprehendens, non *ſub ſe* continens notio abſtracta et communis. C. Conceptus ſpatii itaque eſt *intuitus purus*; cum ſit conceptus ſingularis, ſenſationibus non conflatus, ſed omnis ſenſationis externæ forma fundamentalis. D. *Spatium non eſt aliquid objectivi* et realis, nec ſubſtantia, nec accidens, nec relatio; ſed ſubjectivum et ideale et a natura

tura mentis ſtabili lege proficiſcens, veluti ſchema, omnia omnino externe ſenſa ſibi coordinandi. E. Quanquam *conceptus ſpatii*, ut objectivi alicujus et realis entis vel affectionis, ſit imaginarius, nihilo tamen ſecius, *reſpective ad ſenſibilia quæcunque*, non ſolum eſt *veriſſimus*, ſed et omnis veritatis in ſenſualitate externa fundamentum.

Sectio IV. *De principio formæ mundi intelligibilis.*

Sectio V. *De methodo circa ſenſitiva et intellectualia in Metaphyſicis.*

Concerning the laſt two Sections, I cannot omit mentioning, that an abſtract of them could not be rendered intelligible to the reader, without ſtating likewiſe the illuſtrations of the different poſitions, at full length. Of this detail, the preſent ſketch will not admit; eſpecially as the principles, reſulting from the diſquiſitions contained in theſe two Sections, have been already expounded in the *five problems*, which conſtitute the principal part of the preſent *Elements*; and which, I have reaſon to hope, will afford a comprehenſive, though ſuccinct, view of Kant's Critique.—No further apology will be required by the learned, that the preceding extract from the author's *Inaugural Diſſertation* has been given in his own words, in the original Latin; for, to tranſlate this into Engliſh, might be conſidered as an inſult offered to the literati of this country.—With reſpect to the ſubſequent works, it muſt be remembered, that our object is merely to exhibit the contents of thoſe, which could be procured from Germany, during the limited intercourſe with that country, and to define the moſt difficult and abſtruſe terms in the *Gloſſary*, which concludes this publication.

XVIII. (2) *Kritik der reinen Vernunft.* Critique of Pure Reaſon. 8vo. *Riga.* 1781. Second Edition improved, 1787. Third Edition 1790. Fourth Edition, 1794. pp. 884, and xliv pages Preface.

Table of Contents.

Introduction. I. Of the diſtinction between pure and empirical knowledge. II. We are in the poſſeſſion of certain intuitions (truths) *a priori*, and even common ſenſe never is without them. III. Philoſophy demands a ſcience, which may determine the poſſibility, the principles, and the extent of our intuitions *a priori*.

IV.

IV. Of the diſtinction between analytical and ſynthetical judgments. V. In all the theoretical ſciences of reaſoning we meet with ſynthetical judgments *a priori*, which are contained in them as principles. VI. General problem of Pure Reaſon. VII. Plan and diviſion of a particular ſcience, under the name of a Critique of Pure reaſon.

I. Transcendental elementary Doctrine. *Part* I. Tranſcendental Aeſthetic. *Sect.* I. Of ſpace. II. Of time.—*Part* II. Tranſcendental Logic. *Introd.* Definition of tranſcendental Logic. 1. Of Logic in general. 2. Of tranſcendental Logic. 3. Of the diviſion of general Logic, into Analyſis and Dialectic. 4. Of the diviſion of tranſcendental Logic, into tranſcendental Analyſis and Dialectic.

Division I. *Tranſcendental Analyſis*.—Book I. Analyſis of notions. *Chap.* I. Of the method of diſcovering all purely intellectual notions. *Sect.* I. Of the uſe of Logic in general. II. Of the logical function of the intellect, in judgments. III. Of the purely intellectual notions or Categories. *Chap.* II. Of the deduction of the purely intellectual notions. *Sect.* I. Of the principles of a tranſcendental deduction in general. II. Tranſcendental deduction of the purely intellectual notions. Book II. Analyſis of principles (tranſcendental doctrine of the judging faculty).—*Introd.* Of the tranſcendental judging faculty in general. *Chap.* I. Of the ſchema of the pure notions of the intellect. II. Syſtem of all the principles of the pure intellect. *Sect.* I. Of the ſupreme principle of all analytical judgments. II. Of the ſupreme principle of all ſynthetical judgments. III. Syſtematic exhibition of all ſynthetical principles of the pure intellect. 1. Axioms of perception. 2. Anticipations of apperception (obſervation). 3. Analogies of experience. a.) The principle of continuity of ſubſtance. b.) The principle of ſucceſſion in time. c.) The principle of coexiſtence.—4. Poſtulates of empirical thought in general. *Chap.* I. Of the ground of diſtinction between all objects in general, into phenomena and *noumena*.—Of the ambiguity ariſing in the ideas of reflection, by confounding the empirical uſe of the intellect with thatof the tranſcendental.

Division II. *Tranſcendental Dialectic*. *Introd.* I. Of tranſcen-

dental illuſion. II. Of Pure Reaſon being the ſeat of tranſcendental illuſion. a.) Of Reaſon in general. b.) Of the logical uſe of reaſon. c.) Of the pure uſe of reaſon. Book I. Of the notions afforded by Pure Reaſon. *Sect.* I. Of ideas in general. II. Of tranſcendental ideas. III. Syſtem of tranſcendental ideas. Book II. Of the dialectic concluſions of Pure Reaſon. *Chap.* I. Of the falſe concluſions of Pure Reaſon, reſpecting their form (*paralogiſmi*). Of the antinomy of Pure Reaſon. *Sect.* I. Syſtem of the coſmological ideas. II. Antitheſis of Pure Reaſon. III. Of the intereſt of reaſon in this conteſt with itſelf. IV. Of the tranſcendental problems of Pure Reaſon, in ſo far as they muſt neceſſarily be ſolved. V. Sceptical exhibition of the coſmological queſtions, through all four tranſcendental ideas. VI. Tranſcendental Idealiſm, being the key to the ſolution of coſmological Dialectic. VII. Critical deciſion of the coſmological conteſt, into which reaſon falls with itſelf. VIII. Regulative principle of Pure Reaſon, with reſpect to the coſmological ideas. IX. Of the empirical uſe of the regulative principle of reaſon, with reſpect to all coſmological ideas.—1. Solution of the coſmological idea reſpecting the totality of the compoſition of the phenomena of a whole univerſe. 2. Solution of the coſmological idea reſpecting the totality of diviſion of a given whole in perception.—Concluding remark on the ſolution of the tranſcendental ideas in Mathematics; and previous remark on the ſolution of the tranſcendental ideas in Dynamics. 3. Solution of the coſmological ideas reſpecting the totality of deriving the events of the world from their cauſes.—On the poſſibility of cauſality by the idea of liberty, as combined with the general law of phyſical neceſſity.—Illuſtration of the coſmological idea of a liberty, that is connected with the general laws of phyſical neceſſity. 4. Solution of the coſmological idea reſpecting the totality of the dependence of the phenomena, according to the reality of their exiſtence in general. *Chap.* III. The *Prototype* of Pure Reaſon, i. e. an idea of reaſon *in concreto*. *Sect.* I. Of the prototype in general. II. Of the tranſcendental prototype. III. Of the arguments of ſpeculative reaſon, to conclude the exiſtence of a higheſt Being. IV. Of the impoſſibility of an ontological proof of the exiſtence of God. V. Of the impoſſibility of a coſ-

mological

mological proof of the exiſtence of God. VI. Of the impoſſibility of a phyſico-theological proof. VII. Critique of all Theology from ſpeculative principles of reaſon.—Of the final purpoſe of the natural Dialectic of human reaſon.

II. Transcendental Doctrine of Method. *Chap.* I. The Diſcipline of Pure Reaſon. *Sect.* I. With reſpect to its dogmatical uſe. II. With reſpect to its polemical uſe. III. With reſpect to its hypotheſes. IV. With reſpect to its proofs. *Chap.* II. The Canon of Pure Reaſon. *Sect.* I. Of the ultimate purpoſe of the pure uſe of Reaſon. II. Of the prototype of the higheſt good, as being the fundamental cauſe of determining the ultimate purpoſe of pure reaſon. III. On the expreſſions, " to be of opinion; to know; and to believe." *Chap.* III. Of the Architectonic of Pure Reaſon. *Chap.* IV. The hiſtory of Pure Reaſon.

Although we have already given the ſubſtance of this work in the *Problems*, which are exhibited in the foregoing part of theſe Elements; yet in a matter of ſuch importance as the preſent attempt of Kant actually is, we do not heſitate to inſert here another expoſition of his principles, ſo that the reader may acquire a complete analytical view of their origin.

In order to trace the principles of all human knowledge and judgment, from what ſource both may ariſe, Kant deemed it incumbent upon the enquirer, to inſtitute an accurate analyſis of the intuitive faculty of man. The chief object of this inquiry was, 1, to ſeparate the notion we have of the *intuitive faculty*, from all other notions connected with it; 2, to lay aſide, or to abſtract from, the concomitant and accidental characters of it, and to retain in this notion merely thoſe characters, without which no intuitive faculty can at all be conceived: thus he obtained a general notion of the intuitive faculty of man, i. e. ſuch as conſiſts of no foreign ingredients. This faculty is the attribute of every man, it is given him in his own perſonal conſciouſneſs, and the reality of it cannot be proved otherwiſe than by an appeal to this conſciouſneſs. The exiſtence of ſuch a faculty has never been called in queſtion, it is granted by all parties, and hence it is to be conſidered as a fair point, from which the philoſopher may begin his inquiries.—To premiſe a definition of the intuitive faculty, is by no means ne-

ceſſary; for its reality will be ſufficiently proved, if the conſtituent parts and characters produced of it, be of ſuch a nature as can be diſcovered in every individual, who has the requiſite capacity and inclination of reflecting upon the ſucceſſive operations of his mind. Of infinitely greater importance we ſhall find the complete analyſis of this faculty; ſince the definition of ſomething, the truth of which cannot be diſcovered otherwiſe than by the preceding operation, can be of no poſitive advantage.

Kant ſeriouſly diſcovered, that the intuitive faculty of man is a compound of very diſſimilar ingredients; or, in other words, that it conſiſts of parts very different in their nature, and each of which performs functions peculiar to itſelf; namely the *Senſitive Faculty*, and the *Underſtanding*. The former repreſents the matter of things, ſo as it is affected by them; the latter connects the variety of theſe materials into a whole. Theſe two operations muſt always precede, if there ſhall take place a repreſentation or intuition of a determined object. Both, therefore, are eſſential conſtituents of the intuitive faculty of man, and both muſt be active, at the ſame time, in every intuition.

Leibnitz, indeed, had likewiſe remarked the diſtinction ſubſiſting between the Senſitive Faculty and the Underſtanding; but he entirely overlooked the eſſential difference between their functions, and was of opinion, that both faculties were different from one another only in degree, while he ſuppoſed the Senſitive Faculty to be only a weaker degree of the Intuitive, which, when operating in a ſtronger degree, was called the Underſtanding: both, according to him, repreſented the ſame objects, ſave that the Senſitive Faculty exhibited thoſe objects in a confuſed and obſcure manner, which the Underſtanding preciſely and clearly apprehended. But this diſtinction is altogether falſe and without foundation. The Underſtanding, as far as we can explore this faculty, ſtill remains, even in its weakeſt degree, eſſentially different from the Senſitive Faculty, and the moſt perfect functions of the latter can never ſupply the functions of the Underſtanding. For, while the ſenſes receive the matter of the objects, the Underſtanding combines the variety in that matter, and forms a determined repreſentation of an object, or an intuition. The former may receive clear or ob-

ſcure

ſcure impreſſions; the latter may alſo combine in a diſtinct or confuſed manner. Clearneſs and obſcurity, diſtinctneſs and confuſion, may, therefore, be common to both; nay, what is clearly perceived by the ſenſes, may yet be obſcurely apprehended by the Underſtanding; and what the former exhibit in a confuſed and obſcure manner, may nevertheleſs be very clearly conceived by the latter. The Underſtanding may even form a clear notion of things, that never can become objects of ſenſe; and *vice verſa*, the ſenſes may perceive things, which the underſtanding cannot repreſent, either clearly or obſcurely; although it is impoſſible to have an intuition of any one object, unleſs both faculties are actively concerned in the ſame object. For inſtance, to *think* of God, liberty, virtue, and immortality, cannot yet be called to *recogniſe* or to have an intuition of the objects, different from their ideas; and to perceive ſpaces and times, and ſenſible objects of all kinds, can likewiſe not be ſaid to have intuitions of them. For, to acquire the latter, we muſt reduce the objects to ideas, and combine them according to certain laws. The ſenſes can do nothing further than perceive, i. e. repreſent the given thing *immediately*; and the underſtanding only can think of it, i. e. combine the thing perceived, or exhibit the given thing by *mediately* connecting it into one. The reality of the object, that is conceived by us in an idea, can be repreſented only by the ſenſes, ſince the object itſelf is either perceived through the ſenſation occaſioned by it, or it muſt neceſſarily be combined with any one perception, according to the laws of poſſible experience.

In the works of the Engliſh and French philoſophers, we find this eſſential diſtinction between the ſenſitive and the intellectual faculties, and their combination towards producing one ſynthetical intuition, ſcarcely mentioned. Locke only alludes to the accidental limitations of both faculties; but to inquire into the eſſential difference prevailing between them, does not at all occur to him. It is, however, obvious, that from this neglect there have ariſen many fallacious concluſions, which for a long time, at leaſt in their conſequences, have been hurtful to ſound philoſophy.

This diſtinction then, between the ſenſitive and intellectual faculties, forms an eſſential feature in the philoſophy of Kant; it is the

the baſis, upon which the moſt of the ſubſequent inquiries are eſtabliſhed. It muſt nevertheleſs be remembered, that Kant, in diſtinguiſhing theſe two faculties, does not ſpeak of real ſubſtances, different from one another. His intention merely is, to point out what every reflecting mind may eaſily obſerve within himſelf, if he attends to what precedes an intuition, and how the underſtanding combines every act of perception. Now, ſince the ground or ſource of theſe two faculties obviouſly diſcovers two diſtinct powers, it is both rational and neceſſary, to denote their functions by diſtinct names; though their eſſentially different operations ſhould be formed in one and the ſame ſubſtance. We cannot attend here to an inference, that may be drawn from this identity of origin, againſt the diſcrimination of powers, that are in themſelves as diſtinct as the motion of a clock is from that of the hammer, which ſtrikes the bell, though by the ſame mechaniſm, that moves the pendulum and the hands. In this very contrivance, we may find the moſt convincing inſtance of the actual difference between the exerciſe of the ſenſitive and intellectual faculties, if we conſider it both, in an *objective* and *ſubjective* view. In the former, we behold no more than a machine that moves, at certain equal diſtances, the hands which are attached to it; and he, who is unacquainted with the purpoſe for which it is deſigned, will view it with the aſtoniſhment and fear of the Swiſs peaſant, who formerly deſtroyed a time-piece dropped by a traveller, becauſe he apprehended miſchief from the noiſe that accompanied its motion. But, if this untutored ſon of nature had been informed of the great utility of that machine, by the conſtruction of which mankind have contrived to meaſure time apparent, his intellectual faculty might thus have been enlarged, and he would have acquired the *ſubjective* view of a watch. Without having had any previous experience of the deſign, with which the motions of a time-piece are arranged *in ſpaces*, he could now conceive, *a priori*, the neceſſary reſult of this arrangement, by dividing the duration of the day into hours, minutes, and ſeconds; although experience would *a poſteriori* confirm this intuitive notion, and give it *objective reality*. This, indeed, cannot be obtained in any other way than by means of the ſenſes; for the queſtion, here, is not of the laſt and abſolute ground or ſubſtance of the intuitive faculty, but concerning the intuitive faculty as an appeal

to

to this laſt ſubſtratum, that is determined by its operations.—Thus COPERNICUS acquired demonſtrative certainty upon what he, at firſt, had conceived only as an hypotheſis; for the central laws of the motions of celeſtial bodies at the ſame time proved the reality of that inviſible power of attraction, which ſupports the fabric of the univerſe, and which NEWTON never could have diſcovered, if the former had not ventured to go beyond the limits of poſſible experience, and to ſearch for the ground or cauſe of the motions obſerved, not in the objects of the celeſtial bodies, but in the eyes of the ſpectator.

KANT, therefore, previouſly analyſed the Senſitive Faculty, and endeavoured to diſcover the neceſſary conditions, without which *our* Senſitive Faculty cannot perceive any objects whatever. After having cautiouſly ſeparated all that, which, in the phenomena exhibited by the ſenſes, either is merely accidental, or is owing to the function of the intellect, he diſcovered, that *two conditions* only remain, without which, every where, neither our Senſitive Faculty, nor its objects, are conceivable. Theſe conditions are, *Space* and *Time*. They have ever been the ſtumbling block of all metaphyſicians, and the ſource of endleſs diſputes. KANT conſiders them in ſuch a manner as will afford ſatisfaction to every cool and unbiaſſed enquirer after truth, ſince none but the moſt inveterate Sceptic, or the obſtinate Syſtematic, can withhold their aſſent. He ſhows namely,

1, That both theſe repreſentations are the immediate productions of the ſenſes, and conſequently admit of no further derivation. Hence it was a fruitleſs attempt of LEIBNITZ, who endeavoured to explain their origin from intellectual notions. The Underſtanding has, indeed, the power of arranging Space and Time with their modifications, under the ideas of order, unity, and ſo forth, but it cannot derive either of them from theſe ideas; it can unfold and explain their contents, but it cannot conceive the poſſibility of their origin, any further than that they are ſomething given us by the Senſitive Faculty itſelf.

2, They muſt be thought of as the ſubſtratum of all ſenſible objects, i. e. as the forms of all phenomena. But they are not real objects and ſelf-ſubſiſtent, as CLARKE imagined: their reality wholly

wholly depends upon thoſe things, which can be obſerved in them: abſtractly conſidered, they are the bare forms of our Senſitive Faculty; forms, through which we are enabled to determine, that all real objects of ſenſe are conformable to them, or that theſe objects muſt of neceſſity be given in them.—It is by this manner of repreſentation, that we can explain *all* the predicates of Space and Time, as that of infinity, continuity, uniformity, &c. without incurring thoſe difficulties, which have been productive of the greateſt confuſion in philoſophy, and which have involved Mathematics and Metaphyſics into perpetual diſſenſions.

3, Finally, Kant alſo ſhows, that ſpace and time, being the forms of *our* Senſitive Faculty, muſt conſequently be conceived as the forms of thoſe objects only, of which *we* can attain intuitions: thus they are merely forms of phenomena, and not the forms of all things in general, that are the objects of knowledge. Nay, it is even conceivable, that the things exhibited to us in ſpace and time, abſtractly conſidered, may be viewed or perceived by other thinking beings, under very different forms; although it is not in our power, either to determine more preciſely this difference, or to aſcertain the real poſſibility of it, by any arguments favourable to this conjecture.

From the preceding ſtatement, the reader will be able to form a general idea of the manner, in which the univerſal truths of Mathematics may be demonſtrated upon the principles of the Critical philoſopher, and how theſe principles may be employed, to determine thereby the objects of the world of ſenſe. For, ſince ſpace and time are apprehended immediately through the nature of our ſenſitive faculty, it is now conceivable; how we can perceive all their relations, compare them with one another through the underſtanding, and deduce general principles from theſe ſources. And as all the objects of ſenſe neceſſarily appear in theſe forms, the explanation is ſelf-evident, that all the relations apprehended *a priori*, muſt alſo neceſſarily be diſcovered in all theſe phenomena. It likewiſe follows from this illuſtration, that all Mathematics conſiſt in a ſcience, relating only to objects of ſenſe, and admitting of no application whatever, to thoſe of an oppoſite nature.

After having ſatisfactorily proved, that there are neither more

nor

nor fewer of the neceſſary conditions of perception in the Senſitive Faculty, than Space and Time, Kant proceeds to the inveſtigation of the Underſtanding, as the ſecond principal conſtituent of the intuitive Faculty. He remarks, that all the operations of the underſtanding may be ultimately reduced to the *act of judging*, and he concludes from this, that the different modifications in a judgment, in general, are the principles, according to which the pure notions of the intellect muſt be determined. Upon this ground, he previouſly unfolds all the ſimple and pure notions of the intellect, and exhibits them, in a complete and ſyſtematic manner, as the ultimate elements of all judgments.—It is well known, how much the ſimple notions or firſt principles have intereſted the Metaphyſicians of all ages; it is alſo known, that they never could agree with reſpect to their number; whether, among the ſimple or primary notions, there had not been included ſome of a compound nature; whether thoſe conſidered as original ones were not at the bottom merely derivatives; whether there is no chance of diſcovering in future a greater number of ſimple notions, or of reducing thoſe already diſcovered to a ſmaller number. All theſe doubts and diſputes, Kant has now terminated, by diſcovering a principle, from which it appears evident, that there can be neither more nor fewer than *twelve* * originally pure notions of the underſtanding.

The way, in which Kant diſcovers theſe Categories or primary notions, and how he proves their completeneſs and validity, cannot be detailed nor abridged in this general retroſpect of the Critique; but I ſhall briefly remark, that the categories exactly compriſe thoſe notions, without which the underſtanding is unable to conceive any objects whatever, i. e. to judge of them. Hence they expreſs nothing further than the mode or manner, how the Underſtanding, by the laws of its conſtitution, muſt neceſſarily combine the varities in perception, whenever it attempts to judge upon objects. But the forms of objects naturally lie in the underſtanding, and as ſuch they have always been inveſtigated and de-

* See the Categories, p. 45, and compare them with the definitions in the *Gloſary*.

termined in Logic. Thus the Logicians have long ago taught us, from the nature of the Underſtanding, that every judgment muſt be determined by its extent and compaſs, as well as by its relation to ſynthetic unity and conſciouſneſs; or that it muſt have a certain quantity, quality, relation, and modality. But that, through this proceſs alone, the conceivable objects are determined, that conſequently the forms of judgment are carried over to the objects of thought, and can be predicated of them *a priori*, this neceſſary inference has been leſs attended to, by former philoſophers. For, though they have not failed to make uſe of the notions thus ariſing, in order to determine the objects *a priori*, yet the peculiar ſource of theſe notions has hitherto remained undiſcovered.

From this ſource, Kant derives all our notions *a priori*, and makes them the predicates of general principles, which throughout, become the laws relative to objects of experience *a priori*; for they do not contain actual experience itſelf, but the general conditions, that render experience poſſible, between the nature of man and things. Theſe laws are ſyſtematically exhibited in the CRITIQUE, agreeably to one principle, ſo that the reader is convinced, that there are neither more nor fewer of the general, neceſſary, and elementary principles, than are unfolded through this inquiry. But theſe principles are likewiſe the axioms of a phyſical ſcience, ſo far as nature conſiſts of nothing elſe but the whole complex of experimental objects; and conſequently, from this idea of nature, we not only conceive, very perfectly, the poſſibility of reducing Phyſics to a ſcientific ſyſtem, but likewiſe this ſyſtem itſelf is, in its pure or tranſcendental part, thus actually formed.

Having ſtated in the preceding outlines, how our Underſtanding muſt repreſent to itſelf given objects, or how an intuition of them becomes poſſible through it, I can now proceed to the particular analyſis of the intellectual faculty in forming concluſions, which Kant denominates *theoretical reaſon*. This branch of the intellectual faculty, by virtue of its conſtitution, produces certain notions, to which no objects whatever correſpond *in* experience, although they are connected *with* it in ſucceſſion, and are both influenced and determined by experience. It is namely, in general, the idea of the *unconditional* or *abſolute*, that is immediately connected with the

the nature of Reaſon, and through which, according to the different form of rational concluſions, the ideas of an abſolute ſubject or *mind*, of an abſolute cauſe or *liberty*, and of an abſolute totality of all that is poſſible, i. e. the idea of *God*, take their reſpective origin. The further deduction of theſe notions, abſtracted from pure Reaſon, muſt be ſtudied from Kant's Critique; it forms one of the moſt excellent parts of that work. We learn from it, not only to underſtand completely, how all mankind, immediately after the evolution of their mental faculties, attain theſe ideas; but we likewiſe conceive, how the repreſentations formed concerning the objects of theſe ideas, appear under ſo great a variety of aſpects, as ſoon as we venture to determine the objects beyond the nature of the ideas founded upon human reaſon: nay, we can even generally underſtand, how variouſly theſe determinations may be modified. We further learn, that thoſe, who endeavour to derive every thing concerning religion, from habit, education, and other accidental circumſtances, judge with the partiality and fallacy of others, who conſider their incidental opinions as incontrovertible principles, which are deduced from the eſſence of tranſcendental objects themſelves, or to which they fondly would give the appearance of infallibility, by appealing to the authority of a divine inſpiration. We alſo ſee, how eaſily the *accidental* may be confounded with the *neceſſary*, the *ſubjective* with the *objective*, the *natural* with the *artificial*; unleſs we are acquainted with the ſources, from which all theſe objects flow, not only ſo far as their primary origin extends, but alſo with their minuteſt difference.—Without being enraged againſt thoſe writers, who, from their aſſertions, appear to have formed the artful deſign of depriving man of every thing, that is valuable and intereſting to him as a rational being, we can without difficulty conceive, that it is only a different intereſt or motive of our reaſon, which incites men to propagate irreligious doctrines; that it is not entirely their immoral will, but rather their too extenſive views, encouraged by the weakneſs of their adverſaries, that induce them to expoſe the arguments employed in favour of the moſt intereſting principles of religion, while they flatter themſelves with the proſpect of controverting all the opinions of their opponents.

The CRITIQUE of KANT holds out the prospect of a most complete victory over all the enemies of Religion, and I shall now state, in what manner the principles of Religion are secured against all the attacks of its adversaries, and how religion is fortified against arbitrary and accidental additions. After having shown, that the ground of the idea concerning Mind, Liberty, and the Deity, is to be met with in the nature of Reason itself, and that every rational being is involuntarily led to the formation of these ideas, the author endeavours to prove, and he does this very satisfactorily, "*that the Intuitive Faculty of man has not the power of apprehending objects in a determined manner, or of pointing out characters of them, which are derived from immediate perception.*" He demonstrates, that we can indeed *think* the objects of these ideas, but that, at no time whatever, we are able to apprehend them *theoretically*. For, to acquire a theoretical idea of things, we must not only predicate of them, that they are conformable to the laws of our Understanding, or that they are not something contrary to them, but we must likewise be enabled to point out determinate and *real* predicates, which are taken from the thing itself under apprehension. But the real predicates of a thing cannot be conceived in any other manner, than through sensible perception; whether this take place by immediately perceiving the thing itself, or mediately through some other object, which has certain real properties, in common with that to be apprehended. Hence it follows, that we are unqualified to apprehend the real predicates, or the transcendental properties of those things, which, by their nature, neither in part nor in the whole, can ever become objects of sensible perception. We are altogether deficient in a faculty designed for that purpose; hence we are, for instance, unable to determine positively the nature of mind, according to its internal constitution. We can indeed predicate of it, with certainty, that it is not of itself an object of sense, consequently, not a phenomenon; but whatever predicates of reality may, in other respects, belong to it; how its existence may be constituted, whether it be a simple substance, and different from the internal absolute grounds of matter; how the idea of liberty is evolved; what properties belong to the Deity in a transcendental view, and

the

the like; all these problems could be solved only through the perception of supersensible objects. And as we are provided with no faculty for the exercise of such a function, we cannot at all determine the real characters of these things; nay we do not even understand the real importance of the term "*existence*," when we apply it to supersensible objects. For, with respect to the objects of sense, the expression, "*something exists*," signifies no more than that it affects our senses, by producing a sensation, as soon as it is placed in proper connection with them. But the idea of existence cannot imply the same meaning with respect to supersensible objects; for the term "existence" is not to be defined in its bare relation to our Intuitive Faculty, but as an *internal property*. Yet the impossibility of giving such a definition is obvious, not merely from the failure of all the attempts hitherto made for that purpose, but likewise from the investigation of the sources, from which such a determination ought to be derived.

Although we cannot comprehend, through perception, the objects of those ideas, which, in their nature, lie beyond the world of sense; and though we cannot, on that account, obtain any theoretical intuition of them; we can discover another source, from which, however, we derive no intuitive knowledge of the objects themselves, but a practical and subjective knowledge of their relations to the nature of man. Though our views of the nature of these objects be not thereby enlarged, that knowledge affords us sufficient grounds, upon which we may safely establish rules for our conduct, and convince ourselves of the reality of that ultimate design, which our Reason cannot consistently call in question.

The chief point of this inquiry is, to discover a sufficient ground for the reality of those ideas, and to open a source, from which the determinations of their objects, relative to our practical advantage, shall be derived with safety and without ambiguity. This source, then, according to Kant, lies in the nature of our own subject, i. e. the mind, and is actually that, which we understand by the term *moral sense*. This alone is a safe intuitive ground for determining the reality of the ideas concerning Liberty, God, and Immortality; and this alone establishes the true relations, in which we can form dignified conceptions of the Deity.

KANT admits it as a matter of fact, that we are moral beings, and consequently this moral sense is an essential part of human nature; that reason places the highest value of man, solely and exclusively, in his moral feelings; and that it reduces all his power and prosperity to these feelings, and values the whole of the former according to effects produced upon the latter. After having demonstrated the essential difference subsisting between the moral and sensitive nature of man, and having analyzed the different laws, by which both are governed respectively; he now proceeds to prove, 1, That the reality of Liberty is necessarily connected with the moral nature of man, and that the latter is wholly inconceivable without the former; that consequently our Reason forces us to acknowledge Liberty as a certain, though unaccountable, fact relative to man; because, without doing this, we would be obliged to renounce all claims to Reason, and to consider it as perfectly useless; 2, That the reality of a being, which contains the sufficient ground of a thorough moral order, must be conceived equally combined with the Deity, as it is with the moral nature of man, so that the immortality of the soul must be considered as a necessary constituent of this moral order. Reason, however, being the supreme tribunal, to which man may appeal, persuades us to receive, not only these ideas, but also their objects as founded upon truth; we are therefore justified in relying upon the justness of our Reason, provided that we do not presume to determine with regard to the internal nature and essence of these objects; a determination, which can be made only through the immediate, though impossible, perception of them. Hence we are utterly incapable of ascertaining the nature of a free subject, as an independent substance; the positive constitution of mind, by which immortality becomes possible; and finally, the manner in which the Deity has accomplished a moral connection between man and the world. We only know, that those objects, which we conceive, through general ideas, as the causes of certain effects, are reclaimed by our reason as the necessary conditions of our moral destination; and that ground, on which we must admit them, or believe their reality, lies in our subject, namely in our moral sense, which partly as an intuitive principle, partly as a practical motive, generates

and

and ſupports the belief in the fundamental truths of religion. Since, then, the intuitive principle reſpecting the reality of theſe tranſcendental objects, or of religious truths, is perfectly conſiſtent with Reaſon, not from the immediate perception of objects (the reality of which requires no proof), but from a certain qualification of our own ſubject, as connected with the real ſtate of theſe objects; a ſtate, the exiſtence of which is far from being imaginary only; Kant, conſequently, calls this a *ſubjective* ground of conviction, in contradiſtinction to an *objective* ground, which is derived from the perception of the objects themſelves.

In repreſenting the Kantian doctrine of morals, every thing depends upon our being conſcious of a moral law, conſcious of right and wrong, of good and bad, ſo that the intuitive ground of moral principles be rendered independent on all theology; for the doctrines of the Deity and Immortality muſt be deduced from pure morals; or the latter muſt be the intuitive ground of all religion. And this is likewiſe the actual and neceſſary reſult of his principles. Morality reſts upon its own baſis; and, in the ſublime view which Kant preſents of it, all other things relative to man, muſt be decided by that ſtandard. It is principally in Ethics, we learn, to conſider the things of this world as purpoſes; and by collectively employing them as the means of attaining one ultimate purpoſe, we introduce unity among them. Thus we diſcover their ſubordinate laws, acquire ſyſtematic unity, and produce a perfect harmony throughout the whole ſphere of the intuitive knowledge of man. Yet, through all the illuſtrations afforded by Ethics, we do not learn to comprehend the poſſibility of the things themſelves; we only acquire intelligence reſpecting the poſſibility of our deſtination in general. Hence the intuitions, which we derive from morals, do not enlarge our penetration into the nature of the things themſelves, but they render our reaſon conſiſtent with itſelf, and reſtore harmony between the moral laws and other intuitions and thoughts; an operation, which is attended with no theoretical, but certainly with great practical, advantage.

This view of morals, however, if it ſhall ſerve as the baſis of religion, muſt be extremely different from that, which we find in the "*Syſteme de la Nature*, in the writings of HELVETIUS, and ſeveral

veral other reputed philoſophers, who ſpeak indeed much of Human Nature, but have penetrated leſs into its eſſence than they themſelves aſſure us: and though theſe inquiries conſtantly appeal to experience, they make uſe of principles very different from thoſe, which experience *can* furniſh.—To deſcribe, at length, the Moral Syſtem of Kant, which affords, at once, ſolidity and conſiſtency in that of Religion, would require a ſeparate publication. But we ſhall exhibit the outlines of this ſyſtem in reviewing another work of Kant's, treating particularly of that ſubject, which the reader will find mentioned under No. XXI. (5) of this analytical retroſpect.

XIX. (3) *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphyſik, die als Wiſſenſchaft wird auftreten können.* Introductory obſervations with reſpect to every future Syſtem of Metaphyſics, that may deſerve the name of a ſcience. 8vo. *Riga*, 1783, pp. 222.

In the preface to this work, the author explains his aim at convincing thoſe who employ themſelves in metaphyſical inquiries; that it is indiſpenſably neceſſary to ſuſpend their labours for ſome time, to conſider every thing hitherto done as undone, and above all things to propoſe the queſtion, "whether there is any proſpect of eſtabliſhing every where ſuch a ſcience as Metaphyſics?"

'If it is a ſcience already, how does it happen, that it has not, like other ſciences, obtained general and laſting reputation? If it is none, how is it permitted continually to boaſt of the illuſory name of a ſcience, and to uphold the human underſtanding with hopes equally permanent and unaccompliſhed?—Let us therefore demonſtrate, either our knowledge or our ignorance; the nature of this pretended ſcience ought to be thoroughly inveſtigated; for it is impoſſible to leave things any longer upon the old footing. It appears almoſt ridiculous, while every other ſcience is making inceſſant progreſs, that in this one, which aſpires to the character of being the oracle of wiſdom itſelf, man continually turns round upon the ſame ſpot, without advancing a ſingle ſtep. It is even obſerved, that the number of its votaries is much decreaſing, and that thoſe, who feel themſelves ſufficiently able to gain

gain credit in other ſciences, do not chooſe to venture their reputation in this. On the other hand, it is equally certain, that every tyro, who is ignorant in all other branches of knowledge, here claims the right of pronouncing a deciſive opinion; becauſe in this territory there exiſts in fact no ſettled meaſure and weight, by which the rational inquirer can be diſcerned from the ſhallow prattler.'

'To make plans, is frequently a luxuriant and oſtentatious employment of the mind, by which ſome people acquire the appearance of inventive genius; while they demand what they cannot furniſh themſelves, cenſure what they cannot improve, and propoſe what they themſelves do not know where to diſcover it:—though it may be eaſily conjectured, that a little more than a declamation of pious wiſhes will be requiſite, to form a juſt plan of "a general Critique of Reaſon." But *Pure Reaſon* is a ſphere ſo inſulated and ſo thoroughly connected with itſelf, that we can approach no part of it without touching all the reſt, and that we can do no good, without having aſſigned each part its proper place and influence upon the other. For, ſince without Reaſon there is nothing that could correct our judgment, the validity and uſe of every part depends upon the relation, in which it ſtands towards the others, within the bounds of Reaſon itſelf; as in the ſtructure of an organized body the purpoſe of every member can be deduced only from the complete idea of the whole. Hence we may ſay of ſuch a *Critique*, that no dependence can be placed upon it, unleſs it be *entire* and *complete*, even extending to the minuteſt elements of Pure Reaſon, and that we muſt be enabled to determine either *the whole* or *nothing*, that relates to the ſphere of this faculty.'

'Although the bare plan of ſuch a ſcience, had it been premiſed to the "Critique of Pure Reaſon," might have been unintelligible, ſuſpicious, and uſeleſs; it will, on the contrary, become the more advantageous, when it appears in illuſtration of that work. For, by this plan, we ſhall be enabled to take a view of the whole, to inveſtigate the principal points, upon the ſolidity of which this ſcience is erected, and to underſtand more clearly the principles, which at firſt appeared obſcure.'

'Theſe Prolegomena then contain ſuch a plan as ought to be

ſtated in an analytical method, ſince the preceding work neceſſarily required a ſynthethical arrangement: in order that this ſcience might be exhibited in its individual parts, and as the ſtructure of a very peculiar faculty in the acquiſition of knowledge, which preſents itſelf in its natural connection. Thoſe who ſhould find this plan as obſcure as the Critique itſelf, muſt conſider that the ſtudy of Metaphyſics is not the buſineſs of all; that there are many ingenious men, who make conſiderable proficiency in ſciences, that lie more within the bounds of ſenſible perception, and who do not ſucceed in inquiries carried on through pure abſtract notions. Such individuals muſt employ their mental faculties upon other objects. Thoſe, however, who venture to judge upon Metaphyſics, or even attempt to frame ſyſtems of their own, muſt previouſly ſatisfy the demands made in this work. Whether this be done by approving of the method, in which I have ſolved the different problems; or by refuting this ſolution, upon well-eſtabliſhed principles, and giving another in its place; in either caſe they will do juſtice to the cauſe. For, to reject a plan without trying its merits, is equally frivolous and illiberal. I confeſs I did not expect to hear philoſophers complaining, that my works were deficient in popular, entertaining, and eaſy language; when the queſtion relates to the exiſtence of a ſource of knowledge, which is highly valuable and indiſpenſable to man, but which cannot be demonſtrated, without obſerving the ſtricteſt rules of ſcientific deduction. Popularity, indeed, will in its turn attend theſe inveſtigations, but to aim at it in the beginning, would be a ſilly and fruitleſs attempt.—That very obſcurity, which is ſo much decried, and which is frequently uſed as a cloak for the conveniency and mental weakneſs of its adverſaries, is not without relative advantage; for all thoſe, who obſerve a cautious ſilence in other ſciences, enjoy an opportunity of ſpeaking and deciding in a magiſterial tone upon metaphyſical ſubjects; becauſe their ignorance, here, does not form ſo remarkable a contraſt, when compared with the knowledge of others, as it does in oppoſition to genuine critical principles, of which we may juſtly ſay with the Roman poet,

Ignavum, fucos, pecus a præſepibus arcent.'

VIRG.

As

As theſe Prolegomena are a conciſe and perſpicuous abſtract from the preceding *Critique*, in an analytical method, which the author employs, as it were, to go back again the ſame path, upon which he had ſynthetically advanced in the Critique; we could only repeat that deduction of Kant's principles, which we have already premiſed at ſufficient length.

XX. (4.) *Betrachtungen über das Fundament der Kräfte und Methoden, welche die Vernunft anwenden kann, darüber zu urtheilen.* Reflections upon the foundation of the powers and methods, which Reaſon is entitled to employ in judging upon their validity. 8vo. *Koenigsberg*, 1784.

Of this ſmall work, I know little more than its title, not having been able to procure a copy of it; and as, from the German Reviews, it appears to be a further deduction of the principles laid down in the preceding two works, I ſhall immediately, and at conſiderable length, review the following, which is uniformly conſidered as the moſt perſpicuous and valuable production of Kant.

XXI. (5) *Grundlegung zur Metaphyſik der Sitten.* Fundamental principles of the Metaphyſicks (Theory) of Morals. 8vo. *Riga*. 1785.—2d Edit. 1792, pp. 128 and 14 pp. Preface.

The outlines of KANT's Syſtem of Morals, I ſhall endeavour to exhibit, as clearly as poſſible, in the following analyſis of his principles.

The deſire of happineſs is inherent to human nature: all the inſtinctive propenſities of man are directed to that purpoſe. But our reaſon ſtill reſtrains that deſire, and conſiders only ſuch a poſſeſſion of happineſs as worthy of our exertions, which is perfectly conſiſtent with morality, or rather, which is the reward of moral actions. Morality and happineſs, therefore, are two different but eſſential determinations originating in human nature; which, when united by the dictates of reaſon, render the deſtination of man perfect. This union, however, cannot be better conceived by reaſon, than that morality itſelf contains the cauſe, through which the

happineſs of man is accompliſhed. If we ourſelves are the purpoſes and not the *bare* means in the hands of nature or any other Being; it follows, that the neceſſary attributes of our conſtitution muſt likewiſe be conceived as poſſible: there muſt exiſt ſuch an arrangement of things, as contributes to realize our moral deſtination. The former part of this deſtination, namely morality, depends on ourſelves, and on the degree of ſelf-activity, with which we practiſe the moral law. This faculty of practiſing what the moral law commands, we preſuppoſe in every rational being; for otherwiſe it would be highly abſurd, to impoſe upon ourſelves a law, obedience to which Reaſon could not acknowledge as practicable. It muſt conſequently be in our power, to be morally good, if Reaſon commands us to act in conformity to the moral law. In whatever ſubject then Reaſon actually exiſts, it muſt alſo be poſſible, that it manifeſt itſelf by actions: whoever has the ability to apprehend what is good as a thing abſolutely neceſſary, on its own account, he muſt likewiſe be provided with the faculty of performing it. But it is not phyſically neceſſary to do it; for we nowhere diſcover our Reaſon ſubject to this ſpecies of neceſſity. Why Reaſon very frequently does not practiſe what it muſt acknowledge to be morally good; why our ſenſitive nature is not always vanquiſhed, but frequently prevails in this conteſt; theſe problems we are unable to ſolve; becauſe we do not in any manner comprehend that, which forms the moral nature of man, as an object of perception; and becauſe we can only derive the moral faculty of man from the idea of the poſſibility of morality in general. We know only this much with certainty, that we judge upon the moral value of man, merely and entirely, by the degree of moral motives, which we obſerve in his actions or ſentiments. If, therefore, the phyſical energy is properly arranged in a man, ſo that the uſe of Reaſon, in general, is poſſible to him; we preſuppoſe, that the performance of morally good actions is really entruſted to his will: and if we did not preſuppoſe this inclination, we would in fact deny all the influence which Reaſon exerciſes over human affairs, and thus be obliged to declare the general laws of morality, afforded by this faculty, as mere phantoms of the brain. Our moral perfection depends upon our own exertions, and it is from this quarter, that we may more and more approach our deſtination.

What

What, on the other hand, relates to the ſecond part of our deſtination, namely to our happineſs; this depends on the inſtitution of the things in nature, as well thoſe of our own ſubject as the external objects, and their influence upon us. By means of Reaſon and its inherent liberty, we can indeed make ſuch a uſe of the things in nature, as to produce certain degrees or parts of happineſs. But the rules calculated to produce theſe effects, Reaſon cannot derive from its own nature *a priori*, as is the caſe with the moral law; becauſe experience muſt be conſulted firſt, that we may learn, how the nature of man, and that of individual ſubjects, is conſtituted, and in what relation the things are to human happineſs. The laws by which happineſs is attained, are founded upon the nature of phenomena: man may apply them to his advantage, but he cannot determine them; he may regulate, in a certain degree, the influence of the things upon himſelf; but he muſt ſtill ſubmit to their laws. If, then, we were to conſult Reaſon, and to aſk, by what laws happineſs ought to be diſtributed in the world; it could give no other anſwer, but that the moral law ought to decide this. Morality ſhould always be attended with a proportionate ſhare of happineſs; whether it of itſelf produced that happineſs as its real cauſe (according to phyſical influence), or that a third being allotted to every individual, ſuch a portion of happineſs as he deſerved through the degree of his moral activity: —here we would admit an *ideal* influence, in which a third being had ſo regulated the courſe of nature, that her laws were in perfect harmony with the demands of Reaſon, relative to the happineſs of moral beings.

But if we conſult experience, we by no means learn, that ſuch a moral order really ſubſiſts in the world; ſince we frequently obſerve men of bad morals, and of a depraved character, apparently happy, while good and virtuous men are afflicted by misfortunes. For, though the conſciouſneſs of juſt and good actions be accompanied with agreeable feelings, this alone does not conſtitute human happineſs; ſince the moſt excellent man muſt be called unhappy, if he is labouring under ſuch calamities as are the permanent cauſe of painful ſenſations. The wants of human nature are very numerous! Many of them are independent on our will: the

failure

failure in satisfying urgent necessities, is unavoidably accompanied with pain, frequently the most acute; nay, even a great number of the voluntary or artificial wants are, by degrees and through incidental circumstances, so intimately interwoven with the well-being of man, that he must always feel unhappy, when he is deprived of those means, by which he was accustomed to satisfy them. Besides, there is a great number of accidents, which render him who is exposed to them always unhappy; and experience does not teach us, that any distinction prevails here between the good and bad. Diseases, war, famine, and all physical evils, oppress the honest man with equal, and frequently with much greater, rigour than the dishonest: the former, as well as the latter, is placed in unhappy situations, without the means of evading these evils. It requires, upon the whole, no proof that in the distribution of physical goods, though a necessary part of human happiness, no moral order at all can be discovered in experience; and that, if the latter alone could decide the question, we must explain all the agreement between happiness and virtue, entirely by the law of chance. What happens in nature according to physical laws, is equally different from what ought to happen according to the laws of moral order, as the usual actions of man differ from their duties.

But although we observe in this world no such moral order, as exhibits happiness and morality in constant proportion; our Reason still preserves an uncommon propensity to maintain, that such an order must actually exist. This, however, is a presupposition, which can be justified, neither by argument nor demonstration, nor through the real exposition of such an order; but which is established merely upon a ground contained in our own mind. This ground rests on the necessary internal obligation of being morally good, or on the moral feelings common to all mankind, and acknowledged by all good men. The actual existence of a moral order is so intimately connected with these feelings, that the consciousness of them continually impels us to presuppose this order. And the more eagerly we cultivate morality, by displaying much vigour in the observation of its laws; the more firmly and thoroughly we become convinced, that there must exist a complete moral order.

The

The train of thought, by which Reaſon forms and juſtifies this concluſion, is nearly the following.

Reaſon acknowledges it as indiſpenſably neceſſary, that man ought to act conformably to moral laws. As long as man enjoys the uſe of Reaſon, no ſituation or relation in life can be conceived, in which he is exempted from the obligation of acting as a moral being. To act morally right, is therefore the higheſt object, at which every man ought to aim: Reaſon cannot, upon any condition whatever, reverſe this judgment, without falling into an obvious contradiction with itſelf. Now, we find, in human nature, at the ſame time, a deſire of happineſs, which is not always gratified. Our nature, however, is ſo conſtituted, that we muſt feel a neceſſary deſire of happineſs; and this natural wiſh is a ſufficient ground for exerting ourſelves, to realize it by all the means in our power. The rules, in conſequence of which men attain to real happineſs, are ſolely and exclnſively learned from experience; while the moral laws are derived *a priori* from Reaſon: and thus it happens, that many rules for procuring happineſs are contrary to morality; or that they weaken the force of the moral law. Nevertheleſs, Reaſon places a much higher value on morality, and commands us to wiſh for no other happineſs, but ſuch as is in perfect harmony with moral feelings. Upon this very occaſion we learn, that the happineſs of men is connected with conditions and circumſtances, ſo various and incidental, that we cannot always attain it, by practiſing either the laws of morality or prudence. For, the moral conduct does not, as far as experience informs us, neceſſarily produce happineſs; ſince we obſerve no phyſical connection between them; and ſince the aſſociation of good fortune with a moral conduct appears to be merely accidental. Even the utmoſt prudence of man cannot rear the fabric of felicity, though he ſhould act in defiance of morality, and endeavour to make happineſs his only and unconditional object. For the latter depends on too many circumſtances, over which man has no power of controul, and through which frequently the wiſeſt plans may be rendered abortive.

The happineſs of a moral being, in a moral order of things, can properly be ſaid to conſiſt in no other maxim than the following:

"every

" every thing that happens, is in ſtrict harmony with the general laws of morality." Even the good man can wiſh and deſire nothing further. If he now admit a moral principle or a God, he muſt likewiſe expect, that every thing ſhall really correſpond with moral purpoſes; and conſequently, if a man act virtuouſly, he can expect nothing elſe, in a moral world, but real happineſs. In fact, therefore, man awaits his proſperity from good fortune, the diſpenſation of which is entruſted to a wiſe Providence. This hope is entirely ſupported by the belief in God, and it is equally conſtant and ſafe as the latter.

Since man poſſeſſes no power over all thoſe things, which relate to his ultimate deſtination, no other condition of attaining this remains for the virtuous, but to conſider the whole world ſubject to a moral order; that is, to look upon moral beings as abſolute and ultimate purpoſes, to which every thing relates, that is real in the world; or to conſider theſe beings as containing the cauſe, on account of which every thing is thus conſtituted, and not otherwiſe. For, if theſe contain the ground of the conſtitution of the world, there muſt exiſt a certain order in it, conformably to which the eſſential purpoſes of moral beings can be attained. Allowing, therefore, that happineſs is a part of the eſſential deſtination of human nature, and that men themſelves belong to the claſs of moral beings; nature itſelf muſt be ſo conſtituted, that their happineſs can be effected by her aid. But the deſtination of human nature is not completed by the attainment of that happineſs alone, which conſiſts in mere enjoyment, but by morality, in union with happineſs, and indeed ſo modified, that the latter be in proportion to the former. Morality muſt determine the meaſure of happineſs allotted to every individual, and not *vice verſa*. If thus we ſhall conceive the attainment of our deſtination, as a poſſible event; we muſt admit a thorough moral order as really ſubſiſting, though it be not in our power to produce an *objective* proof of it. The ground, on which we admit it, lies merely in our own mind, and indeed in the conviction, that we are moral beings deſigned for ultimate purpoſes. To conceive theſe beings in connection with other things, is altogether impoſſible, unleſs we grant, that the latter relate to the former, and facilitate the attainment

tainment of their deſtination. It is, conſequently, the reflection made upon our own moral nature, which induces us to admit the exiſtence of a moral order.

Though we cannot diſcover this moral order in experience, the truth of it is not thereby in the leaſt degree affected, nor can it be diſputed from that ſource. For experience could no where prove the exiſtence of a thorough moral order, although all the phenomena, that we obſerve, ſhould correſpond with the idea of it. It would ever remain doubtful, whether this correſpondence be general and conſtant, unleſs a very different manner of repreſenting it, afforded certainty to the concluſions thus ariſing. For, to comprehend the reality of ſuch an order *a poſteriori*, there would be required a complete view of all things and their relations to one another; a view, that is unattainable by beings ſo conſtituted as we are. And the circumſtance of our finding virtue frequently accompanied by misfortune, is by no means inconſiſtent with the *idea* of a moral order. This idea does not imply the neceſſity, that every moral action ſhall be immediately attended with a certain portion of happineſs, or that the latter be phyſically produced: it involves only this much, that the lot of man, upon the whole, is in a certain harmony with his moral character. In this way it is not difficult to conceive, that one or ſeveral periods of his exiſtence are particularly deſigned for the purpoſe of improving his moral nature, and that good and bad fortune may be ſo diſtributed during theſe periods, that they can be uſed rather as the means of improvement, than to ſerve as the ſcale of aſcertaining the moral excellence of the individual. Nevertheleſs, the regulations in the world may be ſo made, that ſuch a ſhare of happineſs ariſes from them for each moral being, as it has merited by its conduct. We elevate man above the conſideration of his being a paſſive inſtrument in the hands of nature, when we repreſent him as ſacrificing a part of that happineſs, of which his ſenſitive nature is ſuſceptible; in order to contribute his ſhare, that other rational beings may likewiſe attain their deſtination; provided that he does not neglect his own. For, Reaſon itſelf muſt approve of ſuch a regulation. If now, from this point of view, we conſider the events and the viciſſitudes of human life, which we obſerve by experience in the

world of ſenſe; all the facts thus obtained are perfectly conſiſtent with the poſſibility of a moral order. We muſt however not attempt to make ſuch uſe of them, as if they were abſolute proofs; ſince they can be uſed only as arguments for diſproving the contrary of a moral order. But if we repreſent the queſtion upon this foundation, that moral actions *ought* to produce happineſs conformably to the laws of nature; then the inſtances, by which we prove that virtue and misfortune are in certain caſes accompanied by one another, would not only be irrefutable, but they would likewiſe prove the nullity of this complete moral order.

In the Kantian philoſophy, it is a matter of no importance, and wholly undetermined, *how* ſuch an order is *really* poſſible. The reality of it, KANT does not attempt to demonſtrate from a pretended view of its cauſes; he rather grants, that theſe are to us altogether inconceivable. He only admits this moral order, on account of the ſtrong and conſtant demands of Reaſon; a faculty, that thinks or judges of moral beings as abſolute and ultimate, to whom every thing elſe relates, and who conſequently muſt determine the order of all other things, and their relations to the moral beings themſelves.

Thus we preſuppoſe a moral order, while we confidently rely upon our Reaſon and our moral nature; becauſe the reality of it muſt be conceived from its being ſo intimately united with our moral feelings. It is certain, that we are moral agents, conſequently the conditions muſt alſo be certain, without which our moral nature, in the eyes of our own Reaſon, would be a nonentity. According to Reaſon, however, our moral nature conſiſts in this, that man is an abſolute purpoſe, to which all other things are ſubordinate means. Yet morality and happineſs, united to one purpoſe, compoſe the deſtination of man, ſo that the former determines the latter. Without a moral order, this is impoſſible. And as, agreeably to Reaſon, moral beings muſt have it in their power to contribute towards the attainment of their deſtination; the reality of a moral order muſt likewiſe be admitted; becauſe it is the only condition, upon which this inference can be juſtified. If we then allow the exiſtence of a moral order, we muſt alſo ſubmit to thoſe conditions, without which it is wholly impoſſible. Though we

cannot

cannot comprehend the real poſſibility of this order, we muſt nevertheleſs grant, that thoſe conditions are real, without which ſuch an order cannot at all be conceived. But it is inconceivable, if we do not admit, 1, that the laws of the world of ſenſe are not the only ones, by which all events are determined: that the world itſelf is ſubject to ſtill higher laws, and upon the whole, relates to ſomething, which is independent on the world, or external to it, and to which the world is merely ſubſervient; 2, that there exiſts a cauſe, through which every thing is determined according to the laws of a moral order, to which conſequently every thing is ſubject, and upon which every thing in the world depends; and laſtly, 3, that the perſonality or individual exiſtence of man continues, in order that through him the moral order may be accompliſhed.

It is eaſy to perceive, that the firſt of theſe poſtulates leads to the idea of a ſuperſenſible world, which is independent on the laws ſubſiſting in the world of ſenſe, i. e. which is *free*. The ſecond idea involves the conception of a *Deity*. For, if we ſeparate every arbitrary and adventitious matter from the idea of the Deity, and preſerve that alone, upon which a repreſentation worthy of ſo ſublime a Being can be eſtabliſhed; nothing further remains than the thought of a connection or relation, by means of which that Being muſt be the foundation of a thorough moral order. No other idea, however, but that of an intelligent power could entitle or even induce us to entertain a notion like that of moral order; hence it is conceivable, how in this idea alone we meet with ſome analogy, that ſerves to diſtinguiſh ſo ſublime a Being, and, together with the moſt perfect will, to attribute to it all thoſe properties, through which only ſo ſacred a will can be exerted. Laſtly; that the third principle before ſtated, leads to the *immortality of the ſoul*, is now a very rational inference.

The idea of *Liberty*, or the faculty of determining our actions uninfluenced by ſenſual motives, and ſelf active, through the conſciouſneſs of the moral law alone; this idea is involved in that of morality. We therefore undoubtedly poſſeſs that liberty, as we are moral agents; and the conception of liberty in general has been perfectly juſtified by ſhowing, that the phyſical world is not

the only one, which influences the nature of man; that it is connected with beings of a very different kind, whose actions are determined by very different laws. The idea of a moral order stands in the same relation to that of our being moral agents, whose destination is certainly attainable; as the former is connected with the idea of God and Immortality; so that if we admit the truth of the one, the relation of the others must likewise be granted. Thus we are sufficiently and perfectly authorized to believe in God and Immortality, as the two essential pillars of all Religion; though the arguments for this belief, are not taken from the perception of objects, but are derived from the more permanent nature of our mind.

Upon a cursory view of the statement here given, it might perhaps appear to some readers, as if in Kant's process of reasoning, first morality is represented as the ground-work of Religion, and afterwards Religion again is called an aid, to support the idea of a moral law. But, upon a mature consideration of the subject, this appearance will very soon vanish. For, the ground of discovering a moral law, lies merely and exclusively in our Reason, which presents to us this law, as soon as it is conceived in a practical or active sense; and which, independent on all Religion, imposes upon us the obligation of observing the precepts of morality. But if, with this moral obligation, we compare nature and her relations to the destination of man, Reason requires, that nature should likewise agree with the destination of moral beings; because, in the contrary case, that value which Reason places upon its faculties and operations, and which is to be computed much higher than Nature itself, would not be real, but altogether imaginary. Thus convinced of a moral order, man may certainly make use of it, in order to remove those difficulties, which present themselves in the practice of the moral law. The doubts and uncertainties, which may arise against the reality of a moral order of things, are thereby suppressed; the sensual appetites, too, are through this conviction so modified and regulated, that they shall be indulged only with a view of such an happiness as is consistent with virtue, while they gradually become familiar with the order, that is manifest throughout all nature. Besides, this mode of representing a

system

ſyſtem contains a great number of arguments, from which even the ſenſitive faculty derives ſome conſolation, if its purpoſes ſhould be occaſionally defeated, and its neceſſities too much limited; for there ſtill remains a ſtate, in which this alſo may be ſatisfied; provided that man perſeveres in obeying the dictates of morality. Thus Religion certainly contains arguments in favour of morality, and on this very account it is calculated to remove many obſtacles, which may occur in the practice of the moral law. Religion, therefore, offers no intuitive ground of diſcovering moral precepts, though it can be employed as an excellent pſychological aid of ſtrengthening the moral faculty of human nature; ſince it overcomes thoſe difficulties, which frequently ariſe from falſe reflections, and which obſtruct the due exerciſe of that faculty.

XXII. (6) *Metaphyſiſche Anfangsgründe der Naturwiſſenſchaft.* Metaphyſical Principles of Natural Philoſophy. 8vo. *Riga*, 1786. 2d Edit. 1787, pp. 158, and xxiv pages Preface.

This is, without exception, the moſt profound of KANT's works; and in order to afford the reader a conciſe view of the author's aim, I ſhall firſt give an abſtract from the elaborate Preface to this publication, and then exhibit the principles of this *new* ſcience, in a cloſe tranſlation.

'It is of the greateſt importance to the progreſs of the ſciences, "ſays Kant," to ſeparate diſſimilar principles from one another, to reduce each ſet of them to a particular ſyſtem, that they may form a ſcience of a peculiar kind. Thus we ſhall prevent that uncertainty in ſciences, which ariſes from confounding them, and in conſequence of which we cannot eaſily diſtinguiſh the limits, which, in a doubtful caſe, are to be aſſigned to each of them; nor can we diſcover the ſource of the errors, that may attend the practical application of them. On this account, I have deemed it neceſſary, to exhibit ſyſtematically the *pure* part of Natural Philoſophy (*Phyſica generalis*), in which metaphyſical and mathematical conſtructions of ideas occur promiſcuouſly; and, in treating of the former, to ſhow at the ſame time the principles of that conſtruction,

and

and consequently to prove the possibility of a System of Natural Philosophy, deduced from mathematical demonstrations. This division of sciences, beside the advantage already stated, is attended with the particular satisfaction, which the unity and harmony of knowledge afford, when we can prevent the limits of the sciences from interfering with one another.'

'As a second reason of recommending this process, it may be urged, that in every department of Metaphysics we may hope to attain to *absolute completeness*, such as we cannot expect in any other species of knowledge; consequently, the completeness of the Metaphysics of material nature may be expected, here, with the same confidence as in the Metaphysics of nature in general. For, in Metaphysics, the object is merely considered, agreeably to the general laws of thought, while in other sciences it must be represented according to the different data of perception, whether this be pure or empirical. In Metaphysics, too, we acquire a determined number of cognitions, which can be completely exhausted; because, here, the object must be continually compared with all the necessary laws of thought: while in the other sciences, on account of the infinite variety of perceptions, or objects of thought, which they present to the mind, we never can attain to absolute completeness, but may extend them in infinitum, as is the case with pure Mathematics and experimental Physics. I likewise believe, that I have completely stated these metaphysical principles of Natural Philosophy, to their utmost extent; but though I have succeeded in this attempt, I do not flatter myself with having performed any extraordinary task.'

'To complete, however, a metaphysical system, whether that of nature in general, or that of the material world, the Table of the Categories * must serve as its Schema. For there are in reality no more nor fewer pure intellectual notions concerning the nature of things, than I have stated in that Table. All the determinations relative to the general notion of matter, consequently all that can be conceived of it *a priori*, that can be exhibited in mathematical construction, or that can be proposed as a determined object of experience, must admit of being reduced to the four

* Vid. the *Categories*, p. 45, and their *Schemata*, p. 47.

four classes of the Categories, viz. that of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. There remains nothing to be discovered or added here; but if imperfections should occur, with respect to perspicuity and order, the system in this respect may be occasionally improved.'

'The idea of matter must, therefore, be examined through all the four mentioned functions of the intellect (in four Sections), in each of which a new determination of that idea occurs. The primary attribute of something, that represents an object of the external senses, must be motion; for by that only can these senses be affected. To this, the Understanding reduces all other predicates of matter, that relate to its nature; and thus Natural Philosophy is, throughout, either a pure or applied *theory of motion*. The metaphysical principles of this science must, consequently, be divided into four Sections: in the *first* of which, motion is considered as a pure quantum, according to its composition, without any quality of that which is moveable, and hence may be called PHORONOMY; in the *second*, motion is investigated in its relation to the quantity of matter, under the name of an originally moving power, and is therefore called DYNAMICS; in the *third*, matter is examined in reciprocal relation to this quantity, by its peculiar motion, and appears under the title of MECHANICS; and in the *fourth* Section, the motion or rest of matter is determined merely in relation to the mode of representing it, or *Modality*, consequently as phenomenon of external senses, on which account is is called PHENOMENOLOGY.'

CONTENTS.

SECT. I. *Metaphysical principles of* PHORONOMY.

POSITION 1. Matter is that which is *moveable* in space. That space, which itself is moveable, is called the *material*, or likewise, *relative space*; that, in which all *motion* must be ultimately conceived (and which consequently in its own nature is absolutely immoveable), is called the pure, or likewise, *absolute space*.

Posit. 2. The motion of a thing is the change of its *external relations* to given space.

Posit.

Posit. 3. *Rest* is the permanent presence (*præsentia perdurabilis*) in the same place; *permanent* however is that which exists, i. e. continues for a certain time.

Posit. 4. To *construct* the idea of compound motion, means to represent motion a priori in the perceptive faculty, as far as the former arises from two or several joint motions in one moveable space.

Theorem. Every motion, as object of experience, may be considered, either as the motion of a body in a resting space, or as the rest of a body and, on the other hand, motion of space in opposite direction with equal velocity.

Posit. 5. The *combination* of *motion* is the representation of the motion of a point, as being homologous with two or several motions of it united together.

SECT. II. *Metaphysical principles of* DYNAMICS.

Posit. 1. *Matter* is that which is *moveable*, so far as it *fills* a *space*. To *fill* a space, is to resist all that is moveable and that makes an effort, by its motion, to penetrate into a certain space. A space that is not filled, is a *vacuum*.

Theorem, 1. Matter fills a space, not by its mere *existence*, but by a particular *moving power*.

Posit. 2. The *power* of *attraction* is that moving power, by which one matter may be the cause of the approach of others towards it; or, in other words, by which it resists the removal of others from it.—The *power of repulsion* is that, by which one matter may be the cause of removing others from it; or, in other words, by which it resists the approach of others towards it.

Theorem 2d. Matter fills its spaces by the repulsive power of all its parts, i. e. by a peculiar power of extension, that has a determined degree, beyond which smaller or greater degrees may be conceived in infinitum.

Posit 3. One matter, in its motion, *penetrates* another, when, by means of compression, it completely removes the space of its extension.

Theorem 3d. Matter may be *compressed* in infinitum, but it never can be *penetrated* by matter, however great its pressing power may be.

Posit.

Posit. 4. That *impenetrability* of matter, which depends upon the resistance proportionally increasing with the degrees of compression, is called *relative*; as on the contrary that, which rests upon the *supposition*, that matter, as such, is not liable to any compression whatever, is here called *absolute* impenetrability.—The *filling* of *space* with absolute impenetrability may be called *mathematical*, while that of relative impenetrability receives the name of *dynamical*.

Posit. 5. *Material substance* is that in space, which is moveable of itself, i. e. separate from every other thing that exists without it in space. The motion of a part of matter, by which it ceases to be a part, is *separation*. The separation of the parts of matter is the *physical division*.

Theorem 4th. Matter is *divisible in infinitum*, and indeed into parts, each of which is again matter.

Theorem. 5th. The possibility of matter renders a power of attraction necessary; this being the second essential and fundamental power of it.

Theorem 6th. By the mere power of attraction, without that of repulsion, we cannot conceive the possibility of any matter.

Posit. 6. Contact, in a physical sense, is immediate action and reaction of *impenetrability*. The action of one matter upon another, without contact, is the *action at distance* (*actio in distans*). This action at distance, which is possible even without the aid of intervenient matter, is called the immediate *action* of matter upon matter, *through empty space*.

Theorem 7th. The *attraction essential to all matter*, is the immediate action of it upon another matter, through empty space.

Posit. 7th. A moving power, by which matters can immediately act upon one another only in a common surface of contact, is called a *superficial power*; but that, by which one matter can immediately act upon the parts of another, even beyond the surface of contact, may be called a *penetrating power*.

Theorem 8th. The original power of attraction, upon which the possibility of matter itself, as such, must depend, extends in

the univerſe immediately from every part of it to another ad infinitum.

SECT III. *Metaphyſical principles of* MECHANICS.

Poſit. 1. *Matter* is that which is *moveable*, ſo far as it (as ſuch) poſſeſſes moving power.

Poſit. 2. The *quantity of matter* is the amount of that which is moveable in a determined ſpace. This, ſo far as all its parts are conſidered in their motions as operating (moving) at the ſame time, is called *congeries*; and we ſay, that a matter acts in a congeries, when all its parts, moved in the ſame direction, exerciſe their moving power externally, and *at the ſame time*. A congeries conſiſting of a determined ſhape is called a *body* (in a mechanical ſenſe). The *magnitude* of *motion* (mechanically computed) is that which is eſtimated both by the quantity of matter moved, and its velocity: when *phoronomically* conſidered, it conſiſts merely in the degree of velocity.

Theorem 1ſt. The quantity of a piece of matter, in compariſon with *any* other, can be eſtimated only by the quantity of motion in a given velocity.

Theorem 2d. *Firſt law of Mechanics.* In all the changes of corporeal nature, the quantity of matter remains, upon the whole, without increaſing or diminiſhing.

Theorem 3d. *Second law of Mechanics.* Every change of matter has an external cauſe. (Every material body remains in its ſtate of reſt or motion, in the ſame direction, and with the ſame velocity, unleſs it be compelled by ſome external cauſe, to change this ſtate.)

Theorem 4th. *Third Mechanical law.* In every communicated motion, the action and reaction always correſpond with one another.

SECT. IV. *Metaphyſical principles of* PHENOMENOLOGY.

Poſit. Matter is that which is *moveable*, as far as in that reſpect it can be an object of experience.

Theorem 1ſt. The motion of matter, in a ſtraight line, is, with reſpect to an empirical ſpace, merely a *poſſible* predicate, in contradiſtinction to the oppoſite motion of ſpace. The very ſame predicate

predicate is *impoſſible*, if we conceive it in no external relation to matter, i. e. as *abſolute motion*.

Theorem 2d. The circular motion of matter, in contradiſtinction to the oppoſite motion of ſpace, is a *real* predicate of it; whereas the oppoſite motion of a relative ſpace, if ſubſtituted for the motion of the body, is no real motion of the latter, and if conſidered as ſuch, is a mere illuſion.

Theorem 3d. In every motion of a body, by which it is moving, with reſpect to another body, an oppoſite equal motion of the latter is *neceſſary*.

XXIII.(7) *Grundlegung zur Critik des Geſchmacks*. Fundamental principles of the Critique of Taſte. 8vo. *Riga*. 1787.

Though we have not ſucceeded in procuring a copy of this publication, we ſhall find an opportunity of ſtating the outlines of Kant's ideas upon this intereſting ſubject, in a ſubſequent work, under No. XXV. (9), in which he conſiders the various *judgments* reſulting from *Taſte*; the modes, in which they take place in the mind; and their reſpective peculiarities.

XXIV. (8.) *Critik der practiſchen Vernunft*. Critique of Practical Reaſon. 8vo. *Riga*. 1788. 2d Edit. 1792.

If we abſtract from the *empirical* part of experience, or if we conceive experience as a general idea, without attending to any variety that may be contained under this idea; we then acquire *a priori* the conditions of it. The empirical or experimental knowledge obtained by experience formed the *matter* of it; but thoſe conditions, without which experience cannot be reduced to the rules of thought, we have called the *form* of it.—We muſt proceed in a ſimilar manner, when we reflect upon the various operations of our *will*. I will, for inſtance, any one object, and I immediately become conſcious of the idea relating to ſome expected pleaſure; an idea, which is connected with this will. The repreſentation of that pleaſure, which the poſſeſſion of the object might afford, is the empirical part of the will, that conſtitutes its matter. If we abſtract from the latter, there is produced the idea

of a *free will*, the condition as it were of every thing that is *empirical*. If, further, we lay aside in thought every thing that refers to experience, and still suppose a will completely determined towards acting; there remains at last nothing but the faculty of reason itself, which determines this will to act. In this manner arises in us the idea of a *Practical Reason*; a faculty, which directs the will, independent of any impulse of the senses. The "Critique of Practical Reason," therefore, sets out with the design of investigating this faculty.

CONTENTS.

BOOK I. ANALYSIS OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON.

SECT. I. *Of the principles of pure practical Reason.*

Illustration. Practical *principles* are such as contain a general determination of the will, which again has a variety of subordinate practical rules. They are subjective principles or *maxims*, when the condition is considered as applicable only to the will of the subject; but they are *objective* principles or practical *laws*, when that condition is acknowledged as objective, i. e. applicable to the will of every rational being.

Theorem 1st. All practical principles, which presuppose an *object* (matter) of the desiring faculty as the cause of determining the will, are wholly empirical, and cannot furnish practical laws.

Theorem 2d. All the practical principles relating to material objects, are, as such, without exception, of one and the same kind, and originate from the general principle of self-love or personal happiness.

Theorem 3d. If a rational being shall conceive its maxims as practical general laws; it can consider them only as principles, which contain the ground of determining the will, not according to the matter, but merely according to the form.

Fundamental law of pure practical Reason.

"Let such be your conduct, that the maxim of your will "may, in every instance, be admitted as the principle of a "general law;—or in other words:

"Act in such a manner, as to consider and to employ hu-

"manity,

" manity, in your own as well as in every other perſon, al-
" ways as the *purpoſe*, but never as the *means* of obtaining your
" object."

Theorem 4th. The *autonomy* of the will is the only principle of all moral laws, and of the duties conformable to them: all *heteronomy* of choice, therefore, not only eſtabliſhes no obligation whatever, but is likewiſe contrary to the principles of it, and to the moral purity of the will. The ſole principle of morality conſiſts in the independence, namely of all matter of the law (i. e. the object deſired), and at the ſame time in the determination of the choice by the pure general legiſlative forms, of which a maxim muſt be ſuſceptible. That *independence*, however, is liberty in a *negative* ſenſe; whereas this *peculiar legiſlative power* of pure, and as ſuch practical, Reaſon is liberty in a *poſitive* ſenſe. Hence the moral law expreſſes nothing elſe but the *autonomy* of pure practical Reaſon, i. e. of liberty, and this itſelf is the formal condition of all maxims, under which alone they can correſpond with the ſupreme practical law. If, therefore, the matter of volition, which can be nothing elſe but the object of a deſire that is connected with the law, enters into the *condition of its poſſibility*; there ariſes from it the heteronomy of choice, namely, the dependence on the law of nature, to follow any one impulſe or inclination; and the will does not give itſelf the law, but only the precept for a rational obſervance of pathological laws. But the maxim, which in this way never can contain the general legiſlative form, upon the ſame ground eſtabliſhes not only no obligation, but is likewiſe contrary to the principle of a *pure* practical Reaſon, conſequently alſo to moral ſentiment, although the action thus ariſing ſhould be lawful.

SECT II. *Of the idea concerning the object of pure practical Reaſon.*

TABLE

Of the Categories of Liberty relative to the cognitions we poſſeſs of the Good and Bad.

I.

1.

Of Quantity.

Subjective, in consequence of maxims: (*opinions depending upon the will* of the individual;)
Objective, in consequence of principles: (*precepts*;)
A priori objective as well as subjective principles of liberty: (*laws.*)

2.

Of Quality:

practical rules of *appetition*, (*præceptivæ*,)
practical rules of *omission*, (*prohibitivæ*,)
practical rules of *exceptions*, (*exceptivæ.*)

3.

Of Relation:

To *personality*,
To the *condition* of the person,
Reciprocally of one person to the condition of another,

4.

Of Modality:

Permitted and *nonpermitted* actions,
~~*Duty*~~ and contrary to duty,
perfect and *imperfect* duty.

Sect. III. *Of the motives of pure practical Reason.*
Critical illustration of the analysis of pure practical Reason.

Book II. Dialectic of pure practical Reason.

I. Antinomy of pure practical Reason.
II. Critical solution of this antinomy.
III. Of the principal advantage of pure practical Reason, in its connection with the speculative.
IV. On the immortality of the soul, as a postulate of pure practical Reason.
V. On the existence of a God, as a similar postulate.
VI. On the postulates of pure practical Reason in general.
VII. In what manner an extensive improvement of pure practical Reason

Reaſon is conceivable in a particular view, without increaſing at the ſame time its ſpeculative knowledge.

VIII. Of ſuppoſed truths, being a neceſſary reſult of pure Reaſon.

IX. Of the cognoſcible faculties of man, being wiſely proportioned to his practical deſtination.

Methodical doctrine of pure practical Reaſon.

XXV. (9) *Critik der Urtheilskraft.*—Critique of the Judging Faculty. 8vo. *Libau*, 1790. 2d Edit. *Berlin.* 1793, pp. 482, and lxx pp. Preface and Introduction.

The author's principal aim in this work is to inquire, 'whether the *Judging Faculty*, which, in the order of our cognoſcible powers, forms an intermediate capacity between the Underſtanding and Reaſon, has likewiſe its own principles *a priori*; whether theſe are conſtitutive or merely regulative; and whether that faculty of judging affords *a priori* the rule for the ſenſations of pleaſure and diſpleaſure, which again are the intermediate degrees between the cognoſcible and appetitive faculties.'

'A Critique of pure Reaſon, i. e. of our capacity of judging conformably to principles *a priori*, would be incomplete, if the Judging Faculty, which likewiſe claims theſe principles, were not treated as a ſeparate part of that Critique; although, in a ſyſtem of pure philoſophy, the principles of judgment muſt not be conſidered as a ſeparate part, belonging either to the theoretical or practical department of the ſyſtem; but, in caſes of emergency, they may be occaſionally connected with either. For, if ſuch a ſyſtem ſhall once be eſtabliſhed under the general name of Metaphyſics (a work, the complete attainment of which is by no means impoſſible, and which would be of the firſt importance to the general uſe of Reaſon); the Critique muſt have previouſly inveſtigated the ground, on which this ſtructure is to be erected, as well as the ſolidity of the baſis of this faculty, that deduces its principles independent on experience: and if any one part of this fabric ſhould be found to ſtand upon a ſlight foundation, the downfal of the whole would be the inevitable conſequence.

'But we may eaſily perceive from the nature of the Judging Faculty, that the diſcovery of the peculiar principle of it, muſt be attended

attended with great difficulties; for this faculty must necessarily contain some such principle *a priori*; because, in the contrary case, it could not be subject to the most common critique as a particular faculty of acquiring knowledge; and because the proper use of it is so necessary, and so universally admitted, that every body is acquainted with its influence. That principle, however, must not be derived from notions *a priori*, since these are the property of the Understanding, and the application of them only belongs to the Judging Faculty. Hence the latter must furnish an idea, through which indeed we obtain no intuition of any object, but which serves as a rule to that faculty itself. This rule, however, is not of an *objective* nature, so that we could compare the judgment with it *in concreto*; for to do this, there would be required a second Judging Faculty, in order to enable us to distinguish, whether the case applies to the rule or not.

'This perplexity on account of a principle (whether a subjective or objective one) chiefly manifests itself in those judgments, which are called *aesthetical*, which relate to the Beautiful and the Sublime, whether that of nature or art. And yet is the critical investigation of a principle of the Judging Faculty, respecting those objects, the most important part of the Critique of this power. For, though the aesthetical judgments, of themselves, contribute nothing to the knowledge we obtain of things, they nevertheless belong exclusively to the cognoscible faculty, and evince the immediate relation of this faculty to the sensations of pleasure and displeasure, in consequence of some one principle a priori, without confounding it with that, which may be the cause of determining the appetitive faculty; because this has its principles a priori in notions, which are the produce of Reason.'

Having premised this extract from the author's preface to the work under consideration, I shall only add the result of KANT's inquiry respecting the final purposes of nature, as exhibited in the SECOND BOOK of this publication; though, in my opinion, this investigation forms the most interesting and essential part of the whole. It is as follows.

In conformity to our Reason, we are obliged to assume a certain connection subsisting between the final purposes of nature, in the same

manner as our Underſtanding, in conſequence of its conſtitution, is impelled to combine things according to their efficient cauſes. As ſoon as we obſerve a certain poſitive relation among things to one another; as ſoon as we can repreſent to ourſelves one thing as poſſible only through the idea we poſſeſs of another; we can reduce ſuch a combination to no other idea than that of final cauſes, or of means and purpoſes. Although we are not able to perceive and to determine the ground, on which that connection reſts, as a thing independent on our ſenſes; we may ſtill conceive it, in a general manner, as the ground of ſuch a combination as can be repreſented by us under the idea of connecting final cauſes; we may thus think of it under the only *ſymbol*, which can properly denote the baſis of this aſſociation, namely that of Reaſon. In this way, however, we have no title to refer the modes and actions we obſerve in our Reaſon, to that being (ſubſtratum) itſelf; but we muſt make uſe of them only as a ſymbol, which at leaſt expreſſes ſimilar relations.

We muſt, therefore, juſtly conſider the world, as if every thing were arranged in it by the higheſt Underſtanding; and we muſt, with the greateſt attention, endeavour to diſcover in experience thoſe traces, that are every where ſcattered for the ſupport of this concluſion; in order to prepare our minds for the conviction ariſing from a very conſiderable number of individual caſes. In this, we ſhall the better ſucceed, if, as the ground-work of this inquiry, we exhibit that ſyſtematic order, which is already determined by our Reaſon *a priori*, and in conſequence of which determination the moral beings compoſe the laſt and abſolute purpoſe, to which all other things ultimately and neceſſarily refer as the means of the former. But ſince we can recognize no other moral being than man, we muſt accordingly regulate our inveſtigations relative to final purpoſes, and particularly attend to what is connected with *his* nature. Here, however, we muſt abandon the notion hitherto erroneouſly maintained by many Theologians, that *every thing* has a neceſſary relation to man. For, as the world of moral beings certainly conſiſts of more claſſes than we are acquainted with, we may indeed preſuppoſe, that men are abſolute purpoſes, yet far from being excluſively ſo; and that nature has

not been conſtituted for the ſake of men alone, but that, at the ſame time, other moral beings have not been diſregarded. We may therefore ſafely admit, that nature has been ſo formed, that the eſſential purpoſes concerning man can be certainly attained, notwithſtanding that the accidental purpoſes muſt occaſionally remain unaccompliſhed, on account of others that are more important and neceſſary. For this aſſertion, which is ſupported merely upon the principles of our moral nature, and not by any intuitive knowledge of the world itſelf, experience only furniſhes us with arguments, which this order of the world diſplays in individual caſes. But the greateſt number of phenomena muſt neceſſarily remain inexplicable to us, who are acquainted only with the ſmalleſt part of the world, and from whom the extenſive territory of moral beings is almoſt wholly concealed: whereas a complete knowledge of their relations to purpoſes would preſuppoſe not only a thorough knowledge of the world of ſenſe, but likewiſe that of moral beings. We derive from the contemplation of the world no proofs ſhowing a regular order of moral purpoſes, but we inveſtigate the caſes correſponding with that order, ſo as to aſcertain it in the individual, and to ſtrengthen our knowledge upon what we had already preſuppoſed, in conſequence of our moral nature. For, that which affords ſome knowledge in a general way, gives but a ſlight degree of conviction; while that which animates this conviction and renders it applicable to particular caſes, i. e. our ſenſation of it, is produced only by individual inſtances.

According to theſe principles, we ſhall be able to diſcover traces of divine wiſdom in a great number of phenomena, without neglecting on that account our inquiries into nature, which alone can extend our knowledge of things; which previouſly unfolds the matter of knowledge; and which points out the relations, wherein divine wiſdom is evident. The field of phyſics is immenſe; and by an appeal to the Deity, who has produced nature itſelf conformably to final cauſes, we can ſet no limits to that field. For, to obtain a complete view of final cauſes, and to apply them to the explanation of phenomena, is entirely out of our power: we can only mark them as the reſults ariſing from our intuitive knowledge of nature, with this limitation; that, when we obtain a

more

more accurate knowledge of the nature of these things, we shall likewise discover a greater variety of final causes, and so on in infinitum.

The contemplation of nature, agreeably to final purposes, is therefore fully established in the constitution of our Reason; although we have no intuition of the being that is the basis of this order. We can conceive this being merely by the idea of Reason in general, as the only possible way of apprehending it: thus, however, our knowledge of the nature of that being is not increased; and we only satisfy a subjective, but necessary claim of our Reason. For such an order of things as depends upon a regular succession of final causes, can be thought of by no other relation but that of a causality conformably to ideas; a result, which exactly corresponds with the general idea of an efficient Reason.

Contents.

Introduction.—I. Of the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical.

II. Of the extent of philosophy in general.

III. Of the Critique of the Judging Faculty, being the medium of combining the two parts of philosophy into one system.

IV. Of the Judging Faculty being a legislative power *a priori*.

V. The principle of formal conformation (*Zweckmäßigkeit*) of nature is a transcendental principle of the Judging Faculty.

VI. Of the connection between the sensation of pleasure and the idea of the conformation of nature.

VII. On the aesthetical method of representing this conformation.

VIII. On the logical method of exhibiting the same.

IX. On the connections formed between the legislative acts of the Understanding and Reason, by means of the Judging Faculty.

The following Table exhibits the whole of what relates to the province of

TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Collective faculties of the Mind.	*Faculties of Cognition.*	*Principles a priori.*	*Application to*
The Faculty of Cognition.	The Understanding.	Legality.	Nature,
The sense of pleasure and displeasure.	The Judging Faculty.	Conformation.	Art,
The faculty of desiring.	Reason.	Final purpose.	Liberty.

Division I. Critique of the aesthetical Faculty of Judging.

Sect. I. Analysis of the Aesthetical Judging Faculty.

Book I. *Analysis of the Beautiful.*

First modification *of the Judgment of Taste according to its* quality.

§ 1. The judgment of taste is *aesthetical.* 2. The approbation determined by this judgment is not influenced by any self-interest relative to the object. 3. The approbation, or the satisfaction we express upon what is *agreeable*, is connected with self-interest. 4. The same is the case with regard to what is *good.* 5. Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of satisfaction.

Second modification *of the Judgment of Taste, namely according to its* quantity.

§ 6. That which is represented as an object of *universal* approbation, independent on collateral notions, is called Beautiful. 7. Comparison of the Beautiful, the Agreeable, and the Good, by the above stated character. 8. The universality of approbation, in a judgment of taste, is represented only in a subjective sense. 9. Investigation of the question: whether in a judgment of taste the sense of pleasure precede the act of judging upon the object, or follow it.

Third modification *of the Judgments of Taste, according to their* relation *to purposes.*

§ 10. Of Conformation in general. 11. The judgment of taste is wholly founded upon the *form* or the *nexus finalis* of an object, (or on the manner of representing that object to the mind). 12. The judgment of taste depends upon principles a priori. 13. 14. This judgment is not related to any emotion of the mind. 15. It is equally unconnected with the idea of perfection. 16. That judgment of taste, by which an object is declared to be beautiful only under a certain condition, cannot be called a pure judgment. 17. On the prototype of Beauty.

Fourth modification *of the Judgment of Taste, according to the* modality *of the satisfaction in the object.*

§ 10. This modality of an aesthetical judgment is not a necessary, but

but an *exemplary* determination of *all* individuals, reſpecting a judgment, that is conſidered as an example of a general rule, the particulars of which cannot be defined. 19. The ſubjective neceſſity, which we attribute to an aeſthetical judgment, is conditional. 20. The condition of the neceſſity, which a judgment of taſte ſuppoſes, is the idea of a common ſenſe. 21. Whether we have grounds, on which we may conclude the reality of a common ſenſe. 22. The neceſſity of the general approbation, which is conceived in an aeſthetical judgment, is a ſubjective neceſſity, which, under the ſuppoſition of a common ſenſe, is repreſented as objective.

COROLLARIES FROM THESE FOUR MODIFICATIONS.

I. *Taſte* is the faculty of judging of an object, or of repreſenting it by means of approbation or diſapprobation, unconnected with *any ſelf-intereſt*. The object of ſuch approbation is called *Beautiful*.

II. *Beautiful* is that which affords univerſal ſatisfaction, without reducing it to a certain idea.

III. *Beauty* is the conformation or *nexus finalis* of an object, ſo far as it is obſerved in it, *without the repreſentation of a purpoſe*.

IV. *Beautiful* is that which is recognized as an object of *neceſſary* ſatisfaction, without combining with it a particular idea.

BOOK II. *Analyſis of the Sublime.*

§ 23. Tranſition from the judging power of the Beautiful to that of the Sublime. 24. Of the diviſion of an inquiry into the ſenſation of the Sublime. A. *On the mathematical Sublime.* 25. Definition of the Sublime: "*Sublime*, in general, is that which is abſolutely great, which admits of no compariſon, to think of which only proves a faculty of the mind, which is not ſubject to any ſcale of the ſenſes, &c." 26. Of the mathematical computation of natural objects, which is requiſite to produce the idea of the Sublime. 27. Of the quality of the ſatisfaction we receive in judging of the Sublime. B. *On the dynamical Sublime of nature.* 28. Nature conſidered as might (*potentia*). 29. On the modality of the judgment reſpecting the

the Sublime of nature.—*Deduction of the pure æſthetical judgments.*—30. The deduction of aeſthetical judgments upon the objects of nature muſt not be directed to what we call ſublime in the latter, but to the Beautiful only. 31. On the proper method of this deduction. 32. *Firſt* peculiarity of an aeſthetical judgment: "that it determines its object with reſpect to the ſatisfaction found in it, at the ſame time claiming the approbation of *every body*, as if it were *objective*," 33. *Second* peculiarity: "that it cannot at all be determined by argumental proofs, as if it were merely *ſubjective*." 34. No objective principle of taſte can be diſcovered. 35. The principle of taſte is the ſubjective principle of the judging faculty in general. 36. How the deduction of aeſthetical judgments muſt be carried on. 37. What is properly aſſerted a priori, in this judgment, concerning the object. 38. Deduction of aeſthetical judgments. 39. How a ſenſation can be communicated. 40. Of Taſte, as a ſpecies of *ſenſus communis*. 41. Of the empirical intereſt in the Beautiful. 42. Of the intellectual intereſt. 43. Of art in general. "*Art* is diſtinguiſhed from *Nature*, like doing (*facere*) from acting or operating in general (*agere*); and the production of the former, i. e. work (*opus*) is diſtinguiſhed from the latter as operation (*effectus*).—*Art*, as human ingenuity, is further diſtinguiſhed from *Science*, like the practical from the theoretical part of geometry; for to be acquainted with the principles of navigation, for inſtance, does not yet form a practical navigator: hence the Sciences imply the knowledge of things, and the Arts teach us the practical application of that knowledge.—Laſtly, *Art* is diſtinguiſhed from *handicraft*; the former may be called *free*, the latter, *mercenary art*." 44. Of the fine arts. 45. By fine arts is underſtood any art, ſo far as it, at the ſame time, is imitative of nature. 46, 47. The fine arts are the efforts of genius. 48. Of the diſtinction ſubſiſting between genius and taſte. "To *judge* of beautiful objects, as ſuch, requires *taſte*; but the art of *producing* ſuch objects, ſuppoſes *genius*." 49. Of the faculties of the mind, which compoſe what is called genius. 50. Taſte and genius muſt be combined in the productions of the fine arts. 51. Of the diviſion of fine the arts:

" 1.) the arts of language, viz. *Oratory* and *Poetry*; 2.) the arts of ſenſible imitation, which are either thoſe of *true* or of *illuſory* exhibitions, the former are called *Plaſtic*, the latter *Painting*:—*Plaſtic* includes *Statuary* and *Architecture*; painting conſiſts either in copying beauteous nature, or in beautifully arranging her productions; i. e. in the reſpective arts of *Painting* or *Pleaſure-gardening*;—3.) the beautiful combination of external ſenſations, viz. the arts of *Muſic* and *Dying*." 52. Of the combination of the fine arts in one and the ſame production. 53. Compariſon of the fine arts with one another, with regard to their aeſthetical value.

SECT. II. DIALECTIC OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGING FACULTY.

§ 55—57. Repreſentation and Solution of the Antinomy of Taſte. 58. On the Idealiſm of conformation in nature as well as art, being the only principle of the aeſthetical faculty of judging. 59. Of Beauty as the ſymbol of Morality. 60. *Append.* Of the methodical doctrine of Taſte.

DIVISION II. CRITIQUE OF THE TELEOLOGICAL FACULTY OF JUDGING.

§ 61. Of the objective conformation of nature.

Sect. I. *Analyſis of the teleological faculty of Judging.*

§ 62. Of the objective conformation, which is merely formal, in diſtinction from what is material. 63. Of the relative conformation of nature, in diſtinction from the internal. 64. Of the peculiar character of things, as purpoſes of nature. 65. Things, as natural purpoſes, are organized beings. 66. Of the principle of judging of the internal conformation of organized beings. 67. Of the teolological principle of judging of Nature in general, as a ſyſtem of purpoſes. 68. Of the principle of Teleology, as an internal principle of Natural Philoſophy.

Sect. II. *Dialectic of the teleological Faculty of Judging.*

§ 69. The antinomy of the Judging Faculty. 70, 71. Repreſentation and ſolution of this antinomy. 72. Of the various ſyſtems

ſyſtems reſpecting the conformation of nature. 73. None of theſe ſyſtems is ſatisfactory. 74. The cauſe of the impoſſibility of treating this idea, "that nature is *technically* arranged," in a dogmatical manner, lies in our incapacity of explaining the deſign or aim of nature. 75. The idea of an objective conformation of nature is a critical principle of Reaſon, belonging to the reflex Faculty of Judging. 76. Illuſtrating remarks. 77. Of the peculiarity of the human underſtanding, from which the idea of the purpoſes of nature ariſes. 78. On the principle of the univerſal mechaniſm of matter, united with the teleological principle in the technical (architectonic) arrangement of nature.

Appendix. *Methodical doctrine of the teleological Faculty of Judging.*

§ 79. Whether Teleology ought to be treated as a branch of Phyſics. 80. Of the neceſſity of claſſing the principle of mechaniſm under that of teleology, when we attempt to explain a thing as a deſign of nature. 81. On the aſſociation of mechaniſm with the teleological principle, accounting for natural purpoſes, as being the productions of nature. 82. Of the teleological ſyſtem in the external relations of organized beings. 83. Of the laſt purpoſe (deſign) of nature as a teleological ſyſtem. 84. Of the final purpoſes of the exiſtence of a world, i. e. of the creation itſelf. 85. Of phyſico-theology. 86. Of ethico-theology. 87. Of the moral proof of the exiſtence of God. 88. The validity of this moral proof is limited. 89. Of the uſe of the moral argument. 90. Of the manner of admitting things as true, in a moral proof of the exiſtence of God. 91. Of the manner of conſidering things as true, by means of a practical belief.

XXVI. *Ueber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle Critik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden ſoll.* On a certain diſcovery, by means of which every (new) Critique of pure Reaſon is ſaid to be rendered unneceſſary by an earlier one. 8vo. *Koenigsberg.* 1790.

We merely take notice of this publication, here, for the ſake of completeneſs. It can ſcarcely be conſidered as forming a diſtinct

part of KANT's ſyſtematic works; it is neither mentioned as ſuch, by the numerous German commentators upon the Critical Philoſophy, nor has Mr NITSCH of London availed himſelf of this (apparently polemic) production, in his late view of the Kantian principles.—For this reaſon, we do not heſitate to paſs it over in ſilence, and to devote a conſiderable degree of attention to the following work, on Religion, which is of infinitely greater importance.

XXVII. (10.) *Die Religion innerhalb den Grenzen der bloſſen Vernunft.* Religion conſidered within the bounds of mere Reaſon. *Koenigsberg.* 1793. 2d Edit. enlarged. 1794, pp. 314, and xxvi pp. Preface.

It cannot be a matter of indifference to a philoſopher, to know what relation the prevailing religion of the age bears to the ſpeculative notions of Reaſon, that are propagated in the philoſophic ſyſtems of his cotemporaries. Although the inquiries of this nature be conducted independently of any poſitive religious creed, we may yet congratulate ourſelves upon the diſcovery, when that poſitive religion, which guides a very conſiderable part of mankind, and which has produced ſo many excellent moral effects, is not found to be altogether inconſiſtent with the principles, maintained by the moſt profound and eminent philoſophers. We may at the ſame time learn, to give a more practical explanation upon thoſe ſymbolical points, that have hitherto met with no uſeful application, and that have occaſioned many fruitleſs and bloody conteſts.

No man of candour and impartiality will cenſure the deſign of a writer, who employs his philoſophic maxims (if they be otherwiſe well eſtabliſhed upon a critical baſis), in order to ſerve as principles, for explaining ambiguous doctrines and poſitive inſtitutions. For, if the Deity has immediately intruſted man with ſo valuable a gift as religion actually is, it muſt have been corrupted by men themſelves, who have delivered it to their poſterity, with ſuch additions as are inconſiſtent with the principles of Reaſon; and the true original ſenſe of ſuch traditions can be diſcovered only through

through the proper exercise of Reason. Every attempt, therefore, of restoring harmony between the positive tenets of Religion and those of philosophy, must be considered as highly beneficial to mankind; because, in this manner only, the design of that revelation can be consistently attained.

Our satisfaction, too, must be the more complete, when we have an opportunity of observing, that such a revelation has not only been preserved in its purity during the course of many centuries, but likewise has been the means of exercising the rational faculties of man, upon the most profound subjects of inquiry.—If we compare the principal tenets of the Christian Religion with the principles of the Kantian system, we shall be agreeably surprised to find, that the former are perfectly consistent with the latter, and that this author satisfies all the claims, which can be made on philosophy, to establish a pure religious doctrine. For the result of KANT's investigations, upon this head, is nearly the following:

1st, That Christianity is throughout a *moral Religion*, such as Reason requires of every religious establishment whatever. It is, among the numerous religions in the world, the only one, which derives its principles from pure morals, and which represents to man his destination as attainable only by moral means. It indeed presupposes, that he has the power and ability of doing, what the law of philanthropy commands him; though, at the same time, Religion apprizes him of that resistance, which natural inclinations or *carnal* desires oppose to the exercise of Reason. It further appropriates to him, in express terms, the capacity of overcoming these difficulties; and as the human understanding can arrive at no objective knowledge of such a power, Scripture lays the foundation of it in something beyond the reach of the senses, while it gives man the assurance, that the Deity may also endow him with faculties, which materially differ from those of mere sensitive beings; in order to accomplish, by the power of his will, whatever he judges to be morally right and and salutary. In this manner alone, Reason can form a complete and clear notion, that the moral power is a *supersensible* agent, whose origin or, in the language of KANT, whose possibility we cannot by any means conceive.

2d. The true deſtination of man is, conformably to the principles of Chriſtianity, not ſought for in the ſenſible, but in the ſuperſenſible part of nature. Man muſt acquire happineſs by his moral conduct, but he ought not to expect the former in this world; not to derive his hopes of it from his ſenſitive, but from his moral nature. For, according to the Chriſtian doctrine, his ſole buſineſs here conſiſts in preparing and making himſelf worthy of it, through a purely moral life.

3d. The Chriſtian Religion throughout preſuppoſes a moral government of the world, and the idea of the moral order of things ſerves as its baſis: this order, however, can be realized or accompliſhed only in relation to the whole exiſtence of rational beings. Exactly in the ſame manner is this propoſition determined by our Reaſon.

4th. The Religion of Chriſt enjoins us to conſider good will to all mankind as the ſupreme principle of all our actions. It enjoins us to unite ſelf-love, in equal proportion with univerſal benevolence, or rather to make the former ſubſervient to the purpoſes of the latter: and this is preciſely the dictate of Reaſon, and what Kant aſſerts to be the firſt moral precept. Through this practical law alone, the Chriſtians determine the attributes of the Deity, ſince they repreſent him as the moral creator, preſerver, and ruler of the world.

5th. Thus, in the religion of Chriſt, morality is laid down as the cognoſcible ground, on which we eſtabliſh our knowledge of the Deity. We can boaſt, indeed, of no perceptive cognition of that Being; yet we are not contented with a mere ſpeculative notion of him, whoſe attributes we can clearly exhibit in the idea of a moral intelligent power. Laſtly,

6th. The whole aim of the Chriſtian Religion is the moral improvement and perfection of man. The whole purpoſe of Religion, when contemplated by Reaſon, can be no other than to render man morally better, or to improve his moral worth. It muſt admit of being employed as the means of ſtrengthening his moral faculties, of removing the obſtacles that frequently occur in the practice of morality, and of fortifying the powers of Reaſon.

Even

Even the dogmatical part of the Chriſtian doctrine is of ſuch a nature as to diſplay, in the greater number of inſtances, a relative application to morals; and the principal tenets of it, have a manifeſt tendency to ſolve moral difficulties. Theſe appear at ſo early a period among men, that attempts to account for them very ſoon follow. Such explanations, in general, are extremely ludicrous, eſpecially in the infancy of Reaſon, when fancy ſupplies its place, and before experience has been made our guide. Imagination ſcarcely liſtens to the ſuggeſtions of Reaſon; and, in this ſituation, men are eaſily pleaſed with any plauſible anſwer, which their anceſtors have contrived from the rich ſtores of mythology. Though their knowledge of objects is not thereby increaſed, yet the hypotheſes thus contrived are uſually ingenious, ſo that they might afford ſome ſatisfaction, if they were founded upon any thing but fancy.

This infant age of reaſoning, if it may be called ſo, is attended with the advantage, that it does not conceal the difficulties, for which it cannot account. Reaſon, being gradually enlightened by philoſophy, is conſcious of this chimerical method of explaining things; but as it imagines any other explanation to be impoſſible; it rather conſiders the difficulty itſelf as fictitious, in order to ſhow, that all attempts at explaining it muſt be diſpenſed with.

By gradual advances, Reaſon diſcovers that ſuch difficulties really exiſt, and that all ſophiſtical diſputes upon them are of no avail. At the ſame time, we find that the former are of ſuch a nature, as to admit of no other ſolution than that by practical ideas, and that theſe ideas are expreſſed in thoſe fanciful explanations of mythology, by the repreſentation of *ſenſible* objects.

Now, ſince every thing connected with morals, as well as every concluſion drawn from that ſource, is juſtly denominated by the epithet 'divine;' it is eaſy to perceive, how thoſe mythological objects, together with the fictitious productions of fancy, could be called divine revelations. For there really is a moral text or meaning at the foundation of them, but which can be diſcloſed only in a more improved ſtate of Reaſon.

From this deduction, it becomes perfectly evident, in what manner we meet with two very different explanations of ſuch books, as

contain

contain the like ſolutions of moral propoſitions, under the title of Revelation. One of theſe explanations namely boaſts of ſtating the literal ſenſe of the Writ, and is ſtyled the *grammatical* interpretation: the other traces the ideas, that may originally have occaſioned thoſe fictions, and conſiders the ſubjects of mythology as the ſymbols of thoſe ideas. And this is juſtly called the *moral* interpretation. If now each of the two purſues its own method of inquiry, diſputes may eaſily ariſe among the different interpreters; for they will frequently find oppoſite meanings in one and the ſame paſſage.

Theſe diſſenſions in the interpretation of Scripture, daily diſplay their baneful effects, however eaſily they might be ſettled, if the interpreters were not averſe to enter into a proper agreement upon certain points. For, no man will deny, that all Revelation reſts upon the inward ſtate of our mind; that all poſitive Religions are more or leſs perfect expreſſions of Revelation; and that, therefore, the true interpretation of it can be diſcovered only by our own ſubjective operations. Hence it is, that thoſe only, who are well acquainted with the nature of the human mind, can find the true ſenſe of Revelations. Reaſon is here likewiſe the ſupreme tribunal, from which no further appeal can be made. The doctrines of the original evil, of reconciliation, and many other principles, peculiar to the Chriſtian Religion, are founded on a baſis, that admits of very excellent and uſeful reflections, upon the moral conſtitution of man, and upon the manner in which his deſtination has been provided for. Nay, from theſe doctrines, it is evident, how thoſe opinions, which appear to have a common origin in human nature, have ever been repreſented through certain narratives and allegories; and how the minds of men in all ages reſorted to them, as if they had been conducted by an inviſible hand, without being uniformly conſcious of their true meaning. And is there any greater ſervice, which the philoſophic inquirer can render mankind, than to inveſtigate theſe traces of Reaſon, which, by their ſacred antiquity, have ſo important an influence on human affairs; though their origin be, for the moſt part, involved in obſcurity. From this inveſtigation, the only explanation muſt reſult, which can contribute to the attainment of that ultimate end, for which man is originally

ginally deſigned. If, in this way of explaining ſymbols, we ſearch merely for ſigns of ſuch truths, as are previouſly diſcovered by our mind, the errors or miſtakes cannot be ſo detrimental, as if we aimed at finding the truth itſelf, by means of theſe ſymbols. For, in the former caſe, imagination can merely miſlead us to denote a true thing by a falſe ſymbol; whereas, in the latter caſe, we are expoſed to the danger of confounding a ſymbol (to which our fancy is but too fondly attached) with the truth itſelf, and thus of falling into mere chimerical notions. Let us therefore ſearch in the regions of truth; and, directing our views to the monuments of antiquity, inquire, whether among them we can diſcover no ſigns correſponding with our moral attainments. Thus we may facilitate the acceſs to the ſanctuary of truth, in as much as our new method of explaining will aſcertain, whether we have ſucceeded in exploring the juſt character of religious truths, and whether the true ſenſe of the reſpective ſymbols has ever been clearly underſtood.

Contents.

Sect. I. On the conjunction or league between the bad and good principle; or on the radical evil in human nature.

1. Of the original diſpoſition (inclination) towards the good in human nature.
2. Of the propenſity to vice.
3. Whether man is *naturally* vicious.
4. Of the origin of evil in human nature.

General Remarks. On the manner of reſtoring to its vigour the *original* diſpoſition towards the good.

Sect. II. On the contest between the good principle and the bad, for the dominion over mankind.

1. Of the legal claim of the good principle to the dominion over mankind.
2. Of the legal claim of the bad principle to that dominion, and the conteſt between the two principles.

Sect.

SECT. III. ON THE VICTORY OF THE GOOD PRINCIPLE OVER THE BAD, AND THE FOUNDATION OF A KINGDOM OF GOD UPON EARTH.

Chap. I. Philoſophical exhibition of the victory of the good principle, by the foundation of a kingdom of God upon Earth.

1. Of the ethical ſtate of nature.
2. Man muſt leave the ethical ſtate of nature, in order to become a member of an ethical *commonwealth*.
3. The idea of an ethical commonwealth is that of a *people of God*, under ethical laws.
4. The idea of a people of God is (through human regulations) no otherwiſe to be exhibited in practice, but by the formation of a Church.
5. The conſtitution of every church uniformly begins with ſome or other hiſtorical belief (revelation) which may be called the church-belief, and this is moſt ſuitably founded on a Holy Writ.
6. The pure religious belief is the ſupreme interpreter of church-belief.
7. The gradual tranſition of church-belief, to the excluſive prevalence of the pure religious belief, indicates the approach of a kingdom of God.

Chap. II. Hiſtorical exhibition of the gradual foundation of the predominance of the good principle upon Earth.

SECT IV. OF THE WORSHIP AND SPURIOUS WORSHIP UNDER THE DOMINION OF THE GOOD PRINCIPLE, OR OF RELIGION AND PRIESTHOOD *.

A. *Of the divine ſervice in Religion in general.*

1. The Chriſtian Religion conſidered as a Natural Religion.
2. The Chriſtian Religion conſidered as a Learned Religion.

B. *Of the ſpurious worſhip of God, in a ſtatutary Religion eſtabliſhed by men.*

§ 1. Of the general ſubjective ground of *religious fancy*.

2.

---

* *Pfaffenthum*, in German, is not literally 'prieſthood,' nor does it ſignify 'prieſtcraft;' but it expreſſes the uſurped dominion of the clergy, by which they pretend to be in the excluſive poſſeſſion of the means of diſpenſing abſolution from ſins and divine grace.

2. The moral principles of Religion, conſidered in oppoſition to religious fancy.
3. Of *Prieſthood*, as being an order of men engaged in the *ſpurious* worſhip of the *good* principle.
4. Of the guide afforded by conſcience, in matters of belief.

XXVIII. *Zum ewigen Frieden*, &c. Project for a perpetual peace. A philoſophical Eſſay. 104 pp. 8vo. *Königsberg*, 1795.

Of this original work, which is ſo much and juſtly admired on the continent, we already poſſeſs an Engliſh tranſlation. And if the appearance of this production in foreign verſions could eſtabliſh any proof of its merits, I might add, that "Kant's project for a perpetual peace" has been likewiſe tranſlated into French, and indeed with the ſanction of the author, who has furniſhed the French tranſlator with a *new* Supplement, which contains, "*a ſecret article for a perpetual peace.*"

Many of our political readers muſt remember, that the idea of a perpetual peace has formerly employed the pen of the good Abbot de St. Pierre; and that, at a ſtill earlier period, the moſt patriotic King of whom France can boaſt, Henry IV, was ſeriouſly engaged in modelling this beneficent plan, which he propoſed to ſubmit to the conſideration of his cotemporary potentates, if an untimely death had not fruſtrated that philanthropic deſign.—Though our ſage politicians have always conſidered plans of this kind as the fanciful productions of good-natured fanatics, it may on the other hand be obſerved, that by diſputing on the poſſibility of a perpetual peace, the neceſſity of a perpetual warfare muſt be admitted as a maxim; becauſe, without being continually prepared for war, the different ſtates of Europe could not long exiſt together. This maxim, however, is as abominable in theory, as it is practically deſtructive of every principle of morality. For, if *all* independent ſtates adopt or continue to practice ſuch a maxim, and if their views be conſtantly directed to the execution of it, their political exiſtence itſelf muſt be extremely precarious. From this ſource, I am inclined to derive the frequent revolutions in the

political world, the frequent returns from a ſtate of intellectual and moral improvement to their former barbariſm, and the perpetual animoſities (emphatically called, *natural* enmities) between man and man, which are ſo induſtriouſly tranſmitted from one generation to another; eſpecially in the frontier-provinces of different nations.—Man is a fighting animal! is the general outcry of all thoſe who are intereſted, whether directly or indirectly, in propagating this abſurd and pernicious doctrine. Even admitting, that man is naturally prone to exerciſe his phyſical powers; that he has this propenſity in common with the lower animals; that he occaſionally manifeſts the deſire of revenge and conqueſt, not unlike the rapacious tyger or the victorious lion; and that he cannot eaſily overcome theſe natural inclinations, as long as his inhuman feats are more admired and encouraged than the dignified, though leſs alluring, exertions of his intellect;—does it follow from theſe *primitive* diſpoſitions of ſavage man, that perpetual warfare is a neceſſary evil in the *preſent* ſtate of ſociety? I hope for the honour of humanity, that none but the callous financiers of deluded nations, or the avaricious contractors of armies and navies, with their numerous train of connections, will be hardy enough to draw ſo falſe a concluſion.

When we conſider thoſe, who direct the affairs of nations, in a moral as well as legiſlative capacity, it is rather ſurpriſing, that the important plan of a perpetual peace has never been duly weighed: while many ſubjects of leſs conſequence, and comparatively trifling matters, daily occupy their attention. Nobody will deny, that the ideas of right and wrong, of juſt and unjuſt, are equally applicable to a plurality of ſtates, as to different individuals of one or ſeveral countries. The only obſtacle to the *juſt* application of theſe ideas muſt, therefore, lie in the diverſity of opinions, ariſing among thoſe *corrupted* ſervants of the ſtate, to whom the management of external affairs is intruſted. Why, therefore, do the rulers of nations not agree upon a general federation of ſtates?—Why do they not, like every other *reaſonable* being, ſubmit to arbitration, by chooſing the arbiters from the boſom of diſintereſted ſtates; in order to ſettle ſuch differences as their own miniſters cannot determine? This would be the only rational and proper method;

method; a method, which is daily practiſed in private life, by thoſe very men, who ſeem to oppoſe its introduction in diplomatic tranſactions. Nay, if the arm of violence and rapacity were permitted to decide the quarrels of individuals, all civil inſtitutions and ſocial compacts would ſoon be diſſolved. And does not the ſame reaſoning apply to every government, whether monarchical, ariſtrocratic, or democratic?—have we not ſufficient teſtimonies upon hiſtorical record, that diſſolution and annihilation have hitherto been their ultimate fate?

Induced by ſuch conſiderations, the venerable Kant, after having obſerved the political changes of Europe, for upwards of half a century, ſteps forward with a plan drawn up in a diplomatic form. His noble deſign of ſtopping the prodigal effuſion of human blood, and his aim at convincing the governors of nations, that the practicability of this plan merely depends upon the exertions of their moral will, are equally conſpicuous. The great modern improvements in Ethics throughout ſociety, particularly in the higher ranks; the view of the innumerable ſufferings and exterminations accompanying the preſent ſtate of warfare in Europe; and finally the conviction, that his "Project" is truly practicable and morally unexceptionable; theſe were ſufficient motives to rouſe the "hoary philoſopher of the North," and to animate him with new vigour for this grand and benevolent attempt.

The author exhibits the *Preliminary* and *Definitive Articles* for a perpetual peace, in two Sections, which he accompanies with proper illuſtrations. The preliminary articles are as follows:

1. "No treaty of peace ſhall be conſidered as valid, that has been concluded with a ſecret reſerve of matters for a future war.
2. "No independent ſtate ſhall ever be permitted to be transferred to the dominion of another ſtate, whether by inheritance, exchange, purchaſe, or donation.
3. "Standing armies (miles perpetuus) ſhall in time be entirely diſcharged.
4. "No national or ſtate-debts ſhall be contracted, that relate to the external or foreign affairs of the ſtate.
5. "No ſtate ſhall, by force of arms, interfere with either the conſtitution or government of other ſtates.

6. " No ſtate, at war with another, ſhall make uſe of ſuch hoſtilities, as muſt deſtroy their reciprocal confidence in a future peace; for inſtance, the employing of aſſaſſins, poiſoners, the violation of cartels, the inſtigation of treaſonable practices, rebellion in the inimical ſtate, &c."

The concluſion of a *definitive peace* preſuppoſes it as a poſtulate: " that all men, who are able to produce reciprocal effects upon each other, muſt neceſſarily be ſubject to ſome civil inſtitutions." All civil inſtitutions, however, as far as regards the *perſons* ſubmitting to them, may be reduced to three claſſes: 1.) thoſe concerning the right of the citizen in the ſtate; 2.) thoſe relative to the right of nations; and 3.) thoſe aſcertaining the rights of the citizen of the world (coſmopolite). Conformably to this introduction, the author propoſes *three Definitive Articles.*

I. *The civil conſtitution of every ſtate ought to be republican.*—By a republican conſtitution is here underſtood ſuch a one, as is founded upon the principles of *liberty*, *dependence*, and *equality*. By means of that *liberty*, acquired by the conſtitutional law, all the members of a ſtate muſt be entitled to the privilege of obeying no other external or bye-laws than thoſe, to which they have given their conſent. By virtue of their legal *dependence*, all members of a ſociety are ſubject to only one common legiſlation. And by their legal *equality*, among men as citizens of the ſtate, there muſt ſubſiſt ſuch a relation, that none of them can lawfully oblige the other, without ſubjecting himſelf to the law, by which the other party *may* reciprocally compel him in a ſimilar inſtance. This, therefore, is the only constitution, which forms the baſis of every other in civil ſociety; and it is alſo the only one, that can lead to a perpetual peace. For, in a government, where the conſent of the citizens of the state is required for declaring war, they will be very cautious in giving their approbation to thoſe horrid meaſures, in conſequence of which they themſelves muſt bear all the calamities of a bloody conteſt.

In order to prevent any miſconſtruction of terms, KANT diſtinguiſhes a *republican* from a *democratic* conſtitution, by diſcriminating between the *forms of government* (*imperii*), and thoſe of

of *adminiſtration* (*regiminis*); the former of which are determined by the diſtinction of *perſons*, who hold the ſupreme power of the ſtate, but the latter, by the *mode of governing* the people by a ſupreme head, whoever this may be. The forms of government, or thoſe of the former kind, are, *autocraſy* or the power of the prince, *ariſtocracy* or the power of the nobles, and *democracy* or the power of the people: thoſe of the latter kind, namely the forms of adminiſtration, are *republicaniſm* and *deſpotiſm*. The former of theſe again conſiſts, according to the eſſential characters above deſcribed, in the ſeparation of the executive power from the legiſlative; the latter, namely deſpotiſm, is the arbitrary execution of the laws, which the ſovereign himſelf has enacted; ſo that his private will becomes the public law of the nation.—Concerning *democracy* then, Kant affirms, that it *neceſſarily* leads to *deſpotiſm*; becauſe it eſtabliſhes a legiſlative and executive power, by which all have a ſhare in forming reſolutions relative to *one*, and even againſt this one, who conſequently would not agree with them, ſo that *all* are ſaid to partake of the legiſlation, when in fact they do not ſo; which is in contradiction to the general will itſelf and to liberty.

II. *The rights of nations ought to be founded upon a federation of independent ſtates.*—The author's ideas in this article are expreſſed with equal boldneſs, energy, and truth. The reſult of them is this: In the relative condition of ſtates to one another, there can be rationally no other method of extricating themſelves from the lawleſs condition, that engenders continual wars, than to imitate individual man in the reſignation of his wild (unconſtrained) liberty; to accomodate themſelves to public compulſory laws; and thus to form a *ſtate of nations*, gradually increaſing, and at length comprehending all the nations of the earth. Since, however, according to their notions of the right of nations, they are averſe to ſubmit like individuals to the laws of compulſion; and ſince they reject *in hypothesi* what is juſt *in theſi*; let them at leaſt adopt the *negative* ſubſtitute of a federation (congreſs) for the prevention of war, inſtead of the *poſitive* eſtabliſhment of an *univerſal republic*. Such a congreſs may at leaſt ſave us from total ruin, by checking that hoſtile

tile diſpoſition of man, which ſhuns the operation of the law; it may gradually ſpread its beneficent influence to diſtant nations; though it will nevertheleſs be in conſtant danger of being interrupted, by the capricious oppoſition of a lawleſs monarch.

III. *The coſmopolitical right ſhall be limited to conditions of univerſal hoſpitality.*—The coſmopolitical right is that of a ſtranger, by which he is intitled to a friendly reception at his arrival upon foreign ground. It is not ſtrictly the right of hoſpitality, but that of viſiting one another, which belongs to all men, in offering their company, by virtue of their common inhabitation of the ſurface of the earth. The *inhoſpitality* of ſea-coaſts, for inſtance that of Barbary, and the *inhoſpitable* conduct of cultivated and chiefly of commercial nations of our quarter of the globe, who change their *viſits* into *conqueſts*, is conſequently againſt the law of nature. As, however, the means of communication among the nations of the earth are ſo much improved, that the violation of a right on *one* ſpot of the globe is now felt in *all* countries; it hence follows, that the idea of a coſmopolitical law is not a whimſical or extravagant repreſentation of a right, but a neceſſary ſupplement to a code, that remains to be written, and that relates to the rights of ſtates and nations, as well as to the rights of man in general. Under this condition only, we may flatter ourſelves with the hopes of a continual, though gradual, approximation to a perpetual peace.

In the further illuſtrations annexed to theſe articles, the author maintains, that both morals and politics, ſo far from being in oppoſition to this plan, rather tend to confirm and to render it univerſal; " for, 'ſays he,' the guarantee of this compact is the grand and ingenious artiſt, nature herſelf, who by her mechanical courſe evidently manifeſts her purpoſed aim of reſtoring harmony among men, even againſt their will, and in the very boſom of their contentions. The proviſional diſpoſitions made by nature for this purpoſe, are the following: 1) that ſhe has provided for the ſubſiſtence of man in all climates; 2) that ſhe has diſperſed them, through wars, in every direction, even to the moſt inhoſpitable countries, in order to people them; and 3) that ſhe has thus compelled them to enter into reciprocal

ciprocal engagements, which are more or less established by law."

The many valuable hints and philosophical reflections, contained in this little work, it is impossible to abridge. And as we possess an English translation of it, I must refer the curious reader to the book itself; at the same time assuring him, that he will find the arts of courts and the juggles of statesmen exposed, in a manner altogether original.

XXIX. (11.) *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre.* Metaphysical Elements of Jurisprudence. 8vo. *Königsberg*, 1797. xii pp. Preface; LII. pp. Introduction; and 235 pp. Text.

This work affords another proof of the very extensive application, of which the Kantian philosophy is susceptible. Having in his former publications established, on a critical basis (that of a pure and practical Reason), the principles of Physics, of Taste, of Morality, and of rational Religion, the author proceeds in the present, to deduce from the same source the elements of Jurisprudence; and not only lays down the private rights of individuals, but unfolds also the principles, which ought to determine the internal arrangements of Civil Society, and regulate the intercourse of nations.

The mode, in which Prof. KANT treats the subject, will appear from the following observation: "A System of Jurisprudence, the first part of the Science of Morals, derived from Reason, and which might be termed the Metaphysics of Law, is still a desideratum in philosophy. But as the idea of law, though pure, has a relation to practice; i. e. is applicable to the cases occurring in experience, a metaphysical system of it, in its division, must also have a reference to the empirical variety of those cases, in order to make the division complete, which is an indispensable requisite in the formation of a System of Reason. Completeness of division, however, in what is empirical, is impossible; and where it is attempted, or at least an approximation to it, such ideas cannot be considered as integral parts in a System, but merely as examples.

The

The only proper appellation, therefore, for the first part of the Metaphysics of Morals, is '*Metaphysical Elements of Jurisprudence*;' because, with respect to the application to these cases, there can only be an approximation to a System, not a System itself."

Having, in a general introduction developed the principles of the Moral Science, and having shown the necessity of a Metaphysical System of Morals, i. e. of a practical philosophy derived from ideas *a priori* merely, and which has not nature, but the freedom of the human will, for its object; the author makes the following distinction between Justice and the other virtues, between Ethics and Jurisprudence.—"All legislation, however it may agree with respect to the actions, being in every case external, may yet be distinguished with regard to the motives. That legislation, which constitutes an action a duty, and at the same time makes this duty the motive, is *Ethical*. But that, which does not include in the rule the idea of duty, which on the contrary admits another motive than this idea, is *Juridical*. With respect to the latter, it is easy to perceive, that this motive, different from the idea of duty, must be derived from the pathological grounds, by which the will is determined, viz. inclination and disinclination, and among these from those of the latter kind; because it is a legislation which is compulsory, and does not influence the conduct by the allurements of reward.—The mere conformity of an action to the rule, without regard to the motive, is called its *legality*; but that, in which the idea of duty, arising from the rule, is at the same time the motive of the action, is its *morality*. The duties, according to a Juridical legislation, can only be external, because this legislation does not require, that the idea of duty, which is internal, should be in itself the principle, by which the will of the agent is determined; and as a proper motive for the rule is nevertheless necessary, it can only be externally connected with that rule. Ethical legislation, on the other hand, makes our internal actions also duties, not as it were excluding the external, but proceeding on what is duty in general. And as Ethical legislation includes in its rule the internal motive of action, the idea of duty, which determination can by no means be introduced into an external legislation; so this Ethical legislation cannot be external, not even that

of

of a Divine will; although indeed it assumes for motives, *as being duties*, those duties which depend upon another, namely an external legislation. It is not a duty of virtue to keep one's promise, but an obligation of justice, of law, to the performance of which one may be compelled. Yet to do this, where no compulsion is to be apprehended, is a virtuous action, a proof of virtue. Jurisprudence and Ethics then are distinguished, not so much by the different duties they enjoin, as by the difference of the legislation, which connects with the rule the one or the other motive."

Next follows a particular '*Introduction to Jurisprudence*,' in which the following subjects are discussed.

Sect. I. § A. Of *Jurisprudence*. B. Of *Justice*.—The idea of what is just or right, so far as it refers to a corresponding obligation, includes first, the merely external and practical relation of one person to another, in so far as their actions, as facts, can have mediately or immediately an influence on each other. But secondly, it does not imply the relation of the will of one individual to the *wish* or mere *want* of another, as in the actions of charity or insensibility, but merely to the *will* of that other. Thirdly, in this reciprocal relation of wills, the *matter* of the will, i. e. the end, which every body has in view with the object, which he wills, does not come under consideration. For instance, the question is not, whether one gains or loses by the commodities, which he purchased from me for the exercise of his trade, but merely according to the *form* in the relation of each will, so far only as it is considered as free, whether the action of the one be consistent with the freedom of the other, according to a general law.—C. *General principles of Justice*.—Every action is just or right, according to the maxim of which the freedom of will of one individual is compatible with the freedom of another, agreeably to a general law. D. *Justice or law*, necessarily presupposes compulsion or force.—E. *Strict* justice or law, may also be represented as the possibility of a reciprocally exerted force, consistent with the freedom of every man, and with general rules or laws.

Sect. II. 1. *Of Equity*. 2. *Of the law of necessity*.

Sect. III. Division of Jurisprudence.—A. *General division of the duties of justice*. B. *General division of laws and rights*. 1.) Law, as

a syſtematic doctrine is divided into the Law of Nature, which depends entirely on principles *a priori*, and poſitive or ſtatutary law, which proceeds from the will of a legiſlator. 2.) Of rights, as the moral power of laying others under an obligation, the chief diviſion is into the *original* and *acquired*; the former of which every man inherits by nature, independent of any legal act; the latter cannot be attained without ſuch an act.—The only original right, that is born with man, is freedom or independence on any other arbitrary will, ſo far as it is conſiſtent with the liberty of every individual, according to a general law.

Further Contents of the work.

PART I. OF THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN GENERAL.

CHAP. I. *Of the mode of poſſeſſing ſomething external as property.*

§ 1. My property is that, with which I am ſo connected, that the uſe, which another might make of it againſt my will, would injure me. The ſubjective condition of the poſſibility of uſe, in general, is *poſſeſſion*. §. 2,—3. Juridical poſtulate of practical reaſon. It is poſſible to have every external object of my will as my property; i. e. the maxim is contrary to juſtice, according to which, if it were a law, an external object of the will behoved to be in itſelf without an owner (res nullius). § 4. Expoſition of the idea of external property. Of the external objects of my will there can be only three: 1.) a corporeal thing without me; 2.) the will of another to a determined act (praeſtatio); 3. the ſituation of another in relation to me, according to the Categories of Subſtance, Cauſality, and Community between me and external objects, agreeable to the laws of freedom. § 5. Definition of the idea of external property. External property is that without me, to hinder me from uſing which, as I chuſe, would be unjuſt, or an injury. § 6. Deduction of the idea of the mere legal or civil poſſeſſion of an external object. § 7. Application of the principle of the poſſibility of external property to the objects of experience. § 8. To have ſomething external as property, is only poſſible in a juridical ſtate, under a public legiſlative power, i. e. in civil ſociety. § 9. In the ſtate of nature, nothing but a merely *proviſional*, though real external, property can take place.

CHAP.

CHAP. II. *Of the mode of acquiring external property.*

§ 10. General principles of external acquisition.—I acquire something originally, when I cause that to become mine, which formerly was the property of no other person.—Division of the acquisition of external property: 1.) according to the *matter* (the object) I acquire either a corporeal thing (substance), or the performance of another person (causality), or this other person, i. e. his or her state, so far as I obtain a right to rule over that person; 2.) according to the *form* or mode of acquisition, I have either a *real* right, or a *personal* right, or *both* real and personal right to the possession, not the use, of another person or thing.

Sect. I. *Of real rights.* § 11. A real right is the right to the private use of a thing, in the common possession of which (whether original or acquired) I am with all others. § 12. The first acquisition of a thing can be no other than that of the soil. § 13. Every part of the soil may be originally acquired, and the ground of the possibility of this acquisition is, that the soil in general was originally common. § 14. The legal act of this acquisition is *occupancy.* § 15. It is in civil society alone, that any *peremptory* acquisition can be made: in a state of nature it can only be *provisional.* § 16. Explanation of the idea of an original acquisition of the soil. § 17. Deduction of this idea.

Sect. II. *Of personal rights.* § 18. A personal right is the possession of the will of another, as the power of determining that will through mine to a certain action, according to the laws of freedom. —Of the transference of will by contract. § 19. Of the constituents of a contract. § 20. Of the causality of the will of another, which is acquired. § 21. In a contract, a thing is not acquired by the acceptance of the promise, but by the delivery of what has been promised.

Sect. III. *Of real—personal right.* § 22. This right is that of the possession of an external object as a *thing*, and of the use of it as a person. § 23. Of the right of the Family-Society. § 24,—27. Title *first*: of the right of marriage. § 28—29. Title *second*: of the rights of parentage. § 30. Title *third*: of the rights of a Master of a Family. § 31, 32. Dogmatical division of all the rights

acquirable by contracts. I. Of Money. II. Of literary property.

Sect. IV. *Of the ideal acquisition of an external object of the will.* I. § 33. Of prescription, or the mode of acquiring property by length of possession. II. § 34. Of acquisition by Inheritance. III. § 35, 36. Of posthumous reputation.

Chap, III. *Of the subjectively conditioned acquisition, by the sentence of a Public Court of Justice.*

A. § 37. Of the contract of Donation. B. § 38. Of the contract of Loan (commodatum). C. § 39. Of the re-acquisition or reclaiming of property lost (vindicatio). D. § 40. Of the acquisition of security by oath (cautio juratoria). § 41, 42. Transition from property in a state of nature, to that in a juridical state, or civil society in general.

Part II. Of Public Law.

Sect. I. § 43, 44. *Of the Constitutional Law of a State.* § 45—47. Of a State as a collection of men.—Of the powers in a State, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. "The only rational plan of government is that, in which the combined will of the people determines the law." § 48, 49. Of co-ordinate and subordinate powers.—*General Remarks.*—*A.* Of the supreme power; of the social compact, and the duty of obedience. Of redress of grievances. Of sedition and rebellion.—According to the principles established by Kant, "A change in the Constitution of a State, "which its faults may sometimes render necessary, can only in "justice be accomplished by the Sovereign, by means of *reform*; "not by the people, by means of a *revolution*; and if it take place, "it can only affect the executive, not the legislative power. At "the same time, if a revolution has once been brought about, and "a new constitution established, the injustice of this revolution in "its beginning and accomplishment, does not free the subjects "from the obligation to accommodate themselves, as good citi-"zens, to the new order of things." *B.* Of the rights of the sovereign power to the territory of the State. Of the rights of taxation. Of Finance and Police. *C.* Of the maintenance of the poor; of Foundling Hospitals; of a religious establishment. *D.* Of the

the diſtribution of offices; of rank in the State; of Nobility. *E.* Of criminal law, and a penal code; of the right of puniſhing and pardoning. § 50. Of the relation of a citizen to his native and other countries, in point of right and obligation. § 51. Of the different forms of government. § 52. Of the attainment of that rational form, which the ſpirit of an original compact requires, which makes *freedom* alone the principle, i. e. the baſis, and condition of all *force*.—Of the repreſentative Syſtem.

Sect. II. *Of the law of Nations, or international law.* § 53, 54. Nations, in their external relation to each other, are in a ſtate of nature, not unlike lawleſs ſavages, among whom the right of the ſtrongeſt is eſtabliſhed; conſequently, a confederacy of ſtates becomes neceſſary, in order to protect one another againſt external attacks, conformably to the idea of an original ſocial compact. § 55—58. Of the right of making war, both with regard to the ſubjects of a State, and foreign nations. § 59, 60. Of the right of peace. § 61. Of the injuſtice of a ſtate of warfare. "*There ſhall be no war*, is the irreſiſtible *veto* of morally-practical Reaſon."—Of the mode of bringing nations, like individuals, from a ſtate of nature to a *juridical* ſtate.—Of the eſtabliſhment and maintenance of a perpetual peace, by means of a permanent Congreſs of States.

Sect. III. *Of Coſmopolitical law, or the rights of the citizen of the world.* § 62. Of the right of mutual intercourſe and commerce, as belonging to all mankind.

Concluſion.

This union of the whole human race, under certain univerſal laws, it may be ſaid, is not the partial, but the total and complete attainment of the grand aim, the final purpoſe of Juriſprudence within the boundaries of mere Reaſon. For, that the prototype of a juridical federation of men, according to public laws in general, muſt be derived from Reaſon *apriori*, is now obvious; ſince all the examples, taken from experience, can indeed ſerve the purpoſe of illuſtrating, but not of eſtabliſhing, the neceſſity of a metaphyſical deciſion of this important queſtion. Thoſe very men, who ſmile at the novelty of this inquiry, incautiouſly betray themſelves, when they

they admit, and even make use of the common-place assertion, "that that is the best constitution, in which the laws govern, not men." And what, 'says the author,' can be more sublime than this idea, which is evidently applicable to practice, and capable of being realized in experience, and which alone—provided it is not attempted to be brought about by means of revolutions, or the forcible overthrow of all erroneous establishments (for that would be the annihilation of all law and justice), but by gradual reform, according to fixed principles—leads by continual approximation to the supreme political good, A PERPETUAL PEACE.

XXX. (12.) *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre.* Metaphysical Elements of Ethics. 8vo. *Koenigsberg.* 1797.

With this publication Prof. Kant will probably conclude his systematic labours in the field of the Critical Philosophy. Though, on account of its very recent appearance, I have not yet obtained a copy of this work, among the books lately received from Germany; I can in some degree satisfy the curiosity of the reader, by stating the object of it, as abstracted from the general Introduction, which is premised to the preceding "Elements of Jurisprudence."

'Moral laws can only be so far valid as rules, if they can be established *a priori*, so that the necessity of them becomes evident. For the conceptions and judgments, relative to our actions and omissions, have no moral application at all, if they contain nothing further than what is learned from experience. And if we should even be misled to assume any data, from the latter source, as moral principles, we cannot avoid falling into the grossest and most destructive errors.

'If the doctrine of morals had no other aim than that of personal happiness, it would be absurd to search for principles *a priori*, in order to establish such a doctrine. For, however plausible it may appear, that Reason can perceive previous to experience, by what means man may arrive at the permanent enjoyment of the true pleasures of life, yet every proposition of this kind, *a priori*, is either tautological, or it rests upon groundless hypotheses. Experience

perience alone can inform us of what is attended with pleasure. The natural instinct for nourishment, the sexual impulse, rest, motion, and (after developing the dispositions of nature) the struggles for honour, the enlargement of our knowledge, and the like, can intimate to every individual in particular, how he may *estimate* his pleasures, and at the same time inform him of the means, by which he is to *attain* them. All plausible reasoning *a priori* is, here, in reality nothing else but experience, which, by induction, has received a general character. This generality, far from being universal, is so very limited, that an indefinite number of exceptions must be granted to every individual, in order to adopt that choice in the mode of life, to his particular inclination, and to his susceptibility of pleasures;—so that, in the end, he can profit and grow wiser only from his own detriment, or that of others.

'The doctrines of morality, however, have a very different origin. They are imperative to every individual, without regarding his inclinations; for this reason merely, because he is a free subject, and is capable of reasoning practically. Instruction, in the laws of morality, is not derived from reflection upon ourselves and our animal nature, nor from the observation of the course of the world, namely from events and actions; but Reason itself commands us, how to act, though we should find no analogy or example in experience, corresponding with the present case. Reason, further, in this injunction, does not attend to the advantage or disadvantage, which may accompany our actions; for experience alone could give us any information upon this point. We are indeed entitled to pursue our advantage in every possible manner, provided that we act consistently with both Reason and prudence; for the former enjoins, while the latter only advises that, upon the whole, we shall derive greater advantages, if we follow, than if we transgress the dictates of Reason.'

The following Eſſays, written by Prof. Kant, were publiſhed in different periodical works of Germany, in the chronological order here ſtated.

1. *Von den verſchiedenen Raçen der Menſchen.* Of the different races of man. Publiſhed in ENGEL's *Philoſopher of the world*: firſt Edit. 8vo. *Leipzig*, 1777, from p. 125 to p. 164.

2. *Briefwechſel zwiſchen Kant und dem verſtorbenen Lambert.* Correſpondence between Kant and the late Lambert.—Publiſhed in BERNOUILLI's *Literary Correſpondence between learned Germans.* Vol. I. from p. 333 to 368.—1781.

3. *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geſchichte in weltbürgerlicher Abſicht.*—Plan of a general hiſtory in a coſmopolitical view. Publiſhed in the *Berlin Monthly Magazine*, for November, 1784.

4. *Beantwortung der Frage: was iſt Aufklärung?*—Reply to the queſtion, what is underſtood by illumination (of mind). *Ibid.* for December, 1784.

5. *Ueber die Vulkane im Monde.*—On the Volcanos in the moon. *Ibid.* for March, 178 5.

6. *Von der Unrechtmäſſigkeit des Büchernachdrucks.*—On the injuſtice of printing ſpurious editions of books.—*Ibid.* for May, 1785.

7. *Beſtimmung des Begriffs einer Menſchenrace.*—Definition of the idea connected with the expreſſion "a race of men."—*Ibid.* for November, 1785.

8. *Muthmaſslicher Anfang der Menſchengeſchichte.*—On the probable Origin of Human Hiſtory. *Ibid.* for January, 1786.

This Eſſay the author himſelf conſiders as the moſt ſucceſsful of his popular productions, or minor works. And though I have not been able to procure a copy of that number, in which it appeared in the Berlin Monthly Magazine, without ordering the whole ſet for the year 1786, I can give the following character of this treatiſe, upon the authority of *Prof.* Will *of Altdorf*, as extracted from his "*Lectures on the Kantian Philoſophy*, 8vo. 200 pages; 1788," in which he ſays, p. 32:—'This maſterly performance contains a philoſophical explanation, which certainly is better founded than upon mere conjecture (as the title modeſtly expreſſes). Though it apparently deviates from the Moſaic narrative, it nevertheleſs forms an uſeful addition to the Bible, and affords illuſtrations of its hiſtorical truth.'

9. *Was heiſst: ſich im Denken orientiren?*—What is underſtood by the expreſſion, "to familiarize oneſelf in thinking;" i. e. to trace the ideas of our own mind to their ſource.—*Ibid.* for October, 1786.

10. *Abhandlung von dem Gebrauche teleologiſcher Principien in der Philoſophie.*—A Treatiſe concerning the application of teleological principles in philoſophy.—Publiſhed in the *German Mercury*, for January and February, 1788.

11. *Ueber das Miſslingen aller philoſophiſchen Verſuche in der Theodicee.*—On the failure of all philoſophical attempts made in the Theodicea (by Leibnitz).—*Berlin Monthly Magazine* for September, 1791.

12. *Ueber das radikale Böſe in der menſchlichen Natur*—On the radical evil in human nature.—*Ibid.* for April, 1792.

13. *Ueber den Gemeinſpruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig ſeyn, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis.*—On the common-place aſſertion, "that may be true in theory, but is not applicable to practice." *Ibid.* for September, 1793.

14. *Etwas über den Einfluſs des Mondes auf die Witterung*, Some Remarks relative to the influence of the Moon on the Weather. *Ibid.* for May 1794.

GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY.

Thoſe terms, which explain themſelves from the context of the Elements, are here omitted.

Such phraſes, as have only one definition attached to them, muſt be underſtood in a general ſenſe.

If any words occur in theſe definitions, which appear obſcure or paradoxical, or do not ſufficiently explain the meaning of the term under conſideration, the reader is requeſted to have recourſe to the further explanations of ſuch words, in the alphabetical order of this Gloſſary.

To render this nomenclature ſubſervient to the purpoſe of obtaining a more general view of Kant's Philoſophy, than could be given in the preceding Elements, I have added explanations of many terms, which, though not occurring in this conciſe account, are uſed by the author in a peculiar ſenſe.

Aesthetic

commonly ſignifies the Critique of Taſte, but with Kant, the ſcience containing the rules of ſenſation, in contradiſtinction to Logic, or the doctrine of the Underſtanding.

To Affect

means, to make immediate impreſſions on the Senſitive Faculty, i. e. to occaſion repreſentations and deſires.

Affirmative, See Judgments.

Agreeable, (jucundum) *angenehm*,

is an object of the Senſitive Faculty, ſo far as it influences the will; or what pleaſes the ſenſes in relation to feelings; or

what affords us pleaſure. The agreeable is not ſomething *abſolutely good*, i. e. good in the eſtimation of every rational being; becauſe it does not immediately depend on Reaſon itſelf, but on the relative ſtate of the mind, ſenſitive inclinations, and the like. The *good*, on the contrary, is an object of pure Reaſon, ſomething that is conformable to the ſubject of all rational beings.

ANALYSIS—*Zergliederung*,

1) of an *idea*, is the reduction of it to thoſe characters, of which it is compounded, in order to render the cognition of it clearer, though we cannot by this proceſs make it more complete: hence it does not furniſh us with additional knowledge, but merely arranges what we already poſſeſs.

2) conſidered in a *general ſenſe*; Analyſis is the ſcience, treating of the form of real knowledge, and of the rules, by which we can examine that knowledge. It is a part of general *Logic*, and the negative criterion of truth; in this ſenſe it is oppoſed to *Dialectic*.

3) *Tranſcendental Analyſis* is the decompoſition of the pure intellectual faculty into the elements, through which all the operations of thought are carried on.

4) of *pure practical Reaſon*, i. e. of the pure practical faculty of Reaſon, or of the pure will, into its elements.

ANALYTICAL, See JUDGMENTS.

ANTHROPOLOGY

ſignifies in general the experimental doctrine of the nature of man; and is divided, by Kant, into

1) *theoretical* or empirical doctrine of mind, which is a branch of Natural Philoſophy;

2) *practical*, applied, and empirical Philoſophy of Morals; Ethics—the conſideration of the moral law in relation to the human will, its inclinations, motives, and to the obſtacles in practiſing that law.

ANTHRO-

ANTHROPOMORPHISMUS

is the art of attributing properties, observed in the world of sense, to a being remote from that world; or the sensualization of an idea of Reason: for instance, if we think of the Deity by human predicates.

ANTICIPATION

of experience, is a cognition of objects liable to observation *a priori*, previous to the observation itself, i. e. according to the pure form of perception, in consequence of which all phenomena are in *Space* and *Time*.

ANTINOMY OF REASON

1. in general; a contradiction between two laws;
2. in particular,
   a) of *pure speculative Reason*, is the contradiction in the results of it, in the application of its subjective idea relative to the unconditional thing, as well as in the application of its law, to the world of sense; a law, by which we form conclusions from the given (perceived) conditional thing, to what is unconditional.
   b) of *pure practical Reason*, which occurs in the inquiry into the highest good; where, on the one hand, practical Reason presupposes a necessary combination between virtue and happiness; but, on the other hand, there is no possibility of perceiving this combination analytically or synthetically, neither *a priori* nor *a posteriori*.—This antinomy is solved by showing the real connection between our good conduct and wellbeing; though this connection be concealed in the world of sense, yet it is really existing throughout the whole of it, and founded on the supersensible existence of ourselves, in connection with other things.

APODICTICAL

or abſolute, and attended with the conſciouſneſs of neceſſity.

A POSTERIORI,

i. e. through ſenſation, experience.—The diſtinction between our knowledge obtained *a poſteriori*, may be rendered more clear by its oppoſite, *a priori*. This diſtinction, in the philoſophy of Kant, does not relate to the *ſeries of time*, in which, but to the *ſource*, from which we receive knowledge or cognitions. Every repreſentation or cognition is *a poſteriori*, that is not founded merely on the original faculty of the mind, but in ſome one or other modification, which that faculty has received. Such repreſentations or cognitions are therefore called *empirical*.

A PRIORI

originally does not ſignify, with KANT, a cognition or repreſentation which, in order of time, precedes experience; of which we could become conſcious independent of all ſenſations; and which, at the ſame time with the repreſenting faculty, could be preſent in our mind as a real repreſentation. Such are the "innate notions or ideas," which Kant expreſsly rejects throughout his works. But by the term "*a priori*" he underſtands thoſe repreſentations, which we acquire through the exertions of our own mind, or the thinking ſubject; and not *through* obſervation and ſenſation (*a poſteriori*); not through given objects and from them, but *from* our faculty of cognition; though this latter muſt be rendered active by means of ſenſible impreſſions; and though the origin or production of ſuch a repreſentation can in this manner only be accompliſhed. Further, all that is *a priori*, which lies in the original conformation of the thinking ſubject, and is not founded on the operation of objects, which conſequently is not firſt introduced *into* the mind, but is evolved *from* it, by

its peculiar faculties. All theſe repreſentations nevertheleſs preſuppoſe experience, i. e. materials of application, if we are to become conſcious of them, and refer them to objects. Without experience, they are non-entities. They do not precede experience as real repreſentations, but as the conditions, that render experience itſelf poſſible. All objective reality of them is founded merely on experience.

APPERCEPTION

or conſciouſneſs, or the faculty of becoming conſcious, ſignifies

1) in general, the ſame as repreſentation, or the faculty of repreſenting;

2) in particular, the repreſentation as diſtinct from the ſubject that repreſents, and from the object that is repreſented.

3) *ſelf-conſciouſneſs*, for which we have two faculties,

a—the *empirical*, the internal ſenſe, i. e, the conſciouſneſs of our ſtate at any time, of our obſervations. This is as ſubject to change, as the obſervations themſelves; conſidered in itſelf, it is not confined to any one place, and does not relate to the identity of the ſubject.

b—the *tranſcendental*, pure, original, i. e. the conſciouſneſs of the identity of ourſelves, with all the variety of empirical conſciouſneſs. It is that ſelf-conſciouſneſs, which generates the bare idea "*I*," or "*I think*," as being the ſimple correlate of all other ideas, and the condition of their unity and neceſſary connection.

There occurs a remark in Kant's Critique of pure Reaſon, which is very humiliating in the tranſcendental doctrine of mind. He ſays upon this occaſion: "Though "conſciouſneſs has no extenſive magnitude, and there- "fore is not diviſible, it certainly has intenſive magni- "tude, and we may well conceive a ceſſation of it, by a "*remiſſion* of power.—For there is a certain degree of

"con-

" conſciouſneſs even in obſcure repreſentations, ſave that
" it does not always ſuffice to diſtinguiſh one idea from
" another, i. e. to make it clear and evident."

APPETITIVE FACULTY, or FACULTY OF DESIRING,
(*Begehrungsvermögen*)

in the moſt general ſenſe, is the power inherent in a living being, to become through his repreſentations the real cauſe of obtaining the objects correſponding with them; although the phyſical powers ſhould not be adequate to the real production of the object deſired: v, g. to wiſh for the great prize in the lottery, and the like.

APPREHENSION

is an act of the mind, by which the variety of individual perceptions is collected, combined with one another, and images are produced. We may diſtinguiſh,

1. the *pure ſyntheſis of apprehenſion*, which compounds the variety of perceptions *a priori*, of Space and Time, and produces pure images, ſuch as repreſentations of numbers, geometrical figures, &c.
2. *empirical apprehenſion*, which combines the pure perceptions together with their matter, i. e. with ſenſible impreſſions, and produces the images of phenomena; v. g. when I obſerve a houſe, the freezing of water, &c.

APPROBATION, See SATISFACTION.

ARCHITECTONIC

is the art of conſtructing Syſtems. The Architectonic of pure Reaſon is, therefore, the plan for a Syſtem of pure philoſophy.

ART, (*Kunſt*)

1, in the moſt extenſive ſenſe, is arbitrary production, in conſequence of preceding repreſentations;

2.

2, in a more limited ſenſe, is production through Liberty, i. e. through a free will, which adopts Reaſon as the ground of its actions.

ARTICULATION

is the ſtructure of the members of a ſcience, or the ſyſtematic unity of it.

ASSERTORY, See IMPERATIVE and JUDGMENTS.

ATTRIBUTE

or *property*, is a character belonging to the exiſtence of a thing conceived, as to its internal poſſibility; which character can be derived from things, or beings, as the neceſſary, i. e. ſufficiently eſtabliſhed conſequence of them.

AUTONOMY,

a peculiar legiſlation of the *will*, is that conſtitution of a rational will, by which it is a law to itſelf, by which it determines itſelf, uninfluenced by inclinations. It is the independence of the will on all matter of it, i. e. on ſenſitive deſires and their objects; the dependence on a rational will, merely on itſelf, i. e. upon the form of Reaſon. This is a practically neceſſary idea, in order to comprehend in this manner the poſſibility of an unconditional Imperative, and a goodneſs (morality) of actions independent on external intereſt.

AXIOM

is a ſynthetical principle *a priori*, which contains immediate or intuitive certainty; i. e. derived from objects of pure perception, and which does not admit of proof, and of the truth of which, we can point out no more accurate character, than what it itſelf expreſſes.

BAD—*Böſes*

is that which, according to a rational principle, is a neceſſary object of deteſtation, in diſtinction from the *diſagreeable*, i. e. what occaſions an immediate ſenſation of pain.

BEAUTIFUL—*Schön*

is that, which excites pleasure and claims our approbation, without satisfying any wants: which pleases us by the harmonious employment of our representing faculty, unconnected with animal desires; and which we are fond of communicating to others; for instance, a witty idea, an acute or bold reflection, a strong picture, and the like.

BEAUTY——*Schönheit*

is the regular conformation of an object, so far as we observe this in it, without representing to ourselves any design or purpose; the regular *subjective* conformation of an object of nature or art; the expression of aesthetical ideas.

BEING——*Wesen, Ding*

signifies 1) a conception with its constituent parts; logically, a *subjectum quod*. The term 'being' is distinguished from the word 'nature;' in as much as the former is the internal principle of all those determinations, which relate to the *possibility* of a thing; and the latter, nature, is the internal principle of all the determinations, relating to the *existence* of a thing:— 2) a real being, *subjectum quo*, the nature of a thing.

BELIEF—*Glaube*

1, signifies the *act* of taking something for true, on account of sufficient subjective, without any objective, reasons for doing so; or, in other words, to conceive things as subjects of cognition, or to admit their possible existence; because Reason enjoins it. These subjective grounds are a certain interest, certain *purposes*;—

2, the *habit*, the moral way of thinking, by which Reason considers as true, what is inaccessible to our theoretical cognition of things;—

3, in particular, *fides sacra*; the adoption of religious principles.

CANON,

in general, means 'a ſcience treating of the proper uſe of our faculty of cognition:' it is therefore oppoſed to '*Diſcipline*,' which is a guide, directing us to prevent the improper uſe of that faculty.

CATEGORICAL, See JUDGMENTS.

CATEGORIES

1, in general, are original notions or intellectual conceptions, which correſpond with the ſimple form of a judgment; logical functions applied to objects in general;—

2, in particular, and according to their twofold uſe, they are,

a) *Categories of theoretical Reaſon*, or of *Nature*; ſo far namely, as they are referred to the variety of ſenſible perceptions, in order to give it unity of apperception in a judgment of experience, or a cognition of nature; hence they are conceptions of unity in this cognition;

b) *Categories of practical Reaſon*; ſo far as the ſame functions of the Underſtanding are referred to the variety of deſires, in order to obtain for it unity in the rational idea of morality.

CAUSALITY—CAUSATION,

dependence, cauſal connection, ſignifies

1, *logically*, the function of the Underſtanding in a hypothetical judgment; the repreſentation concerning the logical relation of cauſe and effect to one another;

2, as the *pure category* correſponding with this function, it expreſſes the notion of a real relation of different objects to one another; the neceſſary determination of the exiſtence of a ſomething through ſomething of a different kind, whether this be homogeneous or not;—a ſpecies of ſyntheſis,

in which, according to, and by means of, something A (cause) we necessarily admit something very different, B (effect), and this in consequence of an absolutely general rule, so that we can conclude the existence of A, from the existence of B.

CERTAINTY—*Gewisheit*

is the consciousness arising from sufficient objective reasons, which are valid with respect to every body.

CHANGE—*Veränderung*,

accidens, is the succession of different states, transition of a thing from one state to another; the co-existence of what is standing and steady in time, with that which changes; the connection of opposite predicates in one and the same object, but at different times, v. g. motion, i. e. a being and not-being of the same thing, in the same place, but at different periods of time.

COGNITION,—*Erkenntniss*,

in general, is a whole of connected representations in one act of consciousness; or the determinate reference of given representations to one object.—Every cognition has 1) *matter*, substance, i. e. something objective, which arises from the objects represented; the variety of given perceptions, objects: 2) *form*, i. e. a determinate way or mode, in which the given matter is received, modified, and combined by the representing faculty; that, which relates to the operation of mind in our cognitions; that, which depends upon the constitution of the thinking subject, or of the Understanding and Reason.

COMMON SENSE—*Gemeinsinn*

is the faculty of determining what pleases or displeases, not through conceptions, but merely through feelings; yet this determination has general validity.

To

To Conceive—*Begreifen*

is a function of Reason, as "*to understand*," i. e. to think of an object, is an act of the Understanding.

Conception—*Begriff*,

1, in the most extensive sense; is every production of the active representing faculty, by which variety, or the multifarious, is connected into unity:

2, in a more determined sense; is a general representation abstracted from a variety of intuitions, and is opposed to a single representation or intuition. A conception of this kind is called by Kant, '*discursive*;' because it does not immediately refer to the object, but only by the representation of a character, which may be common to an infinite variety of things, the representation of which is contained *under* (not, *in*) a *discursive conception*.

In Concreto,

i. e, in real nature, in real objects of experience. Here, many things may be differently constituted, from what they are "*in abstracto*," i. e, when we reflect merely upon the pure idea of a thing, without attending to what may yet lie in the sensible perception of an object.

Condition—*Bedingung*,

the requisite, the ground, that which must be presupposed, in order to understand or to comprehend some other datum, or given thing.—Whatever presupposes a condition, is called *conditionate* or *conditional*.

In *practical* philosophy, we must distinguish

1, that, which is *practically conditionate*, which is determined through natural inclinations and necessities; for instance, the *imperatives* of happiness are valid only under the condition, that

that a perſon feels an inclination for ſomething, an impulſe towards ſomething, a neceſſity of a certain kind; and not otherwiſe:

2, that, which is *practically unconditionate*, which depends merely on Reaſon itſelf, i. e. on the moral law, for inſtance a pure, diſintereſted integrity, fidelity, and general utility.

CONFORMATION—*Zweckmäſsigkeit*,

i. e. *forma, ſive nexus finalis*, is that conſtitution of an object (or even of a ſtate of mind, or of an action), which can be conceived, or thought of by us, as poſſible only through a cauſality according to conceptions, that is, through a Will.

CONSCIENCE—*Gewiſſen*,

means 1) the moral ſenſe, relative to our own actions;
2) the ſelf-determining moral faculty of judging; that unconditionate conſciouſneſs of duty, by which we can determine within ourſelves, whether an action, we are about to perform, be juſt or otherwiſe.

CONSCIOUSNESS——*Bewuſtſeyn*; See APPERCEPTION.

CONSTITUTION OF STATE—*Staatsverfaſſung*;

the moſt perfect is that, in which the liberty of every individual is thoroughly conſiſtent with the freedom of all members of ſociety.

CONSTITUTIVE

principles are thoſe, which refer to an object, ſo as to determine ſomething relative to it, i. e. to the repreſentation of it; namely either the intuition of an object, v. g. the mathematical principles; or the experimental conception of it, v. g. the dynamical principles of the Underſtanding.

REGULATIVE principles, on the contrary, are thoſe, which do

do not determine the objects themselves, but which afford us rules, i. e. determinations of the Understanding, to search for the objects in question.

To Construct

an idea, means to determine an individual object, i. e. the perception itself of that object, which is perfectly conformable to the general idea.

An object requires perception; an empirical perception, however, we cannot spontaneously produce; for the pure perception only is possible *a priori*. In this, namely Space and Time, we can form certain determinations, and combine them in the pure representing faculty, for instance an equilateral triangle. In a similar manner, we can construct the intensive magnitude of the sensations of the solar light, i. e. we can compound them of about 200,000 times the quantity of the light of the moon, and predicate them in a determined manner a priori;—of two given members of a proportion, we are able to construct a third, such as 2 : 4 : 8, &c.

Construction, in a general sense, signifies every exhibition of a general idea, by means of the self-active production of a perception, that corresponds with the idea.

Contact—*Berührung*,

1, in a *mathematical* sense, is the common boundary of two spaces, which is neither within the one nor the other, v. g. two intersecting lines do not touch one another, because their common point belongs to each of them:

2, in a *physical* sense, is the reciprocal effect of the repelling powers in the common boundary of two spaces; the immediate action and reaction of impenetrability. It is distinguished from the action at distance, i. e. from the effect of one matter upon the other, without the mediation of other intervenient matters through the empty space, v. g. in the essential

tial attraction.—The beginning of contact in the approach of one matter to another, is called 'percuſſion' (*Stoſs*); the continuation of it, 'preſſure' (*Druck*).

CONTINUANCE, or PERMANENCY—*Beharrlichkeit*,

is exiſtence at all times, without origin and evaneſcence. If, in this manner, we repreſent to ourſelves the exiſtence of phenomena, we claſs them under the pure intellectual conception, or Category of Subſtance.

CONTINUITY—*Stätigkeit*,

refers to that magnitude, no part of which is the abſolutely ſmalleſt and moſt ſimple, and in the ſolution of which we never can arrive at determined laſt unities; for inſtance, Space and Time, together with the phenomena that exiſt in them.

CONTRADICTION—*Widerſpruch*;

the principle of contradiction, i. e. "no one thing admits of being repreſented by contradictory predicates," is the negative criterion of all abſtract truth, and the ſource of all our analytical, but not of ſynthetical, cognitions.

CONVICTION: See PROOFS.

COSMOLOGY;

the *tranſcendental*, rational coſmology; is either the Science embracing the whole of the phenomena in nature, or the metaphyſical philoſophy of the ſuperſenſible properties of all objects exiſting.

COSMO-THEOLOGY

is the cognition of a primitive Being, from the exiſtence of a world in general, and its accidentality, as oppoſed to ſubſtance.

CRITICISM,

with Kant, ſignifies a critical mode of proceeding (doubts of delay) i. e. the maxim of general diſtruſt with reſpect to all ſynthetical

fynthetical judgments *a priori*, until we have acquired a view of the univerſal ground of their poſſibility, in the eſſential conditions of our faculties of cognition.

Critique of Pure Reason,

or tranſcendental Critique, is the Science of the pure faculty of Reaſon; the inquiry into thoſe particulars, which Reaſon is able to know and to perform, from its own ſources, and independent of experience;—*vid.* the more ample definition, pp. 42 and 43.

Culture,

in a *poſitive* ſenſe, is uſed by Kant, to expreſs the promptneſs we acquire in obeying rules; to which he oppoſes the term '*Diſcipline*,' in a *negative* ſenſe, which weakens and deſtroys that readineſs, and makes us ſuſpend our judgment. The whole Critique is a Diſcipline, as to the contents of pure rational cognition; but as to its method, only a particular part of the Critique is Diſcipline.

Daemonology

is the doctrine of higher, but in other reſpects finite, beings reſembling man; in oppoſition to *Theology*, the doctrine of the higheſt and infinite Being. Phyſical Teleology leads us to the former; moral Teleology to the latter.

Deception—*Betrug*, *Täuſchung*,

is that illuſion of the *ſenſes*, when we conſider ſomething, which is obtained by concluſions, as the immediate obſervation itſelf. This is no error of the ſenſes, but of the Judging Faculty or the Underſtanding.—There is not only a deception of the *external ſenſe*, v. g. the optical, but alſo, an illuſion of the *internal ſenſe*, v. g. when the fanatic believes to feel ſupernatural influence, or when we confound the ſenſation, which neceſſarily accompanies a moral action or determination of the will, with the cauſe of the action itſelf.

Deduction,

in general, is the proof of a legal claim, a right; but, in particular, Kant underſtands by it the eſtabliſhment of a repreſentation; the proof of the right we have to make uſe of it; the proof, that a repreſentation has ſenſe, meaning, reality, objective validity, that it is not vague or empty, but relates to objects.

Demonstrable,

in *Logic*, are called thoſe poſitions, which admit of immediate proof; in oppoſition to *indemonſtrable* poſitions, that admit of no proof;—in a *critical* ſenſe, ſuch conceptions or judgments are demonſtrable, as can be exhibited in perception, whether pure or empirical; in oppoſition to the *indemonſtrable*, which cannot be thus exhibited.

Determination—*Beſtimmung*,

1) as oppoſed to ſubſtance; accidens, a *logical predicate* of a ſubject: 2) a *real predicate*, which amplifies the conception; the determination of a thing: v. g. hard, elaſtic, &c. and *not* mere exiſtence.—The *determinations* of a thing are, according to the ſource of cognition, *empirical*, when they are derived from experience; *tranſcendental*, when they ariſe from the repreſenting ſubject *a priori*.

Determinism

is the principle of determining the will from ſufficient internal (ſubjective) reaſons. To combine this principle with that of freedom, i. e. abſolute ſpontaneity, occaſions no difficulty.

Dialectic

is uſed by Kant in the following ſignifications:

1) *logical*, formal; that Logic, which treats of the ſources of error and illuſion, and the mode of detecting them:

2)

2) *tranſcendental*, material Dialectic; the exhibition and judgment of that illuſion, which ariſes from the ſubjective conſtitution of Reaſon itſelf a priori.

DISCIPLINE—*Zucht*, See CULTURE.

DISJUNCTIVE; See JUDGMENTS.

To DISPUTE

upon any thing, means to decide it by proofs, i. e. from objective conceptions, on which the judgment is founded.—To *conteſt* (ſtreiten) any thing, ſignifies to claim the conſent of others to our judgment; though we cannot always produce objective reaſons, and frequently have only ſubjective grounds to go upon, i. e. aeſthetical grounds, feelings.

DISTANCE: See CONTACT.

DIVINES—*Geiſtliche*

are teachers of the pure moral Religion; as being oppoſed to '*prieſts*, i. e. the conſecrated miniſters of *pious* cuſtoms and ceremonies.

DOGMA,

or a dogmatical judgment, is a direct ſynthetical deciſion from conceptions, and is diſtinguiſhed

1, from analytical judgments, which properly teach nothing;

2, from experimental poſitions, which have no apodictic or demonſtrative certainty;

3, from mathematical principles, i. e. from ſynthetical judgments ariſing from the conſtruction of ideas; and

4, from principles, i. e. indirect ſynthetico-apodictic judgments, ſuch as the principle of the '*ſufficient reaſon*.' Speculative pure Reaſon contains no dogmas; for its ideas have no conſtitutive, objective reality; hence it admits of no dogmatical method.

Dogmatism

or the dogmatical proceſs of pure Reaſon, is the prejudice of maintaining and deciding metaphyſical propoſitions according to cuſtomary principles, and of determining upon the exiſtence or non-exiſtence of ſuperſenſible objects and their properties, without having previouſly deduced the poſſibility of them from the faculties of Reaſon: it is therefore, Metaphyſics without a previous Critique.—Dogmatiſm paves the way for Scepticiſm; this compels us to have recourſe to a Critique; and this laſtly conducts us to a ſolid ſyſtem of ſcience.

Duty—*Pflicht*,

is the obedience of a law from a true regard for it; the objective neceſſity of an action for the ſake of the law, ſo far as this *obliges* the will, i. e. *morally* compels it; though it may have ſome other ſubjective deſires.

Dynamical

1) in general, is ſaid of things, ſo far as we do not attend to their quantity in perception, but to the ground or cauſe of their exiſtence. Hence Kant calls, 2) in particular, a *ſyntheſis* dynamical, where the things combined neceſſarily belong to one another, but muſt not neceſſarily be of a homogenous nature, becauſe they do not, (as in the *mathematical* ſyntheſis) conſtitute together One magnitude, *quantum*. The ſyntheſis of cauſe and effect, for inſtance, is dynamical.

Effect: See Causality.

Empirical: See A posteriori.

Epigenesis of pure Reason

has been called the Kantian explanation concerning the coincidence of the pure intellectual conceptions (Categories) with the objects of experience; according to which explanation,

by

by these pure notions or conceptions, being the forms of thought, experience itself and its objects, as such, become possible.

Vid. the fourth Problem, p. 49 & seq.

ETHICO-THEOLOGY

is that species of Theology, which is derived from pure moral arguments, and admits no symbolical representations.

EXPERIENCE—*Erfahrung*

is, with Kant, an objective, i. e. universally valid and necessary synthetical cognition of given objects (phenomena); or, the representation of observations in a necessarily determined connection; cognition through combined observation; the connection of sensible representations according to certain laws.

EXTENSION—*Ausdehnung*,

in the most comprehensive sense, is the representation of a whole, by means of its continued parts. If these are simultaneous or coexistent, it is *Space*: if they follow one another in succession, it is *Time*. According to this use of the word 'extension,' every *magnitude* is called *extensive*, which is represented by the successive connection of parts of time and space, when the representation of the whole becomes possible only by the representation of the parts. In this sense extension is used in Mathematics, and hence the *mathesis extensorum*.

EXTENSIVE POWER

is, according to Kant, original elasticity or the power of an extended thing by means of the repulsion of all its parts.—It so far differs from what is commonly called *elasticity*, as this is the power of a matter, to resume its form or magnitude changed by another moving power, upon the remission of the latter.

FANCY

FANCY—*Wahn*

is that deception, in which we conſider the mere repreſentation of a thing as equivalent to the thing itſelf. *Religious fancy* manifeſts itſelf in this, when man conſiders the ſtatutory belief and ceremonies as the ſubſtance of religion, and as the ſupreme condition, upon which he may obtain the approbation of the Deity.

FATALISM

is that ſyſtem, in which the connection of purpoſes in the world is conſidered as accidental; and in which this connection is yet derived from a Supreme Being, not indeed from his rational nature, but from the neceſſary conſtitution of this Being, and the unity of the world thence ariſing. Such, for inſtance, is the ſyſtem of Spinoza.

FINAL PURPOSE—*Endzweck*

is that, which requires no other purpoſe as the condition of its poſſibility; which contains in itſelf the determining cauſe, the neceſſary and ſufficient condition of all other purpoſes.

FORM

is the determined mode of thinking ſomething, or the manner of its exiſtence; it is oppoſed to *matter*, i. e. that which is given and determinable.

FUNCTION

is the office, the activity, the form of an higher faculty of cognition: 1) of the *Underſtanding* —to think and to judge; 2) of *Reaſon* —to conclude.

Function is oppoſed to *affection*, as this implies a change, to which our Senſitive Faculty is ſubject.

GENIUS—*ingenium*

is the talent, the gift of nature, or the native diſpoſition of the mind, from which nature preſcribes the rule to art.

To

To Give—*Geben*

an object, is to perceive it, to observe it; to refer the conception of it to real or possible experience. That an object be given, is a necessary condition for receiving a *cognition* of it, but not so, for *thinking* of it only.

Good—*Gutes*,

is that, of which reason approves, and which it considers as practically necessary; that, which according to a rational principle is a necessary object of the faculty of desiring; which has some value. It is opposed to the *agreeable*, which satisfies the inclinations of the senses, or which affords us pleasure.

Gravitation

is called the effect of universal attraction, which every part of matter immediately exerts on all other parts, and at all distances.—Kant distinguishes *gravitation* from *gravity*, i. e. the effort of matter to move itself in the direction of the superior gravitation.

Ground of determination—*Bestimmungsgrund*.

The grounds or causes of determining our actions, are called *formal* (laws), so far as they ascertain the way and manner, in which we view an object; *material* (maxims), so far as they determine the objects, to which an action is directed, *subjective* (laws), so far as they depend upon pure rational conceptions; *objective* (motives), so far as they affect the Sensitive Faculty; *practical*, so far as the last ground, which determines the will is an idea from pure Reason; *aesthetical*, when the last grounds of volition are met with in certain feelings of sense. The pure moral law is the formal ground of determining moral actions; hence the good and bad, i. e. the objects of moral desire and aversion, depend upon this law: it is, therefore, likewise the material ground of determination,

tion, and is objective, as being the form of practical Reason itself. The moral sense is the subjective ground of the same action; but, as this sense or feeling itself is again produced by Reason, it cannot be aesthetical.

Happiness—*Glückseligkeit*

signifies, with Kant, the whole prosperity of a finite, rational being; the consciousness of the agreeable situation, which uninterruptedly accompanies the whole existence of such a being. —It arises from the satisfaction of all inclinations, from the attainment of all ends, which the Sensitive Faculty proposes, and is therefore a prototype of the imagination.

Heteronomy,

or a foreign legislation, is that, in which not the will itself, but something else determines us to act in a certain manner; when not the action itself, but merely its object, its effect interests us; when, beside the idea of the action, another extraneous allurement or compulsion, i. e. hope or fear must concur, in order to produce the action.

Highest Good—*Höchstes Gut*

is the whole unconditionate object of pure practical Reason, and consists 1) in virtue as the constituent of being happy; the *supreme good*; 2) in happiness itself, so far as it is connected with that worth; the *perfect good*.

Hypothesis

is an explanation of something that is real, by something else, the reality of which is not demonstrable or, at least, is not demonstrated.

Hypothetical: See Judgments.

Idea.

This expression Kant employs more determinately (borrowed

rowed from Plato), than is commonly uſed in modern languages. According to Kant, it ſignifies a neceſſary conception of Reaſon, the object of which cannot be perceived by the ſenſes, nor acquired by experience.

IDEALISM

is called that ſyſtem of philoſophy, in which the external reality of certain intuitive repreſentations is diſputed or doubted, and ſpace as well as external objects are aſſerted to be mere fancies.—Such is the ſyſtem of the celebrated biſhop Berkley.

ILLUSION—*Täuſchung, Schein,*

is a falſe judgment, in which we attribute a predicate to an object in itſelf, which predicate belongs to it merely in relation to the ſubject.

IMAGINATION—*Einbildungskraft*

is the faculty of repreſenting an object, in perception, though it ſhould not be preſent.

IMMANENT

is uſed by Kant in oppoſition to *tranſcendental*: the former term is applied to conceptions or principles, which are valid in nature, and are uſed concerning objects of experience, phenomena; though the principles themſelves are not derived from experience: v. g. the application of the principle of cauſality is *immanent*, when it is applied to the relation ſubſiſting among the phenomena of nature as ſuch: it would be *tranſcendent*, when we go with this principle beyond experience, and endeavour to prove from it the exiſtence of the Deity.

IMMORTALITY—*Unſterblichkeit,*

of the ſoul, cannot be proved from ſpeculative reaſons, nor from its ſelf-ſubſiſtence, ſimplicity, and ſo forth; hence it is

not properly an object of knowledge, but it may yet be concluded by analogy, partly from the disproportion of the great talents of man to the confined duration of his present life; and partly for the sake of giving energy to the necessary laws of morality: in this manner it may be defended against all the speculative objections of the rude materialists.

IMPERATIVE—*Gebot*,

1) in general, is an objective practical law;

2) in a more determined sense, it is the formula or prescribed model of that law, by which it is referred to a will, as the necessary precept of its actions; though this will may subjectively have some other object of its wishes, because it is not purely rational, but also depends on inclinations, v. g. those of the human species.

IMPRESSION—*Eindruck*.

'Objects make impressions upon us,' signifies with Kant, that objects of the external sense, external phenomena, affect the internal sense, and are real objects of thought; consequently, that they are sufficiently distinguished from the thoughts themselves, which never can be exhibited in *Space*.—The modus operandi or the origin of this influence occasioned by sensible impressions, cannot be explained by the principles of Kant, nor of any other philosopher.

INCLINATION—*Neigung*

signifies a sensible impulse, the dependence of the appetitive faculty on sensations; in opposition to '*interest*,' i. e. the dependence of that faculty on rational ideas.—The amount of all inclinations is *self-love*; the satisfaction or gratification of an inclination is *pleasure*; that of all inclinations, is *happiness*.

INDETERMINISM

is that inert system of philosophy, which imagines freedom to consist

conſiſt in the accidentality (chance) of actions; that the will is not at all determined by arguments; and that a free being is equally liable, to commit good as well as bad actions

INDIFFERENTISTS

are called thoſe latitudinarians of neutrality, who aſſert, that there are indifferent or involuntary actions, which are neither morally good nor bad.

INDIVIDUAL: See JUDGMENTS.

INDUCEMENT—*Bewegungsgrund*,

is the objective ground of the will, ſo far as it, being repreſented by Reaſon, determines the will.—It is diſtinguiſhed from the 'MOTIVE,' *Triebfeder*, which is ſomething ſubjective, i. e. an inclination, which impels us to an action.

INDUCTION

is cognition of the whole or of the genus, by means of the parts obſerved or perceived: v. g. if we aſcribe to bodies in general, what we have hitherto every where diſcovered in them. From induction there ariſes only a comparative univerſality, or generality of an empirical rule.

INFINITE: See JUDGMENTS.

INTUITION—*Anſchauung*,

1) in the moſt extenſive ſenſe, is every repreſentation of variety or the multifarious, ſo far only, as we conſider the variety, and not the unity in the object. In ſo far, however, as the repreſentation preſents variety, we may call every repreſentation a perception, and unfold it further as ſuch;

2) in a more confined and proper ſenſe, an intuition is not a bare repreſentation of ſight, but every immediate repreſentation of the individual thing, a ſingle repreſentation, which

immediately refers to an object, and by which this is given, i. e. perceived.

To JUDGE—*Urtheilen*

signifies to give unity to two representations, namely to the representation of an object, v. g. of a man, and that of a character, v. g. man is a rational being.

JUDGING FACULTY—*Urtheilskraft*,

is the power of thinking of the particular, as contained under the general or universal.—Kant divides this Faculty into 1) the determining (subsuming) power of judging; this again is a) empirical, b) transcendental; 2) the reflecting or reflex power of judging, which is further subdivided into a) aesthetical, b) teleological.——The meaning of these terms may be found in their respective places in the alphabetical order.

JUDGMENTS—*Urtheile*,

according to the usual definition of Logicians, are representations of one relation subsisting between two notions or conceptions. This explanation, however, applies only to the categorical judgments, and does not determine the nature of this relation. For, even by the laws of the representing power, there arises likewise a relation among our conceptions, which cannot with any propriety be called a judgment. According to Kant, therefore, a judgment in general is the act of comprehending a variety or the multifarious, represented by an intuition, under objective unity. And as nothing else but intuitions can be represented under this unity, they must exhibit either properties of a thing, or effects of a thing, or parts of a whole. Hence the following Judgments will be the result of all representations.

I. JUDGMENTS OF QUANTITY, which determine what can be comprehended under objective unity. The three species of them are,

Individual,

Individual or *ſingular*, when one individual thing,
Particular, when many,
Univerſal, when all,
} can be comprehended under objective unity.

II. JUDGMENTS OF QUALITY, which aſcertain the manner, in which the act of comprehending can be carried on. Their ſpecies are,

Affirmative, i. e. ſo as really to unite an intuition with a conception;

Negative, or ſo as to exclude ſomething from a conception;

Infinite, or ſo as to exclude a whole claſs of intuitions, without determining thereby the conception in any degree.

III. JUDGMENTS OF RELATION, or ſuch as expreſs the relations ſubſiſting between things and properties, cauſes and effects, parts and a whole. The ſpecies of this claſs are,

Categorical, when particular properties or things,

Hypothetical, when particular effects or cauſes,

Diſjunctive, when particular parts or wholes are comprehended under objective unity.

IV. JUDGMENTS OF MODALITY, are thoſe which denote the particular faculties of the mind, by means of which they have been formed; or determine that place, where the things judged of, or comprehended under objective unity, have their reſpective ſeat. The ſpecies of theſe are,

Problematical, when the things exiſt in the Underſtanding alone, or are mere ideas, of which it is not certain, whether they really exiſt without the mind;

Aſſertory, when the things comprehended under the objective are in reality conceived, and believed to correſpond with the conception we have of them; and

Apodictical, or attended with the character of neceſſity, when the things are ſo conceived, as to carry along with them

them the conviction, that according to the conſtitution of the Underſtanding, they cannot be otherwiſe conceived, whether in an affirmative or negative inſtance.

The three laſt ſpecies of Judgments have been reduced by Kant to the claſs of 'modality;' becauſe they add nothing to the contents of a judgment, as is the caſe with thoſe of 'quantity,' 'quality,' and 'relation.'

The further diviſion of Judgments, as to their *origin*, *objects*, *form*, *uſe*, &c. cannot be detailed in an elementary treatiſe; for this would require a ſeparate work, which Kant has actually publiſhed, and of which the reader will find ſome account, in the preceding elementary view of his works, under No. XXV. (9).

To Know—*Wiſſen*,

objectively conſidered, is to have apodictical or demonſtrative certainty. This is poſſible only in cognitions, the origin of which is *a priori*.

Knowledge: See Cognition.

Law—*Geſetz*.

A Law is an objective neceſſary rule, or the repreſentation of a general condition, according to which a variety or what is multifarious muſt be uniformly applicable to all.

Legality—*Geſetzmäſſigkeit*,

moral rectitude, is predicable of every determination of the will and ſubſequent action, which agree with the moral law; whether this action ariſe from the repreſentation of the law itſelf, or from the inclination reſulting from the view of the ſucceſs and advantage of the action.—As to the *morality*, i. e. the properly moral value of the action, there is ſtill required a virtuous ſentiment, or the determination to a lawful action through the law independent of any proſpect of gain or loſs.

Liberty

LIBERTY, FREEDOM—*Freyheit*,

is considered as the attribute of an intelligent being, so far as its actions are not determined by foreign causes. Such a causality and its action is called free.

LIMITATION

is a Category of Quality, which is conceived in things, by connecting the predicate of reality with that of negation; in a similar manner as the judgments of quality (i. e. the species of those called by Kant, *infinite*), have something common with the form of both, *affirmative* and *negative*.

MAN—*Mensch*

a moral being, subject to moral laws by virtue of his rational nature: hence it is highly improper to call him a fighting animal, as some of the modern court-philosophers are pleased to define him.—A *bad* man, is he who has adopted deviation from the moral law as a maxim; a *good* man, who values the moral law as his supreme maxim;—an *accomplished* man, who is both inclined and able to communicate his agreeable feelings to others;—a *man of good morals*, whose actions correspond with the moral law.

MATERIALISM

in general, is the assertion, that the whole of worldly beings consist of matter;—in particular, the *psychological* materialism, or the doctrine, that the personality of man can subsist only under the condition of his being the same body;—the *cosmological*, that the existence and presence of the world can be owing to other circumstances, than to that of its being in *Space*.

MATTER,

1) as opposed to *form*, is the given, perceived thing in general; that, which is determinable; the correlate of the determination;

tion: 2) in oppoſition to *mind*, i. e. an object of the internal ſenſe; matter is that, which is determined by the form of external perception; the ſubſtance of bodies.

Maxims

are ſubjective principles of Reaſon, relative to free actions; whereas *laws* are the neceſſary objective rules, which apply with equal force to every individual, whether morally diſpoſed to obey them, or not.

Mechanically

1) in general, is all that, which neceſſarily happens in time, according to the law of cauſality; 2) in particular, the effect, which bodies in motion produce upon one another by the communication of their motion (not by their internal powers, as in the chemical effects of bodies), v. g. mechanical ſeparation by the wedge.

Mechanism of Nature

is the neceſſary conſequence of events in time, according to the natural law of cauſality.

Metaphysics

1, as defined by Baumgarten, is the ſcience treating of the firſt principles of human knowledge; it has no fixed limits, by which it is ſeparated from other ſciences:
2, with Kant; the whole ſyſtem of pure philoſophy; the philoſophy of things that are not the objects of ſenſe; or the ſcience of the hyperphyſical predicates of ſenſible objects.

Method

1, *Theoretically*, is the mode of teaching; the form of a ſcience; that proceſs of arranging the variety in our cognitions under ſyſtematic unity, which is guided and determined by rational principles:

2,

2, *practically*, the mode and way of eſtabliſhing genuine moral principles. The *methodical doctrine of practical Reaſon* is, therefore, that part of the 'Critique of Reaſon,' which teaches this method from principles.

The *tranſcendental doctrine of method* is the ſcience treating of the form of a metaphyſical ſyſtem.

MIND—*Seele*

ſignifies 1) the ſoul as phenomenon, as the object of the internal ſenſe, with all the internal reflections: it is thus conſidered in the experimental doctrine of mind; 2) the tranſcendental ſubject of thoughts, which we can repreſent to ourſelves merely through the conſciouſneſs accompanying all our repreſentations; 3) in particular, this ſelf-ſame being, as the vital principle of matter.

MODALITY: See JUDGMENTS.

MOTIVE—*Triebfeder*: See INDUCEMENT.

MYSTICISM—*Schwärmerey*

1) that of *ſpeculative Reaſon*, is Plato's doctrine of intellectual perceptions, and the cognoſcible reality of thoſe pretended innate conceptions of things beyond the world of ſenſe; v. g. if we attribute poſitive predicates to the Deity, and ſtill diſpute their borrowed origin from phenomena:

2) that of *practical Reaſon*, is the moral ſyſtem, which does not derive the material ground of human actions from the world of ſenſe, and which conſequently eſtabliſhes the morality of them upon ſuperſenſible perceptions.; v. g. if we admit ſuch divine laws, as differ from the eſſential commands of Reaſon.

NECESSARY: See JUDGMENTS.

NECESSITY—*Nothwendigkeit*

1) *logical*, formal; the neceſſary connection of conceptions in

an apodictical Judgment; that neceſſity, according to which certain predicates belong to a certain conception: 2) *real*, material, phyſical neceſſity of exiſtence; the impoſſibility of non-exiſtence: 3) *moral*, practical neceſſity, which depends upon practical Reaſon.

NEGATIVE: See JUDGMENTS.

NOTION

is a pure intellectual conception, which ariſes from the act of referring the form of a judgment to an object.—An original (not, innate) notion is called a Category.

NOUMENON—*Ding an ſich*,

an object or thing in itſelf, i. e. without or external to the mind in a tranſcendental ſenſe; a thing excluſive of our repreſentation. It is generally oppoſed to the term '*phenomenon*,' or the ſenſible repreſentation of an object.

NUMBER—*Zahl*,

is the repreſentation of unity, from the ſucceſſive addition of One to One, which is of a ſimilar ſpecies. By the idea '*number*,' the Category of *Quantity* is ſenſualized, and the pure ſcheme of Quantity, or ſeries of time exhibited.

OBJECT—*Gegenſtand*

of a repreſentation, in general, is the individual thing, to which the variety of given matter in a repreſentation is referred.

OBJECTIVE

ſignifies, in general, every thing which has objective reality, which relates to an object of ſenſe and experience.

OBLIGATION—*Nöthigung*

is a moral and practical determination of a will governed by rational motives; or the practical neceſſity of volition, in a poſſible

possible contradiction to natural inclinations. In a sacred will, therefore, no obligation takes place.

Ontology

1) as it is pretended; a systematic doctrine of synthetical cognitions *a priori* of things in general:
2) as it is possible; a complete analysis of the pure Understanding, or transcendental philosophy, i. e. the science of the most general conceptions and laws of all rational and moral objects collectively considered;—in opposition to that part of Metaphysics, which treats of the particular objects of the internal or external sense.

Onto-theology

is the cognition of a Supreme Being from bare conceptions.

Organon

1) in general, is the knowledge of those rules, by which a scientific system can be constructed:
2) in particular, the *Organon of pure Reason*; i. e. an Organon for the purposes of Metaphysics. From the complete application of the Organon, arises a system of pure Reason.

Origin—*Ursprung*,

the *first origin* is the derivation of an effect from its first cause, i. e. that cause, which is not again the effect of another cause of the same kind.

Originally—*Ursprünglich*,

i. e. not derived; for instance, original action: (*See* Causality); an original character, which requires no derivation, no proof.

Paralogism

1) *logical*: a false conclusion of Reason, as to its form:
2) *transcendental*: when the ground of the paralogism de-

pends upon the conſtitution of the faculty of cognition itſelf; for inſtance, in the tranſcendental doctrine of mind.

PARTICULAR: See JUDGMENTS.

PATHOLOGICAL

is called that, which depends upon the paſſive part of human nature, upon the ſenſitive faculty. It is oppoſed to '*practical*,' i. e. that, which depends upon the free activity of Reaſon.

PEOPLE OF GOD

is a people, that live under the government of divine laws.

PERCEPTION

generally ſignifies the ſame as '*intuition*;' but, in particular, it is uſed by Kant in a more limited ſenſe, i. e. a repreſentation accompanied with conſciouſneſs or apperception.

PERMITTED—*Erlaubt*

1) is that, which correſponds with a barely poſſible practical precept; *non-permitted*, what militates againſt a problematical Imperative: 2) that, which is conſiſtent with a general law of morality, with the autonomy of the will; the contrary is unpermitted. In the former ſignification, the *non-permitted* is diſtinguiſhed from that, which is '*contrary to duty*,' or what is againſt a real, ſubſiſting law. In the latter ſenſe, theſe terms are equivalent to each other.

PHENOMENON: See NOUMENON.

PHILOSOPHER—*Weltweiſer*,

in idea, is he who renders all cognitions ſubſervient to the neceſſary purpoſes of human Reaſon; a legiſlator of that faculty; a maſter in the ſcience of wiſdom.

To

To Philosophize

means to exercise one's peculiar talent in the philosophical use of Reason, i. e. in the explanation of that, which is explicable.

Physico-Theology

or rather physico-teleological theology, is the cognition of the Deity, as being the author of that order and perfection in the natural world of sense, which is every where discoverable.

Phoronomy

is the pure doctrine of the magnitude of motion.

Possibility—*Möglichkeit*

1) the form of a *problematical judgment*; the conceivable connection of two conceptions: 2) the corresponding pure *Category*, i. e. the reference of a form of thought in a problematical judgment, to perceptions in general, to an object: 3) the application of this Category to sensible perceptions; the agreement of a conception with the general form of sensible perceptions of time.—Impossibility, therefore, signifies the disagreement, the inconsistency with this form.

Practical

is that, which depends on freedom, on the self-active faculty of desiring; which relates to that faculty as the ground, consequence, &c.; for instance, practical cognition, laws, principles, philosophy.

Pragmatical

is that, which is designed for the promotion of general prosperity.

Praying—*Beten*,

is a mere declaration of wishes towards the Divine Being; a Being, that stands in need of no explanation of the internal sentiment of the wishing person.—Praying considered as the means

means of producing effects upon God, is superstition. In order to improve ourselves, and to enliven our moral sentiment, it is one of the most salutary, but by no means generally necessary means.

PRECEPT—*Vorschrift*

means a practical rule, in the most extensive sense, whether it have an absolute (lawful) or only a comparative universality.

PRINCIPLE—*Grundsatz*

is every general cognition, from which others may be consistently derived and conceived.

PROBLEMATICAL: See JUDGMENTS.

PROOFS—*Beweise*

1) in general, are objective grounds of conviction. To prove something, is to demonstrate it sufficiently from objective, logical reasons, to convince, or at least, to prepare the mind for conviction, and not merely to persuade, i. e. to cause or produce our approbation from subjective (aesthetical) grounds of determination: 2) in particular; proofs are either *empirical*, from real experience; or *a priori*, from Reason and independent of all matter of experience.

PSYCHOLOGY,

is the doctrine of mind; the physiology of the internal sense, and a part of physics in general.

PURE—*rein*: See A PRIORI.

PURPOSE—*Zweck*,

in general, is the conception of an object, so far as it contains, at the same time, the ground of the reality of this object.—A purpose is said to be *hypothetical*, when it presents itself as the

the means of attaining ſome other object; *categorical*, when it exhibits itſelf as final purpoſe in the oppoſite caſe.—*Purpoſe of Nature* is the exhibition of the idea of a real, objective conformity in nature. A thing exiſts as a purpoſe of nature, when it is of itſelf both cauſe and effect.

The ſcience or philoſophy of all purpoſes is called *Teleology*.

QUALITY,
QUANTITY, } See JUDGMENTS.

REALITY—*Wirklichkeit*

is real, not merely ideal exiſtence; and this is conceived 1) *pure*, through that Category, which is founded upon the form of aſſertory judgments: 2) *ſenſualized*; i. e. the circumſtance of being in a determined time.

REASON—*Vernunft*

A) *generally* implies the whole, ſupreme, ſelf-active faculty of cognition, in contradiſtinction to the low, merely paſſive, faculty of the ſenſes; and, in this view, the Underſtanding is likewiſe comprehended under it. Hence the whole faculty of cognitions *a priori* is called *pure Reaſon*; which is divided into the faculty of forming conceptions, i. e. the Underſtanding; and into the faculty of forming concluſions, i. e. Reaſon in a more limited ſenſe.

B) *in particular*: the power of conceiving ſomething from principles; of apprehending the particular from the general; of reducing the unity of the rules of the Underſtanding to principles; of claſſing particular conceptions under thoſe, which are general; and finally, of exerting the higheſt degree of activity in the free operating faculty of cognition.—Thus defined, Reaſon is not only diſtinguiſhed from the Senſitive Faculty, but likewiſe from the Underſtanding in a more limited ſenſe.

RE-

RECEPTIVITY,

the ſuſceptibility of impreſſions; the power of receiving repreſentations; of being affected by objects; the *paſſive* faculty of repreſentation; ſenſibility. This, combined with ſpontaneity, forms the ſubſtance of the repreſenting power of man.

REFLECTION—*Ueberlegung*,

1) *logical*; the compariſon made between exiſting conceptions in general: 2) *tranſcendental reflection*, the mode of comparing repreſentations with reſpect to the faculty of cognition, in which they are compared; the act of reflecting upon the manner, how and by what ſubjective conditions (ſtates of mind) we arrive at certain conceptions and judgments, whether through inclination and cuſtom, through the Senſitive Faculty, the Underſtanding, or through Reaſon.

REGULATIVE PRINCIPLES: See CONSTITUTIVE.

RELATION: See JUDGMENTS.

RELIGION

1) *ſubjectively* conſidered, is the repreſentation of the eſſential laws of Reaſon, as the reſult of divine commands and of virtue; the coincidence of the will of a finite being with that of a ſacred and beneficent author of the world, who has both, the will and power of realizing the moſt exact proportion between the happineſs and the moral conduct of man. All Religion is founded upon morals. The Science of Religion is, therefore, called Moral Theology:

2) *objectively* conſidered, it is the whole compaſs of thoſe doctrines, which relate to the ſubjective Religion.

REPRESENTATION—*Vorſtellung*

is an internal determination, a modification of the mind. It is converted into a cognition, as ſoon as it is referred to an object.

RULES

RULE—*Regel*

is a conception or a judgment, so far as the connection of a variety is subjected to a general condition.—As to their validity, Rules are either *universal*, which are necessarily valid, and admit of no exception, for instance, the moral law, and all the rules a priori: or they are *general*, when we frequently observe them to be advantageous and applicable to the purposes of life: such are, for instance, the rules of prudence.

SATISFACTION—*Wohlgefallen*

is the corresponding relation of an object to the sense of feeling, or to the subject itself.

SCEPTICISM

of pure Reason, is the opinion, that we can form no decision upon the existence and non-existence of supersensible things and their properties, without pointing out with accuracy the grounds of this impossibility, which lie in the cognitive faculty itself.

SCHEMA

1) is the general determination of a perception according to general ideas; for instance, the sensible representation of a man, a horse, a house in general. It must, therefore, not be confounded with a 'picture,' i. e. an example in concreto, v. g. that of an individual or particular man, horse, house, &c. 2) the *transcendental* schema of a pure intellectual notion, is the pure and general sensualization of such a notion a *priori*; the sensible condition, under which the pure notions of the intellect are used; i. e. objects can be classed under it.—The regular succession of variety is apriori the schema of causality; number in general is the schema of quantity; whereas an individual number, as that of 5, 15, &c. is merely the picture of it.

SENSATION—*Empfindung*

is ſenſible repreſentation, impreſſion of an actually preſent object upon the mind, modification of the Senſitive Faculty.

SENSE, or SENSITIVE FACULTY—*Sinnlichkeit*,

according to KANT, is that faculty of the mind, which is liable to be modified and affected by things, and thereby to receive impreſſions or repreſentations of things. It is, therefore, neither a bare modification of the Underſtanding, as with LEIBNITZ, nor a mere activity or excitement of the corporeal organs, the peculiar exiſtence of which, if it is to become an object of cognition, rather preſuppoſes a receptivity in the mind itſelf.

The '*pure Senſitive Faculty a priori*,' implies the faculty in itſelf; that, which belongs to it as a power of ſuſceptibility a priori, which is not firſt determined by the ſenſible impreſſions, but which rather determines the latter themſelves, according to Space and Time; it is the ſubjective condition of all that, which receives by it (namely the Senſitive Faculty a priori) the character of reality.

SENSIBILITY—*Empfindbarkeit*

is ſometimes, though rarely, uſed in theſe 'Elements' inſtead of ſenſation; it expreſſes rather the capacity of receiving ſenſible impreſſions.

SENSIBLE and SENSITIVE

muſt not be confounded with one another, as the former is analogous to ſenſibility, the latter to ſenſation.

SIMULTANEITY—*Zugleichseyn*,

is the exiſtence of a variety or the multifarious, at one and the ſame time.

SPACE—*Raum*

is the intuitive repreſentation of things being without and near one another, and of extenſion in general.

SPON-

SPONTANEITY

1) in general, is ſelf-active, unconditionate cauſality;
2) in particular, the *ſpontaneity of the repreſenting faculty* conſiſts in the activity or operation of the repreſenting ſubject upon the impreſſions received. The repreſenting faculty is called, Underſtanding, Reaſon in the moſt extenſive ſenſe, ſo far only, as it is ſelf-active and apprehends the impreſſions received, connects them into a whole, and has the power of reproducing them.

SPURIOUS WORSHIP—*Afterdienſt*

is ſuch a fanciful veneration of the Deity, as is contrary to that true ſervice, which he himſelf requires; v. g. by penance, mortification, pilgrimage, &c.

SUBJECT

1) *logical*; that in general, in which certain predicates are inherent: 2) the *tranſcendental* ſubject in particular, the repreſenting, thinking being in relation to its own thoughts: 3) the *real* ſubject, ſubſtance.

SUBJECTIVE,

as oppoſed to *objective*, ſignifies 1) that, which belongs to the ſubject, i. e. all repreſentations: 2) that, which in part at leaſt is determined by the nature of the ſubject. This is likewiſe the caſe in all our repreſentations: 3) that, which relates to no object correſponding with the repreſentation; thoſe conceptions and judgments, that cannot be exhibited in perception, as the Deity, Liberty, Immortality: 4) in a *practical* ſenſe, ſuch practical principles (maxims), which are not immediately founded upon Reaſon itſelf, but upon the particular conſtitution of the acting ſubject, upon the ſenſible impulſe and inclinations of it.

SUBSTANCE

1) according to the pure *Category*, a ſubject in a categorical

judgment; all that, which is not considered as predicate of something else: in this sense the mind itself is called substance: 2) *sensualized*; substance in a phenomenon, the continuance, perdurability in a perceived object, which exists at all times; that, which contains the ground of reality in the accidens, v. g. matter is the substance of all external objects, without which no object could be conceived in Space: 3) *Substance in itself*, external to the phenomenon; it is that unknown something, by which the different sensations are produced, and necessarily connected with one another in a phenomenon.

SUBSTRATUM.

The *supersensible substratum* of nature is that object, of which we can determine nothing in an affirmative sense, save that it is a being in itself, of which we know merely the phenomenon.

SYNTHESIS

1) in general, is the composition or combination of various representations (whether intuitions or conceptions) into one cognition, which may be conception, judgment, &c. 2) in particular: a) *pure* transcendental synthesis a priori, is the act of combining the variety of Space and Time into One representation of Space and Time. This lies at the foundation of pure Mathematics:—b) *empirical* synthesis, when any experimental varieties, i. e. sensations, are connected into unity. Each of these species consists of three varieties, namely,

1) the synthesis of *apprehension*, when the affections of our internal and external sense are apprehended and arranged;

2) the synthesis of *reproduction*, when that, which has been collected and connected, is reproduced by the power of imagination, in order that the preceding affections may be annexed to those immediately succeeding; and

3) the synthesis of *recognition*, which forms One Intuition of what has been apprehended and connected.

SYSTEM

System

is a whole, which is connected by one principle, and therefore has neceſſary unity. It is oppoſed to '*aggregate*,' i. e. a whole, which owes its origin to the occaſional or accidental addition of one part to another, and conſequently has not the character of neceſſary completeneſs.

Technic

1) in a proper ſenſe, means Art, cauſality according to ideas, purpoſes: 2) in a general ſenſe, the *technic of nature*, the cauſality of nature in relation to thoſe productions, which correſpond with our conceptions of a purpoſe; in oppoſition to '*mechaniſm*,' i. e. the determination of cauſes according to the laws of motion.

Teleology: See Purpose.

Theology: See Religion.

Theosophy

ſignifies that theoretical cognition of the divine nature and exiſtence, which ſatisfactorily explains the conſtitution of the world, as well as the moral laws.

Thing in itself: See Noumenon.

Time—*Zeit*

is, according to Kant, the original perceptive repreſentation of the poſſibility of ſimultaneity and ſucceſſion.

Totality—*Allheit*,

the repreſentation of the whole, (univerſitas); that function of the Underſtanding, by which, when it is applied to conceptions, a plurality of cognitions is comprehended and connected into a general one; when applied to perceptions, Totality

tality is nothing else than plurality considered in things as unity, and forms a species of a Category, viz. that of Quantity.

TRANSCENDENT—*überschwenglich* : See IMMANENT.

TRANSCENDENTAL,

in a general sense, signifies a representation (whether perception or conception), a judgment, a science *a priori*, so far as it still refers to objects, and may be applied to them. For instance, it is a transcendental cognition, that Space is a perception a priori, and yet is applicable to sensible objects. The *transcendental* is opposed to the *empirical*, which latter not only relates to, but likewise arises from, experience.

TRUTH—*Wahrheit*

is the agreement or coincidence of our cognition, 1) with itself, i. e. its own characters, and with the general rules of thought: 2) with its objects; and hence material, positive, *objective*, real, synthetical truth, reality. It requires, that the object be given; the principle of contradiction is only a negative criterion of truth.

UNCONDITIONAL or UNCONDITIONATE—*Unbedingt*,

that, which is absolutely and in itself, i. e. internally possible, which is exempt from those conditions, that circumscribe a thing in Time and Space. Such is the idea of human Reason in the most extensive sense, as it is capable of continual improvement, which, although it cannot be realized in experience, is unlimited; the sphere of the objects of cognition being boundless. And this circumstance ought not to deter, but rather to encourage us in our exertions for the attainment of knowledge, which may be carried on *in indefinitum*.—Compare this Article with the term 'CONDITIONAL.'

UNDER-

UNDERSTANDING.—*Verstand*

1) in the moſt extenſive ſenſe, is the ſelf-active faculty of cognition (ſpontaneity), or the faculty of producing repreſentations, of uniting the repreſentations given or perceived, of thinking and judging upon objects:

2) in particular; the faculty of forming conceptions and judgments of objects perceived; the faculty of acquiring experimental cognitions, i. e. of forming rules, as oppoſed to laws. In this ſenſe, the Underſtanding is diſtinguiſhed from Reaſon in a more limited ſignification.

The WILL

1) in general, is the arbitrary determination, the cauſality of a living being, the power of producing objects correſponding with conceptions, or at leaſt of determining oneſelf as to the attainment of them; an appetitive faculty in general;

2) in particular, the cauſality of Reaſon with reſpect to its actions, practical Reaſon and Liberty; a faculty of acting conformably to principles, i. e. to the repreſentation of laws—to produce ſomething, that correſponds with an idea or purpoſe.

WISDOM—*Weisheit*

is the idea of the neceſſary unity of all poſſible purpoſes. It is therefore 1) *theoretically* conſidered, the cognition of the higheſt good: 2) *practically*: an attribute of that will, which realizes the higheſt good, or at leaſt exerts itſelf for that purpoſe.

FINIS.

THREE

PHILOLOGICAL ESSAYS,

CHIEFLY TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

OF

JOHN CHRISTOPHER ADELUNG, &c.

CONTENTS.

ESSAY FIRST.

A concise history of the English language, its changes, and gradual improvement, - - PAGE v

I. British-Saxon Period, - - - vi

II. Danish-Saxon period, - - - ix

III. Normannic-Saxon Period; or Normannic Anglo-Saxon, - - - xx

IV. French-Saxon, or English period, - xxix

Division first: from 1272 to 1399: or from Edward I. to Henry IV. - - - xxxi

Division second: from 1399 to 1485; or from Henry IV. to Henry VII. - - xlviii

Division third: from 1485 to 1558; or from Henry VII. to the end of Q. Mary. - lviii

Division fourth: from 1558 to 1625; or during the reigns of Q. Elizabeth and K. James I. - lxviii

Concluding general remarks, - - lxxxv

ESSAY SECOND.

A philosophical view of the English language.

Why called philosophical? lxxxviii. Of the English Language, *Ibid.* Of the English written Language, lxxxix. Division of Grammar *Ibid.* Of the English Written Characters, *Ibid.* Of the Anglo-Saxon Alphabet, xc. Of its disuse, *ibid.* Of angular written characters, xci. The English write differently from what they speak, xcii. Explanation of this phenomenon, xciii. Of orthography, xciv. Of the structure of words, *ibid.* Definition of words and syllables, *ibid.* Division of words according to their structure, xcv. Definition of radicals

radicals, *ibid.* Of derivatives, xcvi. Compound words, xcviii. Of the tone or accent of words, xcix. General definitions of the accent, c. Diſtinction of the accent as to its force, *ibid.* Of the duration of the accent, ci. Difference between extended and acute ſyllables cii. Of the accent of radicals, ciii. Of the accent of derivatives, *ibid.* Of the accent of compound words, cv. Reflections upon words as parts of ſpeech, *ibid.* Further reflections upon words, cvii. Analyſis of the inflections, cviii. (I.) Further reflections on the ſubſtantive. (1.) Diviſion of it, cix. (2.) The gender of ſubſtantives, *ibid.* (3.) Of the formation of the Plural, cx. (4.) Of the declenſion, *ibid.* (II.) Of the Article, cxi. (III.) Of the Adjective, cxiii. (IV.) Of numerical words, cxiv. (V.) Of the Pronouns, cxv. (VI.) Of the Verb, cxvii. (VII.) Of the Particles. lxx. Concluſion, *ibid.*

ESSAY THIRD.

On the relative merits and demerits of Johnſon's Engliſh Dictionary, - - - - cxxi

I. Concerning the number of words, - cxxii

II. ——— the value and dignity of words, cxxiv

III. ——— the grammatical deſignation of words, *ibid.*

IV. ——— the etymology of words, - cxxv

V. ——— the principal ſignification of words, cxxvi

VI. ——— the illuſtration of words by examples, cxxix

VII. ——— the practical applicaton of words, *ibid.*

Extract from a Critical Eſſay; by Dr Adam Smith, cxxxi

INDEX,

*Referring to the Names, which occur in these Essays *.*

Alcock, John, 58.
Alfred, king, 7, 9, 10, 19.
Ansley, Brian, 63.
Arbuthnot, Alexander, 79.
Ascham, Roger. 65, 68.
Bacon, lady Anne, 83.
——— lord Francis, 85.
Baldwin, William, 65, 67.
Bale, John, 63.
Ballenden, John, 63.
Barbour, John, 38.
Barclay, Alexander, 58.
Barnsley, Charles, 63.
Baston, Robert, 36.
Bede, Vener. 7.
Behn, Mrs. 84.
Bercher, William, 69.
Berners, Juliana, 57, 60.
Bilson, Thomas, 84.
Boleyn, George, 62.
Borde, Andrew, 63.
Bourchier, John, 64.
Brighman, Nicholas, 44.
Bruce, Robert, 36, 39.
Brumpton, John, 47.
Brunne: V—Robert de Brunne, 35.
Bryant, Sir Francis, 62.
Buckhurst, Lord, 82.
Caedmon, 7, 9.
Campeden, Hugh, 50.
Cary, Henry, 82.
Cavyl, 67.
Caxton, William, 55, 60.
Cecil, Mildred, 83,
—— William, 82.
Chapman George, 69, 71.
Charlemagne, 6.
Chatterton, 52.
Chaucer, Geoffrey, 40, 46, 48,
Cheke, Sir John. 64, 68.
Chertsey, Andrew, 63.
Chester, Thomas 50.
Churchyard, Thomas, 67, 70.
Cook, Catherine, 83.
Cox, Leonard, 74.
Crowley, Robert, 65.
Cuff, Henry, 82.
Culpose, 63
Davie, Adam, 36.
Devereux, Robert, 75.
Digby 23.
Douglas, Gawin, 39, 60.
Drant, Thomas, 71, 72.
Drayton, 26.
Dudley, Robert, 75, 80, 82.
Dunbar, William, 59.
Edward III. 36.
——— IV. 51.
——— VI. 65. 66.
Edwards, Richard, 67.
Elham, Thomas de, 51.
Elizabeth, Queen, 82.
Entick, 123.
Fabian, Robert, 57.
Fairfax, Edward 72, 73.
Fane, Lady Elizabeth, 66.
Fenton Sir Geoffrey, 72, 82.
Ferrers George, 67.
Fleming Abraham, 69, 71, 72.
Forrest William, 68
Galbreith, 63.
Gascoigne, George, 69, 72, 78, 80.
Gaunt John of 41
Golding Arthur, 70, 71.
Googe, Barnaby, 69. 71.
Gower, John 46, 47.
Green, Robert, 81
Gray Lady Jane, 66.
Grimoald, Nicholas, 63, 72.
Grosteste, Robert, 35.
Haliwell Edward, 63.
Hall Arthur, 69.
—— Joseph, 79.
Hampole, Richard, 36.
Harding, John, 50.
Harrington Sir James, 72.
——— Sir John, 78
Harvey Gabriel, 78,
Hastings Francis, 66.
Hatton Lord Chancellor, 82.
Hawes, Stephen 58.
Henry I. 23.
——V. 48.
—— the Minstrel 55.
Heywood Jasper, 70.
——— John, 63.
Higden, 47
Holland, 55.
Holme, Wilfrid, 63.
Hooker, Richard, 75, 84
Hopkins, John, 65.
Howard Henry Earl of Northampt. 82.
——— ——— Surrey, 62, 63.
——— Lady Mary, 67.
Humphrey, Duke of Glouc. 51. 66.
Hunis, William, 65.

James

* In order to save room, and to render the finding out of the Names easier to the reader, we have reduced the Roman Numbers to those in common use.

James of Scotland, 53.
—— VI. Do. 79.
Inglis, Sir James, 63.
Ingulf, Abbot, 19.
John, King, 32.
Johnſon, Dr. Sam. 6, 9, 60, 65, 121.
Kay, John, 51.
Kelton, 66.
Kendall, Timothy, 71.
Kinloch, 63.
Kinwelmerſh, Francis, 69.
Kyd, 63.
Leland, 34, 41.
Lilly, George, 61.
—— John, 80.
Lindſay, Sir David. 63.
Livius, Titus, 51.
Longlande, Robert, 37.
Lumley, Lady Joanna, 67.
——— Lord John, 64.
Lydgate, John, 49, 58.
Maitland, Sir Richard, 79.
Mandeville, Sir John, 37, 47.
Manning, Robert, 35.
Margaret, Counteſs of Richmond, 60.
Marloe, Chriſtopher, 70. 80.
Mary, Queen of England, 67.
——— Scots, 82.
Matthew of Weſtminſter, 47.
Medwall, Henry, 59.
Merimuth, Adam de, 47.
Montfort, Simon of, 32.
Montgomery, Alexander, 79.
More, Sir Thomas, 61, 63.
Morley, Lord, 64.
Naſhe, Thomas, 80.
Nevyle, Alexander, 69.
Newcaſtle, Dutcheſs of, 84.
Newce, Thomas, 69.
Newton, Thomas, 70, 71.
Norton, John, 50.
——— Thomas, 65.
Occleve, 49, 56.
Parker, Matthew, 65.
Parr, Catherine, 64.
Peele, George, 81.
Pelham, Sir John, 54.
Percy, Algernon, 60.
Perkins, William, 75
Phayer, 67.
Philips, Catherine, 84.
Poulett, William, 82.
Poyngz, Sir Anthony, 69.
Puttenham, 74.
Raleigh, Sir Walter, 75. 78,
Raſtall, John, 59, 61.
Ratcliffe, Thomas, 75.
Ripley, George, 50.
Robert de Brunne, 35.
——— of Glouceſter, 35.
Rochford, Viſcount, 62.
Rolland, John, 79.
Roos, John, 62.
Roper, Margaret, 64.
—— Mary, 66.
Rowley, Thomas, 52.
Ruſſel, Elizabeth, 83.
Sackville, Thomas, 67, 79.
Saville, Sir Henry, 72.
Scot, Alexander, 68.
Seager, Francis, 65, 67.
Shakeſpeare, 81.
Sheffield, Lord Edmund, 66.
Sheridan, 99.
Sidney, Mary. 83.
——— Sir Philip, 69, 81
Sinclair, Henry Earl of, 60.
Skelton, John, 60, 61, 67.
Skinner, 126.
Smith, Nicholas, 69.
—— Sir Thomas, 65, 68.
Sommerſet, Duke of, 66
Spenſer, Edmund, 71, 76
Stafford, Lord Henry, 66
Stanyhurſt, Robert, 70
Sternhold, Thomas, 65
Stewart of Lorn, 63
Studley, John, 69
Swynford, Catherine, 42
Tiptoft, John, 56
Tuberville, George. 71, 78
——— Thomas, 70, 71
Tuſſer, Thomas, 67
Tye, Chriſtopher, 65
Twyne, Thomas, 70
Vaux, Lord Nicholas, 62
Vere, Edward. 82
Underdowne, Thomas, 69
Wade, Lawrence, 59
Waller, 73.
Walter, William. 59
Walton, John, 48
Warton, 7, 19, 23, 27, 31
Whetſtone, George, 72, 80
Wickes, Thomas, 47
Wickliff, John 31, 41, 46
Widville, Anthony, 56
Wilſon, Dr. Thomas, 69, 72
Winton, Andrew, 55.
Wyat, Sir Thomas, 62
Wyttingham, William, 65

CATALOGUE

CATALOGUE

Of References to the original publications, as well as tranſlations made into Engliſh, and ſome remarkable paſſages.

Addreſs to his empty purſe, by Chaucer, 43
Aelian's various Hiſtory, by Fleming, 69
Agamemnon, by Studley, 69
Agricola's Life, by Saville, 72
Amadis de Gaule, 81
Arcadia, by Sidney, 81
Arioſto's Suppoſiti, by Gaſcoigne, 72, 80
——— Works tranſlated by Harrington, 72, 78
Ariſtotle, on the Ten Categories, by Googe, 69
Arraignment of Paris, by Peele, 81
Art of Engliſh Poeſie, by Puttenham, 74
Art of Rhetoric, by Wilſon, 74
Aſtrolabe, by Chaucer, 45
Aſtrophel, by Spencer, 77
Bard, William the Conqueror's, 26
Belvidere, or the Garden of the Muſes, 78
Boccace, Viſions of, 72
Boethius's Conſolation of Philoſophy, by Walton, 48
——— by Q. Elizabeth, 82
Book of Kings, 66
Caeſar's Commentaries, by Golding, 71
Canterbury Tables, by Chaucer, 45
Caſtle of Love, by Groſſe-Teſte, 35
Cebes, Table of, by Poyngz, 69
Chriſt's Kirk on the Green, by King James, 54
Cicero's Offices, by Grimoald, 72
——— Oration for Archias, by Drant, 72
——— Select Epiſtles by Fleming, 27
Complaint of Scotland, by Inglis, 63
Concordance of Sins, by Fabian, 57
Confeſſio Amantis, by Gower, 46
Conſolation of Q. Mary's, &c 83
Court of Love, by Chaucer, 40, 55
——— Venus, by K. James, 55
Defence of Poeſie, by Sidney, 82
Demoſthenes's Seven Orations, by Wilſon, 69
Deſtruction of Troy, by Lydgate, 50
Dido, Tragedy of, by Naſhe, 80
Diſcourſe of Life and Death, by M. Sidney, 83
Eccleſiaſtical Polity, by Hooker, 75
Edward the Firſt, by Peele, 81
Egidius, on the Government of Princes, by Occleve, 49
Ella, Tragedy of, by Rowley, 53
Engliſh Name diſgraced, 22
England's Parnaſſus, 78
Eraſmus's Inſtitution, by Lumley, 64
Euphues, a Romance, by Lilly, 81
Euripides's Phœniſſæ or Jocaſta, by Gaſcoigne and Kinwelmerſh 69, 80
Fairy Queen, by Spenſer, 76
Fall of Princes, by Lydgate, 50
Fauſtus's, Dr, Tragical Hiſtory, by Marloe, 80
Froiſſart's Chronicle, by Bourchier, 64
Gammer Gurton's Needle, 66
Glaſs of Government, by Gaſcoigne, 80
Golden Epiſtles, by Fenton, 82
——— Terge, by Dunbar, 59
Gorboduc, by Sackville, 79
Guicciardini's Hiſtory of Italy, by Fenton, 72, 82
Heliodorus's Hiſtory, by Underdowne, 69
Hercules Oeteus, by Studley, 69
Herodian's Hiſtory, by Smith, 69
Hiſtory of the World, by Raleigh, 75
Homer's Iliad, by Hall, 69
Horace's Art of Poetry, by Q. Elizabeth, 82
——— Satires, Epiſtles and Art of Poetry, By Drant, 71
Huſbandrie, five hundred points of good;—by Tuſſer, 67
Hyppolitus by Studley, 69
Idiot, an epithet given to a Biſhop, 22
Jewel's Apology for the Church of England, 83

Iſocrates

Isocrates, by Fleming, 69
Justin's History by Golding, 71
King David and Fair Bethsabe, by Peele 81
King's Quair, by K. James I. 54
Kyng of Tars, 33
Laconic Advice by Chaucer, 44
Life of St. Margaret, 26
Lucan's First Book, by Marloe 71
Magna Charta often reprinted, 64
Mantuan, transl. by Tuberville 71
Manual de Peche by R. de Brunne, 35
Maphæus supplement. book of Virgil, by Twyne, 70
Martial's Epigrams by Kendall, 71
Medea by Studley, 69
Mirrour for Magistrates. by Sackville, 67
Moralities improved by Rastall, 59, 61
Musæus by Chapman, 69
Ochine's Sermons, by A. Bacon, 83
Octavia, by Newce 69
Oedipus by Nevyle, 69
Ovid's Art of Love by Douglas 59
—— Elegies by Marloe, 70
—— Fasti 70
—— Heroical Epistles, by Tuberville, 70
—— Ibis by Underdowne, 70
—— Metamorphosis, by Golding. 70
—— Remedy of Love 70
—— Tristia by Churchyard. 70
Orosius's translation. by K. Alfred 10
Palingenius's Zodiac by Googe, 71
Paradise of dainty dev. by Edwards, 67
Passetyme of Pleasure, by Hawes, 58
Peblis to the Play, by K. James I. 54.
Philotus. 64
Pliny's Letters by Fleming. 72
Plutarch de Curiositate, by Q. Elizabeth, 82
Polyalbion, by Drayton, 26
Pompon. Mela's Geogr. by Golding, 71
Princ. Pleas. of Kennelw. Castle, by Gascoigne, 80
Promos and Cassandra, by Whetstone, 80
Reconciliation way of, by R. Russel. 83
Rhodes, History of the Siege of by Kay, 51
Royal advice to her Son, by Q. Mary, 83
Sallust's Jugurth. War, by Q. Elizabeth, 82
Schoolmaster, by R. Ascham, 68
Seneca's Hercules Furens Thyestes, and Troas by Heywood 70
—— Thebais by Newton ibid.
—— On Benefits by Golding, 71
—— Ten Tragedies 69
Statius's Thebais by Newton 71
Shephe'd's Calendar. by Spenser, 77
Ship of Fools, by Barclay 58
Siege of Thebes by Lydgate 50
Solinus's Polyhistory, by Golding 72
Song of K. James on his Mistr. 54
Synesius's Panegyric by Fleming 69
Tacitus's Four First Books, by Saville 72
Tasso's Jerusalem deliv. by Fairfax 73
Tragedie of Antonio by M. Sidney. 83
Thistle and Rose, by Dunbar 59
Toxophilus, by R. Ascham 65
Travels of Ohthere and Wulfstan, by King Alfred 10——17
Treatise on the proper mode of writing the Eng. Lang. by Smith 65 68
—— on the difference of the ages of man's life, by Cuff, 82
Turkish Mahomet, a Tragedy by Peele, 81
Virgidemiarum, by Hall 79
Virgil's Aeneid, by Douglas 60
—— —— by Howard, 62.
—— —— by Phaer & Twyne, 70
—— —— by Stanyhurst, 70
—— —— Alexis, by Fleming 71
—— Bucolics & Georgics. Do. ibid.
—— Culex, by Spense, - ibid.
Virtue and Vyce, by Ballenden. 63
Vision of Piers Plowman by Longlande, 37
Utopia, by Sir Thomas More 61
Wallace, Sir William's Life and exploits, by Henry the Minstrel 39 55
Writer, the first for Bread, 81
Xenophon's Institut. by Bercher, 69.

ESSAY

ESSAY FIRST.

A concise history of the English Language, &c.

THE history of the English Language begins with the *Anglo-Saxons*; for, though the old *Britons*, the Ancestors of the modern *Welsh*, were the first inhabitants of this country, yet, with respect to its language, they form no epoch in the history of it; as there are but a very small number of words, which can be derived, with certainty and just etymology, from British roots.

It is, indeed, not very probable that the Anglo-Saxons, with their irruption into a new country, should have destroyed, or expelled, all the former inhabitants of it; and it is more reasonable to suppose, that besides those, who fled to the mountains of Wales, there must still have remained behind a very considerable part of the nation, but who, according to the barbarous custom prevailing in those times, were reduced to a species of slavery, were obliged to cultivate the fields of their masters, and were gradually compelled, however unwilling, to adopt the language of their conquerors.

Thus, the ancient tongue of the Britons, was completely eradicated; if we except a few single words, which have still remained current among country-people.—Similar phenomena have occurred in Germany, and frequently too, in other countries. When the Sclavi and the Vandals made themselves masters of the Eastern part of Germany, they did not destroy all the native Germans; but they subjugated and forced them to adopt *their* language. Hence, in Bohemia, there is scarcely any trace left of the ancient language of the country. When the Germans, in succeeding ages, reconquered many of these provinces, and united them into a political body, they proceeded in a similar manner; and it is now very difficult to detect any vestiges of the ancient language of the Vandals, among the country-people of these provinces.

The Anglo-Saxons, who began their irruptions into Britain about the year 450, came from the modern *Frisia*: hence their language bears a closer relation to the *Frisian*, than to any other. It is, however, to be much regretted, that the latter has

not been more accurately inveſtigated hitherto by any philologiſt; for it certainly might be of great advantage for the illuſtration of the ancient *Anglo-Saxon*.

The hiſtory of the Engliſh language, from the firſt inroads of the Anglo-Saxons, down to the preſent time, comprehends a period of nearly fourteen centuries. As the nation, during this long period, has undergone various great changes and commotions, which were neceſſarily attended with relative influence upon the language, it becomes therefore neceſſary to divide it into certain periodical Sections, correſponding with theſe changes. I propoſe to adopt this method; although JOHNSON, my predeceſſor, has contented himſelf with giving promiſcuous ſpecimens of language, as prefixed to his large Dictionary, in chronological order, without however attempting a true hiſtorical diviſion.

The principal changes, which, poſterior to the Anglo-Saxons, affected the Engliſh language, were, the incurſions of the Danes; the invaſion of the Normans; and the adoption of French phraſes and terms, together with the improvements and manners of that people. Theſe collectively ſuggeſt to us *four* periods, in tracing the hiſtory of the Engliſh language: viz. 1ſt, the *pure Anglo-Saxon*, or the Britiſh-Saxon period; 2d. the *Daniſh Saxon*, or Daniſh Anglo-Saxon; 3d. the *Normannic-Saxon*, or the Normannic Daniſh-Saxon; and 4th, the *French-Saxon*, or the Normannic French-Saxon period, in which laſt the language gradually aſſumed the form of the *modern Engliſh*.

I. BRITISH-SAXON PERIOD.

This period begins with the firſt invaſion of the *Anglo-Saxons*, in the year 450; it terminates with the incurſions of the *Danes*, about the year 780, and conſequently comprehends an era of 330 years.—It correſponds with that period in the hiſtory of the German language, which extends from the emigration of the Eaſtern nations, to the reign of CHARLEMAGNE; and with reſpect to the ſtate of improvement during this period, both languages perfectly reſemble one another.

The *Anglo-Saxons* were a rude, untutored people, not unlike all the German and Northern nations of that age, whoſe principal improvements related to the art of war. People of this de-

deſcription do not ſtand in need of letters, or a written language; and it is very probable, that they neither had, nor knew, the alphabet. The increaſe of population, in a limited territory, compelled them, indeed, early to accuſtom themſelves to order and a more rigid civil conſtitution; but as they were employed, for a conſiderable time, in combating the natives of conquered countries, this faint improvement was chiefly, and proximately, deſigned for warlike purſuits.

A more remarkable degree of improvement was manifeſt among the Anglo-Saxons about the year 570, when St AUGUSTINE arrived from Rome, and inſtructed them in the beneficent principles of the Chriſtian Religion. Theſe were the more eagerly embraced, as the progreſs of the mind, though hitherto ſmall and partial, enabled them to perceive the neceſſity of aboliſhing that rude and undigeſted veneration for their idols, which were calculated only to amuſe the fancy of a barbarous and unſettled people.

Together with the Chriſtian Religion, the Anglo-Saxons alſo acquired the firſt rudiments of the arts and ſciences, and a taſte for the literature of ancient Rome, which very rapidly ſpread among them. This may be eaſily accounted for, as it was chiefly promoted by the continual increaſe of a numerous people, who had eſtabliſhed themſelves upon a limited territory. Thus prepared, they likewiſe adopted the Roman alphabet, which had already been introduced as the current ſmall letter in their writings. But as they were accuſtomed to a *ſound* in their language, which was expreſſed with a hiſſing tone, ſomewhat ſimilar to both *t* and *s*, and which was foreign to the Romans, who had no character for it in their alphabet; hence the Anglo-Saxon teachers of Religion were obliged to borrow the ϴ (theta) from the Greek, which therefore ſupplied the place of the modern Engliſh *th*. The other Anglo-Saxon characters are perfectly ſimilar to the Roman current letters of thoſe times, and particularly of the ſixth Century; and the *w* of the former is cloſely imitated from a compounded *v* of the latter.

If full credit be due to WARTON, there is no fragment extant from this period, but a ſmall metric compoſition of the *genuine* CAEDMON, which is inſerted in ALFRED's tranſlation of the Eccleſiaſtic Hiſtory, by BEDE *.—As the only,

* Vol. IV. Chap. 24. (*not* Chap. 4. as quoted by WARTON).

and certainly a venerable piece of curiosity left of these remote ages, it well deserves a place in this period of the British language. It is here offered in two different copies. One of them is transcribed from HICKES's *Grammat. Anglo-Saxon.* p. 187; the other still more ancient, is extracted from WANLEY's *Antiq. Literat. Septentr.* Part II. p. 287—I have met with a third Copy of this fragment in" WHELOCK's *Anglo-Saxon* BEDE; *Cambridge*, 1643; but the text in this differs from both the former, and does not appear to me equally authentic.

HICKES.

" Nu we sceolon herigean
Heofon rices weard
Metodes mihte.
And his mod gethanc.
Weorc wuldor faeder
Suua he wundra gehwaes.
Ece drihten ord onsteald.
He aerest scop
Eordan bearnum
Heofan to rofe
Halig scippend.

Da middangeard
Moncynnes weard
Ece drihte aefter teode.
Firum foldan.
Frea aelmihtig."

WANLEY.

" Nu scylun hergan
Hefaen ricaes uard
Metudaes maecti
End his mod gidanc
Verc uuldur fadur
Sue he uundra gihuaes.
Eci drictin
Ora stelidae.
He aerist scopa
Elda barnum
Heben til hrofe
Haleg scepen,
Tha middun geard
Moncynnaes uard
Ecy dryctin
Aefter tiadae
Firum foldu
Frea almectig.

English.

" Now we ought to praise the author of the celestial empire, the might of the creator, and his counsels, the deeds of the father of honour; how he became the author of wonders.

And when the eternal God first created heaven as the roof for the children of man, and afterwards the earth, being an omnipotent guardian of the human race."

German.

" Nun sollen wir preisen, den Urheber des Himmelreiches, die Macht des Schöpfers, und seinen Rath, die Thaten des Vaters der Ehre; wie er der Urheber der Wunder ward.

Und als der ewige Gott den Menschenkindern zuerst den Himmel zum Dache, und hernach als allmächtiger Hüter des menschlichen Geschlechts die Erde schuf.

Although

Although CAEDMON is said to have miraculouſly compoſed this Song, when dreaming; it nevertheleſs appears to be a tranſlation from the Latin, which then, and for ſeveral ſucceeding centuries, was rendered ſo very literally, that even the article was left out, and the whole conſtruction of the Latin with the participles and many other peculiarities were rigorouſly obſerved. It is for this reaſon, we ought not to judge of the ſpirit of a language from the like tranſlations; and the want of rhymes is very probably owing to the ſame cauſe.

II. DANISH SAXON-PERIOD.

(or, Daniſh Anglo-Saxon.)

This period begins from the incurſions of the Danes, about the year 780, and continues as far as the invaſion of the Normans in 1066; it conſequently includes nearly three centuries. Two circumſtances co-operated here, which produced remarkable changes in the Old Saxon language; namely firſt, the domeſtic improvements of the Anglo-Saxons, both in a phyſical and moral ſenſe, from which the improvement, and conſequently the change of the language was inſeparable; and ſecondly, the mixture of the latter with the Daniſh, which being cloſely related to the Anglo-Saxon, was more eaſily united into *one* language.

Many written fragments, from this period, are ſtill extant; and all ſuch as are commonly called Anglo-Saxon, properly conſiſt of a mixture of Daniſh with the Anglo-Saxon. To this number we may particularly refer two literal tranſlations of the four Evangeliſts, the writings of King ALFRED, and the beautiful poetical paraphraſe of the *Firſt Book of Moſes*, by the *ſpurious* CAEDMON.

As a ſpecimen of the proſe-language of this period, JOHNSON gives the firſt Chapter of St LUKE, extracted from one of the tranſlations above mentioned; but as ſuch literal tranſlations are by no means calculated to exhibit the ſpirit of a language, I have made choice of the Travels of OHTHER and WULFSTAN, as King ALFRED, who died in 901, deſcribed them in his Preface to the tranſlation of OROSIUS.—I have faithfully tranſcribed it from *Spelman's Vita Aelfredi*; Oxford, Fol. 1678; with this

this difference only, that instead of giving the (very inaccurate) Latin of SPELMAN, I have subjoined a German translation; and for the greater convenience of readers, in general, I have likewise exchanged the Anglo-Saxon for the common Latin characters.

This original piece, on account of the many curious particulars it contains, I make no doubt, will prove more acceptable than any of those which are bare literal translations, and consequently improper to serve as specimens for displaying the genius of the language.

Ohthaere saede his hlaforde Aelfrede de Kyningce thaet he ealra Northmanna Northmest bude; he cwaeth thaet he bude on thaem lande northweardum with tha waest sae. he saede theah thaet thaet land sy swithe north thanon· ac hit is eall weste buton on seawum stowum· stice maelum wiciath Finnas· on huntathe on wintra· and on sumera no fiscothe be thaere sae.

He saede thaet he aet sumum cyrre wolde sandian hu lange thaet land north rihte laege· oth the hwaether aenig man benortham thaem westene bude: tha for he north rihte be thaem lande· let him ealne weg thaet weste lande on thaet steorbord· and tha wid sae on baec bord thry dagas· tha wes he

OHTHER said to his Lord, King ALFRED, that of all the Normans he resided the farthest towards the North; he affirmed, that he resided in that country which, in the North, borders on the Western Ocean. This country extends far to the North, is a complete desert, excepting a few places which are inhabited by the *Finns*, who live in winter by the chace, but in summer by fishing.

He related, that he had once wished to examine, how far this country extended to the North; or whether this desert was inhabited in its northern parts. For this purpose he had sailed three successive days in a straight northern line, having the desert country on the right, and the open sea on the left hand; thus he

OHTHER sagte zu seinem Herrn, dem Koenige AELFRED, dass er unter allen Normannen am weitesten gegen Norden wohne; er sagte, er wohne in dem Lande, welches nordwaerts an die Westsee stoesst. Dieses Land erstrecke sich weit gegen Mitternacht, und sey voellig wuist, bis auf einige wenige Orte, wo einige *Finnen* wohnen, welche im Winter von der Jagd, im Sommer aber von dem Fischfange leben.

Er sagte, er habe einmal untersuchen wollen, wie weit sich dieses Land nach Norden erstreckte; oder ob noch Menschen im Norden dieser Wuiste wohneten. Deswegen sey er drey Tage lang gerade nordwaerts gereiset, habe das wuiste Land zur rechten, und die offene See auf der linken Hand gehabt; da er denn bis dahin nord-

he ſwa feor north ſwa ſwa hwael huntan ſyrreſt farath:· tha for he tha gyt north ryhte· ſwa he mihte on thaem othrum thrim dagum geſeglian· tha beah thaet land wer eart rihte· oththe ſio ſae in on thaet land· he nyſte hwaether· buton he wyſte thet he ther bad weſtan windes oththe hwon northan· and ſegled thanon eaſt be lande· ſwa ſwa he mihte on feowor dagum geſeglian· tha ſceolde he bidan ryhte northan windes· forthan thaet land thaer beah ſuthrihte· oththe ſeo ſae in onwaet land· he nyſte hwaether· tha ſaegled he thanon ſuthrihte be lande· ſwa ſwa he mihte on fif dagum geſeglian:.

Tha laeg thaer an micel ea up in that land· wa cyrdon he up in on tha ea· for thaem hyne thorſton forth be thaere ea ſeglian· for unfrithe· for thaem thaet land waes eall gebun on othre healfe thaere ea:· Ne mette he aer nan gebun land· ſyththan he fram his agnum hame for· ac him waes ealne weg weſt land on thaet ſteorbord butan ſiſceran and fugeleran and huntan·

he had come to that northern region, to which the whale-fiſhers were accuſtomed to reſort. From thence he had ſailed, for three days, further North, where he found the country extending due Eaſt. But whether the ſea continue within the land, he knew not; he only knew this much, that he had ſtopped there, waiting for weſterly or northerly winds. After this he ſailed four days along the coaſt, when he was again obliged to wait for a northerly wind, as the country extended to the South. Whether the ſea continue within this part of the land, he alſo knew not. Then he ſailed five additional days along the Southern coaſt.

Here he met with a great river that extended far up the country, and on the mouth of which he ſtopped, but for fear of the inhabitants, he did not venture to ſail up that river; for the country, on one bank of the river, appeared fully inhabited. He had met with no other inhabited country than this ſince his departure from home: the country on the right always appearing

nordwaerts gekommen ſey, wohin die Wallfiſchjaeger zu gehen pflegten. Von da ſey er noch drey Tage lang weiter nordwaerts geſegelt, da ſich denn das Land gerade nach Oſten geſtreckt habe. Ob aber innerhalb des Landes Meer ſey, wiſſe er nicht; er wiſſe nur ſo viel, daſs er ſich daſelbſt aufgehalten, und auf den Weſt-oder Nordwind gewartet habe. Hierauf ſey er vier Tage lang an dem Lande hingeſegelt, worauf er auf den Nordwind habe warten muiſſen, weil ſich das Land nach Suiden geſtreckt habe. Ob ſich die See in dieſes Land erſtrecke, wiſſe er nicht. Hierauf ſey er fuinf Tage lang laengs der Kuiſte ſuidwaerts geſegelt.

Da befand ſich ein groſſer Fluſs, welcher weit in das Land ging, an deſſen Muindung er ſich aufhielt, ſich aber aus Furcht vor den Einwohnern nicht den Fluſs hinauf wagte; weil das Land auf der andern Seite des Fluſſes ſtark bewohnt war. Er hatte auch, ſeitdem er aus ſeiner Heimath abgereiſet war, auſſer dieſem kein bewohntes Land angetroffen, ſondern hatte zur Rechten jederzeit wuiſtes

tan· and thaet waeren ealle Finna· and him waes a Widfae on thaet baec bord:·

Tha Beormas haefdon fwithe well gebun hyra land· ac hi ne dorfton thaew on cuman:· Ac thara Terfin na land thaes eall weſte· butan waer huntan gewicodon· oththe fiſceras· oththe fugeleras :. Fela ſpella him ſaedon tha Beormas· aegther ge of hyra agerum lande ge of thaem lande the ymbe hy utan waeran· ac he nyſte hwat thaes ſothes waes· for thaem he hit ſylf ne geſeah :· Tha Finnas him thuhte and tha Beormas ſpraecon neah angetheode :·

Swithoſt he for thider· to eacan thaes landes ſceawunge· for thaem horſwaelum· for thaem hi habbath fwithe aethele ban on hyra tothum :· Tha tew hy brohton ſume thaem cyningce· and hyra hyd bith fwithe god to ſciprathum :· Se hwael bith micle laeſſa than othre hwalas· ne bith he lengra thonne ſyfan elna

ing a defert uninhabited, except by a few fiſhermen, fowlers and hunters, who were all of *Finnic* extraction. · But on the left, he always obſerved the open ſea.

Many *Biarmians* reſided among them ; yet he was not inclined to venture a landing there. But the country of the *Terfins* was uninhabited, except by ſome hunters, fiſhermen or fowlers who reſided there. The Biarmians told him much of their own country, as well as of the neighbouring lands; but how far their narratives were true, he could not aſcertain, as he had not himſelf ſeen theſe countries. He believed, however, that the FINNS and BIARMIANS had ONE common language.

His principal object in travelling thither had been, to obtain the ſea-horſes, whoſe teeth were compoſed of a very precious bone, and ſome of which teeth he likewiſe gave to the King. Their ſkins are of excellent uſe for tackle. This ſpecies of whale is much ſmaller than any other, being never above

wuiſtes Land gehabt, einige wenige Fiſcher, Vogelfaenger und Jaeger ausgenommen, welche insgeſammt Finnen waren. Zur Linken aber hatte er jederzeit das offene Meer.

Es wohnten viele *Biarmier* in ihrem Lande ; allein er habe es nicht wagen wollen, daſelbſt anzulanden. Das Land der Terfinnen aber ſey unbewohnt, auſſer daſs einige Jaeger, Fiſcher, oder Vogelfaenger daſelbſt wohnten. Die Biarmier haetten ihm vieles, ſo wohl von ihrem eigenen Lande als von den benachbarten Laendern erzaehlet; allein er wiſſe nicht was daran wahr ſey, weil er ſie ſelbſt nicht geſehen habe Er glaubte indeſſen, daſs die FINNEN und BIARMIER EINE und eben dieſelbe Sprache haetten.

Er ſey aber vornehmlich um der Wallroſſe willen dahin gereiſet, welche ein ſehr ſchaetzbares Bein in ihren Zaehnen haetten, von welchen Zaehnen er auch einige dem Koenige gab. Ihre Felle ſind ſehr gut zu Schiffstauen zu gebrauchen. Diese Art Wallfiſche iſt weit kleiner als andere Arten, und nicht uiber ſieben Ehlen lang.

elna lange· ac on his agnum lande iſſe bedſta hwael huntuth. tha beth eachta and feowertiges elna lange· and tha maeſtan fifiges elna lange· thara he ſaede thaet he ſyxa ſum ofsloge ſyxtig on twam dagum.

He waes ſwithe ſpaedig man on thaem aethum the hoera ſpeda on beoth· that is on wildrum :· He haefde thagyt· tha hethone cyning ſohte· tamra deora unbebohtra ſyx hund :· Tha theor he hatad hranas :· wara waeron ſix ſtaet hranas· Tha beoth ſwithe dyre mid Finnum· fof thaem hy foth tha wildan hranas mid :· He waes mid thaem fyrſtum mannum on thaem lande· naefde he theah mathonne twentig hrythera· and twentig ſceapa· and twentig ſwina· and thaet lytle thaet he erede he erede mid horſan :· Ac hyra ar is maeſt on thaem gafole the tha Finnas him gildath· thaet gafol bithon deora fellum· and on fugela fetherum· and hwales bane· and on thaem ſciprapum the beoth of hwaeles hyde

bove ſeven ells in length. But good whales were alſo caught in his native country, which meaſured upwards of forty-eight yards, and ſometimes above fifty yards in length. He affirmed, that he was the ſixth among thoſe (i. e. in company with five others) who had killed ſixty whales in two days.

He was a very rich man in thoſe things which, with them, were eſteemed as riches, that is, in cattle. He had, when he came to the King, ſix hundred, unpurchaſed, tame deer, which he called rein-deer. Among theſe were ſix highly eſteemed by the *Finns*, as by means of them they tamed the wild rein-deer. He was one of the Chiefs in the land, and yet he was poſſeſſed of no more than twenty oxen, twenty ſheep, and twenty hogs. The ſmall piece of ſoil, which he cultivated, was tilled by horſes. The principal revenues (of the Chiefs) conſiſted in the tribute which the Finns paid them, viz. in ſkins of animals, bird-feathers, whale-bone and ſhip-ropes, which were manufactured

lang. Es wuirden aber auch in ſeinem Vaterlande gute Wallfiſche gefangen, welche uiber acht und vierzig, und zuweilen uiber funfzig Ehlen lang waeren. Er verſicherte, daſs er ſelb ſechſte (d. i. mit noch fuinfen) ihrer in zwey Tagen ſechzig erleget habe.

Er war ein ſehr reicher Mann an ſolchen Dingen, welche bey ihnen, fuir Reichthum gehalten werden, d. i. an Vieh. Er hatte, als er zu dem Koenige kam, ſechshundert ungekaufte zahme Hirſche, welche er Rennthiere nannte. Darunter befanden ſich ſechs, welche bey den *Finnen* ſehr hoch geſchaetzet werden weil ſie die wilden Rennthiere damit zahm machen. Er war einer der Vornehmſten in dem Lande, und hatte dennoch nicht mehr als zwanzig Ochſen, zwanzig Schafe, und zwanzig Schweine. Den wenigen Acker, welchen er bauete, den bauete er mit Pferden. Jhre vornehmſten Einkuinfte beſtehen in dem Tribute, welchen die Finneſi ihnen bezahlen, und welcher in Thierfellen, in Vogelfedern, in

 Fiſchbein

hyde geworht and of ſeoles :.

Aeghwilc gylt he his gebyrdum· ſe birdſta ſceall gildan fiftyne mearthes fell· and fif hranes· and an beran fel· and tyn ambra fethra· and berenne kyrtel oththe yterenne· and twegen ſciprapas. aegwer ſy ſyxtig elna lang· other ſy of hwaeles hyde geworhte· other of ſioles :.

* * *

Thaet Eaſtland (WULFSTAN ſaede) is ſwithe mycel· and thaer bith ſwithe manig burh· and on aelcere byrig bith cyninge· and thaer bith ſwythe micel hunig and fiſcath· and ſe cyning and tha riceſtan men drincath myran meocl· and tha unſpethigan and tha

nufactured of the ſkins of the whale and ſea-dog (ſeal).

Every one contributed in proportion to his abilities. The richeſt generally gave fifteen ſkins of the marret, five of the rein-deer, one bear's ſkin, ten meaſures of feathers, together with a coat made of the ſkins of bears or otters, and two ſhip's-cables, each of them ſixty ells long, one of which muſt be manufactured of whale-ſkins, and the other of the ſkins of ſeals.

* * *

This Eaſtern country † (WULFSTAN related) was very large and contained many cities, each of which had its king. Much honey and many fiſhes were likewiſe found there. The King and the richeſt perſons drank horſe-milk, but the poor and the ſervants drank

Fiſchbein, und in Schifsſeilen beſtehet, welche letztere aus Wallfiſch-und Seehundsfellen verfertiget werden.

Jeder giebt nach ſeinem Vermoegen. Der Reichſte giebt gemeiniglich funfzehn Marderfelle, fuinf Rennthiere, ein Baerenfell, und zehn Maafs Federn, nebſt einem Rocke von Baehren-oder Fiſchotterfellen, und zweyen Schifsſeilen, jedes ſechzig Ehlen lang, deren eines aus Wallfiſch—das andere aber aus Seehundsfellen verfertiget ſeyn muſs.

Dieſes Oeſtliche Land (erzaehlte WULFSTAN) iſt ſehr groſs, und hat ſehr viele Staedte, deren jede ihren Koenig hat. Auch giebt es daſelbst viel Honig und Fiſche. Der Koenig und die reichſten Perſonen trinken Pferdemilch, die Armen und Knechte

---

* * * Here follow OHTHER's and WULFSTAN's *Geographical accounts* of *Norway*, the adjacent countries to the Eaſt, and the river *Viſtula*. They are, however, ſo inaccurately ſtated, and ſo little intereſting in themſelves, that I thought proper to ſave the room for other more curious and attractive ſpecimens. I have ſelected a few of that deſcription from the works of CAXTON, HARDING, WARTON, &c. which appeared to me better calculated, to exhibit the *true* ſtate and progreſs of the Engliſh language, eſpecially during the *third* and *fourth* periodical diviſions, here adopted.

† Speaking laſt of the *Viſtula*, the *Ilſing* (modern *Elbing*) the *Eaſtbian Lake* (modern *Friſch Haff*) and the adjacent country to the Eaſt; WULFSTAN relates theſe curious facts concerning the different provinces, now inhabited by the Eaſt- and Weſt-Pruſſians, who gained the victories of FREDERIC II. W.

tha theowan drincath medo :· Ther bith ſwithe mycel gewinn betweonan him· and ne bith thaer naenig ealo gebrowen mid Eſtum· ac thaer bith medo genoh :·

And thaer is mid Eſtum theaw· thonne thaer bith man dead· thaet he lith inne unforbaerned mid his magum and freondum monath· gewhilum twegen· and tha Cyningas and tha othre heah thungene men· ſwa micel lengc ſwa hi maran ſpeda habbath· hwilum healf gear· that hi beoth unforbaerned· and licgath bufan eoarthan· on hyra huſum· and ealle tha hwile the thaet lio bith inne· thaer ſceal beon gedrync and plega oth thone daeg the hi hine forbaerneth :. Thonne thy ylcan daeg hi hine to thaem ade beran willath· thonne to daelath hi his feoh thaet thaer to lafe bith aefter them gedrynce and thaem plegan· on fif oththe ſyx hwilum on ma· ſwa ſwa thaes feos andefn bith :· Aleogath hit thonne fore hwaega on anre mile· thone maeſtan daele fram thaem tune· thonne otherne· thonne thaene thriddan· oththe hyt eal aled bith on thaere anre

drank mead. They likewiſe had much wine, but beer was not brewed among the Eaſtern inhabitants, inſtead of which they had plenty of mead.

The Eaſtern inhabitants had the (ſingular) cuſtom of keeping the bodies of their deceaſed friends and relations for a month, ſometimes for two months, within their houſes; but the kings and other men of rank were kept longer within the houſe, in proportion to their riches. Sometimes they were ſuffered to lie half a year above ground, in their houſes, without being burnt. As long as the corps remained there, they feaſted and played till the appointed day of burning. On this day they removed it to the funeral pile; they divided into five, ſix, or more parts, according to the nature of the property, the goods of the deceaſed, if any remained, after feaſting upon, and playing for them. Then they placed the greateſt part of them, at leaſt one mile from the village (of the deceaſed), then the ſecond, and then the third part, until every thing was placed

Knechte aber trinken Meth. Es giebt auch vielen Wein unter ihnen; aber Bier wird unter den Oſtlaendern nicht gebrauet; dagegen haben ſie Meth genug.

Die Oſtlaender haben den (ſonderbaren) Gebrauch, daſs wenn jemand unter ihnen ſtirbt, derſelbe in dem Hauſe unter den Freunden und Verwandten einen Monath, zuweilen auch zwey, liegen bleibt; die Koenige aber und andere vornehme Maenner bleiben deſto laenger liegen, je reicher ſie ſind. Zuweilen liegen ſie ein halbes Jahr uiber der Erde in ihren Haeuſern unverbrannt. So lange die Leiche ſo liegt zechen und ſpielen ſie bis zur Verbrennung. An dem Tage aber, da ſie ihn auf den Holzſtoſs bringen, theilen ſie ſeine Guiter, ſo viel nach dem Zechen und Spielen davon noch uibrig iſt, in fuinf, oder ſechs, oder mehr Theile, nachdem die Guiter beſchaffen ſind Dann legen ſie den groeſsten Theil derſelben wenigſtens eine Meile von dem Dorfe (des Verſtorbenen,) dann den zweyten, dann den dritten Theil, bis alles inner-

anre mile· and ſceall beon ſe laeſta dael nyhſt thaem tune the ſe deada man onlith :· Thonne ſceolon beon geſamnode ealle tha menn the ſwyftoſte hors habbath on thaem lande· for hwaega on fif milum oththe on ſyx milum fram thaem feo :· Thonne aernath hy ealle toweard them feo· thonne cymeth ſe man ſe thaet Swifte hors hafath to thaem aereſtan daele and to thaem maeſtan· and ſwa elc aefter othrum· oth hit bith eall genumen· and ſe nimth thone laeſtan dael. ſe nihſt thaem tune thaet feoh geaerneth· and thonne rideth aelc his weges mid tha feo· and hyt motan habban eall· and forthy thaer beoth tha Swiſtan hors ungefoge dyre :· And thonne his geſtreon beoth thus eall aſpeded· thonne byrth man hine ut· and forbaerneth mid his waepnum and hraegle· und ſwithoſt ealle his ſpeda hy forſpendath mid than langan legere thaes deadan mannes inne· and thaes the hy be thaem waegum alecgath· the tha fremdon to aernath and nimath :· And thaet is mid Eſtum theaw· thaet thaer ſceal aelces getheodes man beon forced within that mile. The ſmalleſt part was upon this occaſion always placed neareſt to the village, in which the defunct had lived. This being done, all the men poſſeſſed of the ſwifteſt horſes, within five or ſix miles diſtance from the eſtate of the deceaſed, aſſembled and rode with the greateſt ſpeed to the places, where the goods were depoſited; ſo that he who had the ſwifteſt horſe arrived firſt at the beſt ſhare of the property, and thus one after another, till the whole was carried away. But he who arrived at the lot placed neareſt to the village, got the ſmalleſt ſhare. Upon this, each of them rode off with his ſhare and kept it wholly—as his property.—For this reaſon, too, ſwift horſes were highly valued among them. After having thus diſtributed all his property, they carried out the deceaſed (into the open air), and burnt him, together with his armour and cloaths. The greateſt part of the property was ſpent in the long keeping of the corps, but whatever was expoſed on the road, was gained and carried

halb dieſer Meile gelegt iſt. Der kleinſte Theil wird dabey allemahl zunaechſt an das Dorf gelegt, wo der Verſtorbene gewohnet hat. Alsdann verſammeln ſich alle Maenner aus dem Lande, welche die ſchnellſten Pferde haben, fuinf bis ſechs Meilen weit von den Guitern, und rennen ſporenſtreichs darauf zu; da denn der, welcher das ſchnelleſte Pferd hat, zu dem erſten und beſten Theil kommt, und ſo einer nach dem andern bis alles weggenommen iſt. Derjenige bekommt aber den kleinſten Theil, der zu dem naechſt an dem Dorfe gelegenen Theile gelanget. Alsdann reitet ein jeder mit ſeinem Theile davon, und behaelt ihn ganz—als ſein Eigenthum.—Dies macht auch, daſs die fluichtigen Pferde bey Ihnen uiberaus theuer ſind. Wenn nun alle Guiter vertheilet ſind, alsdann tragen ſie den Verſtorbenen hinaus (in die freye Luft), und verbrennen ihn mit ſeinen Waffen und Kleidern. Sein meiſtes Vermoegen gehet bey dem langen Aufbehalten des Verſtorbenen darauf; was aber an dem Wege ausgeſetzet iſt, wird von Fremden gewonnen und weg-

forbaerned· and gyf thar man na ban findeth unforbaerned· hi hit sceolan miclum gebetan:· And thaer is mid Eastum an maeosh· thaet hi magon cyle gewyrcan· and thy thaer licgath tha deadan men swa lange· and ne fuliath· that hi wyrcath thone eyle hine on· and theah man asette twegen faetels full ealath oththe waetheres· hy gedoth· that other bith ofer froren· sam hit sy summor am winter.

carried off by strangers. It was a prevailing custom among the *Esthians*, to burn their dead; and if afterwards a single bone was found unburnt, such an omission was severely punished. The inhabitants of the East were also acquainted with the art of producing cold; hence the corps could lie so long without undergoing putrefaction, because they introduced cold (frigorific substances) into it. And if two vessels filled with beer or water were exposed, they could make both of them freeze, whether it were in summer or winter*.

weggenommen. Es ist bey den *Esthen* der Gebrauch, dass jeder Verstorbene verbrannt wird, und wenn hernach ein einiges Bein unverbrannt gefunden wird, so wird solches scharf geahndet. Die Ostlaender haben auch die Kraft, dass sie Kaelte machen koennen; daher auch die Leichen so lange liegen und nicht faulen, weil man Kaelte (kaltmachende Koerper) in sie bringet. Und wenn man zwey Gefaesse voll Bier oder Wasser hinsetzet, so koennen sie machen, dass beyde frieren, es sey im Sommer oder im Winter.

In

* For such readers as may be only imperfectly acquainted with the *German* language, I beg leave to add the following remarks: 1st. that all Substantives are written with large initials; 2d, that, according to the German idiom, the *present* tense is used, throughout this narrative, instead of the English *imperfect*; 3d. that though a sentence in the German frequently begins with the *imperfect* tense, when introducing the speech of another, (v. g. *Er sagte, er habe*, &c. pag. xiii) yet by the German idiom, the quotation itself is expressed in the *conjunctive present*;—a peculiarity, which is uniformly observed by ADELUNG himself, whose translation I have here subjoined, with scarcely any alteration; 4th, that the preceding *English* translation deviates only from the *German*, where the construction of the former rendered it necessary. Finally; to prove, that the affinity of the *German* to the *Anglo-Saxon* is much stronger than to the *modern English*, I have here added some examples.

German.	*AngloSaxon.*	*English.*
Tagen. (pl. dat. of *Tag.)*	Dagum.	Days, (day)
Gesegelt. (pret. of *segeln.)*	Geseglian.	Sailed, (to sail)
Wuisste. (impf. conj of *wissen).*	Wuiste.	He might know.
Vogelfanger.	Fugeleran.	Bird-catcher.
Gegeben. (participle of *geben)*	Gebun.	Given.
Ihres (poss. pron. neut. of *ihr)*	Hyra.	Their.
Eigenes (part of a poss. pron.)	Agenum.	Own.
Hirschen. pl. of *Hirsch)*	Hryrethera.	Stags (deer).
Zuweilen,	Gewilum.	Sometimes.
Ueberfahren,	Oferferan	To travel (ferry) over.
Unverbrannt (pret. of *nicht verbrennen)*	Unforbaerned.	Unburnt (not to burn.)
Meistentheils	Maestandaele.	For the most part.

And

In order to give likewiſe a ſpecimen of poetical compoſition, I ſhall ſubſtitute for the poem furniſhed by JOHNSON. another original, which I found in HICKES's *Gramm. Anglo-Saxon.* pag. 178.—Though the age of it be not aſcertained, it certainly belongs to this period, and may be conſidered as a conciſe

Topography of the City of Durham.

Is theos burch breome.
Geond Breoten rice.

Steopa geſta tholad.
Stanas ymb utan.
Wundrum gewaexen.
Weor ymb eornath.
En ythum ſtrong.
And therinne wunath
Fiſca feola kinn.
On floda gemong.
And there gewexen.
Wuda feſtern micel.
Wuniath in them wicum
Wilda deor monige.
In deopa dalum.
Deora ungerim.
Is im there byri.
Eac bea num gecithed
De arfeſta eadig Cuthberht.

And

This city is celebrated
In the whole empire of the Britons.
The road to it is ſteep,
It is ſurrounded with rocks,
And with curious plants.
The *Wear* flows round it,
A river of rapid waves.
And there live in it,
Fiſhes of various kinds
Mingling with the floods.
And there grow
Great foreſts;
There live in the receſſes
Wild animals of many ſorts.
In the deep valleys
Deer innumerable.
There is in this city
Alſo well known to men
The venerable St Cudberth,

And

Dieſe Stadt ist beruihmt.—In dem ganzen Reiche der Britten.—Der Weg zu ihr ist jaehe,—Sie ist mit Felſen umgeben,—Und ſonderbaren Gewaechsen.—Die *Were* unflieſst ſie,—Ein Fluſs von reiſſenden Wellen.—Und darin wohnen,—Fiſche vieler Arten—Die ſich mit den Fluthen vermiſchen.—Und daselbst wachsen—Groſse Waelder;—In den Auen wohnen—Mancherley wilde Thiere,—In den tiefen Thaelern—Unzaehlige Rehe, (Thiere).——Es ist in dieser Stadt—Auch den Menschen wohlbekannt—Der ehrwuirdige heil. Cudberth,—Und des

---

And if it be objected, that many of theſe words likewiſe bear ſtrong marks of affinity to the *modern* Engliſh, I muſt remind the reader of my aim, which is *not* to deny this, but to prove, that contrary to the opinion of many Antiquaries, the *German* very probably is the *mother*, and *not* a *ſiſter* language of the *Anglo-Saxon*. Hence the manifeſt abſurdity, in Dictionaries, of giving references to either, as two different languages, eſpecially in words whoſe origin cannot be well aſcertained.

W.

And thes claene cyninges heofud.	And the head of the chaſte king.
Oſualdes Engla leo	Oſwald, the lion of the Angli,
And Aidan biſcop	And Aidan, the biſhop,
Aedberth and Aedfrid.	Aedbert and Aedfrid
Aethele geferes	The noble aſſociates.
Is therinne mid heom	There is in it alſo
Aethelwold biſceop	Aethelwold, the biſhop.
And breoma bocera Beda.	And the celebrated writer Bede
And Boiſil abbet.	And the abbot Boiſil,
De claene Cuthberht.	By whom the chaſte Cudberth
On gichethe lerde luſtum.	In his youth was gratis inſtructed.
And he is lara uuel genom.	Who alſo well received theſe inſtructions.
Eardiath aeth them eadige.	There reſt with theſe Saints,
In in them mynſtre.	In the inner part of the minſter
Vnarimeda reliqua	Relicks without number,
Thaer monige uundrum guuurthath	Which perform many miracles,
The uurita ſeggeth	As the Chronicles tell us,
Mid then drihtnes uuerdomes bideth.	And (which) await with them the judgment of the Lord.

des keuschen Koeniges Haupt.—Oswald, der Angeln Loewe,—und der Bischof Aidan,—Aedbert und Aedfrid,—Die edlen Gefaehrten.—Es ist darin mit ihnen —Der Biſchof Aethelwold.—Und der beruihmte Schriftsteller Beda.—Und der Abt Boiſil,—Der den keuſchen Cuthberth—In der Jugend umsonst unterrichtete, —Welcher auch die Lehre ſehr gut annahm.—Es ruhen bey dieſen Heiligen,— In dem Innern des Muinsters,—Unzaehlige Reliquien,— Welche viele Wunder wirken,—Wie die Schriften ſagen—Und (welche) mit ihnen das Gericht des Herrn erwarten.

Of this period, we muſt finally remark, that from the time of ALFRED, the old Anglo Saxon characters were gradually exchanged for the French letters of the Alphabet. There is little doubt, that the nation had already made ſuch progreſs in taſte, or intellectual diſcernment, as to become ſenſible of the want of ſymmetry in the Anglo-Saxon, when compared to the Roman characters; and that they readily gave the preference to the French letters, in which thoſe of Rome were ſomewhat more faithfully copied.

INGULF *, as quoted by SPELMAN in the work above mentioned,

* Abbot of *Croyland*, and author of the hiſtory of that Abbey, was born in London A. D. 1030—This excellent Chronicler treats from the foundation of that Abbey,

tioned, expreſſes himſelf upon this adoption of foreign characters, in the following lines: "Manus Saxonica ab omnibus Saxonibus et Merciis uſque ad tempora Regis *Aelfredi*, qui per Gallicanos Doctores omnibus chirographis uſitata a tempore dicti Domini Regis deſuetudine vilnerat (vilipenderat); et manus Gallicana quia magis legibilis, et aſpectui perdelectabilis præcellebat, frequentius indies apud Anglos omnes complacebat."

Yet this was the caſe only in a very gradual progreſſion, correſponding with the improvement and diffuſion of taſte; for long after ALFRED's time, the *Anglo-Saxon* characters continued to be uſed, both in public and private writings.

III. NORMANNIC SAXON PERIOD.

(*Normannic Anglo-Saxon.*)

This æra extends from the invaſion of the Normans, under WILLIAM the CONQUEROR, in the year 1066, to the beginning of the thirteenth century, beyond the reign of HENRY II. who died in 1189; and conſequently comprehends a ſeries of about one hundred and fifty years.

The ſtate of the Engliſh language, during this period, cannot be better deſcribed than in the words of the learned and perſpicuous WARTON, in his "*Hiſtory of Engliſh Poetry, from the cloſe of the eleventh, to the commencement of the eighteenth century*;" pag. 2. & ſeq.

"The Norman Saxon dialect formed a language extremely barbarous, irregular, and intractable; and conſequently promiſes no very ſtriking ſpecimens in any ſpecies of compoſition. Its ſubſtance was the Daniſh-Saxon adulterated with French. The Saxon indeed, a language ſubſiſting on uniform principles, and poliſhed by poets and theologiſts, however corrupted by the Danes, had

---

Abbey, 664, to the year 1091; he introduces much of the general hiſtory of the kingdom, with a variety of curious anecdotes that are no where elſe to be found.—INGULF died of the *gout*, at his Abbey, A. D. 1109, in the 79th year of his age —It is a matter of much regret, that men of his ſound judgment and good ſenſe (in ſpite of the ſuperſtitious abſurdities which ſtain the annals of that age) did not themſelves commence writing and cultivating their native language; inſtead of drudging in *monaſtic* Latin. The certain progreſs of both language, and knowledge, in the former caſe, is beyond every calculation of the Moderns. W.

had much perſpicuity, ſtrength, and harmony *: but the French, imported by the Conqueror and his people, was a confuſed jargon of Teutonic, Gauliſh, and vitiated Latin. In this fluctuating ſtate of our national ſpeech, the French predominated. Even before the conqueſt, the Saxon language began to fall into contempt, and the French, or Frankiſh, to be ſubſtituted in its ſtead †: a circumſtance, which at once facilitated and foretold the Norman acceſſion. In the year 652, it was the common practice of the Anglo-Saxons, to ſend their youth to the monaſteries of France for education: and not only the language, but the manners of the French were eſteemed the moſt polite accompliſhments. In the reign of Edward the Confeſſor, the reſort of Normans to the Engliſh court was ſo frequent, that the affectation of imitating the Frankiſh cuſtoms became almoſt univerſal: and even the lower claſs of people were ambitious of catching the Frankiſh idiom ‡. It was no difficult taſk for the Norman lords to baniſh that language, of which the natives began to be abſurdly aſhamed. The new invaders commanded the laws to be adminiſtered in French §. Many charters of monaſteries were forged in Latin by the Saxon monks, for the preſent ſecurity of their poſſeſſions, in conſequence of that averſion which the Normans profeſſed to the Saxon tongue ||. Even

c chil-

* Becauſe the Daniſh was intimately related to the Old Saxon; hence the language, which had originated in a mixture of both, neceſſarily preſerved ſome identity (i. e. ſimilarity and uniformity of ſtructure.) A.

† Probably this was the caſe only among the higher ranks of ſociety; for France, indeed, at this early period, was already conſidered as the School of the Sciences, and the legiſlatrix of taſte to the reſt of Europe. A.

‡ This ſtrange bias ſeems, at preſent, to have ſhifted its ground, and to affect principally the *higher* claſſes of ſociety;—the *higheſt*, or dictatorial, order itſelf *(individually)* not excepted. Thus our ears are *publicly* annoyed with terms and phraſes, which even the Germans, of late years, ſtigmatize with the appellation of *new-frankiſh*.—The *maigre* race of interpreters and tranſlators, by profeſſion, alſo contribute *their* ſhare in corrupting the Engliſh language with new-modelled words and idioms, the meaning of which they themſelves (not rarely) miſtake and miſapply; but to what claſs of ſociety *theſe* individuals muſt be referred, I ſhall, in this place, not attempt to decide. And as I am not deſirous of advancing groundleſs aſſertions, or of extending them, if they be founded, to every reſpective individual, without exception; I muſt requeſt the diſpaſſionate reader, to turn over a few Numbers of the *Monthly*, the *Analytical*, the *Critical*, the *Engliſh*, or any other *Review*, in which the lateſt tranſlations from the *French*, form the object of criticiſm; and his curioſity will be frequently, and amply, gratified. W.

§ But there is a precept in Saxon from William the Firſt, to the Sheriff of Sommerſetſhire. *Hickes. Thes.* I. P. I. pag. 106.—See alſo *Præfat.* ibid. p. xv.

‖ The Normans, who practiſed every ſpecious expedient to plunder the monks, demanded a ſight of the written evidences of their lands. The monks well knew, that it would have been uſeleſs or impolitic to have produced theſe evidences, or charters,

children at ſchool were forbidden to read in their native language, and inſtructed in a knowledge of the Norman only. In the mean time, we ſhould have ſome regard to the general and political ſtate of the nation. The natives were ſo univerſally reduced to the loweſt condition of neglect and indigence, *that the Engliſh name became a term of reproach*: and ſeveral generations elapſed, before one family of Saxon pedigree was raiſed to any diſtinguiſhed honours, or could ſo much as attain the rank of baronage. Among other inſtances of that abſolute and voluntary ſubmiſſion, with which our Saxon anceſtors received a foreign yoke, it appears that they ſuffered their hand-writing to fall into diſcredit and diſuſe, which, by degrees became ſo difficult and obſolete, that few beſide the oldeſt men could underſtand the characters. In the year 1095, WOLSTAN, biſhop of Worceſter, was depoſed by the arbitrary Normans: it was objected againſt him, that he was "*a ſuperannuated Engliſh idiot, who could not ſpeak French* *. It is true,

---

charters, in the original Saxon; as the Normans not only did not underſtand, but would have received with contempt, inſtruments written in that language. Therefore the monks were compelled to the pious fraud of forging them in Latin; and great numbers of theſe forged Latin charters till lately ſuppoſed original, are ſtill extant. *See* SPELMAN in *Not. ad. Concil. Anglic* p. 125; STILLINGFL. *Orig. Eccles. Britann.* p. 14 MARSHAM, *Præfat. ad Dugd.* And WHARTON *Angl. Sacr.* Vol. II. *Monaſt. Præfat* p. ii. & ſeq —See alſo INGULPH, p. 512.—LAUNOY and MABILLON have treated this ſubject with great learning and penetration.

* *Matt. Paris. ſub ann.*—as quoted by WARTON; p. 4. —— When in our days the converſation turns upon the comparative excellence of languages, I beg leave to aſk: 'are the *modern* rulers, tutors, or governeſſes (of and from France) actuated by a *more diſcreet*, by a leſs haughty ſpirit, than the Normans were EIGHT HUNDRED YEARS AGO?—This queſtion is eaſily anſwered. For, although it is fortunately not in *their* power to make us adopt *in a maſs* their new-fangled tongue, by the ſame means which have induced us and other nations to adopt inſtruments, machines and expedients formerly unknown, or *unpractiſed*, in the art of war; yet we are already invaded by ſuch numbers of a race (however *different* in degree, ſtill of the *ſame* kind) as renders the conſequences of our exceſſive indulgence every day more alarming. I am led to this reflection, at a time, when I ſee the legiſlature itſelf ſeriouſly employed in concerting meaſures, *to obviate theſe impending national evils*.—As a well-wiſher, and inhabitant, of this country, I hope Providence will guide the councils of the nation, upon a ſubject of the utmoſt importance. Thoſe who conſider theſe ſymptoms of an *approaching metamorphoſis* as of little importance, plainly manifeſt their unacquaintance with the hiſtory of man and nations. They ſeem to forget, that the Anglo-Saxons *firſt* came to Britain with *no* hoſtile intentions; that they were invited, only to aſſiſt the oppreſſed Britons in repelling their rapacious enemies; and that revolutions, if excited and aided by foreign allies, were always attended with conſequences, equally certain and fatal to the Natives; however imperfectly and gradually they were introduced.—— To return, from this involuntary digreſſion, to the ſubject of language, I ſhall conclude this Note with a remark made by a veteran in the philoſophy of grammar: 'That the *French*, with all its eaſe and "verſatility, is a *monotonous language*; and that thoſe alone who underſtand *it*, can "diſcover the great advantage the *Engliſh* have over that language by their ac-"cent, particularly in the article of verſification." W.

true, that in ſome of the monaſteries, particularly at Croyland and Taviſtocke, founded by Saxon princes, there were regular preceptors in the Saxon language: but this inſtitution was ſuffered to remain after the conqueſt, as a matter only of intereſt and neceſſity. The religious could not otherwiſe have underſtood their original charters. William's ſucceſſor, Henry the Firſt, gave an inſtrument of confirmation to William, Archbiſhop of Canterbury, which was written in the Saxon language and letters. Yet this is almoſt a ſingle example. That monarch's motive was perhaps political: and he ſeems to have practiſed this expedient with a view of obliging his queen, who was of Saxon lineage; or with a deſign of flattering his Engliſh ſubjects, and of ſecuring his title, already ſtrengthened by a Saxon match, in conſequence of ſo ſpecious and popular an artifice."

" It was a common and indeed a very natural practice, for the tranſcribers of Saxon books, to change the Saxon orthography for the Norman, and to ſubſtitute in the place of the original Saxon, Norman words and phraſes. A remarkable inſtance of this liberty, which ſometimes perplexes and miſleads the critics in Anglo-Saxon literature, appears in a voluminous collection of Saxon homilies, preſerved in the Bodleian library, and written about the time of Henry the Second. It was with the Saxon characters, as with the ſignature of the croſs in public deeds; which were changed into the Norman mode of ſeals and ſubſcriptions.'

' Among the manuſcripts of Digby in the Bodleian library at Oxford, we find a religious or moral Ode, conſiſting of one hundred and ninety-one ſtanzas, which the learned Hickes places juſt after the conqueſt: but as it contains few Norman terms, I am inclined to think it of rather higher antiquity. The following ſtanza is a ſpecimen:

' Sende God biforen him man
The while he may to hevene,
For betere is on elmeſſe biforen
Thanne ben after ſevene."

That is, " Let a man ſend his good works before him to heaven while he can; for one alms-giving before death is of more value than ſeven afterwards." The verſes perhaps might have been thus written as two *Alexandrines*:

' Send God biforen him man the while he may to hevene,
For betere is on elmeſſe biforen, than ben after ſevene.'

' Yet alternate rhyming, applied without regularity, and as rhymes accidentally preſented themſelves, was not uncommon in our early poetry.'

HICKES and WARTON have printed a ſatirical poem on mo-

naſtic life, in which the *Saxon* is remarkably adulterated by the Normannic, and which muſt have been written ſoon after the incurſions of the Normans, or at leaſt prior to the reign of Henry II. The poet begins this ſingular performance, with deſcribing the land of idolence or luxury:

Fur in ſee, bi weſt Spaynge,
Is a lond ihote Cokaygne:
Ther nis lond under hevenriche (1).
Of wel of godnis hit iliche.
Thoy paradis bi miri (2) and brigt
Cokaygn is of fairir ſight.
What is ther in paradis
But graſs, and flure, and greneris?
Thoy ther be joy, and gret dute (3),
Ther nis met, bot frute.
Ther nis halle, bure (4), no bench;
Bot watir manis thurſt to quench, &c.

'In the following lines,' ſays WARTON, 'there is a vein of ſatirical imagination and ſome talent at deſcription. The luxury of the monks is repreſented under the idea of a monaſtery conſtructed of various kinds of delicious and coſtly viands.'

Ther is a wel fair abbei,
Of white monkes and of grei,
Ther beth boures and halles:
All of paſteus beth the walles,
Of fleis of fiſſe, and a rich met,
The likefulliſt that man mai et.
Fluren cakes beth the ſchingles (5) alle,
Of church, cloiſter, bours and halle.
The pinnes (6) beth fat podinges
Rich met to princes and to kinges.—
Ther is a cloyſter fair and ligt,
Brod and lang of ſembli ſigt.
The pilers of that cloiſter alle
Beth iturned of criſtale,
With harlas and capital
Of grene jaſpe and red coral.
In the praer is a tree
Swithe likeful for to ſe,
The rote is gingeur and galingale,

The

1 The celeſtial empire, *Sax.* 2 Merry, chearful. "Although Paradiſe is chearful and bright, *Cokayne* is a more beautiful place." 3 Pleaſure. 4 Buttery; or the room where proviſions are laid up. 5 *Shingles.* "The tiles, or covering of the houſe, are of rich cakes." 6 The pinnacles.

The ſiouns beth al ſed wale.
Trie maces beth the flure,
The rind canel of ſwete odure:
The frute gilofre of gode ſmakke,
Of cucubes ther nis no lakke.—
Ther beth iiii willis (7) in the abbei
Of tracle and halwey,
Of baume and eke piement,
Ever ernend (8) to rigt rent (9);
Of thai ſtremis al the molde
Stonis pretiuſe (10) and golde,
Ther is ſaphir, and uniune,
Carbuncle and aſtiune,
Smaragde, lugre, and praſſiune,
Beril, onyx, topoſiune,
Amethiſte and criſolite,
Calcedun and epetite (11).
Ther beth birddes mani and fale
Throſtill, thruiſſe, and nigtingale,
Chalandre, and wodwale,
And othir briddes without tale,
That ſtinteth never bi her migt
Miri to ſing dai and nigt.

[*Nonnulla deſunt.*]

Yite I do yow mo to witte,
The gees iroſtid on the ſpitte,
Fleey to that abbai, god hit wot,
And gredith (12), gees al hote al hote, &c.

'Our author then makes a pertinent tranſition to a convent of nuns; which he ſuppoſes to be very commodiouſly ſituated at no great diſtance, and in the ſame fortunate region of indolence, eaſe and affluence.'

An other abbai is ther bi
For ſoth a gret nunnerie;
Up a river of ſwet milk
Whar is plente grete of ſilk.
When the ſummeris dai is hote,
The yung nunnes takith a bote

And

7 Fountains. 8. Running. *Sax.* 9. Courſe. *Sax.* 10. The Arabian Philoſophy imported into Europe, was full of the doctrine of precious ſtones. 11. Our old poets are never ſo happy as when they can get into a catalogue of things or names. (WARTON.) 12. Crieth. *Gallo-Franc.*

And doth ham forth in that river
Both with oris and with ſtere:
Whan hi beth fur from the abbei
Hi makith him nakid for to plei,
And leith dune in to the brimme
And doth him ſleilich for to ſwimme:
The yung monkes that hi ſeeth
Hi doth ham up and forth he fleeth,
And comith to the nunnes anon,
And euch monk him takith on,
And ſnellich (13) berith forth har prei
To the mochill grei abbei (14),
And techith the nunnes an oreiſun
With jambleus (15) up and dun *.

'This poem was deſigned to be ſung at public feſtivals: a practice which was then very common; and concerning which it may be ſufficient to remark at preſent, that a *Joculator*, or *Bard*, was an officer belonging to the court of William the Conqueror.'

'Another Norman-Saxon poem cited by the ſame induſtrious antiquary (HICKES), is entitled "THE LIFE OF ST MARGARET." The ſtructure of its verſification conſiderably differs from that in the laſt-mentioned piece, and is like the *French Alexandrines*. But I am of opinion, that a pauſe, or diviſion, was intended in the middle of every verſe; and in this reſpect, its verſification reſembles alſo that of ALBION'S ENGLAND, or DRAYTON'S POLYALBION, which was a ſpecies very common about the reign of Queen Eliſabeth. The rhymes are alſo continued to every fourth line. It appears to have been written about the time of the cruſades. It begins thus:

Olde ant [a] yonge I priet [b] ou, our folies for to lete,
Thinketh on god that yef ou wite, our ſunnes to bete.
Here I mai tellen ou, wit wordes faire and ſwete,
The vie [c] of one maiden was hoten [d] Margarete.
Hire fader was a patriac, as ic ou tellen may,
In Auntioge wif eches [e] I in the falſe lay,
Deve godes [f] ant dombe, he ſervid nit and day,
So deden mony othere that ſingeth welaway.
Theodoſius was is nome on Criſte ne levede he noutt,

He

13. Quick, quickly. *Gallo-Franc.* 14. To the great Abbey of Grey Monks. 15 Laſcivious motions. Gambols. *Fr.* Gambiller.

* HICKES. *Theſaur.* I. Part. I. p. 231. ſeq.

a And. *b* I direct. *Fr.* "I adviſe you, our, &c. *c* Life. *Fr.* *d* Called *Saxon.* *e* Choſe a wife. *Sax.* "He was married in Antioch. *f* Deaf gods, &c.

He levede on the falſe godes, that weren with honden wroutt,
Tho that child ſculde criſtine ben it com well in thoutt,
Ebed wen *g* it were ibore, to deth it were ibroutt, &c.

'In the ſequel, OLIBRIUS, lord of Antioch, who is called a *Saracen*, falls in love with MARGARET: but ſhe being a chriſtian, and a candidate for canonization, rejects his ſolicitations, and is thrown into priſon.'

Meiden Margarete one nitt in priſon lay
Ho com biforn Olibrius on that other dai.
Meiden Margarete, lef up upon my lay.
And Ihu that thou leveſt on, thou do him al awey.
Lef on me ant be my wife, ful wel the mai ſpede.
Auntioge and Aſie ſcaltou han to mede:
Ciculauton *h* and purpel pall ſcaltou have to wede:
With all the metes of my lond ful vel I ſcal the fede.

'This piece was printed by Hickes, from a manuſcript in Trinity-college library at Cambridge. It ſeems to belong to the manuſcript metrical LIVES OF THE SAINTS, which form a very conſiderable volume, and were probably tranſlated or paraphraſed from Latin or French proſe into Engliſh rhyme, before the year 1200. We are ſure that they were written after the year 1169, as they contain the LIFE OF SAINT THOMAS OF BECKET. In the Bodleian library are three manuſcript copies of theſe LIVES OF THE SAINTS, in each of which the life of St. Margaret occurs; but it is not always exactly the ſame with this printed by Hickes. And on the whole, the Bodleian Lives ſeem inferior in point of antiquity.'

Towards the concluſion of this period, true poetry begins to flouriſh in England as well as in Germany, ſome features of which are already diſcoverable in the preceding poems. Yet, withall, the Daniſh-Saxon, and probably alſo the Britiſh-Saxon bards can claim little more merit than that of making rhymes, and frequently only of writing abrupt ſentences in proſe. To prove this, I ſhall only quote (the two firſt ſtanzas of) a Normannic-Saxon Ballad *, which is full of alliteration, and has a burthen or chorus:

Blow

---

g In bed. *h* Checklaton. See Obſ. Fair. Q. I. 194. (WARTON.)

* WARTON obſerves in his "Hiſtory of Engliſh Poetry," that this is the *earlieſt Engliſh love-ſong*, he could diſcover; that it is among the Harleian manuſcripts in the Britiſh Muſeum; and that he would place it before, or about, the year 1200.

Blow northerne wynd, ſent
Thou me my ſuetynge; blow
Northerne wynd, blou, blou, blou.
Ich ot a burde in boure bryht
That fully ſemly is on ſyht,
Menſkful maiden of myht,
Feire ant fre to fonde.
In all this wurhliche won,
A bnrde of blod and of bon,
Never *a* zete y nuſte *b* non,
Luſſomore in Londe. *Blow*, &c.
With lokkes *c* leſliche and longe,
With front ant face feir to fonde;
With murthes monie mote heo monge
That brid ſo breme in boure;
With loſſum eie grete and gode,
Weth browen bliſsfoll undirhode,
He that reſt him on the rode
That leſlych lyf honoure. *Blou d* &c. &c.

In a truly paſtoral vein, a lover * thus addreſſes his miſtreſs, whom he ſuppoſes to be the moſt beautiful girl, "Bituene Lyncolne and Lyndeſeye, Northampton and Lounde †."

When the nytenhale ſinges the wodes waxen grene,
Lef, gras, and blóſme, ſpringes in Avril y wene.
And love is to myn harte gon with one ſpere ſo kene
Nyht and day my blod hit drynkes myn hart deth me tene.

'The following verſes have nearly the ſame meaſure, and are not unpleaſing to the ear:'

My deth y love, my lyf ich hate for a levedy ſhene,
Heo is brith ſo daies liht, that is on me wel ſene.
Al y falewe ſo doth the lef in ſomir when hit is grene,
Zef mi thoht helpeth me noht to whom schal I mene?
Ich have loved at this yere that y may love na more,
Ich have ſiked moni ſyh, lemon, for thin ore,
. . . my love never the ner and thatme reweth ſore;
Suete lemon, thenck on me ich have loved the ſore,
Suete lemon, I preye the, of love one ſpeche,
While y lyve in worlde ſo wyde other nill I feche, ‡.

If

a Yet. b. Knew not. *c* Lively. *d* Sic.

* Probably of the reign of King JOHN.

† London. ‡ *MSS. Harl.* 2253. *Fol. Membran.* f. 72. b.—The pieces cited from this manuſcript, appear to be of the hand writing of the reign of Edward the Firſt, (WARTON.)

If we attempt to trace the progreſs of a language, we ſhall always find it connected with the intellectual improvement of a people; for language, in every inſtance, is the firſt object, in which national cultivation becomes manifeſt. To determine this, requires the moſt accurate knowledge of the gradual advances made by a people in manners, arts, and ſciences, together with a very intimate acquaintance with the more ancient modes of ſpeaking and writing, as well as with the changes produced in them, by theſe reſpective improvements. In this progreſs, every nation keeps its peculiar path; a path marked by the collective number of internal and external circumſtances, the particular knowledge of which is indiſpenſible to a philological inquirer.

In *Germany*, the old unpoliſhed language of the country was improved through its own reſources; hence the progreſs towards its refinement was neceſſarily ſlow. In *France*, the language of the natives was formed by a mixture with that of the Romans, yet in ſuch a manner, as made the latter prevail in that mixture; hence its improvement was uncommonly rapid, becauſe the Roman was already a poliſhed language. In *England*, the native language received improvements by a mixture with the French; yet the former ſtill remained the prevailing language: thus it made more rapid progreſs towards its refinement than that of the German, but ſlower than that of the French.—Yet we poſſeſs no hiſtory of any language executed, nor even attempted, in this *progreſſive* manner. And as the natives of Britain have hitherto neglected to trace the gradual improvements of *their* language, it can with leſs juſtice be expected, that *I* ſhould enquire into the path, which they followed. Nor will it be required of *me*, to point out minutely the various changes that have taken place in the Engliſh language, and to ſtate the cauſes, or the origin, of thoſe changes.

IV. French-Saxon; or English Period.

This is not only the longeſt, but alſo the moſt remarkable period in the literary hiſtory of England: it begins with the thirteenth Century, and extends to the preſent time.—The Daniſh-Saxon language, in the preceding period, being corrupted by the Normannic, now begins to unite with the more

modern French; to adopt likewise, in consequence of this precedent, many words from the Latin, and to form by the assistance of both the present English language.

The Normannic-Saxon language was suffered to fall into disuse and contempt, during the era, of which we have last treated; the pure Normannic now became the fashionable language of the court, and of polished society. This happened with the greater facility, as the Norman barons and lords ruled over England, and oppressed its ancient inhabitants, with unlimited sway. But as soon as the power of the barons, during the thirteenth century, began to decline; as soon as the commons, or the order of the citizens, acquired more authority and influence; in fine, as soon as England, with gradual steps, approached to its present constitution;—the popular language, hitherto despised, reclaimed its due rank; it was again introduced into the higher circles, and thus its cultivation was the more easily and the more effectually accomplished. Still, however, the vernacular dialect had been almost suppressed, among the higher classes of the nation, by the language of the haughty Normans; a circumstance which sufficiently accounts for its strange mixture with the French. And as in process of time, French manners and improvements found a more general reception in Britain, this mixture daily increased, not only through the reception of new words, but also in the terminations of old primitive words; and in the various modes of exhibiting and combining them in phrases. In this manner, indeed, the ground-work of the language preserved its *Saxon* origin; but its progress, its cultivation, its augmentation, and subsequent refinement, were carried on upon the principle of the *French*.

Consistent with the limits of this Essay, I cannot enlarge upon the particular phenomena connected with these multiplied changes; I must, therefore, content myself with producing a few specimens selected from the best writers in every century, during this long and productive period.

* * * * * * * *

In order to fill up a chasm which both, Johnson and Adelung, have left in this part of the history of the English language, by not entering into the respective merits of the different writers, during the middle ages, to whom we stand so justly indebted;—I have here selected a number of passages relating to this subject, from a work much

much esteemed at home, and still more abroad, among the lovers of British literature. This work, on account of its high—though comparatively small—price, is not in the hands of many readers; as it already extends to a considerable number of volumes, since its beginning in 1780. It is the NEW ANNUAL REGISTER, to which I allude, and from which I have carefully extracted (and exemplified with a great variety of specimens) those valuable and truly philological remarks, which the reader will find stated, at greater length, in the *fifth*, *sixth*, and following *Volumes* of this work, under the head of "*A concise history of the state of knowledge, literature and taste in Great Britain.*"—It therefore only remains to add, that the *principal part of this history* is partly abstracted from the learned disquisitions, partly founded upon the historical facts, which we find very perspicuously, though somewhat tediously, stated in "WARTON's *History of English Poetry*," three Volumes, Quarto, London, 1770. & seq.

Having recounted the particular causes, to which the greatest alteration and improvement of religious knowledge in England was owing, from the accession of EDWARD I. to the accession of HENRY IV.; and having justly observed that JOHN WICKLIFF * first opened the understandings of the regular clergy;—the philosophic annalist thus proceeds in illustrating the subsequent effects of these changes, with respect to the state of language and literature in Britain.

Division First; *from* 1272, *to* 1399 †.

From EDWARD I. to HENRY IV.

'The literary revolution, which took place in the reigns of EDWARD III. and RICHARD II. with no small degree of splendour, was the appearance of poetry in our own tongue. To this period was reserved the honour of engaging the *Muses* to speak in *English*, with such dignity as to call for general attention and admiration. We must not, however, imagine that before this time no attempts at versification were made in our native language. The poetical productions of the age, if

* This acute Divine opposed the Pope's supremacy in 1377, and was forty years after, burnt for being a heretic.

† All passages enclosed within single *commas*, belong to the *New Annual Register*.

ſuch they may be called, were numerous, and our old libraries abound in them. Previouſly to the æra, concerning which we are treating, the *Lives of the Saints* were written in verſe, and many parts of the Bible were tranſlated in the ſame manner.'

'A love-ſong and ſome compoſitions of a miſcellaneous nature occur in the reign of King JOHN *. Our early poetical effuſions appeared likewiſe, not unfrequently, in the form of ſatire; and when this was clothed in allegory, it was ſometimes conducted with ſucceſs. The objects, on which it was exerted, were generally the lawyers and the clergy. But the principal efforts of our yet untutored Muſes, were rhyming chronicles and metrical romances.'

WARTON, in the firſt Volume, p. 43, of his Hiſtory, entertains us with a ballad, or a ſatirical poem, compoſed by a bard devoted to the court of SIMON of MONTFORT, Earl of Leiceſter, a powerful Baron. It appeared ſoon after the famous battle of 1264, which had a very unhappy iſſue for the king, and which is deſcribed as follows:

1.

Sitteth alle ſtille, ant herkeneth to mi:
The kynge of Alemaigne, be mi leaute (*Loyalty*).
Thritti thouſent pound askede he
For to make the pees (*peace*) in the countre
And ſo ſo he dude more.
Richard, thah (*though*) thou be ever tricchard (*treacherous*)
Tricthen ſhall thou never more.

2.

Richard of Alemaigne, whil that he was kying,
He ſpende all his treſour opon ſwyvyng,
Haveth he nout of Walingford oferlyng (*ſuperior*)
Let him habbe, ase he brew, bale (*poiſon*) to dryng,
Maugre Wyndesore,
Richard thah thou, &c.

3.

The kyng of Alemaigne wende do ful wel
He ſaiſede de mulne for a caſtel,

With

* A monarch of a vindictive and uſurping temper, whom the Engliſh Barons compelled to confirm the *Magna Charta*, in 1215;—he died at Newark, October 8, 1216.

With hare ſharpe ſwerdes he grounde the ſtel,
He wende that the ſayles were mangonel
To help Wyndesore.
Richard thah thou, &c. &c. &c.

'In the reign of EDWARD I. *, the character of our poetical compoſitions was conſiderably changed. The minſtrels either ſubſtituted fictitious adventures for hiſtorical traditionary facts, or reality was diſguiſed by the repreſentations of invention; and a taſte for ornamental expreſſion gradually prevailed over the rude ſimplicity of the native Engliſh phraſeology. This change was occaſioned, among other cauſes, by the introduction and increaſe of the tales of chivalry. It was in the reign of EDWARD II. †, when the metrical romances chiefly flouriſhed; and though the poetry of them was, in general, very rude, imperfect, and feeble, they occaſionally exhibited gleams of imagination. One of them, entitled '*Kyng of Tars*,' has a warmth of deſcription in certain paſſages, that is not unlike the manner of CHAUCER. From the productions of which we now ſpeak, this great poet and his cotemporaries undoubtedly derived ſome advantage; but it was their acquaintance with Italian literature which ſtill more enabled them to produce a literary revolution in their own country. Surpriſing effects had been wrought in *Italy*, by the genius and the writings of DANTE (1) and PETRARCH (2). Our *Engliſh* poets were not equally happy in their endeavours to enlighten the underſtanding, and to refine the taſte of the nation. They had greater difficulties to contend with, and were far more unfavourably ſituated for obtaining a conqueſt over them. Their ſtyle was rough, and the harmony of their poetical numbers was very defective. Nevertheleſs we are much indebted to them for aſſiduouſly applying to the ſtudy of their native language, and for contributing, in a conſiderable degree, to its enrichment and cultivation. The change effected

* Born, June 16, 1239; ſucceeded to the Crown, November 16, 1272; reduced Scotland 1299, died July 7, 1307; was buried at Weſtminſter, where on May 2. 1774, ſome antiquaries examined his tomb, when they found his corps unconſumed, though buried 466 years.

† This unfortunate Monarch was born in 1284; was the first *Prince of Wales* aſcended the throne, 1307; was dethroned and murdered in 1327.

(1) Born, 1265; died, 1321.——(2) FRANCIS PETRARCH, born at *Arezzo*, 1304, died, 1347.

fected by them is, upon the whole, an important event in the literary history of this country.'

'When we look into the accounts of the *British* writers, which have been given us by LELAND (3) and other biographers, and observe the number of persons whom these biographers have rescued from oblivion, together with the praises they have bestowed upon them, as excelling in almost every branch of knowledge, and only defective with respect to the elegance of their style, we are ready to believe, that the times preceding the *Reformation* were much more learned than has usually been imagined. Should we allow full credit to the encomiums, which our historians have so liberally poured on a number of men whose works are now either totally lost, or totally neglected, we might hence see that literature is of no avail (or is not duly valued) without taste; and that, if science be communicated in barbarous language, it will be treated with disregard and contempt by a polite and cultivated age. But the greatest part of our ancient monastic authors, notwithstanding the pompous eulogiums we read concerning them, were as despicable for the matter, as for the expression of their performances. In every view, therefore, they were justly consigned to dust and worms; and though we possess something of an antiquarian spirit, we are not endued with such a portion of it, as to be extremely fond of things which are recommended by nothing but their antiquity. Several persons, however, may deserve a place in a history of the progress of knowledge, whose compositions are no longer valuable; and, as learning cannot be pursued, even in the most disadvantageous manner, or in the most unfavourable circumstances, without producing good effects in certain instances, a diligent enquirer will always find some few names that are worthy of being mentioned with particular esteem. Where this is the case, there is a pleasure in paying the tribute due to departed merit; it is doing honour to our country, to let none be forgotten who have a lawful title to remembrance and applause.'

'Though general light seemed rather to increase during the period, of which we are treating; yet, excepting two or three illustrious men who appeared towards the conclusion of it, this

3 JOHN LELAND, a celebrated antiquary, died 1552; aged 45: Vid. his works, for further information.

this æra did not produce a ſet of writers equal in abilities and character to thoſe who flouriſhed in the preceding.'

'Philological and Polite Literature, till it was revived at the cloſe of this æra, was in as low a ſtate as Natural Philoſophy.—Though we have ſeen that ſo much poetry was produced in the beginning of the period before us, it is remarkable that the names of its writers are, for the moſt part, buried in oblivion. We know not to whom we owe far the greater number of metrical romances, and other compoſitions which the age afforded. It is probable that they were the productions of monks who lived and died, unknown, in their convents. The firſt poet whoſe name occurs, is ROBERT of GLOUCESTER, who flouriſhed about the year 1280. He was a monk of the abbey of Glouceſter, and compoſed a poem of conſiderable length, which is a Hiſtory of England, in verſe, from Brutus to his own time. At the cloſe of Edward the Firſt's reign, we meet with another poet named ROBERT MANNING, but more commonly, ROBERT de BRUNNE *, who appears nevertheleſs only as a tranſlator. The work tranſlated, or rather paraphraſed by him, was originally written by ROBERT GROSTEST, and was entitled *Manual de Peche*, or the Manual of Sins. Among the authors of metrical romances in the time

---

* Becauſe he reſided in the monaſtery of *Brunne*, or *Bourne*, in *Lincolnſhire* inhabited by the monks of the order of St Gilbert. He tranſlated many pieces, from the French and Latin, into Engliſh verſe; among which "*The caſtle of love*, by biſhop GROSSETESTE," is not the leaſt remarkable. It begins with the following pious lines:

That good thinketh good may do,
And God will help him thar to:
Ffor nas never good work wrought
With oute biginninge of good thougt.
Ne never was wrougt non vuel (well, good) thyng.
That vuel thougt nas the beginnyng.
God ffuder, and ſone and holigoſte
That alle thing on eorthe fixt and woſt
That one God art and thrillihod (trinity)
And threo perſones in one hod,
Withouten end and biginninge,
To whom we ougten over alle thinge,
Worshepe him with trewe love,
That kinc worthe king art us above, &c. &c.

time of Edward II. ADAM DAVIE (1) is the only perſon whoſe name has deſcended to poſterity. ROBERT BASTON, (2) a poet who attended this monarch in his expedition to Scotland, wrote chiefly in Latin. It was not till the reign of EDWARD III. (3) that the geniuſſes ſprang up, who produced that poetic revolution already mentioned, and which reflects ſo much honour on themſelves and on their country. RICHARD HAMPOLE, a doctor

(1) Of this character no accounts appear to be extant reſpecting his merits as a bard, nor of the time when he flouriſhed: at leaſt I have not been able to diſcover any in Dr. KIPPIS' *Biographia Britannica*, in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, laſt edition, and ſeveral other works I have purpoſely, though vainly, conſulted.—The fame will apply to other authors mentioned in this *Hiſtory*, whoſe names are not accompanied with any biographical notes.

W.

(2) The greater part of his poems are written in *Latin*, of which that "*De Sacerdotum Luxuriis*" is not the leaſt curious.—In Engliſh he wrote "*A Book of Poems*," and "*A Volume of Tragedies and Comedies*."—Being poet laureat and public Orator at Oxford, he accompanied Edward I. in his expedition into Scotland in 1304, to celebrate his victories over the Scots: but Robert Baſton unluckily fell into the enemy's hands, and was obliged by torture to change his note and ſing the ſucceſſes of Robert Bruce, who then claimed the crown of Scotland. This taſk he reluctantly complied with, as he intimates in the two firſt lines:

"In dreery verſe my rhymes I make
Bewailing whilſt ſuch theme I take," &c.

Our author's poetry was expreſſed in ſomewhat barbarous ſtyle, but not contemptible for the age in which he lived. He died about 1310. KIPPIS.

(3) Born at Windſor, 1312; proclaimed king and crowned at Weſtminſter 1327; died in 1377.—He was undoubtedly one of the greateſt princes that ever ſwayed the ſceptre in England; whether we reſpect him as a warrior or lawgiver, a monarch, or a man. He poſſeſſed the courage and romantic ſpirit of Alexander; the perſeveration, the fortitude, the poliſhed manners, of Julius; the munificence, the liberality, the wiſdom of Auguſtus Cæſar. He was tall, majeſtic, of an elegant figure, with a piercing eye, and aquiline viſage. He excelled all his cotemporaries in feats of arms and perſonal addreſs. He was courteous, affable and eloquent; a conſtitutional knight-errant; and his example diffuſed the ſpirit of chivalry through the whole nation. In imitation of the youthful monarch who delighted in tilts and tournaments, every individual betook himſelf to the exerciſe of arms; every breaſt glowed with emulation, every heart panted with the thirſt of

doctor in divinity, of the order of St Auguſtine, muſt not be reckoned in the number of theſe geniuſſes. ROBERT LONGLANDE, who flouriſhed about the year 1350, and who was the author of the poem called "*The Viſion of Pierce Plowman*," merits a far ſuperior diſtinction. This poem contains a ſeries of diſtinct viſions, in which the vices of almoſt every profeſſion, particularly of the clergy, and the abſurdities of ſuperſtition, are ridiculed with much humour and ſpirit. The ſatire is accompanied with a ſtrong vein of allegorical invention. The great defect of Longlande lies in his language. He has adopted the ſtyle of the Anglo-Saxon poets, and imitated them in their alliterative verſification; in conſequence of which he is remarkably uncouth, and ſometimes obſcure. It is to be lamented, that ſo much genius and abilities ſhould be hidden by ſo unpleaſant and ungracious a mode of compoſition. Bad as the model ſet by Longlande was, he had a number of imitators.'

Longland was a cotemporary of Mandeville, and his *Viſion* before mentioned is one of the beſt poems that appeared during this æra. Under the fictitious idea of viſions, or apparitions, he laſhes in a ſatirical ſtrain, the vices of all ranks, and particularly thoſe ariſing from the abſurdities of ſuperſtition and the corrupted manners of the clergy.—Inſtead of the long paſſages quoted by Warton, a ſhorter one will ſuffice here, in which *Nature* (Kynde) at the command of *Conſcience* and its companions, *Age* and *Death*, ſends her diſeaſes from the planets.

Kynde Conſcience then heard, and came out of the planetts,
And ſent forth his forriours Fevers, and Fluxes,
Coughes

---

of glory; and when he took the field, there was not a ſoldier in his army, who did not ſerve from ſentiment and fight for reputation. The love of glory was certainly the predominant paſſion of Edward, to the gratification of which he did not ſcruple to ſacrifice the feelings of humanity, the lives of his ſubjects, and the intereſt of his country; and nothing could have induced or enabled his people to bear the load of taxes, with which they were encumbered in this reign, but the love and admiration of his perſon, the fame of his victories, and the excellent laws and regulations which the parliament enacted with his advice and concurrence; and finally, the firſt diſtinction was made between lords and commons in 1342, by which the foundation was laid for the preſent Engliſh conſtitution; a fabric that is believed to be capable of repairing and occaſionally reproducing its worm-eaten pillars, however injured and preyed upon by the tooth of time.

W and BARCLAY.

Coughes, and Cardiacles, Crampes and Toth aches,
Reumes and Kadgondes, and raynous Scalles,
Byles and Botches, and burnynge Agues
Freneſes, and foule Evill, foragers of Kynde.
Ther was " Harowe! and Helpe! here cometh Kynde!
" With Death that is dreadful, to unde us all!"
The lord that lyveth after luſt tho aloud cried— — —
Age the hoore, he was in the vaw-ward,
And bare the banner before Death: by ryght he is claimed.
Kynde came after, with many kene fores,
As Pockes and Peſtilences, and much people ſhent.
So kynde through corruptions kylled full many:
Death came dryvyng after and all to duſt paſhed
Kyngs and Kayſers, knightes and popes.
Many a lovely lady, and lemman of knyghtes,
Swoned and ſwelted for ſorowe and Death's dyntes.
Conſcience, of his courteſye to Kynde he beſoght
To ceaſe and ſuſire, of ſe where they wolde,
Leave pride prively, and be perfite chriſten,
And Kynde ceaſed tho, to ſee the people amende.

At length *Good Fortune* and *Pride* diſpatch a numerous hoſt of enemies led on by *Deſire*, to make an attack upon *Conſcience*.

And gadered a great hoſt, all agayne Conſcience:
This Lechery led on, with a laughyng chere,
And with a privye ſpeeche, and paynted wordes,
And armed him in idleneſs and in high bearyng.
He bare a bowe in his hand, and many bloudy arrowes,
Were fethered with faire beheſt, and many a falſe truth.

Upon this *Conſcience* is beſieged by *Antichriſt* who is aided by the ſeven great giants (the ſeven mortal ſins), in which expedition *Idleneſs* forms the order of the attack with an army conſiſting of upwards of a thouſand well-fed prelates, &c.

' There was a Scottiſh poet in the preſent period, who is entitled to diſtinguiſhed praiſes. The perſon we have in view is JOHN BARBOUR, (4) Arch-deacon of Aberdeen. His poem called

(4) Very little is known of this illuſtrious character, one of the earlieſt Caledonian bards, except that he ſeems to have been born about 1326; that he was Archdeacon of Aberdeen in 1357, in which year he travelled to Oxford, and was appointed by the Biſhop of Aberdeen, one of the commiſſioners for the ranſom of David II. king of Scotland; and that in 1365 he accompanied

fix

called "*The History of Robert Bruce, King of the Scots,*' allowance being made for the time in which it was written, is eminent for the beauty of its ſtyle. Another bard of the ſame country wrote a poem on the exploits of SIR WILLIAM WALLACE, which abounds with fine paſſages. Both theſe writers roſe to a ſtrain of verſification, expreſſion, and poetical imagery, greatly ſuperior to the age and country in which they lived.'

 We

ſix knights to St Denis near Paris. In the year 1375, as he himſelf informs us, he wrote a poem of conſiderable length, which was firſt publiſhed, in the original Scottiſh verſe, from a MS. dated 1489, with Notes and a Gloſſary; by Mr Pinkerton, in three Volumes 12mo. London, 1790; entitled, *The Bruce*; or the Hiſtory of Robert I. King of Scotland.—Mr P. the preſent editor ſays that "taking the total merits of this work together, he prefers it to the early exertions of even the Italian muſe, to the melancholy ſublimity of Dante, and the amorous quaintneſs of Petrarca. The reader will here find few of the graces of fine poetry, little of the attic dreſs of the muſe: but here are life, ſpirit, eaſe, plain ſenſe, pictures of real manners, perpetual incident, and entertainment. The language is remarkably good for the time; and far ſuperior, in neatneſs and elegance, even to that of Gawin Douglas, who wrote more than a century after. But when we conſider that our author is not only the firſt poet but the earlieſt hiſtorian of Scotland, who has entered into any detail, and from whom any view of the real ſtate and manners of the country can be had; and that the hero, whoſe life he paints ſo minutely, was a monarch equal to the greateſt of modern times; let the hiſtorical and poetical merits of his work be weighed together; and then oppoſed to any other early poet of the preſent nations in Europe."

"It is indeed poſterior in time to the earlieſt poetry of the moſt modern nations; but it muſt be conſidered that Scotland hardly had one writer in the thirteenth century, and this poem was written in the fourteenth."

The following ſhort ſpecimen of the poem will ſufficiently prove theſe aſſertions, and we have only to attend to the obſervation which the editor has prefixed to his Gloſſary; viz. "The chief obſtacle in peruſing this work ariſes from the orthography, which is extremely irregular. To underſtand many words, it is only neceſſary to pronounce them aloud; and the meaning which is obſcured by the ſpelling, will be evident from the ſound."

A! fredome is a nobill thing!
Fredome mayſe man to haiff liking; (1)

Fredome

(1) *Makes man to have joy*

We are now arrived to GEOFFREY CHAUCER,(5) who claims the higheſt place of diſtinction, on account of his pre-eminent merit, and the more extenſive influence of his example. Into the particulars of his life, which are minutely diſcuſſed in the Biographia

---

Fredome all ſolace to man giffis :
He levys at eſe, that frely levys !
A noble hart may haiff nane eſe,
Na ellys nocht that may him pleſe, (2)
Gyff fredome failyhe : for fre liking (3)
Is yharnyt our all othir thing (4)
Na he, that ay haſe levyt frie,
May nocht knaw weill the propyrtè,
The angyr, na the wrechyt dome, (5)
That is cowplyt to foule thyrldome.
But gyff he had aſſayit it,
Than all perquer he ſuld it wyt ; (6)
And ſuld think fredome mar to pryſe,
Than all the gold in warld that is.

As a ſpecimen of Barbour's rural poetry, the following few lines will confirm Mr ANDREWS's opinion, when he ſays in his *Hiſtory of Great Britain, connected with the Chronology of Europe ;* &c. 4to, *London* 1794, "That Barbour wrote the life and exploits of Robert Bruce in good rhyme ; and in a ſtyle more like our modern Engliſh, than the language of Chaucer."

This was in midſt of month of May,
When birdis ſing on ilka ſpray,
Melland (7) their notes, with ſeemly ſoun,
For ſoftneſs of the ſweet ſeaſoun.
And leavis of the branchis ſpreeds,
And bloomis bright, beſide them, breeds,
And fieldis ſtrawed are with flow'rs
Well ſavoring of ſeir (8) colours.

(5) GEOFFREY CHAUCER, juſtly conſidered as the father of our Engliſh poets, and the firſt great improver and reformer of our language, was born in the ſecond year of Edward III. A. D. 1328. He ſtudied firſt at Cambridge where he compoſed his poem called "*The Court of Love*," in the 18th year of his age, which carries in it very pregnant proofs of ſkill and learning as well as quickneſs

(2) Na ellys nocht ; *nor any thing elſe.* (3) fre liking ; *free will.* (4) yharnyt our ; *deſired above.* (5) angyr ; quare, *angyr*, i. e. *anguiſh ?* (6) perquer ; *perfectly.* wyt ; *know.*

(7) Melland ; *mingling.* (8) ſeir ; *their*

Biographia, we ſhall not enter. It may be ſufficient to ſay, that he was converſant with the court, and engaged in public affairs; that he was cloſely connected with John of Gaunt, and married

---

neſs of wit, and great ſtrength of genius. He compleated his ſtudies in the Univerſity of Oxford, or as ſome ſay, at Canterbury College.—LELAND informs us, that he was a ready logician, a ſmooth rhetorician, a pleaſant poet, a grave philoſopher, an ingenious mathematician, and a holy divine. He afterwards applied himſelf to the ſtudy of Law, in the Middle-Temple; and was made King's page, about the age of thirty, an office then very honourable, as the Engliſh court was the moſt ſplendid in Europe. He married Philippa Rouet, a favourite of the Duke and Ducheſs of Gaunt, about the year 1360; was ſent by King Edward, as his agent to Genoa, to hire ſhips for the King's Navy; and having accompliſhed the object of this miſſion to the ſatisfaction of his maſter, the King granted him, in the 48th year of his reign, a pitcher of wine daily in the port of London, to be delivered by the Butler of England, and very ſoon after he was made Comptroller of the cuſtoms in the port of London. Yet it is doubtful, how long he remained in this lucrative office; for in the ſecond year of King Richard his affairs were in ſuch confuſion that he was obliged to have recourſe to the King's protection, in order to ſcreen him from his creditors.—By attaching himſelf to Wickliff, and his followers, he was involved in great calamities, and became equally ſuſpected by the King, and diſliked by the people.—In 1382, he was obliged to fly from London into Hainault, France, and Zeeland, in which baniſhment he almoſt periſhed by the barbarous ingratitude of his former friends in England, who inſtead of ſending him any ſupplies, rather hindered every attempt made by others to relieve him. When almoſt periſhing from want, he privately came over to England, where he was diſcovered, ſeized, thrown into priſon, and upon diſcloſing all he knew of the king's enemies, he at laſt obtained his pardon. Yet he did not take any meaſures to revenge himſelf againſt his treacherous friends by the confeſſions extorted from him; though with regard to himſelf they brought upon him an inexpreſſible load of calumnies and ſlanders.—The penſion of 20 marks per annum, together with the daily pitcher of wine granted him by King Edward, and forfeited by his dereliction of the court party, were confirmed to him in the reign of King Henry, from whom he obtained a licence on the 11th of May 1389 to diſpoſe of them to one Scalby. In this unexpected and terrible reverſe of fortune, he very wiſely reſolved to quit that

married the ſiſter of the famous Catherine Swynford; that he was involved in the misfortunes of his friend and maſter; that he was obliged to flee into Holland, when the Duke was diſgraced;

---

that buſy ſcene of life, in which he had met with ſo many troubles, and to ſeek a more laſting happineſs in retirement. He therefore choſe Woodſtock for his retreat; a place which had been the ſweet ſcene of ſo much ſatisfaction to him in the days of his proſperity; and here he employed part of his time in reviſing and correcting his writings, totally ſecluded from the world, and taſting only thoſe calm and ſolid pleaſures which are the reſult of a wiſe man's reflections on the viciſſitudes of human life. He reſided here in a ſquare ſtone houſe near the park gate, which ſtill retains his name; and it well deſerves this honourable token, for, being conſecrated in his poems, the whole country round about is become, to Engliſhmen, a kind of Claſſic ground. The ſhort time he lived after the acceſſion of Edward IV, was chiefly employed in regulating his private affairs which had ſuffered by the public diſorders: for all the public acts of the depoſed King Richard, in the 21ſt year of his reign, being declared void, Chaucer was forced to quit his retirement, to come up to town to ſolicit his cauſes, and beginning now to bend under the weight of years, this unlucky acceſſion of buſineſs, which obliged him to alter his uſual way of living, might very poſſibly haſten his end, the near approach of which he bore with Roman conſtancy, or rather with chriſtian patience. For there is ſtill extant a kind of Ode that he is ſaid to have compoſed in his laſt agonies, which very plainly proves, that his ſenſes were perfectly ſound, and the faculties of his mind not in the leaſt impaired. He died October 25th 1400, in the full poſſeſſion of that high reputation which his writings had deſervedly acquired, and was buried in Weſtminſter Abbey in the great ſouth croſs-iſle.—The ſonnet or ode above alluded to conſiſts of three ſtanzas only, and as well for the beauty of the piece, as for the extraordinary occaſion on which it was written, *Dr Kippis* has deſervedly given it a place in his *Biographia Britannica*.

Gode conſaile of Chaucer:
Attempted in modern Engliſh.
THE POETS LAST ADVICE.

I.

Fly from the croud, and be to virtue true,
Content with what thou haſt, tho' it be ſmall.

To

ed; and that he afterwards returned into England, upon the reſtoration of his patron to power and favour.—His literary character was truly illuſtrious; it has been lately, and with great ability

---

To hoard brings hate; nor lofty thoughts purſue,
He who climbs high endangers many a fall.
Envy's a ſhade that ever waits on fame,
And oft the ſun that riſes it will hide;
Trace not in life a vaſt expenſive ſcheme
But be thy wiſhes to thy ſtate ally'd.
Be mild to others, to thyſelf ſevere;
So truth ſhall ſhield thee, or from hurt or fear.

II.

Think not of bending all things to thy will,
Nor vainly hope that fortune ſhall befriend;
Inconſtant ſhe, but be thou conſtant ſtill,
Whate'er betide unto an honeſt end.
Yet needleſs dangers never madly brave,
Kick not thy naked foot againſt a nail;
Or from experience the ſolution crave,
If wall and pitcher ſtrive, which ſhall prevail;
Be in thy cauſe, as in thy neighbour's clear,
So truth ſhall ſhield thee, or from hurt or fear.

III.

Whatever happens, happy in thy mind
Be thou, nor at thy lot in life repine,
He 'ſcapes all ill, whoſe boſom is reſign'd,
Nor way, nor weather will be always fine.
Beſide, thy home's not here, a journey this,
A pilgrim thou, then hie thee on thy way.
Look up to God, intent on heavenly bliſs,
Take what the road affords and praiſes pay;
Shun brutal luſt, and ſeek thy ſoul's high ſphere;
So truth ſhall ſhield thee, or from hurt or fear.

In order to give likewiſe ſome ſpecimen of his original compoſition, Chaucer's humorous *Addreſs to his empty purſe*, and his *laconic advice to his own amanuenſis*, well deſerve here to be recorded.

Chaucer to his emptie purſe.

To you my purſe, and to none othir wight,
Complain I, for ye be my ladie dere,

I am

ability displayed by such writers as a TYRWHIT and a WARTON: hence it is the less necessary, here, to enlarge upon it. Chaucer was skilled in all the learning of the age, and especially in astronomy,

---

I am sorie now that ye be so light,
For certis ye now make me hevie chere;
Me were as lefe be laide upon a bere,
For whiche unto your mercy thus I crie,
Be hevy againe, or els mote I die.
Now vouchsafin this day or it be night
That I of yow the blisful sowne may here,
Or se your colour lyke the sonnè bright,
That of yelowneſſe ne had nevir pere;
Ye be my life, ye be my hert'is stere;
Quene of comfort and of gode companye,
Be hevy againe, or els mote I die.
Nowe purse, that art to me my liv'is light,
And fayvour, as downe in this worlde here,
Oute of this townè helpe me by your might,
Sithin that yow wol not be my tresoure,
For I am shave as nighe as any frere,
But I preyin unto your curtesye
Be hevy againe, or els mote I die, &c.

Chaucer's wordes unto his own Scrivenere.

ADAM SCRIVENERE, yf ever it the befalle
BOECE or TROILES for to write new
Under thy longe lockes thou maist have the scalle,
But after my makynge thou write more true,
So oft adaye I mote thy werke renew
It to correcte and eke to rubbe and scrape,
And al is thorow thy negligence and rape.

The following lines are said to have been anciently upon Chaucer's tomb-stone.

GALFRIDUS CHAUCER, VATES ET FAMA POESIS
MATERNÆ, HAC SACRA SUM TUMULATUS HOMO.

About the year 1555, Nicholas Brighman, a gentleman of Oxford, erected a handsome monument for Chaucer. His picture was taken from Occleve's book, together with the following inscription which still remains:

M. S.

Qui fuit Anglorum vates ter maximus olim
Galfridus Chaucer conditur hoc tumulo:

Annum

aſtronomy, as appears from his *Aſtrolabe*, in which he has collected whatever was valuable in the works of his predeceſſors who applied to the ſtudy of that ſcience. He wrote in Engliſh proſe as well as verſe, being perſuaded that it was the duty of able men to cultivate their native tongue; an opinion correſponding with the ſucceſsful efforts of Petrarch in Italy, whoſe example he found worthy of imitation.'

'Chaucer is entitled to eminent praiſe as a poet. He was endued with an uncommon genius, and ſhone in very different kinds of compoſition. His *Canterbury-tales* are maſterpieces, which exhibit a wonderful variety of talents; for they abound with the ſublime and the pathetic, with admirable ſatire, genuine humour, and an uncommon knowledge of life. The ſtories told by the ſeveral gueſts are exactly ſuited to their characters, and clearly evince that the author, notwithſtanding the aid he derived from his acquaintance with Italian literature, was poſſeſſed of a noble invention and a fruitful imagination. Whatever were the defects of his ſtyle, they were entirely the defects of the period in which he flouriſhed. At the ſame time it has a claim to much higher praiſe than it has frequently received. His verſification has been cenſured as deficient in harmony; this charge has often proceeded from our unacquaintance with the ſtructure of the language in that age, and with the manner in which it was pronounced. Chaucer is uſually characterized as the Father of the Engliſh poe-

f try,

Annum ſi quæras Domini, ſi tempora vitæ,
Ecce notæ ſubſunt quæ tibi cuncta notunt.
25 *Octobris*, 1400.
A. *Ærumnarum requies mors.*
N. Brigham hos fecit Muſarum nomine ſumptus.
1556.

In Engliſh thus:

Of Engliſh bards who ſang the ſweeteſt ſtrains,
Old Geoffrey Chaucer now this tomb contains:
For if death's date, if reader thou ſhould'ſt call,
Look but beneath and it will tell thee all.
25th of October, 1400.
Death is the repoſe of afflictions.

N. Brighman placed theſe in the name of the Muſes at his own expence. 1556.

try: he was undoubtedly the firſt perſon in England, to whom the title of a poet, in its genuine luſtre, could be applied with juſtice. He not only enriched our native tongue in general, but had the honour of eſtabliſhing the Engliſh heroic verſe, in which ſo many beautiful compoſitions have ſince appeared.'

'This illuſtrious man was uncommonly free in his religious ſentiments; he employed his talents with equal ſucceſs in laſhing the immoralities of the prieſts, and in covertly attacking ſome of the doctrines of the Church of Rome: nor has it been imagined without reaſon, that he was a great favourer, if not a direct follower of Wickliff.'

'Another poet of this æra, who is entitled to conſiderable applauſe, is JOHN GOWER (6). He was the intimate friend of Chaucer, and co-operated with him in all his valuable deſigns. With reſpect to religion he was equally liberal in his ſentiments; ſo natural is the connection between genius and the love of liberty. Though he was much inferior to Chaucer in ſpirit,

(6) Gower's chief work in Engliſh, is his *Confeſſio amantis*, or "The lover's confeſſion;" it was finiſhed in the year 1393. It is divided into eight books, firſt printed by Caxton in 1483. He wrote this poem at the deſire of Richard II. who meeting our poet roving on the Thames, near London, invited him into the Royal barge, and after much converſation requeſted him to *book ſome new thing*. On this piece Gower's character and reputation as a poet, are almoſt entirely founded. It is a dialogue between a lover and his confeſſor who is a prieſt of Venus, and like the myſtagogue in the PICTURE OF CEBES, is called Genius.—What Gower wanted in invention, he ſupplied from his common-place book, which appears to have been ſtored with an inexhauſtible fund of inſtructive maxims, pleaſant narrations, and philoſophical definitions: hence his object to croud all his erudition into this elaborate performance; yet there is often ſome degree of contrivance and art in his manner of introducing and adapting ſubjects of a very diſtant nature, and which are totally foreign to his general deſigns. (KIPPIS). That he was a man of judgment, appears from the circumſtance of Chaucer's ſubmitting his *Troilus* and *Creſſida* to Gower's cenſure.—His munificence and piety were great; he largely contributed to rebuild the conventual church of St Mary Overee in Southwark, in its preſent elegant form, and to render it a beautiful pattern of the lighter Gothic architecture; at the ſame time he founded at his tomb a perpetual chantry, and died in 1402.

ſpirit, imagination, and elegance, his language is not deſtitute of perſpicuity, and his verſification is frequently harmonious. His erudition was very extenſive, and accompanied with a knowledge of life. He critically cultivated his native tongue, that he might reform its irregularities, and eſtabliſh an Engliſh ſtyle. His poems are diſtinguished for their moral merit. In ſhort, if Chaucer had not exiſted, Gower would alone have been ſufficient to reſcue the age, in which he lived, from the imputation of barbariſm.'

'In comparing the hiſtorians of this age with their predeceſſors, we cannot allow them equal merit in the ſame ſpecies of compoſition. The Compendium of THOMAS WICKES, which begins with the Conqueſt, and ends at the death of Edward I, is clear and full in its narration of ſeveral events. The Chronicle that goes under the name of JOHN BRUMPTON, is copious in its account of the Saxons, and tranſcribes many of their laws at large. HIGDEN, though a plagiary, preſerves ſome facts which would otherwiſe have been loſt. MATTHEW OF WESTMINSTER (7) concluded his Annals with the year 1307; but his work was continued by other hands, and particularly by ADAM DE MERIMUTH, to 1380.'

'This age alſo produced what was then extremely remarkable, an extenſive and illuſtrious traveller Such was SIR JOHN MANDEVILLE, a perſon deſcended from an ancient and noble family. He had received his education at the monaſtery of St. Albans, and applied himſelf for ſome time to the common ſtudies of the day, and eſpecially to phyſic; but at length he was ſeized with an invincible deſire of viſiting Aſia and Africa. Having amply provided himſelf for the purpoſe, he ſet out upon his travels in 1332, and was abſent from England *thirty-four years*. When he returned to his native country, he was ſcarcely known, as he had long been given up for dead, by his relations and friends. He became acquainted with many modern languages, in the courſe of his adventures, and wrote his Travels in Latin, French, and Engliſh. Several

(7) A Benedictine monk and an accompliſhed ſcholar, who wrote this hiſtory from the beginning of the world, to the end of the reign of Edward I, under the title of *Flores Hiſtoriarum*; he died in 1380. ENCYCLOP. BRIT.

falſe and fanciful things are to be found in them, as he was extremely credulous, and tells us not only what he ſaw, but what he heard. In other reſpects, his accounts of the countries, which he viſited, deſerve attention; and, excepting PAULUS VENUTUS, he was the firſt man who communicated, to the Weſtern Europeans, the knowledge of the remote parts of the world (8).

Diviſion Second; from 1399, *to* 1485.

FROM HENRY IV. to HENRY VII.

'The period, in which Chaucer, Gower and Longlande flouriſhed, was ſucceeded by an age that did not, in any tolerable degree, ſuſtain the ſame reputation. There was only one poet in the reign of King HENRY IV. and he contributed nothing to the improvement of our verſification and language. His real name was JOHN WALTON, though he is called *Johannes Capellanus*. He tranſlated into Engliſh verſe BOETHIUS's "*Treatiſe on the Conſolation of Philoſophy*, a work of genius and merit, which in the middle ages, was admired above every other compoſition.'

'HENRY V. though ſaid to have been fond of reading, derives no luſtre from his patronage of the fine arts, but from his character as a warrior. Although his coronation was attended with harpers, who muſt have accompanied their inſtruments with heroic rhymes, he was no great encourager of the popular minſtrelsy, then in a high ſtate of perfection. When, on his entrance into the city of London in triumph, after the battle of Agincourt, children had been placed to ſing verſes as he paſſed, an edict was iſſued by him, commanding that, for the future, no ſongs ſhould be recited in praiſe of the late victory. This humility perhaps was affected; and, if it was real, does not appear to have been the reſult of true wiſdom. While his inclinations directed him to purſue his eminent military atchievements, he ought to have cheriſhed the perſons who were beſt able to do juſtice to his proweſs. The little

(8) His rambling diſpoſition did not ſuffer him to reſt; for he left his native country a ſecond time, and died at Liege in the Netherlands in 1372. ENCYCLOP. BRIT.

little regard, however, which Henry paid to the poets, could not prevent them from celebrating his warlike actions. Among other productions, a minſtrel-piece was compoſed on the ſiege of Harfleur, and the battle of Agincourt. It was adapted to the harp, and contained ſome ſpirited lines; but the ſtyle was barbarous, compared with that of Chaucer and Gower. The improvement of our language was attended to only by a few men, who had enjoyed the advantages of a ſuperior education, and made compoſition their ſtudy. As to the minſtrels, they were, in general, too illiterate to ſearch after the refinements of diction.'

'Concerning OCCLEVE, though of ſome note in the poetical hiſtory of this period, much cannot be ſaid in his praiſe. His principal poem is a tranſlation of EGIDIUS *on the Government of Princes*. Occleve did not excel in vigour of fancy, and there is no energy in his writings. He had, however, the merit of contributing to the improvement of our language. His pathetic lines on Chaucer, who was his model, and with whom he had probably formed a connection in early life, reflect honour upon the gratitude and ſenſibility of his heart.'

'JOHN LYDGATE (9), a monk of the Benedictine abbey of Bury in Suffolk, was the poet whoſe reputation ſtands the higheſt among the Engliſh bards of this age. He poſſeſſed the advantage of an education, not inferior to any that the times could afford. After having ſtudied at the univerſity of Oxford, he travelled for improvement into France and Italy. Here he acquired the knowledge, not only of the languages, but of the literature of theſe countries, and paid particular attention to the poetry of both nations. Beſides obtaining an acquaintance with all the polite learning which was then cultivated, he was no inconſiderable proficient in the faſhionable philoſophy

(9) At what time he retired to the convent of St. Edmund's-Bury, does not appear; but he was certainly there in 1415. He was living in 1446, aged about 66; but in what year he died, is not known.—Lydgate, according to Pits, was an elegant poet, a perſuaſive rhetorician, an expert mathematician, an acute philoſopher, and a tolerable divine. He was a voluminous writer, and conſidering the age in which he lived, an excellent poet. His language is leſs obſolete, and his verſification much more harmonious, than the language and verſification of Chaucer, who wrote about half a century before him. ENCYCL. BRIT.

philoſophy and theology of his cotemporaries. The vivacity of his genius, and the verſatility of his talents, enabled him to write a great number of poems, extremely diverſified in their ſubjects, and in the nature of their compoſition. His three chief productions were the "*Fall of Princes*," the "*Siege of Thebes*," and the "*Deſtruction of Troy*."—Lydgate alſo improved the Engliſh tongue; for his language is uncommonly perſpicuous for the times in which he lived, and his verſes frequently excite ſurpriſe by their modern caſt He ſeems to have been ambitious, at leaſt in the ſtructure and modulation of his ſtyle, of rivalling Chaucer; but undoubtedly he was far inferior to him in the grand requiſites of poetical excellence. His mode of writing is diffuſe, and he is not diſtinguiſhed by animation or pathos. Nevertheleſs, he is not deſtitute of beauties, and his Deſtruction of Troy, in particular, diſplays much power of deſcription, in conjunction with clear and harmonious numbers.'

'If it were compatible with the nature of our deſign to enumerate names only, other perſons might be added. We might mention HUGH CAMPEDEN, THOMAS CHESTER, JOHN HARDING (10), who wrote a Chronicle in Verſe, and JOHN NORTON and GEORGE RIPLEY, whoſe poems are didactic. It is ſcarcely expreſſing ourſelves with propriety, to ſay that theſe men were mere verſifiers. While they are totally void of the noble

(10) As a ſpecimen of this chronicler's verſification, may ſerve the following curious lines, which Spelman has quoted in his "*Vita Aelfredi*." p. 191. Append.

"Alfrede king was of this regioun
That brother was to the noble Elthride,
A perfect Clerk proved in opinion
As Clerks could diſcern, and proved.
In knighthood alſo approved and notified
So plenerly, that no man knew his peer
So good a knight he was and ſingulere.
In batails many in his father's daies
And alſo in his brethren time all three
He fought full ofte, and bare him wel alwaies,
That for his dedes and ſingularitee
He was commended among the emnitee
Within the land and out, as well was know
His fame among the people hyc was blowe."

noble qualities which conſtitute genuine poetry, their verſification is unpoliſhed and barbarous. Harding ſhould therefore be marked as an antiquary and an hiſtorian, and Norton and Ripley as chemical writers. The latter is underſtood to have been no mean proficient in the general literature of the times.'

'However deficient the minſtrels of this age might be in the excellencies of compoſition, they were great favourites with the nation at large. This is evident from the reward which they received for their attendance on particular ſolemnities. Superſtitious as the body of the people were, they manifeſted greater liberality towards the adminiſtrators to their pleaſures, than towards the leaders of their devotion. During one feaſt, while twelve prieſts had only four pence each for ſinging a dirge, the ſame number of minſtrels were every one of them rewarded with two ſhillings and four pence, beſides having entertainment provided for themſelves and their horſes. At another feſtival two ſhillings were given to the prieſts, and four to the minſtrels; and the latter were treated with the moſt diſtinguiſhed marks of attention and reſpect.'

'It is conjectured that the office of poet laureat originated in this period. An Italian who came into England and profeſſed to be an imitator of the great Roman hiſtorian, Livy, aſſumed the name of Titus Livius, and was protected by Humphrey, Duke of Glouceſter. He wrote, indeed, a judicious Epitome of Thomas de Elham's hiſtory, but did not attain either the elevation of ſentiment or dignity of ſtyle, which ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed the model he wiſhed to follow. But the employment of a poet laureat, as held under the king, took its riſe in the reign of EDWARD IV. and the firſt perſon thus appointed was JOHN KAY, of whom no compoſition is extant, which can be conſidered as aſſerting his claim to this character. The only work that remains of him, is an Engliſh tranſlation in proſe of a *Hiſtory of the Siege of Rhodes*. A crown of laurel was ſometimes conferred, in univerſities, on thoſe who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their abilities in Latin compoſition, and eſpecially in Latin verſe. Hence the king's laureat might be nothing more than a graduate of this kind, employed in his majeſty's ſervice. The laureats appear originally to have written only in Latin, which cuſtom is ſuppoſed to have continued till the time of the Reformation.'

'If the diſcoveries, profeſſedly made ſome years ago at Briſtol, in 1768, are to be credited, we muſt introduce the name of a poet

a poet far more excellent than any, whom we have yet mentioned, and who would confer honour on this age, infinitely greater than that to which hitherto it has eſtabliſhed its title. Our readers muſt be ſenſible that we allude to the poems which CHATTERTON produced as the works of THOMAS ROWLEY, a ſecular prieſt in that city, in the fifteenth century. The full diſcuſſion of this ſubject, which affords a very curious literary problem, would be foreign to our deſign. We know that Chatterton, when little more than fifteen years of age, brought to his friends certain manuſcripts, and a great number of poems, ſaid to have been tranſcribed from manuſcripts, all of which were alleged to have been found in an old cheſt in the bellfrey of St Mary Redcliffe church, and to contain the genuine productions of this Rowley. We know that theſe poems are, in many reſpects, uncommonly beautiful; and that there is ſomething very extraordinary in them, if they were the compoſitions of a ſtripling who had no other advantages of education than what could be derived from the inſtruction of a common charity-ſchool. We know that they exhibit ſuch marks of knowledge, and are otherwiſe accompanied with circumſtances of ſo ſurpriſing a nature, that it has been deemed not only a matter of aſtoniſhment, but even of impoſſibility, that they ſhould be written by Chatterton. We know that the authenticity of them, and the exiſtence of Rowley, have been maintained by ſome able and learned men, with no ſmall degree of acuteneſs and ingenuity. On the other hand, very important arguments and authorities have been urged to prove that they are of modern fabrication. That there ever was ſuch a perſon as Rowley, has been called in queſtion, and ſtill more, that there could be any poet of that name in the fifteenth century, who was capable of producing the works aſcribed to him. It is aſked, how he could poſſibly have been concealed till within theſe few years, and how he could avoid being celebrated in the higheſt terms of applauſe, by his own cotemporaries, and by every ſucceeding age. As to the manuſcripts aſſerted to have been diſcovered by Chatterton, doubts, which will not admit of an eaſy ſolution, have been raiſed with regard to the truth of the fact. Independently of all theſe conſiderations, it is alleged, that the poems themſelves afford the moſt deciſive internal evidence of their being recent productions. This has been argued, with great force of reaſoning, from a variety of concurring circumſtances,

ſtances. The ſtyle, compoſition, ſentiments, and meaſure, carry in them the marks of a refinement that was wholly unknown at the period, in which they are profeſſedly written. In the abſtraction of ideas, in the ſtudied forms of diction, in the harmony of the verſification, we are conſtantly reminded of our lateſt poets. The ſtanza principally uſed was not known in this country till the time of Prior. That ſuch a regular piece as the *Tragedy of Ella* ſhould come from Rowley, at the period pretended, is abſolutely contrary to every thing of the dramatic kind, which exiſted at that period. The fact ſeems to have been that Chatterton originally wrote the poems in the preſent Engliſh language, and afterwards inserted the old words from gloſſaries and dictionaries. It is remarkable that when we peruſe Rowley with dean Mills's learned notes, the moment we turn our eyes from the commentary to the text, the modern air of the latter ſtrikes us in ſo forcible a manner, that the dean's elaborate arguments loſe all power of conviction. It muſt be added, that many undeniable proofs have been exhibited of the moſt direct imitation of recent poets, even to the adoption of their very words. Theſe and other conſiderations have induced a large majority of our ableſt antiquaries and critics totally to deny the authenticity of the compoſitions in queſtion. Should it, however, be allowed, that certain ancient manuſcripts were diſcovered, and that ſome of them contained fragments in verſe, written in the age pretended, Rowley, as we now have him, appears in too queſtionable a ſhape to give the fifteenth century the honour of the works publiſhed under his name.'

'But while—Rowley being rejected—it will be found that little true poetry flouriſhed in England during the preſent period, if we direct our view to the northern kingdom of Great Britain, we ſhall meet with diſtinguiſhed excellence in a perſon of the higheſt ſtation, the ſovereign of the country. It is James I. of Scotland, who introduced a new literary epocha in the nation, over which he reigned. What originally was a great misfortune to this prince, and a flagrant act of injuſtice towards him, turned out, in one reſpect, eminently to his own ſervice, and highly to the advantage of his country. When he was only a youth of thirteen, he was treacherouſly taken priſoner by the Engliſh, and detained, during the term of eighteen years in a confinement which was often very ſtrict and rigid. His education, however, good rudiments of which

he had received in Scotland, was not neglected, but attended to with the utmoſt care. The perſon appointed to be his governor, was Sir John Pelham, a gentleman of worth and literature, who omitted nothing that could tend to form the mind and manners of his royal charge. James, being bleſſed with an admirable genius, and enjoying the ableſt maſters of the time, made an uncommon proficiency both in bodily exerciſes and in mental acquirements. To his knowledge of the Greek and Latin languages, the laſt of which he is repreſented as having written with eaſe, he added an acquaintance with the philoſophy of the age. But the ſtudies, to which he was more particularly devoted, were thoſe of poetry and muſic. Theſe liberal and pleaſing arts formed, in his long and cloſe captivity, the principal conſolation of his ſolitary hours. When he was reſtored to the poſſeſſion of his throne, from which he had been ſo unjuſtly withheld, his grand object was to enlighten and civilize his countrymen. Many of his exertions to this purpoſe were accompanied with ſuch a degree of ſucceſs, that he may be ſaid to have given a new turn to the genius of Scotland. His exertions and ſucceſs would have been ſtill greater and more illuſtrious, if he had not been cruelly murdered in the forty-fourth year of his age. Various works were written by him, both in proſe and verſe, moſt of which are unfortunately loſt: thoſe which ſtill exiſt, are of a poetical nature; and it is certain that ſeveral of his compoſitions of this kind are now no longer in being. Four of James's pieces, which have happily eſcaped the depredations of time, are a "Song on his Miſtreſs;" "The King's Quair;" "Peblis to the Play;" and "Chriſt's Kirk on the Green." The King's Quair is a poem of large extent, being divided into ſix cantos. Its theme is the royal author's love to Jane, daughter to the Earl of Sommerſet; a beautiful lady, of whom he became enamoured while a priſoner at the caſtle of Windſor, and who was afterwards his queen. The misfortunes of his youth, his early and long captivity, the incidents which gave riſe to his paſſion, its purity, conſtancy and happy iſſue, are all diſplayed in the mode of allegorical viſion, agreeably to the reigning taſte of the age. That the merit of the King's Quair is very great, cannot be denied. It is diſtinguiſhed by its invention and fancy, by its genuine ſimplicity of ſentiment, and by the felicity of its poetical deſcriptions. Several men of ingenuity and taſte have contended; that James

is

is little, if at all, inferior to Chaucer. If the former's "Court of Venus" be compared to the latter's "Court of Love," the royal author will lose nothing by the comparison. The Jane, in particular, of King James, is painted with a beauty and delicacy that are not equalled in Chaucer's Rosial. It is to be lamented, that many of the graces of the King's Quair are concealed, at least from common view, in the antiquity of the language.'

'Three other Scottish poets are named in this period, but they are, on the whole, contemptible, when compared with the monarch of the country. ANDREW WINTON, a canon regular of St Andrew's, and Prior of the monastery in Lochleven, and who preceded James I, wrote in verse a very large Chronicle of Scotland. His work, which is valuable, so far as it relates to his own country, and which contains materials not to be met with in Fordun, whom he had never seen, has not yet been published. Its publication would be a desirable accession to the history of North Britain *. HOLLAND was the author of a poem entitled "The Howlat," which appears to have described the poetical employments, and the musical entertainments of the age. HENRY the Minstrel, who, on account of his being blind from his birth, is usually called the BLIND HARRY, composed the "Life of Wallace." It is a romance, like Barbour's Bruce, but not to be ranked with it in point of excellence. At the same time, it is not destitute of merit, and there are various things in it, which cannot fail to gratify the curiosity of the antiquary and the critic.'

'CAXTON † comes before us in the character of an author,

* It has since been published at London, in 2 Vols. 8vo.

† WILLIAM CAXTON, a mercer of London, eminent for the books he published, and for being reputed the first who practised the art of printing in England. He died at a very advanced age, probably above eighty, in 1494.—Much cannot be said in his praise as an author; for his language is rather uncouth; of which the following is a specimen, extracted from his Chronicle:

"King Alfred reigned 30 years, and a good king he had been, and wel coude chastise his enemies, for he was a good Clerc and let make many bokes. And a boke he made of English of aventures of Kings, and of batails that had ben done in the lond: and many other bokes of gestes he let hem write that were of grete

as well as in that of a printer. He is reckoned among the hiſtorians of his age; but in this reſpect he is entitled to a very ſmall degree of applauſe. His chief merit is that of a tranſlator. The books printed by him, were more than fifty in number; ſome of them very large volumes; and many of them were verſions from foreign writers, made by himſelf.'

'Among the patrons of learning, in this period, the name of HUMPHREY, *Duke of Glouceſter*, ſtands foremoſt; a man of an amiable character in our civil hiſtory. He is celebrated by Occleve as a ſingular promoter of literature, and the common patron of the ſcholars of the times. Beſides him two other names ought to be mentioned, whoſe merits were great and eminent. JOHN TIPTOFT, *Earl of Worceſter*, and ANTHONY WIDVILLE, *Earl Rivers*, were not only protectors and promoters of ſcience, but writers themſelves. So eminently was the former at the head of literature, and ſo maſterly an orator, that when, upon a viſit to Rome, he delivered an oration before Pope Pius II, he drew tears of joy and admiration from that celebrated and learned pontiff. The light in which he is now only known to us by his own works, is that of a tranſlator. Of his original productions no more than a few letters and ſmall pieces are remaining in manuſcript. Anthony Widville, greatly to his honour, was the friend of Caxton, whoſe new art he patronized with zeal and liberality. The ſecond book printed in England was a work of Earl Rivers's. He alſo employed himſelf principally in tranſlations, according to the faſhion of the times, and what was then the beſt mode of conveying inſtruction to the kingdom. Beſides theſe he wrote ſeveral ballads againſt the ſeven deadly ſins.—Imperfect as the writings of Tiptoft and Widville may now be deemed, great praiſe is due to them for their zealous endeavours to promote the cauſe of learning, and to ſpread among their countrymen a regard to mental accompliſhments. The examples of men ſo illuſtrious could not fail of producing ſome good effects. It muſt ever be lamented that theſe two eminent noblemen met with ſo untimely and unhappy an end; both of them having been beheaded when they were little more than forty years of age.'

'Another

---

grete wiſdom and good lerning; thurgh which bokes many a man may him amende that will hem reade."

W.

'Another author deſerves to be recorded at the concluſion of this period, not indeed on account of great merit, but for the ſake of her ſex. This was JULIANA BERNERS, prioreſs of Sopewell Nunnery, near St. Albans. She did not employ herſelf altogether in penning devout meditations and rules of holy living, but being a woman of rank and ſpirit, ſhe wrote on hawking, hunting and fiſhing. That part which relates to hunting is in rhyme. This lady is the ſecond, at leaſt in point of time, of any of our female writers, and the firſt who appeared in print.'

'To the number of hiſtorians of this age, whoſe works were compoſed in Latin, we muſt add the name of ROBERT FABIAN, who wrote in Engliſh. He was a merchant and alderman of London, and conſequently a member of a corporation which has produced few literary men, and in which many learned characters are not, in the nature of the thing, to be expected. His ſituation, therefore, in life, eſpecially conſidering the age in which he lived, may be regarded as giving a certain degree of celebrity to his hiſtorical character. The Chronicle of his compoſition is entitled by him the *Concordance of Sins*;" it is apparently written with ſincerity, and its language is intelligible. Beſides the more public facts which it includes, it contains a variety of particulars relative to the city of London. As Fabian's work is carried down to the twentieth year of the reign of HENRY VII. he may in part be conſidered as belonging to the following period.'

In the manners; in the political conſtitutions; in the cuſtoms; and conſequently alſo in the languages of almoſt every European nation, great changes are diſcoverable during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Theſe changes cannot be explained otherwiſe than from the conſtant increaſe of population. The order of knighthood, which hitherto had been the only pride of nations, began much to decline; on the other hand, the lower claſſes of the people, till then very much oppreſſed, recovered from their abject ſervitude, and formed a happy middle rank which ſoon became the ſeat of inventive genius, of thriving commerce, of the arts, and the ſciences. The influence thus occaſioned in language, will be eaſily recognized by him who is acquainted with the exact relation which languages bear to the whole circuit of ideas, and the degree of taſte prevailing in a nation. The queſtion, here, relates only to the Engliſh language, the progreſs of which, during the

the fourteenth century, particularly towards the end of it, was indeed very remarkable. The stock of words it contained, had now become too small and insufficient to express the accession of many new ideas; and therefore its continual augmentation from the French, with which it had already fraternized in the preceding ages, may be without difficulty understood.

Division Third; *from* 1485 *to* 1558: *or*

From HENRY VII. to the end of Q. MARY.

'Of the English poets in the reign of Henry VII, the writer who best deserved that name was STEPHEN HAWES: he was patronized by this monarch. One of his principal productions was entitled the "Temple of Glasse;" which was founded upon Chaucer's "House of Fame." Previous to Hawes, for almost a century, nothing had appeared but Legends, Homilies, and Chronicles in verse. His capital performance, however, was the "*Passetyme of Pleasure*." In this poem there is an effort of imagination and invention; and it contains some striking instances of romantic and allegoric fiction. In point of versification, he improved upon Lydgate, and was superior to that poet in genius and fancy. In the harmony of numbers, and clearness of expression he also excelled his immediate predecessors and cotemporaries.'

'Another poet who flourished in this reign was ALEXANDER BARCLAY. His principal work is the "*Ship of Fooles*." It was chiefly taken from a German original, and from two translations of that original, one in French and the other in Latin. Barclay made, however, some additions of his own.—The language of this writer is more cultivated than that of many of his cotemporaries, and he had the honour of contributing somewhat to the improvement of the phraseology of his country. Besides other pieces, Barclay was the author of five Eclogues, which were the first of the kind in the English tongue. They were formed upon the plan of Petrarch and Mantuan, being of a moral and satirical nature, and containing but few strokes of rural description and bucolic imagery.'

'JOHN ALCOCK, independently of his character as a divine and a bishop, was in many respects a man of distinguished abilities. And though he wrote upon the Penitential Psalms in English verse, we cannot presume to rank him as a poet.'

'Three

'Three verſifiers in this period, WILLIAM WALTER, HENRY MEDWALL, and LAWRENCE WADE, ſcarcely deſerve any notice.—The dramatic entertainments called "*Moralities*," appear to have been carried to their height about the cloſe of the preſent reign. A great contriver of them was JOHN RASTALL, a learned printer, and brother in-law to Sir Thomas More. This ſort of ſpectacle had hitherto been confined, either to moral allegory or to religion blended with buffoonery; but Raſtall formed the deſign of rendering it the vehicle of ſcience and philoſophy.'

'To Scotland we ſtand indebted for names, in Henry the Seventh's reign, which are unrivalled in England. That country produced writers who adorned the age with a degree of ſentiment and ſpirit, a command of phraſeology, and a fertility of imagination, not, perhaps, to be found even in Chaucer or Lydgate. Theſe writers exhibited ſtriking ſpecimens of allegorical invention, a mode of compoſition which for ſome time had been almoſt totally extinguiſhed in England. WILLIAM DUNBAR and GAWIN DOUGLAS are the two principal perſons to whom this high praiſe is due.'

'Dunbar, the chief of the ancient Scottiſh poets, wrote a conſiderable number of poems, the two longeſt of which, and the moſt celebrated are "The Thiſtle and the Roſe," and "The Golden Terge." The former was occaſioned by an event which ultimately produced the union of the two crowns and kingdoms; namely the marriage of James IV of Scotland, with Margaret Tudor, the eldeſt daughter of Henry VII of England. In the latter he endeavours to ſhew the gradual and imperceptible influence of love, when too far indulged over reaſon.—Dunbar unites in himſelf, and generally ſurpaſſes, the qualities of the chief Engliſh poets; the morals and ſatire of Langland; Chaucer's humour, poetry and knowledge of life; the allegory of Gower; the deſcription of Lydgate.'

'Douglas attained to great excellence in claſſical learning. This, in conjunction with the natural vigour of his mind, enabled him to ſuſtain a new character, that of a poetical tranſlator, not from the old French metrical romances, but from the models of the Auguſtan age. In his early youth, he tranſlated Ovid's Art of Love; but he afterwards raiſed his thoughts to a much nobler and more difficult undertaking, which was a complete tranſlation in heroic verſe, of the Æneid

of

of Virgil. The design, which had long been entertained by him, was accomplished in the space of sixteen months, and it is executed with equal spirit and fidelity. Dr Johnson represents Mr Pope's version of Homer, as a very important object in the history of the literature of this country, though it was performed at the time, when learning and taste were in a high state of cultivation in England. What, then, are we to think of such a work as that of Gawin Douglas's in a period comparatively rude and unpolished? No metrical translation of a Classic had yet appeared in English, unless we are disposed to give that appellation to Boethius. Virgil was hitherto generally known only by Caxton's romance on the subject of the Æneid; concerning which Douglas asserted, *that it no more resembled Virgil than the devil was like St Austin.*'

'Henry, Earl of Sinclair, was the particular friend and patron of Gawin Douglas; for it was at the Earl's request that Douglas undertook the translation of the Æneid; though he is eminent not only as a translator, but as an original writer. His allegorical poems, "King Hart," and "Palice of Honour" excel in the same species of composition;—the several books of his translation of Virgil are introduced with metrical prologues, which display a most extraordinary degree of poetical beauty. Milton's L'Allegro, and Il Penseroso have been reckoned the earliest descriptive poems in English. If that was the case, Scotland produced the finest examples of this delightful species of composition, nearly a century and a half before.'

'An illustrious lady must be mentioned as an author as well as a patroness of letters; MARGARET, Countess of Richmond and Derby, the mother of Henry VII. In point of time, she succeeds Julia Bergers, being the third female writer in England. Her works were chiefly translations of the devotional kind; though she, likewise, at the desire of her son the king, drew up orders with regard to the precedence of great and noble ladies, at public processions, and especially at funerals.'

'At the time when the nobility in general were involved in gross ignorance, Algernon Percy, the fifth Earl of Northumberland distinguished himself by being the protector of genius. SKELTON was encouraged by him to write an elegy on the death of his father; but what particularly marked the Earl's literary taste and his love for poetry, was a very splendid manuscript transcribed for his use, containing a large collection

lection of Engliſh poems, finely engroſſed on vellum and ſuperbly illuminated.'

'The prime glory of the reign of Henry VIII, with reſpect to Polite Literature, was SIR THOMAS MORE. Though, according to Mr Hume, there was no man in this age who had the leaſt pretenſion to be ranked among our claſſics, he acknowledges that Sir Thomas ſeems to come neareſt to that character: with all his religious weakneſſes, he was, indeed, one of the greateſt ornaments of his time. "Sir Thomas More," ſays Mr Warton, "is reverenced by poſterity as the ſcholar who taught that erudition which civilized his country, and as the philoſopher who met the horrors of the block with that fortitude which is equally free from oſtentation and enthuſiaſm: as the man whoſe genius overthrew the fabric of falſe learning, and whoſe amiable tranquillity of temper triumphed over the malice and injuſtice of tyranny." His Utopia may be regarded as an ethical as well as a political compoſition. His hiſtory of the reigns of Edward V. and Richard III, is far from being eſteemed among the beſt of his productions.—The hiſtorical works of JOHN RASTALL, GEORGE LILLY, and EDWARD HALL, have little claim to notice; though Hall is of ſome uſe to the antiquary; by the attention which he pays to the variations of dreſs and of faſhion.'

'This period was not unfruitful with regard to poetical writers. JOHN SKELTON* exceeded the licentiouſneſs of the times, and was cenſured by his cotemporaries. His characteriſtic vein of humour is capricious and extravagant; his ſubjects are often ridiculous; and his matter is ſometimes debaſed by his verſification. In a ſhort ode, which was compoſed by him, he has exhibited a ſpecimen of the ſtructure and phraſeology of a love-ſonnet, about the beginning of the ſixteenth century. Notwithſtanding his ſcurrility, he was a claſſical ſcholar.'

'Moralities ſtill continued to hold their rank among the principal entertainments of the times, and they were repre-

h

ſented

---

* The editor of the Muſes Library (E. Cooper) calls Skelton the reſtorer of invention in *Engliſh* poetry. Among his numerous performances, "The Crown of Laurel," is one of the beſt, and he diſplays in it conſiderable wit and humour; he died at Weſtminſter Abbey, 1529.

ſented by different bodies of men. When more regular plays came to be compoſed, ſome of them were acted at the Inns of Court. At theſe ſeminaries, maſques and interludes were occaſionally performed, during ſeveral ſucceeding reigns. The firſt inſtance of this kind, that is particularly recorded, occurs in 1527, when a comedy written by JOHN ROOS, a ſerjeant at law, was repreſented in the great hall of the ſociety at Gray's Inn.'

'HENRY HOWARD*, Earl of Surrey, was a poet of a character far ſuperior to that of Skelton. This accompliſhed nobleman led the way to great improvements in Engliſh poetry. Some of his ſtanzas approach to the eaſe and gallantry of Waller, and exhibit ſpecimens of correct verſification, poliſhed language, and muſical modulation. It is remarkable, that his tranſlation of the ſecond and fourth books of Virgil's Æneid is the firſt compoſition in blank verſe that occurs in the Engliſh language.'

'SIR THOMAS WYAT's genius was of the moral and didactic kind; and his poems are more diſtinguiſhed by good ſenſe, ſatire and obſervations on life, than by pathos or imagination. He may juſtly be eſteemed the firſt poliſhed Engliſh ſatiriſt.—There was an inviolable friendſhip between Wyat and Surrey, ariſing perhaps chiefly from a ſimilarity of ſtudies. Beſides adopting the ſame principal ſubject for their poetry, the paſſion of love, they were alike anxious to improve their native language, and to attain the elegancies of compoſition.'

'Other poets of this period, and of high rank, were SIR FRANCIS BRYANT, the friend of Wyat, GEORGE BOLEYN, VISCOUNT ROCHFORD, brother to Queen Ann Boleyn; and NICHOLAS LORD VAUX, an eminent ſtateſman and ſoldier.—In Tottel's collection of the poetical writings of this period, is found the firſt example, that is known in our language, of the pure and unmixed paſtoral. It is an example, likewiſe, of

* He was the firſt of the Engliſh Noblemen, who diſtinguiſhed himſelf by a fellowſhip with the muſes. In purity of language and ſweetneſs of ſound, he far ſurpaſſed his cotemporaries and predeceſſors. (E. Cooper). His imprudence, in adding ſome part of the Royal arms to his own, being deſcended from the heroic King Edward I, coſt him his head; though juſtified by the Heralds. He was executed January 19, 1547.

of extraordinary merit. In eaſe of numbers, elgance of rural alluſion, and ſimplicity of imagery, there is nothing of the kind equal to it in Spencer. The ſame collection affords one of the earlieſt inſtances of the pointed Engliſh epigram; and it is ſuppoſed that it came from the pen of Sir Thomas More. Several poems, which were chiefly the performances of his youth, were written by Sir Thomas in his native tongue.'

'NICHOLAS GRIMOALD was the next Engliſh poet, after the Earl of Surrey, who wrote in blank verſe; he gave to this new mode of verſification, additional ſtrength, elegance, and modulation. Grimoald wrote, likewiſe in rhyme; in which reſpect he is inferior to none of his cotemporaries, for a maſterly choice of chaſte expreſſion, and the conciſe elegancies of didactic verſification. Some of his couplets have the ſmartneſs which marks the modern ſtyle of ſententious poetry.'

'ANDREW BORDE, JOHN BALE, BRIAN ANSLEY, ANDREW CHERTSEY, WILFRID HOLME, CHARLES BARNSLEY, and EDWARD HALIWELL, were poets of a ſubordinate claſs in this period, of whom it is ſufficient to mention their names.'

JOHN HEYWOOD, commonly called the Epigrammatiſt, is repreſented by ſome as the firſt writer of comedies in England. Though moralities and interludes were written and performed long before the time of Heywood, it muſt be allowed, that he is among the firſt of our dramatiſts who drove the Bible from the ſtage, and introduced repreſentations of familiar life and popular manners.'

'The poetry of Scotland during the reign of Henry VIII. was much declining. The writings of SIR DAVID LINDSAY were very numerous and extremely popular, on account of their being applied to the purpoſes of the Reformation. Another Scots poet of this period was SIR JAMES INGLIS. His principal performance, the "Complaint of Scotland" is well written for the time, and diſplays abundance of learning. In one of his compoſitions he mentions a number of poets of his country as then living, that is, about the year 1530. Theſe are, CULROSE, KYD, STEWART, STEWART OF LORN, GALBREITH, KINLOCH, and BALLENTYNE. Concerning four of theſe perſons, nothing is known. Lord Hailes has publiſhed ſome pieces of the Stewarts; and Ballentyne, muſt mean JOHN BALLENDEN, the tranſlator of Hector Boethius's Hiſtory of Scotland, in which work he has interſperſed ſeveral poems, and particularly one entitled "Virtue and Vyce," which has

been reprinted. The author of the article concerning Ballenden, in the Biographia Britannica, repreſents his writings as diſtinguiſhed by that noble enthuſiaſm which is the very ſoul of poeſy.'

'About this time was produced, by an unknown writer, a comedy called *Philotus*, which is extremely valuable for its curious pictures of life, manners, dreſs, and other circumſtances relative to the age in which it was compoſed.'

'Among the number of noble authors in the time of Henry VIII, the names of LORD MORLEY, and JOHN BOURCHIER, Lord Berners, ſtill deſerve honourable mention. The former appears to have been a multifarious writer, in proſe and verſe; he chiefly diſtinguiſhed himſelf as a tranſlator, and certainly was one of the moſt learned noblemen of that age. The latter alſo tranſlated Froiſſart's Chronicle, by the command of the king, beſides which he was the tranſlator of ſome French, Italian, and Spaniſh novels.—The only circumſtance that entitles JOHN LORD LUMLEY to the appellation of an author, is his having tranſlated into Engliſh, Eraſmus's Inſtitution of a Chriſtian Prince.'

'This æra was likewiſe adorned with ſome female authors of high rank. The principal of theſe were, CATHERINE PARR, the laſt wife of Henry VIII, and MARGARET ROPER, the favourite daughter of Sir Thomas More. The works of the former, which were partly originals and partly tranſlations, are entirely of a religious nature: the compoſitions of the latter were not confined to the Engliſh language; for ſhe wrote the Latin with no ſmall degree of elegance.'

'Some idea of the literary character and taſte of an age may be formed from the nature of its publications. The works iſſued by the preſs, were numerous; and among theſe, controverſial treatiſes and devotional writings held a principal place. It is ſurpriſing what a number of law books appeared in this period.—Magna Charta was ſo often reprinted that it may hence be judged, that our anceſtors were extremely attentive to, and had a high value for that grand ſecurity of Engliſh liberty.'

'Sir JOHN CHEKE can never be mentioned with too much reſpect, as one of thoſe who firſt introduced genuine literature into this country. In a plan of innovation, which he had formed with regard to the orthography of the Engliſh language, he was neither ſo happy, nor ſo ſucceſsful, as he had been

in

in reſtoring the pronunciation of the Greek and Latin tongues.'

'Sir THOMAS SMITH alſo directed his attention to his native language, which he was ſolicitous to refine and to poliſh. He publiſhed a treatiſe, the object of which was to promote the correct writing of the Engliſh tongue, and the true ſoundings of the letters and words. If he carried the matter to ſome degree of exceſs, and propoſed alterations that would not be productive of much advantage, he has only erred in common with other ingenious and learned men.'

'ROGER ASCHAM was an excellent compoſer in his own tongue. Sir Thomas More excepted, he was perhaps the firſt of our ſcholars, who ventured to break the ſhackles of Latinity, by publiſhing his Toxophilus in Engliſh. This he did with a view of giving a pure and correct model of Engliſh compoſition, or rather of ſhewing how a ſubject might be treated with grace and propriety, in Engliſh as well as in Latin. His Vindication of his conduct, in attempting ſo great an innovation, diſplays the ſoundneſs and ſtrength of his underſtanding. Dr. Johnſon obſerves of Roger Aſcham, that his philological learning would have gained him honour in any country; and that among us it may juſtly call for that reverence which all nations owe to thoſe who firſt rouſe them from ignorance, and kindle among them the light of literature.'

'The poetical annals of EDWARD VI. are marked with metrical tranſlations of various parts of Scripture. Of theſe the chief is the verſification of the Pſalms by STERNHOLD and HOPKINS, a performance which is entitled to no regard from its own merit. Wyat and Surrey had before tranſlated ſome of the Pſalms into metre; but THOMAS STERNHOLD was the firſt whoſe metrical verſion of them was uſed in the church of England. His co-adjutor, JOHN HOPKINS, was rather a better poet than himſelf. His other aſſiſtants were, THOMAS NORTON, and WILLIAM WYTTINGHAM, afterwards Dean of Durham. The ſpirit of verſifying the Pſalms, and other parts of the Bible, was generally diffuſed at the beginning of the reformation; and among the reſt that employed themſelves in this way, were WILLIAM HUNIS, WILLIAM BALDWIN, FRANCIS SEAGER, and MATTHEW PARKER, afterwards archbiſhop of Canterbury. Another contributor to the metrical theology was ROBERT CROWLEY, an Oxford Divine; and another ſtill more extraordinary one was CHRISTOPHER TYE, a Doctor of Muſic at Cambridge. Tye projected a tranſlation

of

of the Acts of the Apostles into familiar metre, of which he completed only the first fourteen chapters. The Book of Kings had before been versified by another hand. Dr. Tye carried his absurdity so far as to set his version to music; and his Acts of the Apostles were sung for a time in the royal chapel of Edward VI. Even this good king himself is to be ranked among the religious poets of his reign.'

'Among the anonymous poems of this period, we may reckon the first drinking ballad of any merit, in the English language, which appeared in the year 1551. It has a vein of ease and humour, superior to what might have been expected in those times; and it may be considered as the parent of many pleasing compositions, which have highly contributed to convivial entertainment. This ballad opens the second act of "Gammer Gurton's Needle," a comedy written and printed in the year just mentioned, and which was soon afterwards acted at Christ's-College in Cambridge. It is the first English play which was neither mystery nor morality, and which handles a comic story with some disposition of plot, and some discrimination of character. Earlier in the reign of Edward VI, we find a poet of the name of KELTON, who wrote the "Chronicle of the Brutes," in English verse.'

'King EDWARD VI. stands in the list of royal authors, and he is justly entitled to that distinction. Considering the times in which he lived, and the early period of his death, his Journal of his own reign, his Remains, and his other compositions display such a promise, and indeed such a possession of abilities, as add greatly to the regret arising from his premature decease.—The Duke of SOMERSET has obtained a place among the noble writers of the age. His principal title to this honour is founded on one or two religious pieces, which were penned during his troubles.—EDMUND LORD SHEFFIELD is said to have composed a book of Sonnets in the Italian manner.—HENRY LORD STAFFORD, and FRANCIS HASTINGS, second Earl of Huntingdon, exerted their talents only as translators.'

'The female authors belonging to this short period, are considerable in number, and eminent for their station. The principal of them are, QUEEN MARY, Lady JANE GREY, MARY ROPER, and Lady ELIZABETH FANE. Several other ladies of high rank distinguished themselves as translators from, and into, the Greek and Latin languages; among these we find Lady

Lady JOANNA LUMLEY, and Lady MARY HOWARD, Dutcheſs of Norfolk.'

'Under Queen Mary, notwithſtanding the wretched ſituation of the public, ariſing from the horrid perſecutions which bigotry was carrying into execution, poetry aſſumed a higher tone. A poem was planned, though not fully completed, which ſheds no common luſtre on the dark interval between Surrey and Spenser. This poem was entitled "A Mirrour for Magiſtrates," and in the compoſition of it more writers than one were concerned. Its primary inventor, however, and moſt diſtinguiſhed contributor, was THOMAS SACKVILLE, afterwards Lord Buckhurſt and Earl of Dorſet, and who in the next reign will come before us as the author of the firſt genuine Engliſh tragedy. The object of the "Mirrour for Magiſtrates," was to make all the illuſtrious but unfortunate characters in our hiſtory to paſs in review before the poet, who deſcends, like Dante, into the infernal regions, and is conducted by Sorrow. A poetical preface called an "Induction," and one Legend, which is the life of Henry Stafford, Duke of Buckingham, were the only parts executed by Sackville. The completion of the whole was recommended by him to Baldwyn, before mentioned, and GEORGE FERRERS, who carried it into execution, with the aſſiſtance of CHURCHYARD, PHAYER, SKELTON, SEAGERS, and CAVYL. Among theſe finiſhers of the "Mirrour for Magiſtrates," Ferrers was the moſt eminent in point of abilities; but he compoſed no more than three of the Legends, far the greater number of them having been written by Baldwyn. As to the poetical merit of the work, it reſts almoſt entirely with Lord BUCKHURST, whoſe Induction and Story of the Duke of Buckingham contain many proofs of a vigorous fancy, and many ſplendid paſſages.'

'Another poet of this period was RICHARD EDWARDS, whoſe principal work was the "Paradiſe of daintie Deviſes." What chiefly entitles him to notice is, that he was one of the earlieſt of our dramatic writers, after the reformation of the Britiſh ſtage.—In THOMAS TUSSER we meet with, perhaps, the firſt exhibition of didactic poetry in this country. He was the author of a work in rhyme, the title of which was, "Five Hundred points of good Huſbandrie," and which has more in it of the ſimplicity of Heſiod, than of the elegance of Virgil. Indeed, it is ſo deſtitute of poetical ornaments, that its ſole value ariſes from its being a genuine picture of agriculture, the

the rural arts, and the domeſtic œconomy and cuſtoms of our anceſtors.—WILLIAM FORREST brings up the rear of our poets, but with no degree of ſplendour. He compoſed, in octave rhyme, a panegyrical hiſtory of the life of Catherine, the firſt Queen of Henry VIII. His other poems do not deſerve a diſtinct ſpecification.'

'The only Scotch poet we ſhall now take notice of, is ALEXANDER SCOT, the Anacreon of his time and country. If the age in which he lived be conſidered, his pieces are correct and elegant. He wrote chiefly upon ſubjects of love, and ſtands at the head of the ancient minor poets of Scotland.'

Diviſion Fourth; from 1558, *to* 1625; *or*

During the reigns of Q. ELIZABETH and King JAMES I.

'In a ſcene of great and unavoidable theological diſputation, the ſcholars of England were obliged to direct their principal attention to objects that were eſteemed of infinite importance; and conſequently they had not much leiſure for reſearches into the niceties of languages and learning. We have no names in Elizabeth's reign, that can be compared with Sir John Cheke, Thomas Smith, and Roger Aſcham, whom, in the preceding Diviſion of this Hiſtory, we have mentioned as eminent improvers of claſſical taſte. Smith and Aſcham may in part be conſidered as belonging to the reign of Elizabeth; for Smith's "Treatiſe on the proper mode of writing the Engliſh language," was not publiſhed till the year 1568; and "Aſcham's Schoolmaſter" was firſt printed in 1573.'

'One circumſtance, which contributed to the increaſe of knowledge in general, and to the improvement of the Engliſh language in particular, was the multiplicity of tranſlations. This multiplicity conſtitutes a ſtriking feature in the literary character of the age. On the benefits, which may be derived from tranſlations, it is needleſs to enlarge. Beſides the great ſtore of materials, ſcientific, literary, and entertaining, which they import into a country, they promote a more accurate acquaintance with the language from which they are made, and enrich the tongue into which they are rendered. A much ſuperior advantage might have reſulted from them, at the time we are treating of, if our writers had been better judges

of

of the ſubject, and if they had not, in particular, moſt of them, entertained an opinion, that it was neceſſary for verſions to be ſtrictly literal.'

'The Greek authors, which now appeared in Engliſh tranſlations, were briefly the following. Ten books of Homer's Iliad, from a metrical French verſion of that work; by ARTHUR HALL: a complete and regular verſion of Homer, from the original; by GEORGE CHAPMAN: Muſæus (according to a poetical paſſage of Drayton); by the ſame author: the Jocaſta, or the Phæniſſæ of Euripides; by GEORGE GASCOIGNE, and FRANCIS KINWELMERSH: Ariſtotle's famous treatiſe on the ten categories; by BARNABY GOOGE; ſeven orations of Demoſthenes; by THOMAS WILSON: Herodian's Hiſtory, from a Latin verſion of Angelus Politianus; by NICHOLAS SMITH: Xenophon's Inſtitution of Cyrus, from the original; by WILLIAM BERCHER, or as he is called in another edition of the book, Wylliam Barkar: the Table of Cebes, from a Latin verſion; by Sir ANTHONY POYNGZ. It is the firſt tranſlation of Cebes that appeared in the Engliſh language.—ABRAHAM FLEMING, who was a frequent tranſlator, among other works, produced in Engliſh, Aelian's various Hiſtory. Something, likewiſe, of Iſocrates came from the ſame hand; and alſo Syneſius's Panegyric on Baldneſs, which had been brought into faſhion by Eraſmus's Encomium on Folly. Fleming was of conſiderable ſervice to the literature of his country, by rendering into Engliſh many celebrated books, which had been written in Latin about the fifteenth century, and at the reſtoration of learning.—The only remaining tranſlation from the Greek, of which we are able to give an account, is that of the ten books of Heliodorus's Ethiopic Hiſtory; by THOMAS UNDERDOWNE. By the publication of this work, a new field of romance was opened, which is ſuppoſed to have ſuggeſted to Sir PHILIP SIDNEY the ſcheme of his Arcadia.'

'The tranſlations from the Latin poets were more numerous than from the Greek. Seneca's ten tragedies were tranſlated by different poets, at different times, and they were printed together in 1581. The Hyppolitus, the Medea, the Hercules Oeteus, and the Agamemnon were tranſlated by JOHN STUDLEY; the Octavia, by THOMAS NUCE, or NEWCE; the Oedipus, by ALEXANDER NEVYLE, who, in the ſixteenth year of his age, produced the moſt ſpirited and elegant ver-

ſion in the collection; the Hercules Furens, the Thyeſtes and the Troas of Seneca, by JASPER HEYWOOD, ſon of John Heywood the Epigrammatiſt; and laſtly, the Thebais, by THOMAS NEWTON the publiſher of the whole.'

'Early in Queen Elizabeth's reign, the firſt four books of Ovid's Metamorphoſis were tranſlated by ARTHUR GOLDING; and in a ſhort time afterwards, he completed the whole. His ſtyle is poetical and ſpirited; he excelled many of his cotemporaries as a tranſlator and a poet; his verſions of many modern Latin writers were then of conſiderable utility, as being adapted to the condition and opinions of the times. The Faſti of Ovid were rendered into Engliſh verſe by an author whoſe name does not appear; and THOMAS UNDERDOWNE not only gave a tranſlation of the Ibis, but illuſtrated it with annotations.—CHRISTOPHER MARLOE was ſo void of principle and decency, as to tranſlate the elegies of the ſame poet; the elegant language of which can make no atonement for their obſcenities.—Ovid's Remedy of Love met with an anonymous tranſlator. A verſion of the Heroical Epiſtles was publiſhed by THOMAS TUBERVILLE.—There exiſts, it is ſaid, one of Ovid's Epiſtles tranſlated by the accompliſhed Earl of Eſſex. But if it could be recovered, it is probable that it would only be valued as a curioſity; ſince it is apparent, from a few of his Sonnets, which are preſerved in the Aſhmolean Muſeum, that he was not endued with a poetic genius.—Finally, Ovid's three firſt books of his Triſtia were tranſlated by THOMAS CHURCHYARD.'

'Great attention was alſo paid to the prince of Latin poets, Virgil. Thomas Phayer, as mentioned in the preceding Diviſion, had tranſlated in the reign of Q. Mary, the ſeven firſt books of the Æneid. He afterwards finiſhed the eighth and ninth books, but died ſoon after he had begun the tenth. This imperfect work, after a ſpace of more than twenty years, was completed by THOMAS TWYNE. To the four laſt books of Virgil, Twyne added a tranſlation of Maphæus's ſupplemental book. The reaſon of Phayer's undertaking this verſion, according to his own account, was to inſpire the young nobility, gentry, and ladies of this country with a ſenſe of the riches of their native tongue, and to ſhew, that the Engliſh language was not, as too many thought, incapable of propriety and elegance.—ROBERT STANYHURST, a native of Dublin, alſo tranſlated the four firſt books of the Æneid into Engliſh hexameters.

hexameters. He was more unfortunate in the meaſure of his verſification than his predeceſſors, and he was not equal to them in other reſpects.—The Bucolics and Georgics of Virgil were tranſlated as literal as poſſible, by rendering verſe for verſe, in the regular Alexandrine without rhyme, by ABRAHAM FLEMING; he afterwards publiſhed ſeparately the Alexis of Virgil, tranſlated into Engliſh hexameters, verſe for verſe.—EDMUND SPENSER condeſcended to tranſlate, though in a vague and paraphraſtical manner, the Culex aſcribed to Virgil.'

'THOMAS DRANT publiſhed a tranſlation of the two books of Horace's Satires, which was followed by the Epiſtles, and the Art of Poetry. The tranſlator was at firſt very paraphraſtical, but afterwards endeavoured to be ſo literal as well nigh to render word for word, and line for line. TIMOTHY KENDALL did not obtain much glory by the ſpecimens which he exhibited of his application to claſſical literature. His performance cannot ſtrictly be called a tranſlation of Martial, becauſe it includes epigrams from many other writers, modern as well as ancient. Martial, however, forms the principal baſis of the work.'

'MARLOE gave a verſion in blank verſe of the firſt book of Lucan. His death prevented his carrying on the deſign, which, in the reign of James I, was completed by GEORGE CHAPMAN, but in a very inferior manner.—The Thebais of Statius, was tranſlated by THOMAS NEWTON.'

'Beſides the tranſlation of the ancient Latin claſſic poets, verſions were not uncommon from ſome of the modern poetical writers in the ſame language. Among others, Mantuan, who had acquired the rank of a claſſic, was tranſlated by TUBERVILLE.—Another favourite author, among the Engliſh ſcholars in this period, was Palingenius, whoſe "Zodiac" was rendered into Engliſh verſe by BARNABY GOOGE; and the tranſlation had the good fortune of the original, to be very much admired.'

'The tranſlations from the ancient Latin proſe writers were not ſo numerous as from the poets. GOLDING, whom we have already mentioned with due reſpect, enlarged the knowledge of the treaſures of antiquity, by his verſions of Juſtin's Hiſtory, Cæſar's Commentaries, and Seneca's fine moral treatiſe on Benefits. Works of leſs conſequence, rendered into Engliſh by Golding, were Pomponius Mela's Geo-

graphy, and the "Polyhiſtory" of Solinus.—Cicero's Oration for Archias was tranſlated by DRANT.—ABRAHAM FLEMING publiſhed a tranſlation of certain ſelect epiſtles of Cicero, and afterwards gave a large collection from the ſame author, to which were added letters of Pliny, and of other writers.—Tully's offices were tranſlated by NICHOLAS GRIMALD, a poet of the age; and ſo adapted was the book to general inſtruction, that it was ſeveral times reprinted.—One of the moſt important tranſlations of this period, was that of the four firſt books of Tacitus, and the life of Agricola, by Sir HENRY SAVILLE. This tranſlation was accompanied with notes; which were deemed of ſuch conſequence, that they were afterwards rendered into Latin by Gruther, and publiſhed at Amſterdam.'

'The books that were chiefly rendered into Engliſh from Italian and French authors, were of the fictitious and narrative kind. Among the productions of this nature, thoſe of Boccace were the moſt diſtinguiſhed favourites; and the verſions made from different parts of his works, were very numerous. Indeed the Italian language now began to be ſo faſhionable, that Dictionaries and Grammars of it, written in Engliſh, became common publications. The principal perſons who figured as tranſlators, were GEORGE GASCOIGNE, GEOFFRY FENTON, THOMAS TUBERVILLE, GEORGE WHETSTONE, Sir JAMES HARRINGTON, and EDWARD FAIRFAX.—One of the works tranſlated by Gaſcoigne, is a comedy of Arioſto's called "Suppoſiti," which was acted at Gray's Inn. This tranſlation is in proſe; and it is obſervable, that it was the firſt comedy in proſe which was compoſed in our language, and exhibited upon our ſtage.—The moſt valuable of Fenton's various performances, was his verſion of the twenty books of Guicciardin's Hiſtory of Italy; for in this he preſented to his readers not fiction but truth; and truth, too, of the firſt importance.—Sir James Harrington's tranſlation of Arioſto's Orlando Furioſo, was a great undertaking; and though it is neither executed with ſpirit nor with accuracy, it contributed to enrich our poetry with new ſtores for the imagination, both of the romantic and comic ſpecies. A wonderful union was preſented to the reader of Gothic machinery and familiar manners.—Edward Fairfax concludes the liſt of poetical tranſlators, with no ſmall degree of eminence and celebrity. As he lived till the year 1632, he is commonly reckoned among the poets of James the Firſt's time. The grand work, upon which

which his reputation wholly depends, the tranſlation of Taſſo's "Jeruſalem delivered," was performed by him in very early life, and was publiſhed in Queen Elizabeth's reign, to whom it was dedicated. It undoubtedly ſtands at the head of the poetical verſions of that æra. This tranſlation is particularly diſtinguiſhed by the harmony of its verſification, in which reſpect he ranks nearly, if not entirely, upon a level with Spenſer. Waller acknowledged that he had learned his numbers from Fairfax.'

'In general it may be obſerved, that the beſt ſtories of the early and original novelties of Italy, in one form or other, were given in an Engliſh dreſs. The verſions from French authors were leſs frequent, and for the moſt part of leſs importance. With regard to tranſlations from the ancients, Mr Warton has remarked, that almoſt all the Greek and Roman claſſics appeared before the year 1600 The remark we conſider as too general. Were we to enter into an enumeration of them, it would be ſeen, that many of the fineſt claſſic writers, both in proſe and verſe, were left untranſlated.'

'Imperfect as the multifarious tranſlations of this period were, they contributed, amongſt other cauſes, to excite a ſpirit of criticiſm, and an attention to the laws of compoſition. This ſpirit, however, had been previouſly diſplayed by one of the authors of the age, of whom little notice had been taken, till Mr Warton drew him out of obſcurity. It is THOMAS WILSON *, who in Q. Mary's reign, (though he flouriſhed chiefly in

* This great improver of the Engliſh language was a native of Lincolnſhire, and, in 1541, was admitted a ſcholar of King's College, in Cambridge. He became fellow of the College, and whilſt he reſided at the Univerſity, was tutor to the two celebrated youths, Henry Duke of Suffolk, and Lord Charles Brandon, his brother. In due courſe, he took the degree of Doctor of Laws, and was afterwards one of the ordinary maſters of requeſts, and maſter of St Catherine's Hoſpital near the Tower. Being a man of buſineſs as well as learning, he was at times employed by Queen Elizabeth as ambaſſador to Mary Queen of Scots, and into the low countries. At length he roſe to be a ſecretary of ſtate, and a privy counſellor. In 1579 he was appointed Dean of Durham, and died in 1581. It is ſaid, that Dr Wilſon was endued with an uncommon ſtrength of memory, and that this enabled him to act

in Elizabeth's) publiſhed an Art of Rhetoric in Engliſh.—A technical and elementary manual, in our own tongue, written by LEONARD COX, had indeed appeared many years before; but Wilſon's treatiſe is more liberal and diſcurſive. It has the merit of having illuſtrated the arts of eloquence by example, and of having examined and aſcertained the beauties of compoſition with the ſpeculative ſkill and ſagacity of a critic: ſo that this work may juſtly be conſidered as the firſt ſyſtem of criticiſm that appeared in our language. The four parts belonging to elocution he ſtates to be plainneſs, aptneſs, compoſition, and exornation, and has ſome excellent obſervations on ſimplicity of ſtyle. Among other leſſons, this, he ſays, ſhould be firſt learned, never to affect any ſtrange inkhorn terms, but to ſpeak as is commonly received; and he ſtrongly condemns thoſe writers who ſeek ſo far for outlandiſh Engliſh, that they altogether forget their mother tongue. It appears from the work, that to write elegantly in Engliſh now began to be faſhionable, and to meet with the higheſt applauſe.'

'Another compoſition of a ſimilar nature with Wilſon's Art of Rhetoric, though more confined in its object, was PUTTENHAM's "Art of Engliſh Poeſy." Puttenham had right notions of the true character of a poet, which is, to be poſſeſſed of a creative genius. Accordingly, he commonly uſes the word "Maker" for poet; and he was the firſt author that brought this expreſſion into faſhion, the ſignificancy of which has been much commended by Sir Philip Sidney and Ben Johnſon. Imperfect as Puttenham's work is upon the whole, it was the only piece of poetical criticiſm of any conſequence, that England produced for a long period. Indeed, nothing of importance appeared on the ſubject, till Dryden began to write his prefaces.'

'During Elizabeth's reign, the Engliſh language was carried by ſome writers to a high degree of perfection. There have not been wanting perſons who have thought, that our native tongue then roſe to the greateſt excellence which it has ever attained;

---

with remarkable diſpatch in his negociations. He was the author of various other works beſides the two which we had occaſion to mention, and was one of the moſt accompliſhed ſcholars of his time. NEW ANN. REG.

attained; and Dr Johnson, we believe, has expreſſed the ſame opinion. In this opinion, however, we do not agree, though we are ſenſible of the extraordinary merit of a few individuals. Amongſt theſe, particular praiſes are due to RICHARD HOOKER, a celebrated divine. He exhibited a fine model of the reaſoning ſtile in his famous "Eccleſiaſtical Polity;" a work that reflects high credit on his powers of reaſoning, and the extent of his literature. In this admirable production he ſet a noble example to his ſucceſſors; an example which was ſucceſsfully followed by a Chillingworth, a Locke, and a Hoadly.—Sir WALTER RALEIGH afforded ſeveral proofs, in this reign, of that dignity of compoſition which he afterwards diſplayed in his Hiſtory of the World.—WILLIAM PERKINS, an eminent Divine at Cambridge, is ſaid to have written the beſt language of any of that age or the next, and that many paſſages in his writings are equal to thoſe of the beſt authors in modern times.'

'Some of the ſtateſmen of Elizabeth's reign excelled in the propriety, freedom, and ſtrength of their ſtyle. This was the caſe with ROBERT DEVEREUX Earl of Eſſex; ROBERT DUDLEY, Earl of Leiceſter; and THOMAS RATCLIFFE, Earl of Suſſex. Of all the illuſtrious characters of this period, none, with reſpect to Engliſh compoſition, was equal to the Earl of Eſſex, the Queen's unfortunate favourite. In a variety of inſtances he gave ample proofs of his being both a vigorous and an elegant writer. Indeed, public men may be more likely to excel in this reſpect than mere ſcholars. The latter, being confined to their cloſets, contract a formality and ſtiffneſs of ſtyle; and this was particularly the caſe, when the learned by profeſſion did not ſo generally mix with the world, as is cuſtomary at preſent. But thoſe who are engaged in the grand ſcenes of buſineſs, who have their talents called into exerciſe by frequent and ſtriking emergencies, and who follow the dictates of their immediate feelings, provided they have had a tolerable education, acquire an eaſe and variety of expreſſion, which the others cannot readily attain.'

'Engliſh Poetry aſſumed a peculiar importance and character in the reign of Elizabeth. This was owing to a variety of cauſes and circumſtances.—The age we are treating of has often been called the golden age of our poetry; and, if this may not be true in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, it was certainly a very poetical æra, and few periods can be mentioned in our hiſtory, which ſhine in that view with ſuperior luſtre. The principal features,

features, that ſtrike us in the poetry of the times, are the predominancy of fables, fiction, and fancy, and a fondneſs for intereſting adventures and pathetic events. This characteriſtic diſtinction may be chiefly referred to the following principles, which were ſometimes blended, and ſometimes had a ſingle operation. The principles we ſpeak of were the revival and vernacular verſions of the claſſics; the viſionary reveries or refinements of falſe philoſophy; a degree of ſuperſtition, ſufficient for the purpoſes of poetry; the adoption of the machineries of romance; and the frequency and improvement of allegoric exhibitions in the popular ſpectacles.'

'Many circumſtances contributed to give a deſcriptive, a picturesque, and figurative caſt to the poetical language of our country; and even the proſe compoſitions of Elizabeth's reign took a tincture from the ſame cauſes. In the mean while, general knowledge was widely and rapidly increaſing. Books began to be multiplied, and many uſeful and rational topics had been diſcuſſed in our own tongue. Science, at the ſame time, had not made ſuch great advances as to damp the ſpirit of invention (fiction). On the whole, we were now arrived at a period that was eminently propitious to original and true poetry. It was a period in which genius was rather directed than governed by judgment; and in which taſte and learning had ſo far only diſciplined imagination, as to ſuffer its exceſſes to paſs without cenſure or controul, for the ſake of the beauties to which they were allied.'

'At the time when the objects pointed out by us were calculated to have a powerful operation upon the nature and character of our poetry, a genius of the firſt order aroſe, who was animated with a full portion of the ſpirit of the age, and capable of painting it in all its energy. This genius was SPENSER, and the production we allude to, his "*Faery Queene.*"—It was not to Homer, or Virgil, or even to Taſſo, that Spenſer looked up for a model; but to Arioſto: and it was conſequently his intention to produce a poem which ſhould conſiſt of allegories, enchantments, and romantic expeditions, conducted by knights, giants, magicians, and fictitious beings. If he was blameable in this reſpect, the fault is not ſo much to be imputed to himſelf, as to the times in which he lived. It was natural for him to follow the mode of compoſition which then was moſt admired, and to adopt thoſe laws of taſte, which Italian critics had approved: for Italy, not France, was

was in Elizabeth's reign the arbiter of elegance; and in Italy Arioſto was greatly preferred to Taſſo. Whether this opinion was juſt or not, we are not here called upon to determine. It is ſufficient for our purpoſe to obſerve, that it was embraced by Spenſer; and that upon this principle, the plan of his grand poem, the Fairy Queen, was framed.—In powers of invention and richneſs of fancy, he has ſcarcely ever been exceeded. To the diſplay of theſe talents, the ſubjects he was led to, by the faſhionable reading of the times, were peculiarly accommodated. There could not be more admirable inſtruments in the hands of a genuine poet, than the adventures and manners of chivalry, and the ſuperſtitions and enchantments of the dark ages. They gave ſcope for all the wildneſs and beauty of imagery, and for all the ſplendour and majeſty of deſcription; circumſtances, of which Spenſer has availed himſelf in the higheſt degree. As, therefore, his Fairy Queen comes recommended to us by ſo many excellencies, it may be thought ſurpriſing, that at preſent it ſhould, comparatively, have only a ſmall number of readers. But this may be accounted for from ſeveral cauſes. The cuſtoms and manners deſcribed by Spenſer are vaniſhed away, and conſequently are little underſtood by the bulk of mankind. His alluſions, likewiſe, are often too abſtruſe and learned for common apprehenſion; and ſome degree of obſoleteneſs hangs upon his language. Nor is allegorical poetry adapted to the general underſtanding. Hence it is that Spenſer, with all his merit, can only be the laſting favourite of the few, who, by reading and true taſte, are fully qualified to appreciate, and to feel, his tranſcendent beauties. By ſuch perſons, he will be admired and applauded, ſo long as poetry ſhall continue to be the object of admiration and applauſe.—Various other poems were written by him, beſides the Fairy Queen, among which the "Shepherd's Calendar," has excited the greateſt attention. By the admirers of paſtoral poetry it has always been held in high eſtimation, and it has no ſmall merit of its kind. It has been the ſubject of imitation to ſucceeding writers; and the ſame has been the caſe with regard to his "Aſtrophel," or Elegy on the death of Sir Philip Sidney. It is a paſtoral elegy; and we know that paſtoral elegies have been fabricated in this country, by a long train of verſifiers, till they have become inſignificant, and even diſguſting. It need not be added, that we except the Lycidas of Milton.'

'So ſtrongly was the age of Elizabeth devoted to poetry, that poetical publications were more numerous than thoſe of any other ſpecies of compoſition in our language. One effect of this taſte in the nation was, that there were two collections of "Flowers" ſelected from the works of the moſt faſhionable poets. The firſt was entitled, "England's Parnaſſus;" and the other, "Belvidere, or the Garden of the Muſes." The former had the ſuperiority, both in point of method and ſelection. Thus a cuſtom was begun, which in our own time, has been carried to a blameable exceſs. If ſuch compilations are not wholly deſtitute of utility, they have the diſadvantage of contributing to the number of ſuperficial readers, and of preventing many authors from being entirely read, the whole of whoſe productions might juſtly claim a diligent peruſal.'

'It will not be expected, that we ſhould endeavour to recite the names of all the writers of general poetry, that appeared during the reign of Elizabeth. Several of them, though applauded by their cotemporaries, are now found to have been entitled to no more than a ſmall degree of praiſe.—GEORGE GASCOIGNE, in addition to his merit as a tranſlator and a dramatiſt, may here be mentioned as having been eſteemed one of the beſt love poets of his time. He attained alſo ſome reputation as a ſatiriſt.—GABRIEL HARVEY deſerves to be remembered with reſpect, on account of a copy of verſes written by him, ſigned Hobbinol, and which is prefixed to Spenſer's Fairy Queen. It has even been ſaid that this poem, if he had compoſed nothing elſe, would have rendered him immortal. GEORGE TUBERVILLE's compoſitions, beſides his tranſlations, were of various kinds; ſuch as epitaphs, epigrams, ſongs, and ſonnets; and poems deſcribing the places and manners of the country of Ruſſia, where he reſided for a time, as ſecretary to Sir Thomas Randolph. He was one of thoſe who endeavoured to refine the Engliſh ſtyle.—SIR JOHN HARRINGTON deſerves little notice as a poet, independently of his tranſlation of Arioſto. His Epigrams, however, are not deſtitute of wit.—If, amidſt ſo many claims to admiration and applauſe, SIR WALTER RALEIGH is to be ſpoken of as a poet, his title to that appellation belongs to the reign of Elizabeth; for his poetical pieces were entirely the amuſements of his youth, his attention being ſoon directed to ſuperior purſuits.'

'There is ſome difficulty in aſcertaining the exact proportion of fame due to SIR PHILIP SIDNEY, as a poet. He was a paſſionate

paſſionate admirer of the art of poetry, and his productions in this way were very numerous. It is univerſally allowed, that he was unfortunate in his attempts to introduce the Roman meaſures of verſe into our language, thoſe meaſures not agreeing with the genius of the Engliſh tongue.'

'JOSEPH HALL, who, in proceſs of time became ſucceſſively Biſhop of Exeter and Norwich, is entitled to particular diſtinction as a ſatiric poet. At the beginning of his celebrated "*Virgidemiarum*," he claims the honour of having led the way in this ſpecies of compoſition;

"I firſt adventure, follow me who liſt,
"And be the ſecond Engliſh ſatyriſt."

This aſſertion of our poet is not ſtrictly true; for there were various ſatirical writings previouſly to his appearance. But he was the firſt who diſtinguiſhed himſelf as a legitimate ſatiriſt, upon the claſſic model of Juvenal and Perſius, with an intermixture of ſome ſtrokes in the manner of Horace. Succeeding authors have availed themſelves of the pattern ſet them by Hall.'

'SIR RICHARD MAITLAND was the principal Scotch vernacular poet of this period. His productions were various, and are read with pleaſure by thoſe who are competent maſters of the local and obſolete language in which they are written.—ALEXANDER ARBUTHNOT, ALEXANDER MONTGOMERY, and JOHN ROLLAND, may be paſſed over without farther notice; nor is it merit, but rank, that induces us to mention JAMES VI. of Scotland. He publiſhed in 1585, "The Eſſayes of a Prentiſe in the divine Arte of Poeſie;" and in 1591, "His Majeſties poetical Exerciſes at vacant Houres." King James acted the critic as well as the poet. At the end of the firſt of theſe performances are, "Rewlis and Cautelis of Scottis Poeſie," which, ſays Mr Pinkerton, are curious, though ſtupid.'

'We cloſe the ſubject of the poetry of this period with ſome view of it, as diſplayed in the dramatic form. The firſt regular tragedy which England produced was early in Elizabeth's reign; and this was the *Gorboduc* of THOMAS SACKVILLE, Lord Buckhurſt. It is written in blank verſe, divided into acts and ſcenes, and cloathed in all the formalities of the legitimate drama. The firſt exhibition of it was in the great hall of the Inner Temple, by the ſtudents of that Society, as part of the entertainment of a grand Chriſtmas; and in Ja-

nuary, 1561-2, it was again repreſented before the Queen at Whitehall. It was not intended for the preſs, but having been ſurreptitiouſly and careleſſly printed, a correct edition was given in 1571. Though this tragedy never was a favourite, even among our anceſtors, and has long fallen into general oblivion, the language of it has great purity and perſpicuity, and it is entirely free from that tumid phraſeology which afterwards took place among our dramatic poets. Every ſcene of the Gorboduc is marked with Sackville's characteriſtical manner, which conſiſts in a perſpicuity of ſtyle, and a command of numbers, ſuperior to the tone of his times.'

'CHRISTOPHER MARLOE, whom we have mentioned as a tranſlator, appeared with greater luſtre as a dramatic poet. Six tragedies were written by him, and he began a ſeventh, which was completed by another hand. It is remarkable, and indicates the credulous ignorance of the age, that the ſubject of one of his pieces ſhould be the Tragical Hiſtory of the Life and Death of Dr. John Fauſtus. Marloe's chief fault in deſcription is an indulgence of the florid ſtyle, and an accumulation of conceits, reſulting, however, from a warm and brilliant fancy. It has even been ſaid of him, that he bore ſome reſemblance to the incomparable Shakeſpeare. The tragedy of Dido, left incomplete by Marloe, was finiſhed by by THOMAS NASHE, who was likewiſe the author of a comedy. —GEORGE WHETSTONE was a writer upon various ſubjects in proſe; but his poetical compoſitions were of too quaint and pedantic a nature, to deſerve the attention of poſterity. His comedy, "Promos and Caſſandra," no otherwiſe deſerves to be noticed, than as it is ſaid, that Shakeſpeare founded upon it his "Meaſure for Meaſure." Beſides other works, Whetſtone drew up a life of GEORGE GASCOIGNE, who claims a place among our dramatic poets, not only as the tranſlator of the "Jocaſta" of Euripides, and the "Suppoſes" of Arioſto, but as the author of a tragi-comedy, called the Glaſs of Government," and a Maſque, entitled, "The Princely Pleaſures of Kennelworth Caſtle." This Maſque is compoſed partly in proſe, and partly in rhyme; and is a relation of the entertainment given to Queen Elizabeth at Kennelworth, by Robert Dudley, Earl of Leiceſter, in the month of July, 1575.—JOHN LILLY wrote a number of comedies, which were acted before the Queen, and ſeem to have been much applauded in their day. He has been highly extolled as a reformer and purifier

purifier of the Engliſh language; but the affected turn of his compoſitions, and eſpecially of his "Euphues," a romance, does not give credit to ſuch an encomium.—Another comic writer of this reign was ROBERT GREEN. He was a man of great humour and drollery, and by no means deficient in point of wit; which talents, however, were proſtituted by him to the baſe purpoſes of vice and obſcenity. It is ſaid of him, *that he was the firſt author who wrote for bread.*—GEORGE PEELE exerciſed his abilities for the ſtage in a different form. His "Arraignment of Paris" was a dramatic Paſtoral; his "Edward the Firſt" an hiſtorical play; and his "King David and Fair Bethſabe," a tragedy. He wrote, likewiſe, another tragedy, called "The Turkiſh Mahomet, and Hyren the fair Greek," which has not been printed. The ſtory, no doubt, is the ſame as that, upon which Dr. Johnſon's "Irene" is founded. Other poems were written by Peele, and it has been admitted, that he was a good paſtoral poet.'

'But all the dramatic authors, we have mentioned, and the luſtre they ſhed on the reign of Queen Elizabeth, are of little ſignificance, when compared with the glory, which was reflected upon it by its having produced SHAKESPEARE, that maſter of human nature and human life; that prodigy of invention and imagination; that commander of the ſublime, the pathetic, and the comic; that painter of external paſſions and external manners; that miracle of deſcription, moral wiſdom, and deep penetration; and that treaſure of pure poetry. It was in the latter end of this period, that he wrote ſome of his fineſt pieces, and diſplayed the wonderful ſources and energies of his mind. We pretend not to give a minute character of Shakeſpeare. This it would be impoſſible to do with juſtice, in many pages. Beſides, he chiefly flouriſhed in the next reign of James I, ſurrounded with his great competitors, but far ſurpaſſing them all."

'Among the miſcellaneous writers of the age, SIR PHILIP SIDNEY deſerves the firſt place. His "Arcadia" was long highly celebrated and greatly admired. What Sir Philip has obſerved concerning "Amadis de Gaule," may in ſome degree be applied to his own performance. "Truly," ſays he, "I "have known men, that even with reading Amadis de Gaule, "which God knows, wanteth much of a perfect poeſie, have "found their hearts moved to the exercife of curteſie, libe-"ralitie, and eſpecially courage."—But there is another pro-

duction,

duction, on account of which Sir Philip deſerves to be recorded with honour as a miſcellaneous writer. This is his "Defence of Poeſie," which will probably long continue to be read with pleaſure, by perſons of true taſte and diſcernment. It is an ample and maſterly vindication of the art, and there are many paſſages in it, which diſplay great power of compoſition.'

'HENRY CUFF has here ſome claim to remembrance, in conſequence of his "Treatiſe on the Differences of the Ages of Man's Life." It is a curious and philoſophical performance; but the value of it is diminiſhed by its partaking too much of that uncouthneſs of language, which was generally prevalent. Cuff was the unfortunate ſecretary to the Earl of Eſſex, and had in his maſter a ſuperior model of Engliſh ſtyle; for the former had habituated himſelf to write like a ſcholar, while the latter managed his pen with the freedom of a man of the world.—To the names already given, may be added that of SIR GEOFFREY FENTON, ſecretary of ſtate in the kingdom of Ireland. He chiefly figured in the capacity of a tranſlator, and his principal works were "Golden Epiſtles," gathered from Latin, French, and Italian authors; and a tranſlation of "The Hiſtory of the Wars of Italy, by Francis Guicciardini, in twenty Books."—Sir Geoffrey wrote with eaſe, and his ſtyle reflects credit on his judgment and taſte.'

'The miſcellaneous authors of eminent ſtation were the following: LORD BUCKHURST; EDWARD VERE, ſeventeenth Earl of Oxford; WILLIAM POULETT, Marquis of Wincheſter; ROBERT DUDLEY, Earl of Leiceſter; WILLIAM CECIL, Lord Burleigh; HENRY HOWARD, Earl of Northampton; Lord Chancellor HATTON; and HENRY CARY, firſt Lord Falkland. ——Among the female authors of this period, the illuſtrious QUEEN ELIZABETH maintains the firſt rank; for ſhe was the moſt learned woman of the age. Beſides her tranſlations into Greek and Latin, which are foreign to this hiſtorical view, ſhe tranſlated Plutarch de Curioſitate, Boethius's Conſolation of Philoſophy, Salluſt's Jugurthine War, and part of Horace's Art of Poetry, into her native language.—By her cotemporaries Elizabeth has been highly extolled for her poetry; but this muſt be attributed to the flattery of the age. The beautiful, the unfortunate, and the imprudent MARY QUEEN OF SCOTS makes but a feeble compariſon with her rival Elizabeth; for ſhe was far inferior to her in profound erudition, and rather excelled in thoſe lighter parts of literature, that

that were fashionable at the Court, where she had been educated. Besides the poems written by her in Latin, French, and Scotch, she composed also a "Consolation of her long Imprisonment, and royal Advice to her Son." Many of her Letters occur in public libraries, and are frequently finding their way to the press, in consequence of the minute attention to historical information, which is now so generally prevalent. MARY SIDNEY, Countess of Pembroke, and sister to Sir Philip Sidney, was a very accomplished lady, and received ample testimonies of her merit. The two works, which she published, were only translations; one being "A Discourse of Life and Death;" and the other, "The Tragedie of Antonie."—But among the women of this period, who were devoted to the study of literature, the principal place is due to the four daughters of Sir Anthony Cooke. They were well acquainted with the ancient and modern languages, and translated several works into their own.—MILDRED, the eldest of the four sisters, was, for more than forty-two years, the wife of the illustrious statesman William Cecil, Lord Burleigh. She translated a piece of St Chrysostom's, from the original, into the English language.—ANNE, the second daughter of Sir Anthony Cooke, became the wife of the Lord-keeper, Sir Nicholas Bacon, and was the mother of the illustrious Francis Bacon. She translated from the Italian into English, twenty-five Sermons written by Barnardine Ochine, a celebrated divine of that age, concerning the predestination and election of God. Not long after her marriage, Lady Bacon gratified the curiosity of the public, and contributed much to the instruction of her countrymen, in religious matters, by translating from the Latin into English, an "Apology for the Church of England;" originally written by the learned and eloquent Bishop Jewel.—ELIZABETH, the third daughter of Sir Anthony, was first married to Sir Thomas Hobby, and secondly to John, Lord Russell, son and heir to Francis Russell, Earl of Bedford. She wrote epitaphs for her son, daughter, brother, sister, both husbands, and a venerable old friend, in the Greek, Latin, and English tongues. Besides these, Lady Russel translated, from the French into English, a tract, entitled "A way of Reconciliation of a good and learned Man, touching the true nature and Substance of the Body and Blood of Christ."—KATHERINE, the fourth daughter in this learned family, though likewise famous for her knowledge in the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin

language,

languages, and for her ſkill in poetry, does not appear to have been the author of any diſtinct treatiſe.'

'It muſt, however, be remembered, that the literature of the women of that period extended comparatively but to a few perſons, and thoſe only of conſiderable rank; the generality of the female ſex being in a ſtate of ignorance. There was by no means that diffuſion of knowledge, that cultivation of mind, that taſte for books, with which we now meet, in almoſt every company of ladies. Neither do we find, that the learned women of the ſixteenth century produced ſuch works as have continued to be read much by poſterity. The moſt important production of any of Sir Anthony Cooke's daughters, was Lady Bacon's tranſlation of Biſhop Jewel's Apology; and yet, who but an antiquary will now ſeek for it, or give himſelf the trouble of peruſing it? Not a ſingle poeteſs, deſerving to be mentioned, aroſe in this country till the ſeventeenth century. The DUTCHESS OF NEWCASTLE, Mrs KATHERINE PHILIPS, and Mrs. BEHN, appear to have been the firſt who could, in any degree, merit that appellation. Independently of poetry, the learned women of Elizabeth's reign have been far exceeded by the ingenious ladies of the preſent age, both in the general and extenſive utility of their writings, and in the elegancies of compoſition. There is a remark to be made concerning the difference between the literature of the ladies of the ſixteenth century, and that of the females of more recent times. The former entered deeply into the ſtudy of the ancient languages; whilſt the latter, beſides acquiring a ſkill in the modern tongues, eſpecially the French and the Italian, have paid their principal attention to the cultivation of general knowledge; though a few of them have been no ſmall proficients in the learning of antiquity.'

'Among the numerous Divines of this period, who have a claim to peculiar and extraordinary diſtinction, both as men of letters and as improvers of their native language, we have already mentioned RICHARD HOOKER, to whom we ſhall join the name of THOMAS BILSON, ſucceſſively Biſhop of Worceſter and Wincheſter. This prelate was one of the final correctors of the Engliſh tranſlation of the Bible, in the reign of JAMES I. For this office he appears to have been particularly qualified, as his ſtyle is, in general, more eaſy and harmonious than was common among the eccleſiaſtics of his time.'

'Amidſt the endleſs theological productions of the age, ori-

ginal

ginal works in Ethics were almoſt totally unknown among us, till at length the public received ample gratification from FRANCIS BACON'S Eſſays, concerning which we need not ſay, that they opened a rich treaſury of moral obſervation, and that they were worthy of the great and comprehenſive mind, from which they proceeded. The name of Eſſays was then new to the world, and perhaps had been derived from Montaigne. Thus Bacon introduced into England a ſpecies of writing, which has ſince been largely cultivated, which has produced a vaſt number of beautiful compoſitions, and which conſtitutes an elegant part of modern literature.'

The ſpecimens of compoſition quoted by Dr. Johnſon, in his Hiſtory of the Engliſh language, extend only to the period, in which Dr Wilſon wrote; a man whoſe merits in refining his native tongue we have ſtated in page lxxiii & ſeq. It would, however, have been very uſeful, if Dr. Johnſon had produced further ſpecimens, * taken from the writers of the ſixteenth and ſeventeenth centuries, ſo that the ſubſequent tranſition, from the Saxon-Normannic to the modern Engliſh language, might have been exhibited in an uninterrupted view. During a period of two centuries and a half, a living language muſt undergo great changes. This is particularly obvious in the German, when we compare the language of the modern Germans with that of Luther and his cotemporaries. I propoſe, therefore, to conclude this Eſſay with a few general remarks.

1. The cultivation of a language altogether depends upon the progreſs, which a nation makes in taſte, and in philoſophical acquirements. The latter enrich a language, while the former contribute to give it an agreeable form, and to regulate its inflexion and harmony. Hence the hiſtory of a language cannot be properly exhibited, without giving a cloſely connected view of the reſpective improvements of the people, that make uſe of this language.

2. As in languages we find no arbitrary but conventional

* If it were conſiſtent with the limits allotted to this publication, many other ſpecimens from later writers might have been inſerted. But as the works of the beſt authors, during the ſeventeenth and eighteenth centuries, are pretty generally known, this omiſſion cannot be conſidered as material.

W.

arrangements in every part of them; hence the changes, which a language from time to time undergoes, muſt be deduced and explained from the particular circumſtances, in which a nation is placed. In order to fix our attention here excluſively upon the Engliſh language, we may obſerve, that though the conqueſt of England by the Normans, points out the cauſe of the ſubſequent mixture of the Saxon-Daniſh dialect with the Normannic; yet as many nations have been conquered by invaders, whoſe languages were not introduced into the vanquiſhed countries, this mixture cannot be ſatisfactorily explained, unleſs we have recourſe to a variety of concurrent circumſtances. Among theſe, the relative ſituation, in which the conquerors were placed towards the conquered, deſerves particular attention. As long as the conquerors ruled the natives with deſpotic rigour, their language prevailed, both at court and in common life; they compelled the ſubjugated Britons to make uſe of the Normannic language, as well in their mutual intercourſe as in all public tranſactions. Thus this language ſpread rapidly, even among the lower orders of the people. But as the dominion of the proud Norman Barons did not continue long enough, to ſuppreſs completely the language of the country; and as the lower claſſes, under Henry II, again acquired their former importance, the old popular language likewiſe reſumed its former authority. Beſides this circumſtance, the nation at the ſame time advanced in knowledge, taſte, and improvements of every kind, ſo that the deficiencies and imperfections of the ancient language were ſoon diſcovered. On this account, the more refined Normannic tongue, with which the people were already acquainted, was mingled with the dialect of the natives: and as England henceforth continued to improve in knowledge and taſte, by its intercourſe with France, it happened, that the French language diſplayed its influence more and more upon that of the Engliſh; particularly as its kindred dialect, the Normannic, had already paved the way for this mixture. Hence, too, we can explain the ſingular phenomenon, that of two names given to the ſame object, the one of which is of Saxon-Daniſh, and the other of Normannic or French extraction, the latter ſhould be more dignified than the former, or, at leaſt, uſed more frequently among the higher claſſes of ſociety. The words *ox*, *calf*, *wether*, are derived from the Daniſh-Saxon; but *beef*, *veal*,

veal, and *mutton* * from the Normannic-French. Many other inſtances of a ſimilar nature occur in modern Engliſh.

3. Beſides the peculiarities found in every individual nation, there are, in many languages of nations intimately connected, always ſome particulars, in which they all agree: and as this is obſervable during one and the ſame period of time, it muſt be explained from the prevailing ſpirit of the age. In order to give an example of this kind, we ſhall mention the appearance of the ſoftening letter *e*, which, ſince the fifteenth century, has been prevalent in ſeveral languages of Europe. The adoption of this letter appears to have ariſen in conſequence of the progreſſive refinement of taſte, ſo that ſpeakers and writers of modern languages felt the neceſſity of ſoftening the harſhneſs of the vernacular tongues, which were overloaded with conſonants. For this purpoſe, the inſertion or the addition of the vowel *e* has been the moſt uſual and the moſt general expedient; by which, among other languages, the French in particular has been much refined. The ſame has been adopted in the German, as the words, *Bube*, *Knabe*, a boy; *Käſe*, cheeſe; *enge*, narrow; *blöde*, weak, timid; *Getreide*, corn, and many others, were ſince that period written and ſpoken with an additional *e*, inſtead of the harder words, *Bub*, *Knab*, *Käs*, *eng*, *blöd*, *Getreid*.—A ſimilar method has been practiſed in the Engliſh language, as is obvious from the ſpecimens given in the earlier periods of its Hiſtory. But the limits of propriety, in this reſpect, were ſoon tranſgreſſed in all the modern languages, and this *e* was frequently annexed, without neceſſity, to many words, in which it ſerved only to obſcure their ſtructure and inflexion, or at leaſt to render them aukward and heavy. Such are, in German, the words, *die Geſchwiſtere*, the brothers and ſiſters; *die Bürgermeiſtere*, the Burgo-maſters; *ofte*, frequently; *reine*, purely; *die Ableitunge*, the derivation; and in Engliſh, the words, orderinge both *e*, accordynge, ſuche, anye, and many others. Hence all the languages, as the people advanced in ſound taſte and knowledge, have, in latter times, reſtrained this addition within certain and proper limits.

* The words here employed in illuſtration of the remark, do not appear to have been diſtinctly underſtood by Mr. Adelung; for they are not ſtrictly ſynonymous, and though they both refer to the objects expreſſed by them, yet always in different ſtates of their exiſtence. W.

ESSAY SECOND.

A Philoſophical view of the English Language.

Why called Philoſophical?

It has now become uſual in language, to call that method of treating a ſubject *philoſophical*, where we not only deſcribe the phenomena as they exiſt, but inquire alſo, how they came to be what they are, and why they are ſo. And it is merely in this ſenſe I make uſe of this expreſſion here; for the term *philoſophical* ſtrictly implies nothing more than *rational*. It would lead me too far, were I to ſhow the ſuperiority of this rational method in languages, over the mechanical mode of teaching, hitherto practiſed. It has already been introduced, with ſucceſs, in all the other ſciences; language alone is behind in this reſpect: for which reaſon grammar muſt ſtill be contented with the contemptible appellation of a mere art, however ſuſceptible it may be of a ſcientific method. All I intend here is merely an experimental inquiry, in which I propoſe to ſelect a few of the more remarkable phenomena occurring in the Engliſh language; ſo that the reader muſt by no means expect to find a grammar, in the common acceptation of that term.

Of the Engliſh Language.

What has been the origin of the Engliſh language, and by what means, by what intrinſic and extrinſic changes it has been gradually improving, for upwards of a thouſand years paſt, has been ſhewn in the preceding Eſſay.—It is ſpoken in the greateſt part of England, and in the Low-lands of Scotland, while, on the contrary, in the mountainous parts of Scotland, in Ireland, and in the Engliſh provinces of Wales and Cornwall, another language prevails, which is the offspring of the oldeſt language of the country, the Britiſh, and bears an affinity to that ſpoken in the French province of Britanny.

Of

Of the Engliſh Written Language.

The Engliſh, like every other living language, is again divided into various dialects, which differ, partly according to the diſtricts of the country where they are ſpoken, partly according to the degrees of cultivation acquired by thoſe who ſpeak them. The moſt improved of theſe dialects, as in every other language, is likewiſe the written language of the nation, and in the ſtricteſt ſenſe termed the Engliſh language. The moſt accompliſhed part of the nation is here, as in many other ſtates, the court, and the higher claſſes of the inhabitants of the Capital; for wealth and taſte are generally the attendants of the court, and their natural influence on language is here accordingly moſt remarkable. Hence it is this refined dialect, which all writers of taſte employ, and which, out of the Capital, can be learned only from books.

Diviſion of Grammar.

Grammar is divided into two principal parts, of which the firſt and moſt important relates to the art of ſpeaking with propriety, the ſecond to the art of writing correctly, or orthography. As one muſt firſt ſpeak properly, before he can write with accuracy, orthography ought, in juſtice, to hold the laſt place in every grammar. Yet as no progreſs can be made in ſpeaking, without acquiring the elementary part of the mode of writing, it is cuſtomary to begin with the orthography; particularly in ſuch languages as are ſpoken differently from what they are written.

Of the Engliſh Written Characters.

There is every reaſon to believe, that the ancient Britons were as little acquainted with the art of writing, as any of the rude and ſemi-barbarous nations of thoſe times. The Romans, indeed, as ſoon as they eſtabliſhed themſelves in Britain, likewiſe introduced their written characters; but it does not appear, that they were adopted by the natives: and though this had been the caſe, they would have been loſt by the ſucceeding invaſions of the Saxons, who, at their firſt appearance in this country, were a more rude and ſavage people than the ancient Britons.—As ſoon as the Saxons were converted to Chriſtianity, they received the Roman characters from

from their Italian and Gallic teachers of religion; and these characters had been already transformed, and adapted to the running hand, then in use.

Of the Anglo-Saxon Alphabet.

As the Saxons had certain sounds in their unpolished and harsh language, with which the Romans, as well as the cultivated Gauls were unacquainted, and which therefore could not be expressed by the common written characters of the latter, many of these were changed, and some new ones adopted; such as that which represents the hissing *th*, and which was borrowed from the Greek Θ, thêta. This alphabet, termed the Anglo-Saxon, maintained its ground till the invasion of the Normans, and for a considerable time after that event.

Of its disuse.

However much the ancient Roman characters might have been disfigured by the corrupted taste of the middle ages, they still retained a certain affinity to their original form: but this affinity was destroyed by the peculiar Anglo-Saxon letters. —In the Saxon and Saxo-Danish periods, the national taste, notwithstanding the progress it had made, was still much too rude, to exhibit this corruption, in a sensible manner. But when the Normans subjected England to their power, and began to spread the higher degrees of improvement, that prevailed in France; when the Saxo-Danish language itself was refined by the Normannic and later French; this aukward state of things became evident, the old Anglo-Saxon characters were again abandoned, and the Roman alphabet in its pure form, such as prevailed at that time in France, was consequently adopted, in preference to the former. This change, however, was now attended with the inconvenience, that the simple hissing middle-sound, which had formerly been expressed by the letter Θ, borrowed from the Greek, behoved now to be denoted by the compound *th*, which could express it only in a very imperfect manner. But if the improvements in a language be carried on with taste, of two inconveniences, that one is always preferred, which is the least repugnant to the sense of beauty and propriety. The old Anglo-Saxon figure disagreed altogether with the symmetry

metry of the Roman letters; and therefore proved more offenſive to ſound taſte, than the *th*, although it be a compound ſign for a ſimple ſound, becauſe it was ſtill agreeable to the Roman faſhion, at leaſt with reſpect to its ſhape.

Of angular Written Characters.

To trace all the changes, which theſe characters have, from time to time, undergone in their figure, would be tedious, and is not properly an object of this inquiry. I ſhall remark only one circumſtance. In the latter centuries of the middle age, when taſte and induſtry began to revive, there aroſe a mode of writing, which is properly denominated the "Broken writ," but which, in common life, is generally called the "Monkiſh writing," becauſe the monks, in particular, uſed it in their manuſcripts. It is alſo frequently termed the "Gothic character," not as if it had been invented and uſed by the Goths, but in ſo far only, as we are accuſtomed to call all that taſte Gothic, which delights in angular, pointed, and curled ornaments. As this handwriting was certainly more beautiful than the long and "waving" current hand, formerly in uſe, it afterwards became general over all Europe, and maintained its place till the revival of the ſciences and of good taſte, when people returned to the beautiful Roman letters, as they were formed, before the barbarous nations imprinted on them the marks of their corrupted and uncultivated taſte.

Theſe characters were firſt diſcontinued in Italy, where the round Roman hand was ſoon revived, which is therefore termed Italian; and whence it was by degrees introduced into ſeveral countries of Europe. But as the prevailing degree of taſte was by no means uniform, either in all countries, or among all the claſſes of one and the ſame nation, this change happened in different ways, and with various modifications. England, ſince the preceding century, has been gradually adopting the round Italian letter, in all writings deſigned for the higher and middle claſſes; while, on the contrary, in ſuch writings as are immediately addreſſed to the common people (for inſtance, in acts of parliament, public deeds, &c.) the old angular character, generally called "engroſſing," is ſtill uſed; becauſe they have been long accuſtomed to it, and have not yet acquired a ſufficient degree of taſte *, to perceive its inelegance.

The

* The author certainly alludes here to the Engliſh lawyers *only*; as

The Engliſh write differently from what they ſpeak.

The Engliſh language conſiſts of a mixture of the old Saxon and Daniſh, of the Normannic and modern French, and of the Latin. The Italian and Spaniſh are often added to this number, but theſe two languages neither have had, nor could have had, ſo great an influence on the Engliſh, as to form a conſtituent part of it, although individual words may be derived from them, which holds alſo with reſpect to many other languages. And as the languages before mentioned are ſo different from each other in their external and internal ſtructure, it is eaſy to ſee, that this aſſociation or combination of words could not take place without great violence, and the deſtruction of a great part of the peculiarities of each of the languages thus combined in the Engliſh. Since, in all languages, a cloſe adherence to etymology preſerves their peculiar form, and has a tendency to prevent thoſe remarkable changes, which the conſtant progreſs of civilization, as well as the precipitate alterations of the people, would otherwiſe produce; it is not difficult to perceive, that, by this method of adopting and incorporating words, the proximate ſtructure of them, with reſpect to the ear at leaſt, muſt in a great variety of inſtances be deſtroyed; eſpecially as this ſtructure, in general, is but very imperfectly known in ſuch words, as are derived from a foreign language, that forms a component part of the ancient language of the country. The pronunciation, accordingly, in all ſuch mixed languages, is exceedingly variable; becauſe the neareſt derivation, of the greater number of words, is unknown to the people, who ſpeak them; and conſequently there is no fixed immoveable point, to which the ideas denoted by them, might be attached, and which could guide the tongue and the ear. This deficiency is obvious in all thoſe modern languages, which have been formed by a mixture with the Latin, as the Italian, French, Spaniſh, and Portugueſe, the pronunciation of which is expoſed to far more conſiderable changes than ſuch languages, as have remained pure and unmixed, like the German

---

as the continuation of this barbarous character is productive of conſiderable fees, while the diſuſe of it would materially affect their intereſt.

Note of the Compoſitor.

man and her northern ſiſters. Thoſe mixed languages, too, would in a few centuries be deprived of their uniformity, had not the "latent perception" of neceſſity furniſhed theſe nations with a method of preſerving, for a long time, the proximate derivation of words, at leaſt to the eye, though the ear may have loſt it.

Explanation of this phenomenon.

The method of preſerving the etymology of words, as adopted by the nations above alluded to, is no other than this, that people write differently from what they ſpeak: a phenomenon, which indeed has been hitherto repreſented, by grammarians and philoſophic linguiſts, as the moſt palpable abſurdity that can be conceived; although the agreement of all the weſtern nations of Europe, in what they have thus termed abſurdity, ſhould have convinced them, that there muſt be ſome reaſon for it, and which ought not to be overlooked. This reaſon then is no other, than to preſerve, as long as is neceſſary, to the eye at leaſt, the proximate derivation by means of writing, although the pronunciation has loſt it; to promote thereby that univerſal intelligibility, which is the firſt and principal object of language; and, at the ſame time to prevent the ſwerving and fluctuating pronunciation, as long as poſſible, from further and ſtill greater deviations.—An example or two will ſerve to make the matter more evident. The following words, being borrowed from the French and Latin languages, *legality*, *legion*, *organ*, *orgies*, are now pronounced *legallity*, *ledzhun*, *argun*, *ardzhyz*. If they were written in this manner, an Engliſhman might, at length, learn to underſtand them tolerably well, but he would ſtill find a difficulty, when theſe words occurred to him again in their original language, to recognize his own in them. The bond of connection between the Engliſh language and its conſtituent parts would thus be diſſolved, and the reciprocal intelligibility would thereby be rendered obſcure. Further, as the pronunciation in all ſuch mixed languages, from the cauſes above mentioned, is from time to time conſiderably changed, many words would ſoon become altogether obſcure and unintelligible, did not the etymological way of writing them, ſtill maintain their true form, as long as is practicable and neceſſary. Beſides, the adherence to the neareſt derivation, and the preſervation of the original form of words, by accurate writin

are likewiſe the means of preventing the extremely fluctuating pronunciation from ſtill greater deviations. This is the true reaſon, why all the weſtern Europeans, and conſequently the Engliſh too, write differently from what they ſpeak: and as this phenomenon has been produced entirely by "the latent perception of purpoſe and means," which is involved in ſo much obſcurity, that, ſo far as I know, their grammarians have not yet been able to account for it; hence we receive a leſſon, not to cenſure the like regulations, if they are univerſally adopted by one or more nations, until the real foundation of them has been diſcovered. The difference of this mode of writing from that of ſpeaking, is indeed in itſelf an imperfection; but in all thoſe languages, that are ſo thoroughly mixed, it is a real perfection; becauſe it preſerves, at leaſt to the eye, the immediate derivation, and conſequently furniſhes us with the eaſieſt poſſible method of underſtanding words, while it ſerves to prevent any further deviations in the pronunciation.

Of Orthography.

On the preceding doctrine of pronunciation, is alſo founded the greateſt and moſt important part of the Engliſh orthography, or rather, the orthography of the Engliſh language is the reverſed doctrine of pronunciation; becauſe it muſt ſhew, how every uttered ſound is to be written with its proper characters. The leſs important parts of it are, the rules for uſing initial capital letters, the diviſion of ſyllables, the ſpelling of compound words, the orthographical ſigns, and the like.

Of the ſtructure of words.

Neither orthography, nor the doctrine of tone, nor any other part of grammar, can diſpenſe with the elements of the *ſtructure of words*, or *etymology* in the ſtricteſt and moſt rigid ſenſe; however much this has been neglected in all the Engliſh grammars, with which I am acquainted. Hence I propoſe here, to make an attempt towards tracing and marking the outlines of this doctrine, which is ſo little underſtood in all languages.

Definition of words and ſyllables.

Language is compoſed of words. A word is the perceptible expreſſion of an idea, which is pronounced without ſuſpending the voice. Words then are the names of particular ideas

ideas, and are conſequently as various in their ſtructure, as the ideas themſelves. In general, a word may conſiſt of one or more ſyllables, and a ſyllable is a perceptible ſound, which is pronounced with a ſingle emiſſion from the mouth. Since, therefore, the vowels are ſimple ſounds, which are produced by the mere opening of the mouth, and diphthongs are double ſounds, namely two vowels, in which the voice paſſes, without ſuſpenſion, from one opening to another, it follows from this, that a word properly contains as many ſyllables, as there occur in it vowels or diphthongs. I have uſed the term "properly;" for the pronunciation, in Engliſh, occaſions a variety of exceptions, by ſuppreſſing many vowels, ſo that for inſtance a word, which in writing conſiſts of four ſyllables, may in pronunciation conſiſt only of three.

Diviſion of words, according to their ſtructure.

All words, with reſpect to their ſtructure, are of three kinds; they are either *radicals*, or *derivatives*, or *compounds*. Contracted words might alſo be added here; but they belong for the moſt part to the language of low life; for inſtance, *gaffer* for good father; *gammer*, for good mother; or if they are at all in general uſe, they are conſidered and treated as radicals.

Definition of radicals.

Radical words are properly ſuch, as expreſs the firſt original idea, of whatever kind, by a ſingle emiſſion from the mouth; and hence they are uniformly monoſyllables, becauſe every original idea is founded on a ſingle tranſient and undivided ſenſation. Theſe radicals may again be divided into various ſpecies: but in grammar, this diviſion is not attended with any practical advantage; for every word that is a monoſyllable, if it cannot be proved to be contracted from two others, is admitted there as a radical. In the following part of this treatiſe we ſhall find, that, in Engliſh, the moſt of the words borrowed from the French, Latin, and other foreign languages, are treated as radicals, of whatever number of ſyllables they may conſiſt.

Among the radical words are likewiſe comprehended thoſe, which have adopted the final letter *e*, for the ſake of rendering the harſh monoſyllables ſomewhat ſofter, although they acquire, by this proceſs, an additional ſyllable. In all the modern European languages, particularly in the Engliſh, German, and

French, this *e* has been an useful expedient, to soften the harshness of the old languages, and to introduce into them smoothness and harmony. Examples of this kind, in English, occur in the words *ake*, *alcove*, *ale*, *anise*, *ape*, to *appease*, *babe*, *baize*, to *bake*, &c.; as likewise in the German words *Affe*, an ape; *Bube*, *Knabe*, a boy, and many others. Upon a superficial perusal of English works, written during the last centuries, we shall find, that this expedient, from an extravagant fondness for refinement, has been carried to excess, and thus the structure of words rendered obscure. There is no doubt, that, with increasing cultivation, the English perceived this impropriety, and therefore rejected this *e*, with which, in many cases, the words had been unnecessarily loaded: in those words, however, where it was still preserved in writing, it was suppressed in the pronunciation, and thus became a mute final *e*; hence the above mentioned words are pronounced *ähk*, *alkohu*, *ähl*, *ännis*, *ähp*, &c. But whether this alteration has been accomplished within proper limits, and whether the language has not acquired, through this medium, much unnecessary harshness, I shall not attempt to decide. I must only observe, that it is a very erroneous rule, by which, according to the English grammarians, this mute *e* makes the preceding vowel *uniformly* long, if by the term *long* we are to understand *extended*. Examples of the contrary occur in the words, *axe*, *fickle*, *badge*, *bottle*, and a great many others; beside the words consisting of three and four syllables, in which the preceding syllable is not at all accentuated, and much less should it be lengthened, as in *artifice*, *concurrence*, *perceptible*, &c.

Of Derivatives.

The limits of the *derived* and *compound* words cannot, in every individual case, be accurately ascertained; although they may be determined with sufficient precision, according to the ideas connected with these words. In a grammatical sense, a *derived idea* is formed by joining an obscure collateral notion to a principal, or radical idea, and by considering both as one single idea: and a *derived word* arises from expressing this obscure collateral notion, by means of a syllable, which is no longer used as a peculiar word, consequently is as obscure as the collateral notion itself. Such a syllable is then called a *derived syllable*.

The *derived syllables* now are of two kinds; they are placed either

either before or after the word: in the former case they may be called *præposita*, while in the latter, we shall call them *postpositа*. Both, however, must no longer be used as peculiar words; for in this case the new word is not a *derivative*, but a *compound*. The *præpositа*, as well as the *postpositа*, are, in English, of two different sorts: they originate either from the Saxo-Danish, or from the Latin and French. The words derived from the last two languages are, indeed, considered as radicals, and are not subject to any determined rules; but with the former, namely the Saxo-Danish, he ought to be accurately acquainted, who is desirous of acquiring a thorough knowledge of the English language, and of facilitating his study of the tone or accent of words; a doctrine, which, without this previous knowledge, would appear very perplexed.

The principal *præpositа*, from the Saxo-Danish, are the syllables *a*, *be*, *for*, (in so far as it represents the German *ver*) *mis*, and *un*; for instance, away, aloud, abroad, above, anew, to abet, to abide, abode; before, to begin, beget, befall, befriend; to misgive, mislead, misbehave, mistrust, mistake; unaware, unbelief, undone.—The chief French-Latin syllables are the following; *ac*, *com*, *con*, *em*, *en*, *ob*, *op*, *pre*, *re*, *se*, *sub* and *sur*.

The principal Saxo-Danish *postpositа* are these: *ard*, coward; *ed*, for forming passive participles; as created, oppressed, animated; *el*, synonymous with the German *el*, as bowel; *er*, not only in substantives, where it corresponds with the German *er*; adder, answer, alder, angler, finger; but likewise in verbs, to stammer, to waver; and in prepositions, as after;—the syllable *en*, in adjectives, as leaden, sudden, sullen; in verbs, to heighten, blacken, redden;—*ess*, abbess, dutchess, largess;—*ey*, agreeing with the German *ey*, as abbey, survey;—*ing*, for forming the present participles, as well as substantives, in both of which it corresponds with the German *ing* and *ung*: feeding, breeding;—*ish*, like the German *isch*, in apish, foolish;—*le*, the same as the German *el*, as idle, ancle, angle, apple;—*ly*, as the German *lich*, particularly for forming adverbs, as absolutely, greatly, accordingly —*ness*, for the formation of abstract ideas, like the German *niss*, as goodness, frankness, abstemiousness;—*ship*, not unlike the German *schaft*, as lordship, friendship —*y*, corresponding with the German *ig*, in adverbs, and *ey*, in substantives, as already, abbey.——But far more numerous are the terminations formed from the Latin-French syllables, *ance*, *ant*, *ate*, *ble*, *bly*, *cal*,

cal, cle, cy, eer, ier, en, ence, ent, ial, ian, ic, iſt, ive, ion, ſion, tion, ment, or, ous, ple, tive, ure, y, &c. I cannot enter upon the ſignification and the practical uſe of all theſe derived ſyllables; ſince my purpoſe, in this place, is merely directed to excite the attention of future teachers of the Engliſh language, with reſpect to them. Let nobody, however, imagine, that the inveſtigation of theſe particles is a mere illuſion; for their utility, throughout the whole grammar, is very great, particularly in the ſubſequent doctrine of the accent.

All theſe derived ſyllables, and eſpecially the *poſtpoſita*, may again be combined with one another in different ways; as coward, cowardly, cowardlineſs, or cowardice; crafty, craftily, craftineſs, or craft; yet to inveſtigate their peculiar ſtructure, would exceed the limits of this Eſſay.

Compound words.

If two or more words, ſtill current by themſelves, are combined into one, there ariſes from this combination a *compound word.* By means of derivation we conjoin an obſcure collateral notion to a radical idea; but in compounding words, we unite two radical ideas, or rather two clear notions, into one. The deſign of ſuch an union is to determine a word and its meaning, more accurately, by the medium of another; but frequently alſo to expreſs a metaphorical idea, by means of both. That, which is *determined* by another, or the *cardinal word,* in Engliſh as well as in German, is placed laſt: while the *determining* word, in both languages, ſtands foremoſt. Thus in the examples, cherry-tree, child-birth, powerful, to undergo, to ſubdue, the latter words contain the principal idea, that is more cloſely determined by the words ſtanding foremoſt.

The compound words are as various as there are parts of ſpeech, which can be mutually combined. The ſubſtantive may in this manner be determined by another ſubſtantive, as gold-fiſh; or by an adjective, as green-fiſh; or by a participle, as looking-glaſs; or by a pronoun, as ſelf-conceit; or by a verb, as break-faſt; or by an adverb, as fore-noon;—the adjective and participle may be joined to a ſubſtantive, as hand-full; to another adjective, as big-bodied;—the verb to a ſubſtantive, as horſe-whip, bind-weed; particularly by the particles *fore, out, ab, ad, at, de, in, ob, e, ex,* &c.;—the adverb to another adverb, as there-fore, where-ever, &c.

In

It would lead me too far from my object, if I attempted to define the nature of true compounds; for this can be accomplished only by means of a minute and accurate investigation of them, from which the general rules for the compounding of words must result, and at the same time the various modifications, to which the *determining* word is liable, might be discovered and established.

Of the tone or accent of words.

The rules for the tone or accentuation of words, in English, are perhaps more variable and intricate than in any other language. This want of uniformity is owing, partly to the whole genius and disposition of the language, partly to the careless method and confused notions of grammarians.—1. On account of the genius and disposition of the language. The English tongue is a mixture of the Saxon, Danish, French, and Latin; it has therefore lost a great share of its peculiarity, while each of these foreign languages, being thoroughly mixed with it, have likewise communicated to it a considerable part of their analogical affinities. Among other parts of grammar, this deviation is obvious in the accentuation of words, which is regulated by different analogies; hence no general or determined rules can be laid down for it. In the German language, the tone is the most regular and settled part of grammar; hence it can be reduced to a few plain rules.—2. On account of the confusion prevailing among grammarians, who, in English, as well as in German, have always confounded the *prosaic* measure of the accent with that of the *metrical*, and therefore constantly speak of *long* and *short* syllables; notions, which do not at all apply to this doctrine, and which occasion great embarrassment.

I am induced to censure, upon this head, not only the grammarians and schoolmasters of the common sort, but even such teachers and writers as claim a superior rank, for instance a JOHNSON, SHERIDAN, and several others. The latter has published "A General Dictionary of the English language, in two Volumes, Quarto, London, 1780;" in which he confines himself entirely to the accent, and the pronunciation of words; but, with respect to the former, he proceeds in the same intricate, fluctuating, and undetermined manner, as his other brethren of Priscian's family.

It

It is therefore my aim in this Eſſay, to propoſe a method, by which rational teachers may, in a great meaſure, explain this obſcure doctrine concerning the accentuation of words, and thus arrive at ſome certainty, at leaſt with reſpect to a conſiderable number of Engliſh words. Previouſly to this inquiry, however, it will be requiſite to premiſe ſome general ideas, and to diſmiſs altogether, the former notions of *long* and *ſhort* ſyllables.

General Definitions of the accent.

The accent conſiſts in a particular elevation of the voice, with which, in polyſyllables, the one ſyllable is as it were raiſed above the others: thus in *emérgency*, *emplóyment*, the ſyllables *mer* and *ploy* are called *accentuated ſyllables*. The reaſon of this mode of diſtinguiſhing one ſyllable from another, is properly contained in the nature of the word and the intention of the ſpeaker, who, by this elevation of the voice, points out that ſyllable, which expreſſes the principal idea, and to which he chiefly directs the attention of the hearer. Hence the two accentuated ſyllables, above mentioned, contain the principal ideas of the words, in which they occur, and all the other ſyllables denote only collateral ideas, or further determinations, inflexions, and the like. I have ſaid, that this, in the nature of the thing, is "properly" the intention of the accent; for this reaſon in the German, and probably, too, in all other unmixed languages, we meet with the general rule, that the radical ſyllable, in ſuch words as conſiſt of a plurality of ſyllables, always receives the accent; ſince it contains the principal idea of the word. In the German language, this rule is ſo general, that the few exceptions from it ſcarcely deſerve any attention. But as the Engliſh is a very mixed language, this rule is liable here to a much greater number of exceptions; eſpecially with reſpect to the words borrowed from the Latin and French, in which the radical ſyllable has become obſcure, ſo that it cannot in all inſtances preſerve its due accent. Since I propoſe to reſume that ſubject in another part of this Eſſay, I ſhall here only remark, that thoſe words from the Anglo-Saxon, which are ſtill current in the Engliſh language, follow this rule, and perhaps as uniformly as in the German.

Diſtinction of the accent as to its force.

The tone or accent muſt be diſtinguiſhed, both as to its force

force and duration. With reſpect to the former, it may be divided into the *principal* and *concurrent* force of the accent. There are certain polyſyllables, in which two of the ſyllables are marked by the accent, when one of them, that requires the ſtrongeſt elevation of the voice, receives the *principal* force; while the other, in which the elevation of the voice is weaker, is uttered with a *concurrent* force. Thus, in the word hórſe-courſer, the ſyllable *hor*, as well as the ſyllable *cour*, are both marked by the accent; yet with this difference, that the former is more ſtrongly pronounced, and the *principal* force is laid upon it; while in the latter, the elevation of the voice is weaker, and conſequently it is denoted only by a *concurrent* force. There is, however, a general rule, which deſerves to be remarked in this place, and according to which no word can have more than one principal accent. But the caſes, in which words, beſide the principal one, may have a concurrent accent, are the two following: 1, in compound words, where every word retains its accent, yet ſo that, in one of the words, this accent becomes the principal or predominant ſound, as will clearly appear from the ſequel; 2, in derivatives conſiſting of polyſyllables, which require the principal accent to be laid upon the fourth or fifth ſyllable from the end; in which caſe, unleſs a ſyllable be ſuppreſſed, one of the derived ſyllables receives a ſecondary or concurrent accent; becauſe three or four ſyllables in ſucceſſion, without any diſtinction of tone, would offend the ear. In the word *dégénerateneſs*, the accent reſts upon the ſyllable *ge*; and though the *e* in the ſyllable *te* be ſuppreſſed, there would ſtill follow three ſyllables in ſucceſſion, without any elevation of the voice, if the ſyllable *ra* were not pronounced with a ſecondary accent; by which means this monotony is avoided. The ſame occurs in the words, *fàtherlineſs*, *délicateneſs*, *abſolutely*, &c.

Of the duration of the accent.

Whether the accent be principal or ſecondary, it is with reſpect to its duration, either *extended* (long) or *acute*, (ſhort). It is *extended*, when the voice dwells longer upon the vowel, as in the words, fàme, fàte, fàther; *acute*, when it quickly paſſes over the vowel and reſts upon the conſonant, which then acquires a double ſound, as in fán, whén, móther, pén. Theſe diſtinctions between the *extended* and *acute* accent, the grammarians of the Engliſh as well as the German and other lan-

guages, have endeavoured to expreſs by the terms *long* and *ſhort*; but as they were under the neceſſity of calling thoſe ſyllables, which are pronounced with no accent whatever, upon the ſame plan, either long or ſhort, they involved themſelves in perpetual labyrinths, from which there was no eſcape. The fact is, that in proſody every accentuated ſyllable is likewiſe long, whether the accent be extended or acute; for here the unaccentuated or neutral ſyllables alone are ſhort.—In the Dictionary of the Engliſh language, which I have publiſhed in two volumes, 8vo. Leipzig, 1783 and 1796, I have pointed out the extended or long accent thus (à) and the acute or ſhort accent with this (á) mark: yet as I was miſled at the commencement of the work, by implicitly following Johnſon as my guide in the accent, I began that diſtinction only about the middle of the letter A.

Difference between extended and acute ſyllables.

From what has been ſaid in the preceding ſection, it is evident, that in the extended accent the voice dwells longer upon the vowel; thus the ſucceeding conſonant can have only a mild and ſimple ſound: as on the contrary, in the acute accent the voice quickly glides over the vowel and reſts upon the conſonant, which conſequently is pronounced with more energy, or like a double conſonant. Hence, in German, we find the excellent rule prevailing, by which only a ſimple conſonant is uſed after a long or extended vowel, but a double conſonant after a ſhort or acute vowel; excepting thoſe caſes, where two different conſonants accompany the preceding vowel; for inſtance, *ich kàm*, I came; *Dér Kámm*, the comb; *die Muſe*, the Muſe; *zu müſſen*, to be obliged. This rule indeed is liable to ſome exceptions, but it forms nevertheleſs one of the moſt admirable peculiarities of that language; a peculiarity, of which the modern innovators wiſh to deſpoil it; as theſe men are more fond of deſtroying than of erecting. But in the Engliſh language, where the pronunciation is perpetually at war with the orthography, that excellent rule cannot be put in practice, as the exceptions from it are more numerous than the caſes to which it applies. Thus the words, mán, múd, múg, móther, mínion, &c. have the ſhort or acute accent, though only a ſingle conſonant follows the vowel, while the words, àll, àlms, mòſt, càll, fàll, fàlſe, fàrm, &c. take the long or extended accent, notwithſtanding that the vowel is accom-

companied by two conſonants. Even the orthographical diphthongs are not uniformly pronounced as ſuch; for they are very frequently uttered ſhort or acute, as is obvious in the words, déad, héad, léarn, léad, méadow, &c. Nay, it often happens, that even double ſounds, according to orthography at leaſt, may occur in ſyllables, which receive no accent; for inſtance in the words, cháplain, pídgeon, fórfeit. In theſe circumſtances, it muſt be extremely difficult to lay down fixed rules, in what caſes and ſituations the accent is acute, and where it muſt be extended.

Of the accent of radicals.

All radicals are originally monoſyllables, except in the caſes already pointed out, where the harſh ſound of the monoſyllable has been ſoftened by the additional vowel *e*. As every radical word is the ſign of an idea, it likewiſe has its peculiar determined accent, but which is perceivable only in combination with other words; for the accent itſelf is nothing elſe than than a relative idea. There are however words, which in the connexion of a ſentence receive no accent, but throw it upon the ſucceeding word; and theſe are commonly ſuch words as denote circumſtances or unimportant modifications; for inſtance, the article, ſeveral of the pronouns, and the particles. In "*the finger, my houſe, on the eaſt,*" the determining words, *the, my, on the*, throw their accent upon the ſubſtantives that accompany them. All theſe caſes ought to be determined with preciſion in an Engliſh grammar; it is ſufficient here, to have hinted at them.—All the radical words, however, which ſignify principal ideas, ſuch as ſubſtantives, verbs, adjectives, &c. muſt neceſſarily be accentuated. It is evident from theſe remarks, that the accent, in monoſyllables, as well as in polyſyllables, wholly depends on the importance of the idea.

Of the accent of derivatives.

With reſpect to the accent, the derivatives muſt be divided into two great claſſes; namely into ſuch as are derived from the Saxo-Daniſh, and into thoſe which have been adopted from the French and Latin: both muſt, in this reſpect, be ſubject to different rules.

The words derived from the Saxo-Daniſh, follow that very eaſy and preciſe rule, according to which, in polyſyllables, the principal accent is uniformly placed upon the original

or

or radical syllable; a rule, which in German is liable to fewer exceptions than any other, and which I believe to be as general in English, since it is so deeply founded on the nature of the thing, and the purpose of language: for my part, I am acquainted with no words, that can be considered as exceptions. A few instances will serve to illustrate this assertion. The following are derivatives with additional preceding syllables; *afàr, away, behìnd, begét, begín, besìdes*;—with succeeding syllables are, *àcorn* (from the Low Saxon *Ecker*, in which instance the syllable *orn* corresponds with the German final syllable *er*), *bàreneſs, béggarlineſs, tàmeneſs, fàther, móther, sínger, bósom, boìſterous, ſúdden*;—with both preceding and succeeding syllables are, *aſhàmed, behòlden, behàviour, begínning, becómingly*.—Those, who pay proper attention to this easy rule, will find, that one half of the difficulties, in placing the accent on English words, is thereby removed.

The words derived from the French and Latin, in some instances, likewise follow this rule; *to abàte, to abándon, abrídge, abóminable, abſtèmious* &c.; but as the exceptions from it are more numerous than the cases to which it applies, it cannot be considered as a general rule; for in the examples, *ávenue, barbárity, bombàrdment, cómmiſſary, cóntinent, continùity, inoculátion*, &c. the accent is throughout placed upon derived syllables. In addition to this difficulty of distinguishing the accent, we may observe, that the English words very frequently displace the accent from the syllable, which possessed it in Latin or French. This is the case in the words, *Eùrope, ábſence, áblative, ábrogate, ábſolute, ácademy, áccent, ádage, ádvocate, aſſigneè, balloòn*, and a great many others. But even here some general rules may be formed, which would hold good, at least with respect to some particular cases. Thus in derived words, that terminate with the syllables *ſion, tion, cious* and *tious*, the accent rests upon the next-preceding syllable: this and similar rules we find already stated in the common grammars.—The causes, from which the placing of the accent in English words is so precarious, are chiefly the following: 1. because these words had in their original languages, namely in Latin and French, already deviated from the natural rule above mentioned; the Latin words *imputàre, imprudéntia, adequàtus*, and the French words *imputèr, marìne, marchèr, opinión*, have not preserved their accents upon the radical syllables;—2. because in the English language these words

words were frequently contracted, so that a change in the placing of the accent became necessary; v. g. *to opìne*, from the Latin *opinàri*, or the French *opinèr*; although this accidental change was frequently attended with the advantage of replacing the accent upon the radical syllable of the word; in this condition we find the verbs, *to desìre*, from the French *desirer*; to *despàir*, from the Latin *desperàre*; to *detést*, from *detestàri*.

Of the accent of compound words.

Although every word, when compounded with another preserves its peculiar accent (bóok-bìnder, bàck-bìte) yet as there can be only *one* principal accent pronounced in each word, this accent is usually, "and according to rule," placed upon the determining word, namely that which stands foremost; for instance, *álder-man*, *áxle-tree*, *bàck-bite*, *bàck-ward*, *bàne-ful*, *bàre-foot*, *blóod-shed*, *coàl-pit*. I have said, "according to rule;" for there are indeed many exceptions here, not only with respect to various particles, as in the words *al-mìghty*, *an-óther*, *arch-dèacon*, *with-hòld*, *with-oùt*, *where-by*, *un-like*, *under-tàke*, &c. but likewise in the triple compound words, *al-to-géther*, *ash-wédnes-day*, *what-so-éver*, *here-to-jòre*, for which instances, however, many fixed rules might be discovered.

Reflections upon words as parts of speech.

The rules concerning the letters and their pronunciation, the structure of words, and the accent founded upon that structure, compose the first and *etymological* part of grammar; after which follows the second division, treating of words as parts of speech, and their inflection. Words are called *parts of speech*, in so far as they denote different modifications of ideas in the connexion of a sentence: and in order to understand a language thoroughly, we must previously acquire clear notions of this subject.—Speech is the audible enunciation of our ideas, and these are (generally) produced by objects without us. In so far as these objects affect the representations of the mind, they are of two kinds only; namely, either self-subsistent things, i. e. *substances*; or those circumstances and modifications which occur in substances, i. e. *the accidental*. If our speech were conformable to the nature of things, we should have no more than these two parts of speech; but as we cannot comprehend a substance with all its relations, at one view, nor conceive these in an uniform manner, various parts

of

of ſpeech muſt neceſſarily reſult, particularly with reſpect to the *accidental*. Beſides, the degree of perſpicuity in our conceptions renders a new diſtinction neceſſary; ſince the repreſentations of the mind are either ſo obſcure, that they remain mere ſenſations, or aſſume the form of clear notions. As, therefore, with reſpect to the parts of ſpeech, every thing depends upon the method, in which they are exhibited to the mind; and as this method is by no means uniform in all nations, conſequently the number and diſpoſition of the parts of ſpeech do not correſpond with each other in all languages. The Engliſh, for example, have arranged their ideas and repreſentations in the manner as follows.

I. Abſtruſe repreſentations, or mere *ſenſations*, in an abſtract ſenſe. The expreſſion of theſe affords the *interjections*, or words of ſenſation, which denote mere abſtract ſenſations. —From the higher branches of etymology we learn, that the interjections are the foundation of all language; becauſe our repreſentations muſt be firſt abſtruſe, and conſequently mere ſenſations, before they can be developed into clear notions.

II. Diſtinct repreſentations or ideas, the expreſſion of which furniſhes us with *words*, in the moſt concrete and peculiar ſenſe.—The things, of which we have ideas, are of a twofold nature; namely,

1. *Self-ſubſiſtent things* or *ſubſtances*, and every thing that is exhibited to the mind as independent. The ſign or expreſſion of them is the *ſubſtantive*.

2. *Accidental things*, among which we compriſe all that can be diſtinguiſhed in the ſelf-ſubſiſtent thing, and that relates to it. In general, this is again of a twofold nature; for it is either belonging to the thing itſelf, as *red*, *great*, *beautiful*; or it is external to it, as *now*, *here*, *away*: in the former caſe, it is called a *quality*; in the latter, a *circumſtance*. But according to the manner of exhibiting it, this accidental thing is again divided into different claſſes, which afford an equal number of parts of ſpeech. It is conſidered,

A. Independently, external to the ſelf-ſubſiſtent thing, and and in immediate connection with it; and then it is in the aforeſaid manner of two kinds; namely,

1. a *quality*; hence ariſes the qualifying word, or the adverb

adverb of quality, which can be predicated of the ſubſtantive, only by means of a verb;

2. a *circumſtance*, which in grammar, is of three different kinds; viz.

a, an independent circumſtance, the *adverbium circumſtantiæ*, or a word expreſſive of a circumſtance, in the moſt concrete ſenſe;

b, the relation ſubſiſting between two ſelf-ſubſiſtent things, the *prepoſition*; and

c, the relation between ſentences and their members, the *conjunction*.

B. As compriſed in the attribute, i. e. ſomething accidental reſpecting the circumſtance of time, number, &c, predicated of the ſelf-ſubſiſtent thing, viz. the *verb*.

C. As already attributed, or in immediate connexion with the ſubſtantive. This is either

1. a predicated quality, i. e. a property, the name of which is expreſſed by the *adjective*; or

2. a circumſtance; and then again

a, of ſelf-ſubſiſtence, the *article*;

b, of the accidental relation to the perſon, the *pronoun*; and laſtly

c, of computation, the *number*.

Farther reflections upon words.

From the premiſes laid down, the following parts of ſpeech are the neceſſary reſult:

1. The *ſubſtantive*, or the ſign of all things, which do not only ſubſiſt of themſelves, but which are likewiſe conceived as ſuch. It is either a proper name, *nomen proprium*; or the name of a certain claſs of things, *nomen appellativum*. As the latter appertains to ſeveral things of the ſame ſpecies (for inſtance, *man*, *horſe*, *houſe*,) and thus again ſuffers a great diminution of its ſelf-ſubſiſtence, certain words became neceſſary, in order to reſtore this ſelf-ſubſiſtance, in ſuch ſituations as required it. This was accompliſhed

2, by means of the *articles*;

3, by *numbers*, that expreſs the circumſtance of computation; and

4, by the *pronouns*; which ſerve to denote the immediate relation of the perſon, in connexion with the ſubſtantive.

5.

5, The accidental thing, as connected with the ſubſtance itſelf, is conſidered, in the German language, in two different ways, namely of itſelf *(per ſe)*, in which caſe it can be predicated of the ſubſtantive, by means of a verb only, v. g. *this houſe is large*; or in immediate connexion with the ſubſtantive, as *the large houſe*, *a great houſe*. In the former caſe it is called *adverbium qualitatis* or a *qualifying word*; but in the latter, it is ſimply an *adjectivum* or a *word of property*: this is derived from the former, by means of a peculiar method of inflecting it, by grammarians called *concretion*. In Engliſh, however, this diſtinction does not prevail; for the adjectives here are nowiſe different from the adverbs of quality; hence a peculiar term of art would be requiſite to denote, with preciſion, the idea combined in both caſes: *God is almighty*, and *the almighty God*.—To this head alſo belong the *participles*, which are not conſidered as particular parts of ſpeech, but are either adjectives or adverbs of quality derived from the verb; ſo that they expreſs, in the ſame word, the collateral idea of time.

6, The *verb*, a part of ſpeech, predicating of the ſubſtantive that which is accidental, together with different collateral ideas, combined in one and the ſame word.

7, The *prepoſitions*; 8, *conjunctions*; and 9, *interjections*, having been conſidered in the preceeding ſection, require no further explanation.

Analyſis of the inflections.

That which is accidental may be expreſſed in a great variety of ways, as belonging to the ſelf-ſubſiſtent thing; whence a number of caſual relations ariſe, which would render our ſpeech extremely prolix, if we had not contrived means of immediately denoting them in the compaſs of every word itſelf, through ſimple radical ſounds, i. e. by inflecting the word. The Germans have adopted the following modes of inflection. 1. The diſtinction of plurality in ſubſtantives, or the *formation of the plural*. 2. The diſtinction of the relation ſubſiſting between the ſubſtantive contained in the predicate, and the ſubject; the *declenſion*. 3. The diſtinction of the gender in the words determining the ſubſtantive; the *motion*. 4. The change of an adverb of quality into an adjective; the *concretion*. 5. The diſtinction between a higher and the higheſt degree expreſſed in an adverb of quality, or adjective; the *degrees of compariſon*. And finally, 6, the diſtinction of the different relations,

relations, which verbs denote, or the *conjugation*.—The *Engliſh* language is, with reſpect to the inflection of words, very ſimple, or rather defective; for, of the ſix modes of inflection above ſpecified, three only are known in Engliſh; namely, the formation of the plural, the degrees of compariſon, and the conjugation. As the adjective here is in no manner different from the adverb of quality, and as the ſubſtantives likewiſe have no peculiar declenſion, there can be exhibited neither *concretion* nor *motion* in their form.

I. *Further reflections on the ſubſtantive.*

1. *Diviſion of it.*

Every part of ſpeech muſt be ſeparately conſidered in grammar; it muſt be divided into its different ſpecies, and the inflections, to which it is liable, muſt there be exhibited. The ſubſtantive juſtly occupies the firſt place, as it is the moſt important word in ſpeech; in the next place, the words which determine the ſubſtantive, namely the articles, adjectives, pronouns, and numbers ought to follow; after theſe the verbs, and finally the adverbs and interjections conclude the whole. As it is not my intention to write a grammar in this Eſſay, I ſhall content myſelf with making a few remarks upon each part of ſpeech.

The ſubſtantive is the ſign of a ſelf-ſubſiſtent thing, or a ſubſtance. This is either really and independently ſubſiſting; or it is not ſubſtantially exiſting, and only repreſented as ſelf-ſubſiſtent: the former is called a *concretum*, the latter an *abſtractum*. The *concrete* thing is again divided into four claſſes; for it repreſents either the name of an individual, the proper name, *nomen proprium*; or that of a whole claſs of ſimilar individual things, *nomen appellativum*; or that of a multitude of things, in which no individuality is diſtinguiſhed; a collective name, *nomen collectivum*; or laſtly, that of matter, *nomen materiale*, ſuch as iron, wood, ſtone, bread.

2. *The gender of ſubſtantives.*

Many languages divide all their ſubſtantives into certain claſſes, borrowed from the phyſical gender of the animal kingdom, ſo that all their words of determination, i. e. the articles,

ticles, pronouns, adjectives, and ſometimes alſo the numbers, muſt mark the gender peculiar to every ſubſtantive. The queſtion now ariſes, whether this be likewiſe the caſe in Engliſh. If we follow the common ſtatement of grammarians, we muſt anſwer in the affirmative: but if we reflect upon the nature of the thing, we cannot allow the Engliſh ſubſtantives any ſuch gender as theſe words poſſeſs in the German, Latin, and many other languages. The ſtrongeſt proof of this is the abſence of all the genders in the determining words above mentioned. The perſonal pronoun of the third perſon, indeed, appears to prove the contrary; for *he*, *ſhe*, and *it*, are really inflected according to the three different genders. But there is a great difference between marking the phyſical gender, where this diſtinction becomes neceſſary; and between claſſing all ſubſtantives according to the different genders, although they might refer to inanimate things, and to abſtract ideas. All languages practiſe the former expedient, though they do not make uſe of the latter claſſification; and this is alſo the caſe in the Engliſh language. The Engliſh ſubſtantives, as ſubſtantives, mark no particular gender; for if they did ſo, their determining words likewiſe ought to point it out; which however is not conſiſtent with practice. Hence this apparent deficiency greatly facilitates the acquiſition of a language, which does not impoſe upon us the taſk of ſtudying the genders of nouns; ſince it is obvious, that this diſtinction, in our preſent method of repreſenting objects to the mind, is not attended with the leaſt advantage, that could in any degree compenſate this inconvenience.

3. *Of the formation of the Plural.*

Since the words expreſſive of kind, or *appellatives*, may either relate to one thing of the kind, or to a plurality of things, the *numbers* ſerve the purpoſe of marking this double diſtinction. The formation of the plural, which in the German, Latin, and other languages is very difficult, is remarkably eaſy in the Engliſh; as it is formed by adding the letter *s* or the ſyllable *es* to the ſingular; and the few exceptions, or deviations from this rule, we find ſtated in every grammar.

4. *Of the Declenſion.*

To *decline* a noun, is to denote certain relations of a ſelf-ſubſiſtent

ſubſiſtent thing, by means of ſimple radical ſounds, which are annexed to the word itſelf: for inſtance, *Haus*, a houſe; *Hauſes*, of a houſe; *Hauſe*, to a houſe; *Häuſer*, houſes; *Häuſern*, to the houſes, &c. The Engliſh language does not admit of theſe inflections, and by rejecting them, ſaves much trouble and inconvenience, which attend the many declenſions, and the exceptions from them prevailing in other languages. In Engliſh, therefore, ſome prepoſitions are uſed, which expreſs the inflected caſes of other languages: and as two caſes only are marked by the prepoſitions, namely the genitive or ablative of the Latin by the particle *of*, and the dative by *to*, both of them are employed like all other prepoſitions, without diſtinction of numbers, or any other circumſtance. Yet there is ſtill a veſtige of a true declenſion remaining in Engliſh, which conſiſts of what is called the *genitivus poſſeſſivus* (more properly *poſtpoſitivus*), which is pointed out by the letter *s*, and made uſe of, when the genitive ſtands before its ſubſtantive without an article; v. g. *the king's ſpeech, the queen's brother*; inſtead of "the ſpeech of the king, the brother of the queen." —It is not difficult to diſcover, that this *'s* is a veſtige of the German genitive, *des Königes Rede*. And as the Engliſh ſubſtantives have no variety of gender, this *'s* conſequently remains unaltered, of whatever gender the word may be in other languages.

II. *Of the Article.*

The article is a part of ſpeech, which ſerves to diſtinguiſh different kinds of abſoluteneſs in ſubſtantives, and is chiefly uſed with *appellatives*. Theſe mark whole kinds of things of the ſame nature; ſuch as *horſe*, *houſe*, *tree*; which, from their very extenſive application, loſe a great ſhare of their abſolute identity: or, in other words, as they are common to many owners and places, the hearer could never know, which individual horſe, houſe, or tree is meant, if this circumſtance were not determined by the article. *I have ſeen horſe*, has a very obſcure meaning, whence the hearer is neceſſarily induced to aſk, whoſe or what ſort of a horſe I have ſeen.—The pronouns and numbers, indeed, likewiſe ſerve to determine the objects, but there is yet another determination requiſite, to which they are not adapted, namely that of abſoluteneſs, which is expreſſed by the articles.

In the Engliſh grammars, *three* articles are generally enumerated; the *indefinite*, which is ſaid to conſiſt in the prepoſition *of* in the *genitive*, and *to* in the dative caſe; the *definite* expreſſed by the word *the*; and the article of unity, *a* or *an*. But this may be called true pedantry of the ſchools, by which we are led from one abſurdity to another. For 1, who will allow himſelf to conſider the words *of* and *to* as articles, ſince they are real prepoſitions, which govern their reſpective caſes. 2. If theſe particles *of* and *to* repreſent the definite article, we muſt likewiſe grant, that in the expreſſions "*of the king*" and "*to the king*," two different articles are uſed before the ſubſtantive, viz. one that is indefinite or undetermined, and another that is definite or determined, ſo that one of them neceſſarily ſuperſedes the other: this, however, is a palpable contradiction. 3. The propoſed article of unity is incorrectly expreſſed in its denomination, becauſe it is liable to be confounded with the number *one*, and has actually been confounded with it, by ſeveral Engliſh grammarians.—The definitions and explanations of the articles, which appear in the uſual French grammars, are equally erroneous. The Engliſh language admits only of *two* articles; the *definite*—*the*, and the indefinite—*an* before a vowel or mute *h*, and *a* before a conſonant. The latter, no doubt, has likewiſe a tendency to determine the ſelf-ſubſiſtent thing; but as it does this in a much weaker degree than the former, it has received the name of the indefinite or undetermined article. I. The definite article points out an individual of a kind or claſs, that is already known and ſelf-ſubſiſtent: *the emperor*, ſignifies, according to the connection of the ſentence, either the preſent reigning emperor, or that emperor, of whom we were ſpeaking laſt; conſequently this article denotes one individually determined perſon, which is ſingled out from that claſs of individuals, who are or have been emperors. II. The indefinite article *an* or *a* ſerves to mark; 1, an indefinite ſelf-ſubſiſtent thing belonging to a whole claſs, without pointing out a particular individual; v. g. "an enemy is not to be truſted," i. e. "no enemy whoever he be;" 2, the ſpecies or claſs, to which a thing belongs, as an undetermined ſelf-ſubſiſting thing, v. g. "he was killed by a ſword," i. e, "by one of the weapons called ſwords."

Without any article may be uſed; 1, proper nouns; becauſe they are already more accurately determined by means

of

of the individual, to which they refer, than they could be through the articles; v. g. *Cicero was an excellent orator*; —*all Europe is in confuſion:* excepting, however, when theſe nouns again partake of the nature of appellatives, i. e. when they may be referred to more than one thing; for inſtance, *the elder Pliny, the little James.* In like manner are the names of rivers and ſhips conſidered as appellatives, and connected with the definite article;—2, if a determined ſingle individual is meant, and the whole kind or claſs is underſtood by it, in which caſe the Germans make uſe of the definite article; v. g. *der Menſch iſt vernünftig,* "man is rational;" but in ſuch expreſſions, the Engliſh make uſe of no article:—3, if an indefinite number of ſingle things, out of a whole claſs, is to be expreſſed; or in ſuch caſes as require the indefinite article in the ſingular number;—"I want pens," in the ſingular, "I want a pen:"—and 4, if merely the claſs, kind, or matter is to be denoted; as "building is precious; or, "it is fine cloth." In all theſe inſtances, the oblique caſes of the nouns are only marked by the prepoſitions *of* and *to* in the genitive and dative, and by the ſenſe of the active verb itſelf in the accuſative, without admitting any article.

III. *Of the Adjective.*

In the German language, that which is found to be changeable in the thing itſelf, is conſidered in two different ways, namely, 1, as independent of the ſubſtantive or, at leaſt, not in immediate connection with it, in which caſe it is enunciated by the verb; v. g. *der Mann iſt gut,* "the man is good;" or 2, in immediate connection with the ſubſtantive, v. g. *der iſt ein guter Mann,* "that is a good man," where the German adjective is regularly inflected, according to the gender of the noun: while in the former caſe, it is uſed adverbially, and remains indeclinable. Hence ariſe two parts of ſpeech, namely the adverb of quality, and the adjective, or the word expreſſive of the property of the thing, which is derived from the former, by means of the concrete ſyllables *e* for the feminine, *er* for the maſculine, and *es* for the neuter gender, or with the ſimple vowel *e* for all the three genders, when the definite article is connected with the noun. And as the German ſubſtantives not only mark different genders, but alſo the oblique caſes, it may be eaſily inferred, that the adjectives are liable

liable to ſimilar inflections; a circumſtance, which is attended with conſiderable difficulties to foreigners, who apply themſelves to the ſpeaking and writing of that language. In Engliſh, a much eaſier and ſhorter method is practiſed, ſince the adverb of quality is, in no reſpect, different from the adjective, and may be combined with the ſubſtantive, without any inflection: thus it remains uniformly in the ſame termination, whether we ſay, "the prince is powerful," or "the powerful prince." Hence, too, the adjectives diſtinguiſh no plural; and as the Engliſh ſubſtantives mark no gender, and are of themſelves indeclinable, the adjectives likewiſe cannot be inflected, and are in this reſpect throughout managed like adverbs.

The only inflections, of which adjectives are capable, are the degrees of compariſon, which are formed nearly upon the plan of the German, by adding to the poſitive degree the ſyllable *er*, in order to make the comparative; and the ſyllable *eſt*, to form the ſuperlative: but very frequently theſe two degrees are expreſſed by prefixing to the ſimple adjectives the reſpective adverbs *more* and *moſt*.

IV. *Of numerical words.*

The words denoting numbers are rarely introduced into Engliſh grammars, as particular parts of ſpeech, and frequently they are not at all mentioned: we muſt nevertheleſs attend to ſeveral peculiarities in the uſe of them. As, with reſpect to the idea combined with them, they are remarkably different from all other parts of ſpeech, they certainly deſerve to be ſeparately treated.—Numbers denote nothing that is diſcoverable in the things themſelves, as is the caſe with the preceding part of ſpeech; but they eſtabliſh a circumſtance, namely that of numerical computation. Beſide this peculiarity, they are alſo diſtinguiſhed from the uſual words denoting circumſtances, by their immediate connexion with the ſubſtantive, while the former can be predicated of ſubſtantives, by means of verbs only. Grammarians ought to diſtinguiſh the different ſpecies of numerical words, ſince they ſignify either abſolute number without any collateral idea, viz. the *radical* or *cardinal* numbers, which may again be divided into *definite* and *indefinite*; or they are connected with the collateral ideas of order or ſucceſſion, claſſification, proportion, &c.

All

All theſe words are liable to many peculiar applications, which, however, properly belong to the province of grammar.

V. *Of the Pronouns.*

Pronouns are words determining the ſubſtantives, and denoting thoſe changeable relations, which are indicated in the very act of ſpeaking, and the principal of which concerns the relative condition of the perſon. They are as various as the relations pointed out by them; namely,

1, *perſonal*, which refer to perſons only. Theſe may be farther 1,) *definite*, which are again divided according to the three perſons, and according as each of them is in the ſingular or plural number. The firſt and ſecond perſons are ſufficiently determined by the relation, in which they appear in ſpeech; hence there is no farther neceſſity for pointing out their gender. But the third perſon is, of itſelf, wholly undetermined; and for this reaſon its gender is marked in the ſingular number, by different words for each of the three genders. Yet as the Engliſh ſubſtantives, in general, expreſs no peculiar gender, the third perſonal pronoun ſerves only to denote the phyſical gender of the perſon; for this reaſon all ſuch things, as cannot be diſtinguiſhed by being phyſically of the maſculine or feminine gender, receive the imperſonal pronoun *it*; 2,) *indefinite*, among which this undetermined ſyllable *it* occupies the firſt rank; a ſyllable, which indicates a determined ſubject in ſo undecided a manner, that it does not poſitively follow, whether a perſon or a thing is underſtood by it: v. g. "*it* is ſaid; *it* was Mr Pope; *it* is I." —In like manner is uſed the improper pronoun *one*, in as far as it correſponds with the German pronoun *man* or *jemand*, "ſomebody;" v. g. to love *one*.

2. *Reciprocal* pronouns, which properly belong to the former claſs, and are only uſed, when the predicate is again referred to the ſubject: "I love myſelf," &c.

3. *Poſſeſſive* pronouns ſerve to determine the relation of poſſeſſion, with reſpect to the perſon. They are either *conjunctive*, when immediately combined with their ſubſtantives, "my houſe, your father;" or *abſolute*, when they are predicated of ſubſtantives by means of a verb, as likewiſe in anſwering a queſtion: v. g. "this houſe is mine; —whoſe father called?—yours." The poſſeſſive pronoun

or

of the third perſon is, like the perſonal pronoun, again diſtinguiſhed according to its phyſical gender, ſo that *his* and *her* are uſed of things, which by the laws of nature are of the maſculine or feminine gender; and in all other caſes the poſſeſſive pronoun *its*.

4. *Demonſtrative* pronouns, which denote the relation of the place with reſpect to the ſpeaker, ſo that the neareſt place is expreſſed by the words, *this* in the ſingular or *theſe* in the plural, and the moſt remote, by the reſpective words *that* or *thoſe*.

5. *Determinative* pronouns, which aſcertain the ſubject, to which a ſentence is referred by means of the ſubſequent reciprocal pronoun. To this number belong, partly the perſonal pronouns *he* and *ſhe*, when they are uſed in a determinate ſenſe, v. g. "he that, or who, fights with ſilver arms;" partly the pronoun *ſuch*, in which caſe it is accompanied by the particle *as*: "ſuch as are loyal, &c."; partly alſo the "pronoun of identity," *the ſame*, with its further determinations, *the very ſame*, *the ſelf ſame*, and *the very*.

6. *Relative* pronouns, which bring back the ſentence to a ſubject, either previouſly pointed out, or connected with a determinative pronoun; of which claſs are, *who*, *which*, *what*, and *that*.

7. *Interrogative* pronouns ſerve to introduce a queſtion, for which purpoſe we make uſe of the relative pronouns, *who*, *which*, and *what*.

The pronouns, in general, and the perſonal pronouns, in particular, are very irregular in their inflection. This peculiarity is remarkable, not only in the Engliſh, but likewiſe in all the languages hitherto diſcovered: for the pronouns may be claſſed among the moſt ancient words in ſpeech; their origin muſt be traced in the primitive ages, when the language of every nation was yet in its infant ſtate.

A number of other pronouns are commonly enumerated in grammars under the name of *pronomina indefinita*; but as they expreſs none of the relations denoted by pronouns, they cannot be reduced to any of the claſſes before ſpecified. Beſides, many of them are ſo pointedly determined, that no rational being will conſider them as indefinite; for inſtance, *all*, *whole*, *each*, *neither*, *every*, &c. By far the greater part of them rather belong to the claſs of general numbers, viz. *all*, *any*, *ſome*, *both*, *each*, *either*, *neither*, *every*, *few*, *much*, *no*, *none*.

Some

Some again, as *whole*, *certain*, *other*, are with more propriety ranked among the adjectives; and others as *ever* and *never*, are in reality adverbs.

VI. *Of the verb.*

The verb is, in all languages, the most artificial and the most difficult part of speech; because men have contrived to point out, in immediate connection with it, very different and multiplied relations. To denote these relations properly, in the various inflections of the verb, is called by grammarians, *to conjugate*. The verbs are divided into different species, arising partly from their *signification*, partly from their *use*, and partly also from their *conjugation*.

With respect to their *signification*, they attribute something to an object, which can either be conceived immediately in it, and in this case they are called *intransitive*, sometimes too, but not very properly, *neuter* verbs; or they imply something that takes place externally to it, *transitive* verbs; when two self-subsistent things are required, the one of which is in an active, and the other in a passive state. On this account, in many languages, the transitive verbs have two different forms; namely the *active*, when the subject is in an active state, and the *passive*, when it is suffering. The *reciprocal* verbs are true transitives, with this exception only, that the predicate is brought back to the subject, by means of a pronoun.

With respect to the *use*, the verbs are either *personal*, when their subject is determined, or *impersonal*, when it cannot be ascertained, and consequently is something unknown. Farther, they are either *perfect*, when they can be used in all the different relations, in which the predicate can be placed towards the subject; or *defective*, when they are used only in some of these relations.

With respect to the *conjugation*, the verbs are called *regular*, when all their relative states can be expressed conformably to one rule; or *irregular*, when they deviate from the established rule.

The relations, circumstances, and collateral notions, which mankind have contrived to express by the verb, are very numerous. The principal of them are as follows.

1. The *form* of the word, whether a verb is *transitive*, or *intransitive*; and in the former case, whether it is *active* or *passive*.

2. The *mood* or the manner, in which the predicate is ſtated concerning the ſubject. This may be done, a,) in a poſitive manner, implying truth and certainty; hence the *indicative mood*; b,) in an uncertain and doubtful manner, the *conjunctive*; c,) by way of command, the *imperative*; and d,) without any reference to the perſon, the *infinitive*.—The participle, which is ſometimes conſidered as a peculiar mood, deſerves no place here; ſince it is properly an adjective derived from the verb, and carrying with it the collateral idea of time.
3. The *time*, in which the predicate belongs to the ſubject. This ſtrictly conſiſts of three periods only, namely the *preſent*, *paſt*, and *future*; but as the two laſt are ſuſceptible of a great variety of farther determinations, not indeed ariſing from their own nature, but from the various relations of ſpeech, many languages expreſs theſe in the verb itſelf; and thus the *paſt* time is again divided into three tenſes, the *imperfect*, *perfect*, and *pluperfect*; in a ſimilar manner the *future* is again reſolved into ſeveral ſpecies.
4. The *number* of the perſons of the ſubject; and laſtly,
5. The *ſpecies* of the perſon itſelf, whether it is the firſt, ſecond, or third.

To expreſs all theſe circumſtances and relations in the verb itſelf, agreeable to the method adopted in every language, is by grammarians called, *to conjugate*. Under this expreſſion, however, we underſtand only this much, that all the relations, above ſtated, ought to be expreſſed by means of proper ſyllables of inflection, attached to the root of the verb itſelf; and in this proceſs, the Engliſh language is remarkably ſimple and eaſy. It admits only of *one form* and *one gender*; for the *intranſitive* verbs are likewiſe conjugated in the *active* form; in this there are only three *moods*, the *indicative*, the *imperative* and the *infinitive*: in the indicative we make uſe of two tenſes, viz. the *preſent*, and a ſpecies of the paſt, the *imperfect*; but in the imperative, and infinitive, of one tenſe only: in both tenſes of the indicative, there appear *two numbers*, and in each of theſe, three perſons, which however can be only imperfectly marked by the verb itſelf; a deficiency, which renders the prefixing of the pronouns neceſſary.

To denote the remaining relations, the Engliſh are obliged to make uſe of circumlocution, or of indirect expreſſions furniſhed them by certain verbs, that generally indicate ſome collateral

lateral circumſtances, and on this account are called *auxiliary words*; becauſe they ſerve to expreſs thoſe relations, in the formation of which the Engliſh verbs are deficient. Theſe then conſiſt of the verbs, *to be*, for the paſſive form; *I may*, for the conjunctive; *to have*, for the paſt; and *I ſhall*, for the future tenſes;—although ſeveral other auxiliary verbs are commonly enumerated. But, as the whole of this *periphraſtical conjugation* has been formed merely upon the plan of the more complete Latin inflection of verbs, thoſe above ſpecified will anſwer the preſent purpoſe; ſince any other method of conjugating verbs, if carried on by auxiliary words, is in every reſpect periphraſtical.

I cannot here enter upon the extenſive application and the uſe of theſe auxiliary words; and therefore I ſhall only obſerve, that the *tranſitive* verbs, in the German language, are divided into two claſſes, according as the ideas expreſſed by them partake more of the active or paſſive meaning. In the former caſe, they are accompanied by the auxiliary verb *haben*, "to have;" in the latter, by *ſeyn*, "to be;" v. g. *er hat geſchlafen*, "he has ſlept;" but in another inſtance, *er iſt geneſen*, "he is recovered." This diſtinction, however, does not prevail in Engliſh, where all tranſitives are inflected by the auxiliary verb, *to have*, without attending to their ſignification.—*Regular* verbs are ſuch as preſerve the radical ſyllable unchanged, and in which the inflection is carried on, in an uniform manner, by means of fixed terminating ſyllables. *Irregular* verbs either deviate from the eſtabliſhed ſyllable of inflection, or they frequently want it altogether; for inſtance, *I burſt*; imperf. *I burſt*; participle, *burſt* or *burſten*; or the inflection takes place in the radical ſyllable itſelf; *I bleed*; imperf. *I bled*; participle, *bled*; or where both deviations occur in the ſame verb; *I beſeech*; imperf. *I beſought*; partic *beſeeched* or *beſought*. The irregular verbs are, in all languages, the moſt ancient and the moſt original: in tracing the nature and origin of them, we muſt reſort to the higher branches of etymology. In Engliſh we find the irregular verbs throughout derived from the Saxo-Daniſh, in which language they likewiſe appear in the irregular form; as, on the other hand, the verbs formed from the French and Latin uniformly follow the regular inflection.

VII. *Of the Particles.*

The particles furniſh a ſubject of inquiry, that would be inconſiſtent with the limits of this Eſſay. They are throughout conſidered as adverbs; ſince they denote either a circumſtance in general, in which caſe the preciſe meaning of them reſults from thoſe parts of ſpeech, with which they are immediately connected; or they point out a circumſtance of itſelf, and independent of any other part of ſpeech, in which ſituation they are called adverbs; or they relate to particular kinds of circumſtances: thus the *prepoſitions* denote the relation ſubſiſting between two ſubſtantives, in which relation they have been placed by the verb; as the *conjunctions* mark the relation between ſentences and their members.—The laſt part of ſpeech, with which grammarians conclude their taſk, compriſes the *interjections*. They expreſs the various ſenſations or emotions of the mind, ſimply as ſuch, and may be divided according to the various kinds of theſe emotions. There are however ſome words, i. e. expreſſions of clear ideas, which are occaſionally uſed to denote mere ſenſations; for inſtance, "O ſad! well a day!" and for this reaſon they cannot, with ſtrict propriety, be called interjections.

Concluſion.

Since my intention, throughout the whole of this treatiſe, has been no other, but to ſhew in a curſory manner, that the Engliſh grammar is leſs arbitrary, and more ſuſceptible of rational treatment, than many philologers imagine, I muſt content myſelf, for the preſent, with this ſhort ſpecimen.

If teachers and learners ſhould gradually adopt this method of etymological reaſoning, it will be eaſy to apply it to the ſyntax; which, independently of this conſideration, is much eaſier and more conciſe in Engliſh than in other languages; becauſe the words, in the former, are deprived of nearly the whole of their inflection. Indeed, by far the moſt eſſential buſineſs in the ſyntax conſiſts, partly of a rational method of conſtructing the *ſeries of words*, in which the Engliſh language much reſembles the German; partly of the proper uſe of the participles, which diſplay many peculiarities in the conſtruction of that language.

ESSAY

ESSAY THIRD.

On the relative merits aud demerits of Johnſon's English Dictionary.

THE Engliſh are in poſſeſſion of a very copious Dictionary of their language, with which the late DR. SAMUEL JOHNSON has preſented them, and of which the fourth edition appeared (London, 1773) with ſome additions, in two large Folio Volumes, compriſing upwards of thirty Alphabets, or 716 Sheets of letter-preſs *.

As the completeneſs of this work, together with the critical and philoſophic manner, which the author follows, has been frequently the ſubject of great praiſe, not only in England, but alſo in other countries, by recommending it as a model of a uſeful Dictionary for any language; I was induced to think, that an accurate abridgment of this work might of itſelf ſuffice, to ſupply ſo important a defect in German literature. Nor indeed had I directed my views further, when I reſolved upon publiſhing an Engliſh-German Dictionary, deſigned chiefly for the uſe of my countrymen. But upon a more minute inquiry into the merits of Johnſon's work, I very ſoon diſcovered, that this performance, notwithſtanding the many advantages it poſſeſſes, is replete with great imperfections.—As theſe imperfections are of ſuch a nature, as to exhibit themſelves more remarkably in an abridgment, tranſlated into German, than they perhaps do appear in the original; and as the principal utility, which the Germans expect from ſuch an undertaking, might thus have been much diminiſhed, I was obliged to ſubmit to a more arduous taſk than I was, at firſt, inclined to undertake.

This aſſertion will not be conſidered as unjuſt, when I ſhall point out, individually, the principal requiſites to a Dictionary, and remark upon every point, how far *Johnſon* has performed

* This computation is made from the firſt Edition, Lond. 1755.

formed his duty, and wherein *I* have endeavoured to improve upon him.

1. In the number of words.
2. In the value and dignity of every word, whether it be quite obſolete or current; and in the latter caſe, whether it is uſed in the more elevated, poetical, ſocial, or vulgar ſtyle.
3. In the grammatical nature of the word, to which I alſo refer the orthography, the mark of the accent, and the pronunciation.
4. In the etymology or derivation.
5. In the decompoſition of the principal idea denoted by the word;—either by means of a definition, or by a ſynonymous *German* word;—and in the analyſis of the different ſignifications.
6. In the illuſtration of words by examples; and,
7. In the grammatical combination, or the uſe of every word, with reſpect to the ſyntax.

Conformable to this diviſion of the ſubject, I ſhall offer ſome remarks upon each of theſe particular points.

I. Concerning the number and the practical uſe of words I expected to find the work of Johnſon in its greateſt perfection. In a book, conſiſting of 2864 pages, large folio, and four times reprinted, I hoped to meet with the whole treaſure, or at leaſt with the moſt neceſſary and current words, of the Engliſh language. But, in this reſpect, my diſappointment was great; and thoſe, who have conſulted Johnſon's Dictionary with the ſame view, will agree with me, that upon this very point he diſplays his weakeſt ſide. We muſt however do him the juſtice to allow, that with reſpect to terms of ſcience, and written language, his work is very complete; but it is defective in ſocial language, in the language of civil life, and in the terms of arts and manufactures. His defect in the laſt-mentioned branches, the author himſelf acknowledges in the preface, and makes this ſtrange apology for it, "that he found it impoſſible to frequent the work-ſhops of mechanics, the mines, magazines, ſhip-yards, &c. in order to inquire into the different terms and phraſes, which are peculiar to theſe purſuits." Yet this is a great deſideratum to foreigners, and conſiderably detracts from the merit of a work of this nature; for theſe are the preciſe caſes, in which they have moſt frequent occaſion for conſulting a Dictionary. To

this

this head we may refer the names of plants, fiſhes, birds, and inſects, frequently occurring in common life, of which a great number are wanting in the work of Johnſon; though this deficiency might have been moſt eaſily ſupplied, as there certainly is no want of botanical books and publications on Natural Hiſtory, in the Engliſh language. In order to ſhow the extent of this deficiency, in a particular inſtance, I ſhall only remark, that in the ſingle work containing the laſt voyage of Capt. Cook, in two moderate volumes, octavo, (publiſhed 1782) there occur nearly one hundred words, relating partly to navigation, partly to Natural Hiſtory, that cannot be found in Johnſon's or other Dictionaries.

It will be admitted, that a dictionary of a language ought to poſſeſs the greateſt poſſible degree of completeneſs, particularly with reſpect to names and technical terms, which are more rarely employed in common language, and the meaning of which cannot be conjectured from the context. As ſuch words frequently become an object of reſearch, I have found myſelf under the diſagreeable neceſſity of filling up theſe chaſms, as far as my time, my plan, and my ſources of information would admit. Thus I have increaſed the ſtock of words, occurring in Johnſon's and other Engliſh Dictionaries of diſtinguiſhed merit, with a great number (perhaps ſeveral thouſands) of words which were wanting; eſpecially ſuch as concern the objects of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, of the Engliſh conſtitution, and of various other departments. With regard to the laws, manners, and cuſtoms of England, I have availed myſelf of the well known work of Entick.

The proper names of countries, places, and perſons, when deviating from the genuine orthography, I have likewiſe more correctly ſtated, and added ſuch as have been omitted in Johnſon's and other dictionaries.

For the improvement of terms in ſocial language, I am much indebted to Boyer's Engliſh and French Dictionary. But as I had, in this reſpect, placed more confidence in Johnſon than I could juſtify after a careful examination of his work; and as, on this account, I did not beſtow the portion of time requiſite to a cloſe compariſon with other Dictionaries, I readily confeſs, that there remains much to be done yet, eſpecially with the aſſiſtance of the lateſt Engliſh productions in the department of Belles Lettres. For, in latter times, the

Engliſh

Engliſh language appears to have undergone the ſame changes as the French and German.

II. It is well known, that all the words of a language do not poſſeſs an equal value or degree of currency: ſome of them are entirely obſolete, but ſtill occur in writings, which are ſtudied in modern times, for inſtance, in the tranſlation of the Bible, in Shakeſpeare, Spencer, &c.; others are peculiar to poetical language; again, others are current only in certain provinces, or in particular ſituations of life; and ſtill others are vulgar, and exploded from the more dignified written ſtyle, as well as from the polite circles of converſation. It is one of Johnſon's great merits, that he has carefully attended to this diſtinction; I have likewiſe marked it, in my Engliſh and German Dictionary, with equal attention; and I have pointed out the moſt neceſſary of theſe diſtinctions, by means of particular ſigns or characters.

III. Next to the preceding, I conſider the grammatical deſignation of every word as the moſt important part of a good Dictionary: and under this head I place not only the orthography, the accentuation, and pronunciation, but alſo the claſſification of a word, to whatever claſs it belongs as a part of ſpeech, and finally, its inflection; whether it be regularly or irregularly declined or conjugated. Upon this point, alſo, Johnſon is in moſt inſtances very correct; excepting that he does not always diſtinguiſh the ſubſtantive from the adverb, and this again from the adjective; an imperfection which, with the aid of ſome general ideas of grammar, I have had no great difficulty to remedy.—In the ſpelling of words, Johnſon has adopted the method prevalent among all ſenſible people, and conſigned the orthographic diſputes to thoſe, who, from want of more important knowledge, have no other means of obtaining reputation. For my part, I ſaw no reaſon for differing from Johnſon on this head.—The proper accentuation is, in the Engliſh language, one of the moſt difficult points. The cauſes of this difficulty muſt be obvious from the remarks upon the accent, which I have premiſed in the ſecond Eſſay. The greater number of Engliſh Dictionaries, therefore, have conſidered it as neceſſary, to mark that ſyllable, which is accentuated in a word. Nevertheleſs, they have committed the common error, that the reader is never certain, whether an accentuated ſyllable muſt be pronounced with the grave i. e. extended, or acute, i. e. ſhort tone of the voice; for inſtance, *blóod and róom*, are

are marked with the same accent; though the former be pronounced short, and the latter long. In this matter I have followed Johnson, nearly as far as the middle of the letter A; but as the true pronunciation is thus very imperfectly marked; and as I was successful enough to discover this common error, I began very early to differ from him and his colleagues; and, consequently, from the middle of the first letter, I have endeavoured to distinguish carefully the *length* of an accentuated syllable by a mark drawn from the left towards the right, and the *shortness* of it by a mark running from the right towards the left.—In the remaining part of grammatical determinations of words, I have followed Johnson as my guide, and carefully distinguished the neuter from the active form of verbs: though, in a few instances, I have been induced to differ from him, when he had mistaken the neutral use of an active verb for a neuter verb.

IV. The proximate derivation of a word is a matter of importance in all languages; for upon this circumstance depends not only the full idea or intelligibility of words, but likewise their orthography. Johnson has sensibly perceived this difficulty, and consequently has shortly pointed out the immediate derivatives, "in cases where he was acquainted with them;" and I must add, "that he has done it in such a manner as appeared to him the most proper." For, upon this particular head, his Dictionary is very defective. When an English word is derived from the French or Latin, he does not easily mistake its proximate root: in words, that are obvious derivatives of familiar Anglo-Saxon terms, he is equally successful. But in most other cases, he proves himself a shallow etymologist: and as his own notions of the origin of languages were not very clear, he is frequently led into great errors. Thus he considers the words, with whose origin he is unacquainted, either as *fortuitous* and *cant words*, or he derives them frequently in the absurdest manner from words nearly corresponding in sound, while he aims at explaining them in three or four different ways; for instance, "to *chirp*," derived from, "to chear up, to make cheerful, &c." yet this word obviously comes from the vernacular German, *tschirpen* or *zirpen*, "to twitter like birds." This may serve as a specimen of the manner, in which he searches for the source of one river in the mouth of another, which is altogether different from the former. Here I have had frequent opportunities of correcting

him; particularly as SKINNER was his principal hero in etymology, and as Johnson himself was unacquainted with the German and other languages related to it. But in cases, where the derivation of a word required laborious researches, such as would have occupied much room to little purpose, I have rather passed it over altogether, because the like words are generally considered as radicals, or as proper names. And as the object expressed by a word of this kind must be represented by a sensible exhibition of the thing itself, the method of rendering it intelligible, by a probable derivation, is but a negative advantage; though the etymology of it might be established by a far-fetched analogy with other words.

Upon this occasion, I cannot omit mentioning a circumstance of some importance to the philosophic inquirer into the structure of languages. There are, in English, as well as in all other languages, a great number of words, which are pronounced and written perfectly analogous to one another; although it can be proved, that they are derived from very different roots. Such are, for instance, the German words, *Bär*, *Bock*, *Hund*, *Katze*, &c. and the English words, "arm, buxom, cock, &c." To consider words of the same sound as of common origin, and to treat them as such, discovers a very superficial knowledge in languages: besides, this method is attended with the singular effect of misleading the ignorant, who form the strangest combinations of ideas, when they attempt to derive the different significations and applications of a word from *one* common root. Johnson was aware of this impropriety, but he has not always been successful enough in obviating it. Hence we frequently meet with such a number of significations crowded upon the same word, that it is a matter of astonishment, how they happened to meet under the same head. For this reason, I have separated the different significations of monotonous words by means of numbers, and have endeavoured to show the derivation of each, when I was enabled to do this in a satisfactory manner.

V. To ascertain the principal and peculiar signification of a word, from which the others, if there be any, must be derived, has been my next employment. This, indeed, is always the most difficult point in a Dictionary; a point, which not only presupposes correct ideas of the origin of languages, but also the most precise knowledge of every word, and of its use from the earliest periods. The whole of this knowledge must

muſt be founded upon a ſufficient number of works, written by men who lived in the different ages, in which the language was ſpoken. But as we poſſeſs no ſuch number of works in any language, as is ſufficient to make us acquainted with all the words, that are or have been current in it; it may be eaſily conjectured, that the primitive ſignification of every word cannot be pointed out with preciſion. But even in caſes where this is poſſible, it requires the moſt careful examination of all the ancient monuments of a language, that are ſtill preſerved, together with much ſound philoſophy, in order to avoid falling into dreams and fancies, and deriving, in an arbitrary manner, the words from one another. In etymology, as ſoon as it carried him beyond the proximate derivation of a word, my predeceſſor has not been very ſucceſsful. For, even in the latter caſe, he relied too much upon the authority of others; and it evidently appears from his Dictionary, that the ſtructure of language did not induce him to philoſophical inquiries. On this account, we can form no great expectations, and we muſt be ſatisfied with his claſſification of the different meanings of words, ſo as they in every inſtance appeared to him moſt proper. His want of knowledge in etymology, however, is attended with this advantage, that it has guarded him againſt a thouſand follies, to which the pſeudo-etymologiſts, of all languages and climates, are very liable.

As a foreigner, I could not eaſily remedy this deficiency in the claſſification of words, unleſs it had been my inclination to proceed upon arbitrary principles, which ought not to be introduced into the philoſophy of language. Yet I have corrected another, perhaps more important, error. Johnſon is uncommonly liberal with a variety of ſignifications, particularly in ſuch words as are frequently uſed; for in theſe, the ſignifications pointed out *by him*, are almoſt endleſs. Thus he has given *ſeventy* different ſignifications of the verb, *to go*; *ſixty-nine* of the verb, *to ſtand*; &c. and he might, without great difficulty, have produced the double of that number, if he had proceeded upon a ſimilar plan.—In theſe verbs, as well as in many hundred other caſes, Johnſon has obviouſly and uniformly confounded the various applications of one and the ſame meaning, with the different ſignifications themſelves. Hence I found it neceſſary, to reduce many of his ſignifications to one general idea, and thus to ſave the reader the trouble of ſearching for the accurate idea of the word in queſ-

tion among a number of similar ideas, and of frequently missing the true meaning of the word altogether. In order to perceive this inconvenience, I request the reader to compare with one another the words, *ground*, *form*, and many others of a similar tendency.

It is a very common practice among the compilers of Dictionaries, to point out the signification of a word, by means of a synonymous expression used in another language. A small share of correct philological knowledge must convince every one of the impropriety and disadvantage of this practice. There are no words completely synonymous in any language; nor can any two words, from different languages, be considered as synonymous. And although in languages, that bear strong marks of affinity to one another, there should be two words of common origin, or even radically the same, such as "ground" with the German *Grund*; "to go," with the German *gehen*; they still deviate in the indirect significations, or, at least, in the application to individual cases. The safest and most rational method, therefore, is to resolve every signification into other words, or to give a clear and, if possible, concise definition of it. I am sensible, that in this manner the idea of a word cannot be exhausted, nor is it possible to point out this idea with all its shades and subtle modifications. I further admit, that this developement of the idea is not in all instances practicable; since the meaning of a word, in many cases, is so obscure that it cannot be made perspicuous. Yet, at the same time, where this expedient is applicable, it affords the most certain method of exhibiting a competent notion of every word and its significations; while it serves to promote a clear and just knowledge of things in general. This, therefore, is one of the most important advantages of Johnson's Dictionary: for the author possessed a very happy talent of displaying the idea of a word in a concise, intelligible, and pertinent manner. In this respect, I have throughout followed him as my guide, except where I was obliged to contract the significations of words, which he had unnecessarily accumulated, and consequently to search for an appropriate and more comprehensive idea.

Johnson has not avoided the common error of lexicographers, who have either neglected to state the names of plants and animals, or have done it in a very vague and undetermined manner. He commonly dismisses the names of vegetables with the addition, "*a plant*." Thus he forsakes the reader, where

a guide is moſt anxiouſly looked for. I have endeavoured to ſupply this deficiency, by adding a number of names from the three kingdoms of nature, together with the ſyſtematic name of Linnæus, to every plant, in order to prevent any miſtakes. As the Germans, according to the different provinces, make uſe of a variety of names for one and the ſame plant, the addition of the Linnæan name was indiſpenſable. It is now to be hoped, that none of their numerous tranſlators from the Engliſh, will, in future, be induced to tranſlate the word "pine-apple," *ananas*, by the German expreſſions "*Tannzapfen*, or *Fichtenapfel*," which ſignify the reſpective productions of the fir- and pine-trees; *Abies*, and *Pinus Lin.*; while the pine-apple is the produce of the *Bromelia Ananas Lin.* Such miſtakes have been frequently committed in German books on gardening; and, in the imperfect ſtate of the Engliſh-German Dictionaries hitherto publiſhed, it was not an eaſy matter to avoid them.

VI. In order to ſupply the imperfect definitions of words, the ſignification of which cannot be fully collected from the notion contained in the definition, it is a neceſſary point in a Dictionary, to illuſtrate them by examples. From theſe illuſtrations, this additional advantage reſults, that the grammatical uſe of a word, and its combination with other parts of ſpeech, can be rendered more conſpicuous. Johnſon is very liberal with his examples, and not unfrequently prodigal to exceſs. The greater number of them, he has extracted from poetical works, as he had employed much of his time in publiſhing the Engliſh poets. I have made it my ſtudy, to hold a middle courſe, and to ſelect from the rich ſtore of Johnſon's examples the moſt conciſe and pertinent, eſpecially in ſuch caſes as appeared to require an example, to ſhow the preciſe meaning or the grammatical uſe of a word. As, however, his examples and the whole ſtock of his words principally relate to the language of authors or "written language;" I have endeavoured to ſupply the obvious want of examples for the purpoſes of ſocial life, from the above quoted Engliſh and French Dictionary, by BOYER; a work, the phraſes and exemplifications of which are principally of the latter kind.

VII. Concerning the practical application of words, when in connexion with others, Johnſon has beſtowed great attention upon the moſt important caſes, in which every word may occur. His accuracy in this reſpect has induced me to adopt his

his examples, without attempting to change or improve them.

To conclude this account, I ſhall add ſome remarks, which excluſively concern the publication of my own Dictionary.—It is a common error of the moſt, if not of all, Dictionaries which appear with German explanations, that the authors of them not only pay no attention whatever to the propriety and dignity of the German expreſſions and phraſes, but likewiſe that they are very ſtudious to find the moſt abſurd and vulgar words in the German, and to make uſe of them for the illuſtration of foreign words; though the latter ſhould not hold out the leaſt inducement to this outrage. The injury thus occaſioned to inexperienced ſtudents of languages, who moſt frequently ſtand in need of ſuch books, is much greater than is commonly imagined; becauſe their taſte or intellectual diſcernment is thereby for ever depraved. And what muſt be the ideas of foreigners, reſpecting the German (as they cannot avoid making uſe of ſuch books), when they diſcover in them the eſſence of all that is obſcene and vulgar, inſtead of the more poliſhed language of authors? What muſt an Engliſhman think of us, when he finds in our Engliſh German Dictionaries, "gormandizer" tranſlated *Saumagen;* "to gormandize," *ein Saumagen ſeyn;* "gangrel," *ein groſſe lange Strunze.* Similar indecencies occur in every page. A ſmall degree of common ſenſe would have prevented the inſertion of this traſh into our Dictionaries, while it would have taught the compilers, to render the expreſſion with becoming dignity. I have exerted myſelf to ſhun the like inelegant terms and phraſes, even in thoſe caſes where the Engliſh word might have afforded an opportunity of uſing them; for I have rather ſubmitted to the taſk of circumlocution, than to the propagation of mean and indecent words.

There is another remark to be made, relative to the orthography of the Engliſh. Johnſon has given a ſeparate analyſis of every compound word, after having firſt printed the words in a combined ſtate. In order to ſave room and trouble, I have thought proper to point out the compound words immediately in the order of the alphabet. For this purpoſe I have almoſt throughout the whole (for in ſome inſtances I may have overlooked it) divided ſuch words in the ſpelling, as "hopeleſs,

leſs, black-ſmith, &c. though theſe words ſhould be read and conſidered as inſeparable *.

The following Extract from a Critical Eſſay originally publiſhed in the Edinburgh Review for 1755, will, it is hoped, be acceptable to the reader; as the ideas contained in it very nearly coincide with thoſe advanced by Mr. ADELUNG; and as it is now underſtood to be the production of the celebrated Dr. ADAM SMITH.

'A Dictionary of the Engliſh language, however uſeful, or rather neceſſary, has never been hitherto attempted with the leaſt degree of ſucceſs. To explain hard words and terms of art, ſeems to have been the chief purpoſe of all the former compoſitions, which have borne the title of Engliſh dictionaries. Mr Johnſon has extended his views much farther, and has made a very full collection of all the different meanings of each Engliſh word, juſtified by examples from authors of good reputation. When we compare this book with other dictionaries, the merit of its author appears very extraordinary. Thoſe which in modern languages have gained the moſt eſteem, are that of the French academy, and that of the academy Della Cruſca. Both theſe were compoſed by a numerous ſociety of learned men, and took up a longer time in the compoſition, than the life of a ſingle perſon could well have afforded. The Dictionary of the Engliſh language is the work of a ſingle perſon, and compoſed in a period of time very inconſiderable, when compared with the extent of the work. The collection of words appears to be very accurate, and muſt be allowed to be very ample. Moſt words, we believe, are to be found in the Dictionary, that ever were almoſt ſuſpected to be Engliſh; but we cannot help wiſhing, that the author had truſted leſs to the judgment of thoſe who may conſult him, and had oftener paſſed his own cenſure upon thoſe words which are not of approved uſe, though ſometimes to be met with

* This method of pointing out compounded words is profeſſedly contrived to ſave room and the repetition of words; yet, at the ſame time, it is unavoidably attended with this diſadvantage, that it may induce foreigners, to conſider *all* thoſe words, which are printed with a ſign of diviſion, as ſeparable compounds.—Mr. Adelung might have eaſily obviated this inconvenience, by uſing different marks of ſeparation for thoſe compounds, the parts of which are written ſeparately, as "party-man;" and for thoſe, that are contracted into one word, as "ſpite-ful."

with in authors of no mean name.—Where a work is admitted to be highly uſeful, and the execution of it intitled to praiſe; the adding, that it might have been more uſeful, can ſcarcely, we hope, be deemed a cenſure of it. The merit of this Dictionary is ſo great, that it cannot detract from it, to take notice of ſome defects, the ſupplying which, would, in our judgment, add a conſiderable ſhare of merit to that which it already poſſeſſes. Theſe defects conſiſt chiefly in the plan, which appears to us not to be ſufficiently grammatical. The different ſignifications of a word are indeed collected; but they are ſeldom digeſted into ſeveral claſſes, or ranged under the meaning which the word principally expreſſes; and ſufficient care has not been taken to diſtinguiſh the words apparently ſynonymous.'

'It can import no reflection upon Mr. Johnſon's Dictionary, that the ſubject has been viewed in a different light by others; and it is at leaſt a matter of curioſity to conſider the different views, in which it appears. Any man who is about to compoſe a dictionary, or rather a grammar of the Engliſh language, muſt acknowledge himſelf indebted to Mr. J. for abridging at leaſt one half of his labour. All thoſe who are under any difficulty, with reſpect to a particular word or phraſe, are in the ſame ſituation. The Dictionary preſents them a full collection of examples; from whence indeed they are left to determine; but by which the determination is rendered eaſy. In this country *, the uſefulneſs of it will be ſoon felt, as there is no ſtandard of correct language in converſation. If our recommendation could in any degree incite to the peruſal of it, we would earneſtly recommend it to all thoſe who are deſirous to improve and correct their language, frequently to conſult the Dictionary. Its merits muſt be determined by the frequent reſort, that is had to it. This is the moſt unerring teſt of its value: criticiſms may be falſe, private judgments ill-founded; but if a work of this nature be much in uſe, it has received the ſanction of the public approbation.'

* Scotland.

FINIS.

SPECIMEN

OF AN

IDENTICAL DICTIONARY

OF THE

GERMAN, ENGLISH, FRENCH, AND LATIN LANGUAGES.

Note. *All thoſe compounded words, which are eaſily explained from their conſtituent parts, are here purpoſely omitted.—The vocables firſt ſtated, after the German, expreſs the moſt literal ſenſe.—Subſtantives, without a number referring to the declenſion, are indeclinable; the numbers mark the* five *German declenſions.—Further, the aſteriſk* (*) *points out thoſe ſubſtantives, which change their* firſt *vowel into a diphthong, when uſed in the plural number*;—a. a. *ſtands for adverbial adjective*;—adj. *for adjective*;—adv. *for adverb*;—conj *for conjunction*;—obj. *for objectively, or in a phyſical ſenſe*;—ſubj. *for ſubjectively, or in a mental ſenſe*;—s. f. *for ſubſtantive feminine*;—s. m. *for ſubſtantive maſculine*;—s. n. *for ſubſtantive neuter*;—v. a. r. *for verb active, regular*;—ir. *for irregular*—v. n. *for verb neuter*;—vulg. *for vulgarly, or in low life.*

GERMAN.	ENGLISH.	FEENCH.	LATIN.
Aal, s. m. 2.	eel	anguille.	anguilla.
Aas *, s. n. 5.	carrion, carcaſs	charogne, cadavre	cadaver.
Ab, ſyll of compounds.	down, from, off	de, du, &c.	de
Abänderlich, a. a.	variable, changeable	variable	varians, mutabilis
Abändern, v. a r.	to vary, change, ſhift	varier, changer, corriger	mutare, immutare
Abänderung, s. f. 3.	alteration, variation	alteration, variation	mutatio, immutatio
Abarbeiten, v a. r.	to work or labour for	travailler a compte de ce qu'on a reçu d'avance	aliquid labore compenſare
——— (*ſich*) recipr.	to fatigue, or wear oneſelf out by labour	épuiſer ſes forces par le travail	laboribus frangi
Abarten, v. n. r.	to degenerate	dégénérer forligner	degenerare depravari
Abartung, s. f. 3.	degeneration	dégénération	degeneratio, depravatio
Abbeiſſen, v. a. ir.	to bite off or from	mordre, arracher avec les dents	demordere
Abbeſtellen, v. a r.	to countermand	contremander	renunciare, adimere.
Abbilden, v. a. r.	to faſhion or portray	repréſenter, tirer d'après nature	effingere, exprimere
Abbildung, s. f. 3.	formation, picture	image, portrait.	formatio, effictio

GERMAN.	ENGLISH.	FRENCH.	LATIN.
Abbinden, v. a. ir.	to untie or unloose	délier, détacher	ſolvere, reſolvere.
Abbitte, s. f. (ſing. only)	excuſe, apology,	excuſe, apologie	deprecatio, ignoſcendi poſtulatio.
Abbitten, v. n. ir.	to beg pardon, or to apologize.	demander pardon	deprecari, veniam petere.
Abborgen, v, n. r.	to borrow.	emprunter	mutuari.
Abbrechen, v. a. ir.	to break off	rompre	carpere, decerpere.
——— ——	to pull down	abattre, démolir	diruere, demoliri.
——— v. n. ir.	to ſtop ſhort, in ſpeaking	s'arrêter, pauſer	abrumpere ſermonem.
——— ——	to detract, leſſen.	déduire, rabattre	detrahere (de pretio)
——— (*ſich*) recipr.	to abſtain from.	s'abſtenir de qq. ch.	abſtinere, ſeſe continere.
Abbrennen, v. a. r. & ir.	to burn down, or out	réduire en cendre	urere, comburere.
——— v. n. ———	to conſume by fire	conſumer par le feu	deflagrare, conflagrare flammis.
——— ——	to give over burning	ceſſer de bruler	deſinere ardere.
——— ——	to diſcharge a gun	tirer un canon ou un fuſil	tormentum vi pulveris igniferi mittere.
Abbruch m. 2. (ſing. only)	detraction	rabais	defractum, decerptio.
——— ——	diminution, detriment	diminution, detriment	deminutio, detrimentum
——— ——	loſs, damage	perte, dommage	jactura, damnum.
Abbrüchig, a. a.	derogatory	dérogatoire	derogans.
Abbüſſen, v. a. r.	to expiate, or atone for	expier	luere.
Abdanken, v. a. r.	to ſay thanks or grace	remercier	gratias agere.
——— ——	to diſcharge	congédier	dimittere.
Abdankung, s. f. 3.	diſcharge, diſmiſſal	congé, démiſſion	miſſio, dimiſſio.
——— ——	reſignation, abdication	reſignation, abdication	abdicatio muneris.
Abdecken, v. a r.	to uncover (the roof)	découvrir	detegere (domum).
——— ——	to ſtrip off (the ſkin)	écorcher	pellem detrahere.
Abdecker, s m. 1. vulg. *Schinder*.	the ſkinner	écorcheur	pellium detractor.
	the hangman (in office)	bourreau	carnifex, tortor.
Abdeckung, s. f. 3.	uncovering, denudation	dénuement	detectio, nudatio.
Abdingen. v. n. r.	to deduct in bargaining	défalquer	detrahere pretio.
Abdringen, v. a. ir. *or* vulg *abdrücken* (ſubj.)	to extort	extorquer	exprimere, extorquere.
Abdruck * s. m. 2.	a copy, impreſſion	copie, empreinte	exemplar, impreſſio.
Abdrucken, v. a. r.	to imprint, or to take a copy	imprimer, tirer copie	typis exſcribere.
Abdrücken, v. a. r. (obj.)	to let down the cock of a fire-lock	preſſer, ſéparer à force	premendo avellere, ſolvere.
Abend, s. m. 2.	the evening	ſoir, ſoirée	veſpera.
Abentheuer, s. n. 1. or *Ebenteuer*, —	adventure	aventure	eventura, portentum;
Abentheurer, s. m. 1.	adventurer	aventurier	qui tentat et periclitatur fortunam.
Aber, conj. —	but, yet, however	mais, pourtant, or	aſt, ad, ſed, verò, &c.
Aberglaube, s. m. 3. (ſing. only)	ſuperſtition	ſuperſtition	ſuperſtitio, falſa religio.
Abergläubiſch, or *Abergläubig*. a. a.	ſuperſtitious	ſuperſtitieux	ſuperſtitioſus.
Aberkennen, v. a. r & ir.	to judge, paſs ſentence upon	juger, décréter	abjudicare.
Abermal, or *Abermals*, adv.	once again, anew	encore, de nouveau	iterum, rurſus, denuo.
Abermalig, a a.	repeated	nouveau, autre	iteratus.
Aberwitz, s. m. 2. (ſing. only)	dotage, delirium	folie, délire	amentia, delirium.
Aberwitzig, a. a.	diſtracted, inſane	devenu fou	amens, delirus
——— adv.	diſtractedly, foolifhly	comme un fou	demente; more delirantis.

Date Due

[redacted]			
[redacted]			
[redacted]			

B2798 .W73
Elements of the critical philosophy:
Princeton Theological Seminary–Speer Library
1 1012 00008 0939